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ABSTRACT

This dissertation exam ines the ways that m oneyed Philadelphians
invented corporate pow er in A m erica during the first fo u r decades of the federal
republic, specifically focusing on business corporations, such as canal
com panies and banks, and on a public corporation, Philadelphia’s municipal
government. Through evidence from company and m unicipal records and
publications, the private papers and correspondence o f corporate officers,
newspapers, pam phlets, and legislative acts and proceedings, this study
identifies the people and the technological and financial processes that
contributed to the establishm ent and entrenchment o f corporate econom ic and
political power.
From the 1790s to the 1830s, Philadelphia-area residents demanded
cheaper transportation, a better w ater supply, and m ore adequate credit facilities
and financial institutions. The technical, legal, and m onetary requirements of
corporations that adm inistered these projects served to increase their leverage in
political and econom ic relations with other individuals and groups, allowing the
few who controlled those institutions to exert power o ver space in unprecedented
ways. The men w ho dom inated those corporations justified this increased
influence by successfully casting their own interests as being synonym ous with
those of the public a t large. In addition, by the 181 Os, a small group of
Philadelphians recognized the centrality of transportation and banking to
econom ic growth and coupled them to the corporate form to establish a forum at
once withdrawn from public input yet able to exert pow er in public politics: the
meeting-rooms of corporations run by men with close business and fam ily ties.
Most significantly, this study argues that the creation of such a domain
held serious consequences fo r the legacy of the Am erican Revolution.
Philadelphia corporations provided broader political and econom ic independence
fo r more people than before the Revolution; indeed, these com panies grew
because of the great demand fo r their services and the freedom s they fostered.
However, as corporate associates consolidated their hold over institutions they
gained increasing com m and over w hat direction growth could take and how its
rewards would be distributed. These phenomena contributed greatly to the
transformation of A m erica from a gentry-dominated society in the eighteenth
century to the corporate-dom inated one of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.

vii
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Introduction
In the 1790s, Philadelphians referred to th e ir city as the “Metropolis of
Am erica," and for good reason. A t over 50,000 people and growing, its
population easily surpassed that of any other city in the new nation. No
Am erican city hosted as m any prominent cultural institutions, including the
Am erican Philosophical Society, the Library Com pany, the College of
Pennsylvania, and the Pennsylvania Hospital. Its wharves on the Delaware
River were among the busiest on the Atlantic seaboard, as thickets of tall ships
loaded grain farmed in its lush hinterland and flo u r milled along the eastern
seaboard to trade for sugar from the West Indies and a plethora of goods from
Europe and beyond. Nonetheless, Philadelphians worried about a host of
problems. W ith Britain having been their source o f commercial credit they were
apprehensive about locating the capital necessary to finance economic
development. The rising cost o f fuel also bothered them as they ransacked the
surrounding countryside fo r firewood. They had further concerns about the
continued viability of their competitiveness. Despite the difference in population,
New York had usurped Philadelphia’s position as the primary commercial city in
the nation and Baltimore threatened to displace it to third. Both o f these cities
had more extensive natural inland navigation networks that portended for
continued growth at Philadelphia’s expense. But their most pressing problem
was the water— it was terrible. They did not have enough to drink and
com plained about the poor quality of what little they got. Many blamed the bad
water for the terrible yellow fever plagues that sw ept the city alm ost every year.

2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3

Searching fo r solutions, Philadelphians primarily turned to Britain for
technologies, organizational and legal structures, and financial m ethods not yet
implemented in the U nited States. The city governm ent built the first large
municipal waterworks in America, originally steam-powered and later harnessing
the power of the Schuylkill, a feat previously thought to be im possible. To
com pete with their m etropolitan rivals fo r interior trade, Philadelphians
constructed artificial navigations along the Lehigh and Schuylkill rivers and built
canals to connect o ther waterways. They discovered how to burn anthracite coal
and how to mine and transport it to the city affordably. They founded new
financial institutions— banks and insurance com panies— and experim ented with
novel forms of investm ent. They invented new ways to explain and justify these
new technologies and institutions. To adm inister all these activities,
Philadelphians recast a British legal and adm inistrative structure that provided a
platform for power, the corporation.
This dissertation is an examination o f how Philadelphians used Britishinspired projects and m ethods such as waterw orks, banks, canals, and
insurance companies to confront the city’s challenges from the 1790s to the
early 1830s. I argue th a t Philadelphians, borrowing from British precedent,
constructed these technologies and the institutions that adm inistered them in
such a way as to create and entrench econom ic and political corporate power, to
extend it ever farther throughout the region, and to consolidate it in a handful of
institutions controlled by a dwindling num ber of moneyed men. Indeed, they
forged a new corporate sector of society th a t in some ways stood aloof from
traditional politics and econom ic relations. Although certainly a subject of public
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discussion, corporate consolidation did not take place over the violent objections
of the citizenry nor secretly in closed drawing-room s. Rather, the men who
owned or controlled large projects responded to and m anipulated the demands
of a growing city. Farmers, m anufacturers, and merchants alike in the city and
the region called for better transportation, more extensive public services, and
access to credit, but often balked at paying fo r them in taxes or subscriptions.
Am bitious investors were only too happy to enter into the vacuum , and they
profited from the region’s economic needs in two ways: not only through financial
returns but also by controlling crucial technologies on which great numbers of
people depended. Furthermore, through interlocking directorates, a small group
of men was able to coordinate consolidating efforts across technologies and
institutions. By the early 1830s, public corporations such as the City of
Philadelphia and private ones such as the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany had
obtained legal, political, and econom ic leverage by those m ethods. By doing so,
corporate insiders increasingly reserved fo r themselves control over wide areas
of the econom y previously left to sovereign governments— including money
supply, transportation policy, and credit issues. The age of corporate power
began in early republican Philadelphia. This dissertation explains how and why,
and in so doing addresses one of the great unanswered questions of American
history: the genesis of corporate power in Am erica.
Previous historians who have considered the role of corporations and the
technologies they administered in A m erica during this period have largely done
so from either a legal or an economic standpoint. Economic historians
conducted a cluster of case studies tow ard the end of the 1970s identifying
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regional development and transportation im provem ents as central to city
expansion. Most of these monographs chiefly address the years from 1810 to
1840, previously pinpointed by economic historians as the take-off period fo r the
growth associated with the beginning of Am erica’s industrial revolution.1
Generally these works emphasize geographic and economic approaches to
urban growth, com paring intra-regional econom ic development with inter-regional
trade. While noting the importance of infrastructure in the young nation’s growth,
business historians in particular have discounted the influence of corporations
before the 1830s. Certainly compared to the railroads and industrial giants that
became national in scope during the second half o f the nineteenth century, the
projects in the 1810s or 1820s seem pitifully small in terms of money and
num ber of employees. Economists have mostly explained corporate growth as a
function of greater efficiency— a quantifiable measure— rather than analyzing the
more qualitative characteristics of political or econom ic influence.2
Legal scholars have debated the role of the state in the developm ent of
the corporation and the extent to which the state encouraged or involved itself in

’For case studies of urban growth, see Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development in the Philadelphia
Region. 1810-1845 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), which focused on the development of a
regional trade; Gary Browne’s Baltimore in the Nation. 1789-1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1980), emphasized the development of capital, coupled with immigration and improvements in
transportation; Francis X. Blouin, Jr., in The Boston Region 1810-1850: A Study of Regionalization (Ann
Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1980) described the growth of the Boston region as the result of increased
efficiencies of regional economic and industrial integration; John G. Clark argues in New Orleans: An
Economic History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1970) that this city was the beneficiary of a
huge hinterland, its growth eventually guaranteed by the proliferation of steamboats; Carville Earle provided
a summary of a relevant geographic description of urban growth as a function of hinterland staple crops in
“Why Tobacco Stunted the Growth of Towns and Wheat Built Them into Small Cities,” in Carville Earle,
Geographical Inouirv and American Historical Problems (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).
See George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution (New York: Harper and Row, 1951), Alfred
Chandler, The Visible Hand: the Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge: Belknap Press,
1977), Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the United States. 1790-1860. Thomas C. Cochran,
“The Business Revolution,” American Historical Review79 (Dec. 1974) 1449-66, Diane Lindstrom,
“American Economic Growth before 1840: New Evidence and New Directions" Journal of Economic History
39 (March 1979), 289-301, Carter Goodrich, ed., Canals and American Economic Development (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961).
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econom ic activity, usually considering corporate behavior through the use of
sources such as legislative debates and pronouncem ents o r juridical rulings.
They have not, however, adequately considered the reverse: how corporate
insiders strove to influence o r exploit the political process, a phenom enon best
understood through the analysis o f corporate records.3 Historical econom ic
sociology offers valuable insights by addressing all these issues fo r later periods,
but because it draws on existing legal and economic historiography rather than
prim ary sources for the early national era, it is laden with the assum ptions of
those disciplines: that corporations were small-scale, quasi-public institutions.4
None o f the aforementioned scholars has properly explored the ways the men
w ho ran corporations m anipulated their technologies fo r clearly political and
econom ic considerations, nor th e extent to which owners linked the new
technologies, legal structures, and financial methods.
Although historians of technology have elaborated upon the great debts
th a t Am erican technological developm ent owed to British engineers and
engineering, legal and econom ic historians have seriously underestim ated the
profound influence of British corporate organizational, legal, and financial

3See Guy S. Callender, “The Early Transportation and Banking Enterprises of the States in Relation to the
Growth of Corporations" Quarterly Journal o f Economics 17 (Nov., 1902), 111-162; Oscar Handlin and Mary
F. Handlin, “Origins of the American Business Corporation" Journal of Economic History. 5 (May 1945). 123: Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin. Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the
American Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947); Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and
Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania. 1776-1860 (Cambridge, 1948); James W . Hurst, The Legitimacy of the
Business Corporation in the Law of the United States. 1780-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 1970); Morton J. Horwitz. The Transformation of American Law. 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1977), Ronald E. Seavoy, The Origins of the American Business Corporation. 1784-1855:
Broadening the Concept of Public Service During Industrialization (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), L.
Ray Gunn, The Decline of Authority: Public Economic Policy and Political Development in New York. 18001860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), and Pauline Maier, “The Revolutionary Origins of the
American Corporation,” WMQ, 3d Ser., 50 (1993) 51-84.
4See William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: The Rise of the Large Industrial Corporation in America
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), Robert Alford and Roger Friedland, The Powers of Theory:
Capitalism, the State, and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), and Neil Fligstein,
The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).
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techniques upon A m erican efforts in the sam e areas.5 For the m ost part,
scholars remain strangely mute on the subject. The few who do address British
influence have even gone so far as to label the origins of Am erican business
corporations a “m ystery,” or to argue th a t in the United States, “corporation law
was a homemade product.”6 As will be dem onstrated in the follow ing chapters,
nothing could be fu rth e r from the truth. A m erican corporate boosters m im icked
British predecessors in nearly every conceivable arena, from the w ays that they
presented their goals to the public and th e ir general administrative structure to
particular m oney-raising schemes and identical language in corporate by-laws
and charters.
This study com bines the scholarship of legal history, econom ic history,
and the history of technology to posit insights that no one of those historiographic
traditions alone has made. By examining legal, economic, and technological
developments with th e understanding of th e ir interconnection, this study
illuminates the w ays in which economic behavior and manipulation o f technology
translated into power. Late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Am ericans
would have found foreign the classical liberal distinction between politics and
econom y posited and academically institutionalized in the second half of the
nineteenth century; even the patron saint of liberalism, Adam Smith, understood
such issues to be inextricable. In pam phlets, newspapers, petitions, and

sDarwin Stapleton has written several pieces about Benjamin Henry Latrobe— the designer of the first
Philadelphia waterworks— regarding his role as the primary agent of transfer in both steam technology and
inland navigation technology; the best summary of that work is “Benjamin Henry Latrobe and the Transfer of
Technology,” in Pursell, Carroll, ed., Technology in America: A History of Individuals and Ideas (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1982), 34-44 while his more broad treatment of the subject in general is The Transfer of Early
Industrial Technologies to America (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1987).
bPauline Maier, “The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation,” William & Mary Quarterly, 3d. Ser.
50 (1993), 52; James W . Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United
States. 1780-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1970), 1.
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speeches the first generation of United States citizens used the term “political
economy,” inherited from the Enlightenment, to describe the field of thought that
addressed the social and political consequences o f economic activity and vice
versa.7 Especially during the early republic, before the weight of precedent
pressed so heavily upon legislators to separate the “political” from the
“economic,” A m ericans struggled in word and deed to define the limits of
governmental and non-governmental activity, individual and collective privileges,
and moneyed and m ass influence.
Because o f the unique range of large-scale technologies its residents
pursued from 1790s to the 1830s, Philadelphia provides an excellent site to
examine all of the relevant issues. Philadelphians pioneered river navigations,
canals, a steam -powered waterworks, a water-powered waterworks, banking,
insurance, and various kinds of municipal finance. They administered these
projects through a public corporation, the City o f Philadelphia, and through
private corporations such as the Farmers and M echanics Bank, the
Pennsylvania C om pany for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, and the
Union Canal Com pany. Despite many false starts, Philadelphians discovered
how to use anthracite coal and founded the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany and
the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Com pany to bring it to market. By 1830,
Philadelphia’s corporations had gained control both over major local resources
and over the allocation of capital in the region.

7 Perhaps Drew McCoy has best defined the meaning of “political economy” in the early republic; he
described it as the “characteristically republican idea of a dynamic interdependence among polity,
economy, and society.” Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 6.
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This study em phasizes the extent to which corporate consolidation
involved at least the im plicit and often the explicit cooperation of many disparate
groups.8 Previous studies have focused prim arily upon the men who proposed
and ran corporations, ascribing all agency to them. However, these men were
not acting in a vacuum: th ey were actors in an environm ent in which farmers,
merchants, and m anufacturers continually petitioned the state legislature for
public improvements and greater access to credit. Despite the political pressure
for such technologies and services, most Pennsylvanians were not willing to pay
for them through increased taxes and were wary of governm ent administration of
financial services and large construction projects. Thus, the people who
demanded better transportation, paper money, and access to credit cooperated
with com panies in their efforts to secure charters and other favorable legislation.
At the sam e time, many sm all investors—widows, m iddling tradesmen and
merchants, executors of estates for orphans— were eager for safe ways to invest
that would provide a steady income without requiring the time and expertise to
devote the money to their own business pursuits; corporate stocks and m unicipal
bonds often provided the perfect investment vehicle. These people were willing
to supply the money for corporate projects that others would administer.
Together, the cooperation o f corporate officers, small investors, and the great
num ber of people who dem anded canals, banks, and waterworks made
corporate power possible.

8ln surveying literature on the interaction of various groups with different kinds of technologies, Thomas J.
Misa has pointed out that historians have found agency at every level of interaction from designer to
producer to administrator to user. Each kind of agency is different in that various parts of a technology are
determined by the different groups. See Thomas J. Misa, “Retrieving Sociotechnical Change from
Technological Determinism,” in Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History? The
Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994), 115-141.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10

Nonetheless, because a small com m unity o f insiders worked m ost actively
to establish and ad m inister corporations, those individuals must be near the
center of any analysis o f corporate power in the early republic. In this sense,
then, this study fo llo w s in the footsteps of others th a t examined particular groups
o f “associates” in the late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Atlantic
w orld.9 Just as in those works, “associates” here does not refer to m em bership
in a formal organization, nor to shareholders in one particular venture. Many
w ere long-term partners o f various firms or served together on corporate boards,
but overall they had no single business or line of w ork that united them . They did
not necessarily have fam ily ties, although many w ere related either by birth or by
marriage. Boundaries remained fluid; as individual men became more prom inent
in Philadelphia’s business circles, they could buy large blocks of stock or gain
election to corporate boards and thus earn acceptance into corporate insider
circles. The term s “associates” and “insiders” will be used in this study to
describe a group o f men in a particular time and place who shared many
business dealings, class interests, and a com m on vision of economic
development and th e ir role in that developm ent.10 Because the group had no

9See Robert F. Dalzell, Jr., Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987); Thomas M. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise:
Merchants and Economic Development in Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1986); David Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the
British Atlantic Community. 1735-1785 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Naomi Lamoreaux,
Insider Lending: Banks. Personal Connections, and Economic Development in Industrial New England
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Cathy Matson, Merchants & Empire: Trading in Colonial
New York (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and Anthony F. C. Wallace, Rockdale:
The Growth of an American Village in the Early Industrial Revolution (New York: W.W. Norton & Company,
1978).
10For a particularly explicit definition of “associates,” see Hancock, 11-12. The definition I have given of
associates mostly mirrors Hancock’s. However, my use of the term for research resembles that of Wallace
and Dalzell in one crucial sense, which is that Hancock’s group was circumscribed by the number of
merchants whose lives he examined, a number necessary limited by research requirements including
extant records and a depth not reached in this study; rather, the Philadelphia associates constitute the
entire community of men active in Philadelphia corporations during the first three decades of the nineteenth
century.
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form al membership rites or titles, those men did not explicitly label themselves as
associates. Nonetheless, they could clearly identify others in their network as
men who were active in Philadelphia corporations.
W hile associates and others influenced the developm ent of corporations
in ways small and large, the sum of those contributions cannot be described fully
by the actions of any particular individual or sm all group. The interaction of
m any people and interests on a grand scale also shaped these institutions and
affected their econom ic and political roles. Thus, this study addresses both the
words and actions of the individuals involved and the greater process of
corporate growth that exhibited similar patterns and results across the range of
corporations in the Philadelphia area.

In alm ost every case, corporations gained

w hat historian of technology Thomas P. Hughes has labeled “institutional
m om entum .”11 That is, as technologies are first deployed, many individuals o r
groups can have great influence over their design and implementation; however,
once a technology is established, owners, adm inistrators, and users will often
have an interest in keeping it unchanged as well as discouraging competing
versions of the technology. Beyond the actions of individuals, Philadelphia
corporations did take on institutional m om entum in the 1810s and 1820s as they
matured and gained m ore customers and represented increasingly entrenched
interests.
This work is also guided by the recognition that certain kinds of
technologies and activities were integral to the workings of an entire local or even

11Thomas P. Hughes, “Technological Momentum,” in Merritt Roe, and Marx, Leo, eds. Smith, Does
Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994),
101-115.
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regional economy, such that their designers and administrators could manipulate
them for great pow er.12 Although m any observers of technology have analyzed
systems— most prominently electrical networks, telephone networks, and railroad
systems— they have not adequately conceptualized the ways in which certain
kinds of technologies can be deployed to gain economic leverage.13 Those
scholars considering these issues have sharply disagreed over the possibility
that large technological systems may have inherent political or social
consequences. Observers with a more philosophical bent have tended to
portray some large technologies as necessarily entailing certain centralizing or
authoritarian effects. On the other side of the fence, most historians of
technology have argued that, like any technology, large technological systems
are culturally defined and open to literal and figurative construction by
administrators, designers, builders, users, and legislators. This study bridges the
two views by pointing out that both argum ents apply in part to canals, river
navigations, and waterworks. Like any technology, they could be designed and
12ln this study, “local” will be used to describe one municipality and its immediate surroundings, for example
Philadelphia and its contiguous suburbs, the town of Reading, or the town of Mauch Chunk and its local
mines. “Regional” will be used to describe the geographic area of which Philadelphia was the economic
hub, so including much of the Delaware, Schuylkill, and eventually Lehigh River valleys.
13For a discussion of the use of railroad routing and financing to establish economic power, see John
Lauritz Larson, Bonds of Enterprise: John Murray Forbes and Western Development in America's Railway
Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); David E. Nye does the same for electricity in Electrifying
America: Social Meanings of a New Technology (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990); also see Thomas P.
Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society. 1880-1930 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1983). For a summary of the historiographic debates on technological determinism,
especially in terms of large technologies, see Merritt Roe Smith, “Technological Determinism in American
Culture,” in Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds. Does Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of
Technological Determinism (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994), 2-35.
Lewis Mumford, in “Authoritarian and Democratic Technics,” Technology and Culture 5 (Winter 1964), 1-8,
postulated that large technological systems engendered themselves to centralized control, and thus
contributed to the consolidation of bureaucratic power.
Thomas Hughes, in Networks of Power Electrification in Western Society. 1880-1930 (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), argued just the opposite: that national engineering cultures and
local economic and political decisions determined the deployment and administration of large technological
systems. For insightful discussions on the political nature of technology, see Langdon Winner, The Whale
and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago: The University of Chicago
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administered in a nearly infinite number of w ays. Nonetheless, m ore so than
m ost technologies, so m e large technological system s cost great sum s to build
and became central to a city’s or region’s econom ic life, m aking them particularly
attractive targets fo r am bitious men with access to capital who saw opportunities
fo r profit and for gaining a large say in the direction of econom ic grow th.14
Banks and insurance companies were the financial equivalents to such
large technologies in th e early republic.15 T he Philadelphia w aterw orks gathered
a precious resource to be distributed at a controlled flow through predeterm ined
conduits from a reservoir to particular places, all the while decreasing the
responsibility and burden to individuals of gathering their own water. Banks and
insurance companies essentially performed the same centralization and
distribution functions, again relieving individuals o f certain encum brances and
liabilities. Rather than water, the latter institutions each gathered and spread
more abstract yet equally crucial commodities: banks did so w ith capital and
insurance companies did so with risk, though their functions often overlapped.
Those who adm inistered the companies overseeing such operations— often the
sam e men or in league with those who ran river navigations, turnpikes, and

Press, 1986), 19-58 and Jacques Ellul, The Technological System. Joachim Neugroshel, trans. (New York:
Continuum, 1980).
’“Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitling argued that “which technological possibilities are in fact realized
depend crucially on the distribution of power and wealth in society: those who control the disposition of
resources and the returns from investments choose from among the available applications of technology
the one most favorable to their interests as they define them.” Charles Zable and Jonathan Zeitling,
“Historical Alternatives to Mass Production: Politics, Markets, and Technology in Nineteenth-Century
Industrialization,” Past and Present (August 1985), 161. Historians of technology have attacked this general
assertion for many technologies, especially those at the “consumption junction”: mass consumer
technologies. However, Sabel’s and Zeitlin’s contention remains particularly apt for technologies requiring
vast resources.
,sThe question of whether a bank or an insurance company itself is a technology is open to debate. While
many historians have limited their definition of technology to artifacts— machines, roads, circuits, cloth,
tools, and so forth— others have widened the definition. For instance, an alphabet does not necessarily
have a physical component, nor does calculus; however, each are humanly constructed tools representing
some facet of the physical world. Other tools are trickier; for example, paper money is clearly a technology
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canals— could and did use them to extend the ir influence over the direction and
distribution of Philadelphia’s econom ic growth.
The chapters to follow will address th e ways that corporate insiders, in
cooperation and conflict with legislators, investors, and the general public,
shaped these technologies and institutions. C hapter Two begins with an
analysis of the transatlantic financial and m ercantile community. Although postRevolutionary Philadelphia remained peripheral to the British m etropole, the city
became more integrated with Britain institutions following the Revolution than it
had before the start of the conflict. Philadelphia’s commercial leaders looked to
the mother country for the econom ic and technological tools that would bring
stability to their businesses and to the greater economy. They turned to new
solutions, ones th a t had profound consequences fo r the projection o f power
across space. This chapter also outlines the consolidating and diffusing
characteristics of corporations that led to changes not only in the econom y but
also in the construction of pow er in the early republic.
The following three chapters investigate in closer detail the phenom ena
identified in C hapter Two. Chapter Three addresses the new technologies
Philadelphians adopted, specifically the Philadelphia waterworks, the Schuylkill
and Lehigh navigations, and, to a lesser extent, various canals in the
Philadelphia region. The designers and owners o f these technologies planned
and built such technologies in ways th a t ensured centralized control over their
administration. Once these projects had been constructed, their adm inistrators
manipulated the dependence of others upon the technology to enlist their help in
according to the widely accepted definition, but a bank may not be. For the purposes of this study, banks
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securing legislation that gave the organizations that ran them advantages over
other actors in the economy. For example, the city gained power over issues of
rate collection for water delivery in Philadelphia’s suburbs, and internal
navigation companies acquired advantages in suits concerning property damage.
These new technologies proved more effective than previous ones for the men
who wanted to extend power over more people and greater space.
C hapter Four exam ines the role that the exploitation of finance played in
Philadelphia’s expansion, concentrating on banks, insurance companies, and the
m ethods they and the controllers of physical-technology projects used to raise
money.

In Pennsylvania, the widespread desire for credit and for better

transportation facilities, in com bination with the resistance to taxation, played into
the hands of those who had the m oney to invest in such activities. In addition,
the administrators of the technology exploited the desire of most investors to
avoid active participation in the venture. Corporate insiders were thus able to
gather vast amounts of capital over which the public and eventually even m ost
investors would have little control.
Just as physical technology and financial institutions were powerful
consolidating tools, so too was the use of ideology to legitimate, justify, extend,
and protect the gains of adm inistrators and large investors. Chapter Five will
exam ine how those who ran corporations manipulated terms and ideas
concerning concepts of private interest, public service, and city, state, and
patriotism in their efforts to prom ote and defend their projects and institutions.
By cham pioning the interests o f those who would benefit from their projects,

and insurance companies will not be defined as technologies.
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corporate insiders w ere ab le to associate their own interest w ith the public
interest.
Although each o f th e institutions under study w as owned and
administered separately, corporate insiders ran them in sim ilar ways and to
defend similar interests. Corporate boosters did th e ir be st to gain as much
independence as po ssib le from state authorities in term s of th e ir own
administration while keeping lines of communication open with the statehouse to
gain legislative favors. C h a p te r Six details the effort to keep public officials out
o f the boardroom and to resist governmental regulation, giving special attention
to the composition of corpo ra te boards of directors, the extent to which corporate
boards interlocked and th e w ay they worked in concert. Such activities
necessitated coordination am ong and between corporations; Chapter Six also
investigates how the co rpo rate com munity coordinated its de facto control of
state money policy and directed Philadelphia’s econom ic growth.
As Chapter S even shows, companies used technology, ideology, and
finance together to c re a te a corporate sphere. This developm ents held profound
consequences for the ordering of American society in the half-century after the
Revolution. C orporations brought Philadelphians greater access to credit,
efficiency of transportation, availability of water, circulation o f cash, and supply of
coal, and in doing so helped bring about the end of the old, patron-client
econom ic order. They allow ed the diffusion of econom ic— and thus political—
independence for the m any. At the same time, corporate insiders gained and
retained control over th e s e processes. Chapter Seven will also place
Philadelphia’s changes in the context of Jacksonian Am erica, showing how an
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acknow ledgm ent o f the early nineteenth-century creation of a new, corporate
sphere allows the synthesis of th e two seem ingly antithetical interpretations of
changes in the distribution of political and econom ic power in the early republic.
By the 1830s, Philadelphians could no longer call their city the “Metropolis
o f Am erica” ; clearly, New York had taken that honor, never to relinquish it.
Philadelphia was poised to move in another direction, toward its nineteenthcentury self-designation as the “w orkshop of Am erica.” It was in a position to be
a center of heavy industry, especially the m anufacture of steam engines, through
a heritage o f steam engine use fostered by the first waterworks and access to
cheap anthracite coal. Building from their experience with canals, Philadelphians
would help found and run the Pennsylvania Railroad, the largest and most
powerful corporation in Am erica fo r m ost of the nineteenth century.
Philadelphia’s Fairmount waterworks would becom e a model fo r m unicipal
waterw orks across the country, as would the city's administration and finance of
such projects. The big city corporation and the big business corporation had
th e ir origins in early nineteenth-century Philadelphia. The following chapters will
explain how and why.
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British Precedents, Am erican Conditions, and Philadelphian Consequences

In the decades follow ing the Revolution, the United States attempted to
achieve economic independence from Britain. Part o f th a t effort involved the
creation of the physical, financial, and institutional structures denied them under
British rule. Philadelphia led the way in many of those areas by developing the
new mechanisms necessary fo r independent econom ic growth. Ironically, the
men most responsible fo r establishing this infrastructure borrowed heavily from
British precedent.
As Philadelphia recovered from the British occupation, it quickly reclaimed
its place as the largest and m ost culturally sophisticated city on North Am erica’s
Atlantic seaboard. In the mid-1780s, about 40,000 people lived in Philadelphia
or its suburbs, still ahead of close rival New York City. Although in 1682 W illiam
Penn had planned the city to span a one-mile wide, two-m ile long stretch of land
between the Delaware and Schuylkill Rivers, a century later it remained mostly
hunched along the w estern bank of the Delaware. The Delaware not only was
deeper and less likely to freeze than the Schuylkill, but also was navigable fo r
many miles above th e growing commercial capital, well into New York State. By
the 1780s, city habitations reached less than a mile inland, a densely settled six
or seven blocks beyond the busy wharves. Nonetheless, residents boasted
about Philadelphia’s rational plan, its copious markets, and its broad, paved
avenues with their brick sidewalks and gutters.
The city’s wide streets and grand buildings drew compliments from m any
travelers, too, as did its lively cultural and social scene. “ Philadelphia may be
considered the m etropolis of the United States,” observed an impressed French
18
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traveler, J.P. Brlssot de W arville, in 1788, long enough after the Revolution for
the repainting of facades, the replacem ent of windows, and the m ending of
streets to have taken place. “It certainly is the finest town, and the best built; it is
the m ost wealthy, though not the m ost luxurious. You find here more men of
information, more political and literary knowledge, and more learned societies.”1
He was referring to well-grounded institutions including the American
Philosophical Society, founded there in 1743, the Pennsylvania Hospital, opened
in 1752, the College of Philadelphia, chartered in 1755, and the Library
Com pany of Philadelphia— A m erica’s first lending library— organized in 1731.
Philadelphia’s cultural wealth reflected its commercial wealth, m anifested in the
grand, three-story brick mansions built by the city’s richest men. Com merce was
the lifeblood of all waterfront cities in the Atlantic world in the eighteenth century,
and the Q uaker City was no exception.
Philadelphia merchants tried their best to amass fortunes amid the
instability and uncertainty of the Atlantic economy. In order to gain som e
modicum, or perhaps some illusion, of control over their businesses, Philadelphia
merchants tended to specialize in one of two particular modes of commerce, the
provisioning trade or the dry goods trade.2 Provisions consisted of all the goods
exported from Philadelphia. Drawing from hundreds of square miles of
hinterland in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, Philadelphia
provisioning merchants annually shipped hundreds of thousands of barrels of

1J.P. Brissot de Warville, New Travels in the United States of America. Performed in the Year 1788 (Dublin:
W . Corbet, 1792).
2See Thomas M. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants and Economic Development in
Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early
American History and Culture, 1986) for a complete analysis of Philadelphia merchants and their business
methods during this period.
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flour. By the end of the colonial period, they began searching ever farther for
supply, acting as an entrepot to export grain farm ed a s fa r afield as upstate New
York and much of the C hesapeake Bay region. Southern Europe increasingly
became the destination o f choice, as prices there rose because of poor harvests
and continental conflicts.3 Philadelphians continued to send great quantities of
flour, beef, and wood to the W est Indies, the first two to feed Caribbean slaves
and the last for the barrels in which to store and ship th e products the slaves
made, sugar and molasses. Philadelphia merchants also transported large
quantities of flax to Ireland fo r its linen m anufactories and a variety of other
goods to other selected destinations. These businessm en bought locally and
sold globally. W herever th e y did business, their long-term success depended
upon the cultivation of reliable contacts in distant ports as well as a considerable
am ount of luck on the high seas.
Dry goods m erchants did exactly the opposite, im porting mostly finished
goods to be distributed in the Delaware Valley and beyond. Isaac Weld, an
Englishman who visited in 1795, wrote that Philadelphia “has evidently been
raised to [its] state of pre-em inence by her extensive inland commerce.”4 The
dry goods business consisted of receiving m anufactured wares on credit from
Britain, then selling them b y offering credit either at the m erchants’ own stores in
town, to sm aller local m erchants in the interior, or to shallopm asters and
team sters who would carry the goods many miles afield. Thus, while dry goods
m erchants traded directly within a radius of perhaps a hundred miles, W eld
3See John McCusker and Russell Menard, The Economy of British America. 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1987).
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pointed out that Philadelphia was the center of a vast distribution network.
G oods sent from Philadelphia traveled to Harrisburg in central Pennsylvania and
from there up both branches o f the Susquehanna, and “by land carriage
Philadelphia also trades with the western parts o f Pennsylvania, as far as
Pittsburgh itself, w hich is on the Ohio, with the back o f Virginia, and, strange to
tell, with Kentucky, seven hundred miles distant.”5 Philadelphia merchants
connected the m iddle states to the Atlantic world. Although the dangers of
Atlantic shipping affected provisioners more than dry goods merchants, the latter
had their own problem s. Should th eir ultimate custom ers not be able to pay bills
because of bad harvests or lack of hard money, a dry goods business could
collapse under the w eight of unpaid bills to London creditors.
By the 1770s and 1780s, the dry goods and provisioning businesses had
becom e so com plex— and so profitable— that they each became split and
spawned another m ercantile layer between producer and customer. This new
group of middlemen concentrated either on inland distribution of the
merchandise that dry goods merchants imported or on engrossing large enough
cargoes of grain or lum ber fo r the provisioners to fill ships’ bottoms. They
cultivated contacts inland, established local credit networks, and worked out the
details of intra-regional transportation. Levi Hollingsworth, for instance, built a
fortune in the late eighteenth century as a flour merchant, buying from millers in
the Delaware River valley and selling to provisioners fo r overseas shipment.
Such specialization allowed dry goods and provisioning merchants to

4lsaac Weld, Travels Through the United States and the Provinces of Upper and Lower Canada. During the
Years 1795.1796. and 1797 (London: John Stockdale, 1799), 34.
slbid., 34.
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concentrate on the details o f Atlantic shipping while the m iddlem en labored over
the vagaries of inland com m erce. Still, those middlemen depended upon good
grain prices to make a living, and Atlantic grain prices spiked and plummeted in
unfathomable patterns.
Regardless of the specialization of individual Philadelphia merchants, they
all operated in an extremely uncertain business environm ent. The increased
concentration on smaller niches of commercial activity m ade Philadelphia
merchants even more acutely aware of the greater need fo r better inland
transportation networks, better credit facilities, and easier access to cash. Those
common concerns far outweighed any sense of internal com petition between
firms, leading to a spirit of cohesion that often crossed political, ethnic, and
religious lines. Eighteenth-century Atlantic-world com m erce entailed high risks
and high rewards that led m erchants in the same city to pool resources rather
than fight over them.

Despite the thousands of vessels criss-crossing the

Atlantic on a regular basis, captains had not found ways to elim inate the dangers
o f wind and storm or to avoid the predations of privateers and hostile navies in
wartime. Merchants shared cargoes and insured each other’s ships and
merchandise in order to reduce their exposure on any one voyage while retaining
their potential for large net profits. Quite literally, several m erchants’ fortunes
would ride in the same boat. The uncertainty did not end when a ship reached
port, for prices changed quickly, often going from good to bad in the time of a
single voyage. Merchants needed to know the quality and quantity of agricultural
and manufacturing production at home and abroad, the latest international
political conditions, the variations in exchange rates, and the fluctuating value of
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the financial instrum ents they used to conduct their business. Because market
information traveled at the sam e rate as cargo, local conditions and prices in
distant ports— and thus the profitability o f a given voyage— shifted faster than
merchants could adapt, putting a prem ium on gathering as much data as
possible, data th a t affected all m erchants because it affected local commodity
prices, too. Again, the benefits o f sharing far outweighed any slight advantage to
be gained from sim ply knowing m ore overall than an other m erchant down the
block, for the o th e r man might possess that essential m ore recent or reliable
tidbit. The pooling of all available inform ation proved especially crucial given that
choosing the right destination and the proper mix of cargo could m ean the
difference between big profits and selling entire shiploads at a loss. Just as
merchants spent long hours poring over their own account books, they spent
much time exchanging inform ation and making deals in Philadelphia
coffeehouses.6 Their general w illingness to cooperate would be a hallm ark of
their corporate activity in the com ing decades.
In addition to sharing a spirit of community, Philadelphia merchants nearly
universally agreed on the necessity of establishing m ore stable econom ic
exchange. To be successful in any mercantile business required possessing a
healthy preoccupation with questions of credit and m oney supply, two separate
but related issues. In the eighteenth-century Atlantic world, silver and gold, or
specie, formed the universally accepted media of exchange but had the liabilities
of being bulky and risky to send in large quantities. Even if specie had been

6See Richard D. Brown, Knowledge is Power: The Diffusion of Information in Early America. 1700-1865
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 110-121 for the ways that merchants received and exchanged
information.
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m ore physically practical fo r long-distance com merce, merchants still would have
needed other ways to convey money. Also, the specie supply could not keep up
with the increases in population and productivity, th a t is, the increased need fo r
circulating currency. S pecie w as so hard to come by that a m erchant who could
m erely get his hands on som e to import it to Philadelphia could make a fortune.7
Com pounding matters fo r Philadelphia merchants, the colonies and later the
United States always im ported a higher value of goods than they exported,
consistently draining w hatever specie made its w ay there back out of the country
quickly. Instead, m erchants, tradesmen, and farm ers alike found ingenious ways
to cope with the literal and figurative shortcomings o f specie.

For long-distance

com m erce, they used instrum ents called bills of exchange. These were
essentially checks w ritten on accounts with British-based commercial houses.
To pay fo r goods in Charleston, fo r example, a Philadelphia m erchant could write
a bill of exchange prom ising th a t his British agent would pay a certain am ount
upon demand. Both th e Philadelphia merchant and the London house would be
liable fo r the bill. The receiving Charleston m erchant could then either send the
bill to London for paym ent o r sign it and use it to pay som eone else, in which
case the Charleston m erchant could also be held responsible for payment. In
each m ajor Atlantic port, m erchants traded bills of exchange, making them both
a convenient form of specialized payment as well as a kind of currency. This
system generally served Atlantic commerce well, but the lack of a strong local
institution able to issue notes accepted locally or in distant ports still plagued
Philadelphia merchants
7Ralph Hidy, The House of Baring in American Trade and Finance: English Merchant Bankers at Work.
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Furthermore, the brisk generation of and trade in bills o f exchange could
not operate as a viable m oney supply for the small, everyday transactions of
most people. Bills of exchange were cumbersome, difficult to understand, and
usually involved large sums. Parliament had never chartered any banks in the
colonies, so colonial governm ents had tried all sorts o f alternate methods to
increase local credit and m oney supply. These efforts, usually either fiat money
o r land banks, met with mixed success.8 Fiat m oney referred to paper currency
issued by a governm ent to be used as legal tender; unlike notes generally issued
by eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century banks, fia t money could not be
redeemed for specie by the issuing agency. Rather, the institution that printed
the bills arbitrarily declared w hat each note would be valued, thus “fiat.” Fiat
money had the potential to depreciate quickly, depending upon the confidence of
the general population in the solvency of the governm ent. The other popular
solution to inadequate levels of cash was the land bank. Land banks were
agencies run by colonial governments that printed m oney to be loaned in
exchange fo r interest on the principal and a lien on the debtor’s property. Their
notes tended to be more solid than fiat currency as long as confidence held that
the colonial officials would enforce the seizure of mortgaged property should the
bank’s debtors default. For better or worse, colonial legislatures did not always
have the discipline to resist passing laws that relaxed debt collection, resulting in
decreased public confidence in the value of land bank notes. As successors to

1763-1861 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 20
“See Richard Sylla, “Monetary Innovation in America” Journal of Economic History 42 (March 1982), 21-30,
especially 23-26.
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the colonial governm ents, state legislatures searched fo r more successful ways
to create stable currencies and establish an a dequate money supply.
To com pensate fo r the paucity of cash, A m ericans generally operated in a
book-credit econom y th a t had serious liabilities. M ost farmers and tradesm en
kept two sets of books, a daybook and a ledger. W hen buying or selling goods,
they entered the transactions in chronological o rd e r in the daybook— w hat goods
were exchanged and th e ir market price— w ith o u t exchanging cash. They also
entered each transaction in a ledger that had a separate page for every
customer. W hen th e custom er finally had th e cash to pay, the tradesm an could
sim ply go to that person’s page in the ledger to fin d how much the custom er
owed. The web of cre dit could get quite com plicated: often, customers paid
debits by crediting w h a t the tradesman owed ye t another person. The
universality of these practices was reinforced by laws that made entries in
daybooks and ledgers legally binding, and th e heavy dockets of local courts
testified to the difficulties in collecting book debts. W ithout the ability to extend
o r receive credit, farm ers and tradesmen had tro ub le keeping afloat, and as the
basis of the Am erican economy they had the potential to take most m erchants
down with them in a whirlpool of insolvency.
Credit proved to be an especially volatile issue because it was the key to
pow er in the transatlantic economy of the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. The ability to get credit offered th e chance either to expand business
or to ride out econom ic storms. Everybody w anted credit, from farmers,
craftsmen, and sm all merchants, to m anufacturers and big city merchants, and in
the early republic, th e re was not enough to go around. Thus, the ability to
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extend credit, sometimes by direct loans and more com m only by selling goods
fo r future payment, gave anyone with the wherewithal to use it wisely great
leverage in business dealings.

By selling merchandise on credit or by extending

credit on speculation of sales, m erchants cultivated dependencies among their
clients. Samuel Gist, an Am erican-born, London-based tobacco merchant
engaged in a typical use of the leverage of credit in 1767 when he insisted that
his Am erican debtors “consign th e ir tobacco to him... o r pay their balances at
once or face a suit fo r debt.”9 Philadelphia merchants did the same with their
clients in the Delaware and Schuylkill valleys. Links of credit formed the chain o f
dependency and power in the eighteenth-century Atlantic world.
Credit also formed the cornerstone of the relations between what John
Trenchard and Thom as Gordon, British pamphleteers popular in the colonies,
called those between “Patron and Client,” the most typical mode of economic
and political pow er in Am erica.10 Usually the patrons, either planters or
merchants, created influence based upon their ability to m ake loans to farmers
and tradesm en and to provide a conduit through which these clients could
m arket their surplus goods. Patrons provided legal advice, political
representation, and cultural leadership; in short, they controlled the terms of
activity between their clients, w hose orientation remained parochial, and the
outside world. They also perform ed the task of local arbiter either in an official
capacity, such as alderman o r justice o f the peace, or inform ally by settling local
argum ents and claims. At the sam e time, the power o f patrons was limited by
9Charles Royster, Fabulous History of the Dismal Swamp Company: A Story of George Washington’s
Times (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999), 137.
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the amount o f capital and effort they were able to use— often a t a financial loss—
to cultivate such relationships. For merchants and planters, extending power
cost money. Furtherm ore, the fragility of mercantile partnerships and the risk
inherent in eighteenth-century commerce mitigated against the establishment of
family dynasties, m aking the economic basis of patron-client pow er frustratingiy
impermanent. Also, life in trade did not provide for a stable living: markets rose
and fell, and wars could disrupt trade for years. Furthermore, w hile a merchant
could train his sons to take over the business, he could have great difficulty
providing for daughters and widows as well as sons who had a different aptitude
or disposition. M eanwhile, patron-client relationships required constant
reinforcement through face-to-face encounters in churches, on court days, at
militia musters, during election campaigns, and any num ber of other public
occasions in addition to more private individual business and legal transactions
with clients. This personal touch made patron-client power difficult to project
over space or to a great num ber of people.11 Like the technologies it supported,
patron-client power would have difficulty sustaining itself in the expansion of the
early republic.
Just as Philadelphia merchants still took their fashion, reading, and social
cues from Britain, th e y did so in mercantile matters. Scholar David Hancock has
noted how the m ost successful London merchants diversified th e ir portfolios

10Quoted from Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books,
1992), 57.
11See for example Wood, 57-77; Alan Taylor, William Cooper's Town: Power and Persuasion on the
Frontier of the Early American Republic (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 229-255. For the most insightful
discussions of patron-client relationships in their purest form, see Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of
Virginia. 1740-1790 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American
History and Culture, 1982), and Charles Sydnor, American Revolutionaries in the Making: Political Practices
in Washington's Virginia (originally Gentlemen Freeholders) (New York: The Free Press, 1952).
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once they had m ade their fortune in Atlantic commerce. Although a fe w
continued som e o f the commercial activities, all bought sugar plantations, British
estates, or both. These new investments held distinct advantages o v e r the
merchant business. First, they tended to be extremely stable in that they
produced roughly the same income year after year. This was in m arked contrast
to the high stakes world of Atlantic com m erce with its cycles of price fluctuations,
its uncertainties o f w ar and weather, its long periods of waiting punctuated by
bursts of activity when ships loaded or landed, and its nearly annual potential to
bring ruins or riches. Second, plantations and estates virtually ran themselves:
owners hired supervisors to adm inister them . The merchants could then devote
more of their own tim e to other endeavors such as philanthropy and art
collecting. Best yet, the combination of stability and ease of m anagem ent
allowed these men to provide long-term financial security fo r their fa m ilie s .12
Rather than spending all their days in counting houses and coffee houses, their
children could devote their careers to more prestigious cultural and political
pursuits. Those London merchants provided a powerful example. If
Philadelphia m erchants could find stable, easily managed investm ents close to
home, they too could retire and ensure th eir families' continued prom inence.
In addition to the more personal challenge of building dynasties, the
founding and growth of the new nation entailed novel sets of problem s for the
Philadelphia m erchant community. From the 1790s to the 1830s, Philadelphians
faced a new series of challenges that established technologies and th e old
systems of paying for and organizing them could not resolve.

The chronic

12David Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic
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shortage of money fo r the growing econom y rem ained a source of com plaint
throughout the period. Like specie, flexible credit could be difficult to acquire.
G rander Philadelphia m erchants worked together to pool their capital in
partnerships, and often traded on credit from their British counterparts, and
sm aller merchants, tradesm en, and m anufacturers, in turn, had to rely on the
rich merchants for credit, thus forging the chain o f credit dependence that gave
econom ic force to patron-client relations.

However, a fte r the Revolution, with an

econom y growing in both relative and absolute term s, cash and credit were short
fo r merchants and th e ir clients. A tradesm an was certainly not alone when he
grum bled in the new spaper that “the m echanic labors under the... difficulty of the
impracticability of obtaining money to carry on his business.”13 In a new nation
with seemingly lim itless possibilities, Philadelphians w ould turn to a tried-andtrue device, the corporation, to solve their credit and m oney supply problems.
As they did in so m any other arenas, Am ericans decided to try a British
solution: banks. Philadelphians founded the nation’s first bank, the Bank of
North America, controlled the first and second Banks o f the United States, and
established seven o th e r banks in the area. As one proponent explained, these
new financial institutions “provide[d] a means for putting industry and capital into
activity, which would have otherwise remained wholly unproductive and wholly
useless— this is done by the operation o f credit.”14 Not only did the banks loan
money, but also they issued currency, thereby alleviating both the cash and the

Community. 1735-1785 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
Freeman’s Journal, December 13, 1786, as quoted from Russell F. Weigley, ed., Philadelphia: A 300Year History (New York: W .W . Norton & Company, 1982).
William Duane, Observations on the Principles and Operation of Banking: with Strictures on the
Opposition to the Bank of Philadelphia (Philadelphia. 1804), 10.
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credit crunch. Still, they could never seem to supply enough m oney to meet the
ever-growing demand.
Philadelphians also faced the typical early nineteenth-century urban
challenge of gaining access to a hinterland exploding in population and
productivity. Eighteenth-century colonists had m ostly stayed within fifty miles of
the ocean, or at least within a day’s ride of the fall lines of m ajor rivers, partly for
safety but also because prevailing transportation technologies could not support
extensive m arket activities. Beyond that range, poor road quality and the
bulkiness o f m ost agricultural products rendered the cost of transportation to
market prohibitive and made potentially productive farm land not worth settling. If
getting a farm er’s grain to Philadelphia cost more than the sale price, growing a
surplus— or, fo r that matter, planting anything in the first place— would not
provide the income to pay taxes and to buy necessary finished goods. Exactly
that kind o f reasoning led many western Pennsylvania farm ers to distill grain into
whiskey to reduce the volume and weight of their product to make transport to
market econom ically feasible. Land travel, as opposed to w ater transport,
remained highly expensive fo r bulky goods: the cost o f shipping grain all the way
across the Atlantic was lower than sending it 30 miles overland by wagon— and
that was on a good road. Finished goods bore the high cost of transport from
Philadelphia inland, but grain produced as close as 100 miles west of the Quaker
City was shipped down the M onongahela or the Ohio to the Mississippi and all
the way to New Orleans. Turnpikes, especially the Lancaster Philadelphia
Turnpike, did low er transportation costs greatly, but few were well built or well
maintained, and teamster costs remained high. M erely constructing more and
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longer roads would not sufficiently reduce the price o f sending produce from
Pennsylvania’s rich farm s to Philadelphia. Both farm ers and city m erchants
started to demand new technologies that, in the w ords of canal booster Charles
Paleske, would “secure the grand objects of conveying the products o f the
interior country to the metropolis, and returning with the imports or m anufactures
of the latter.”15
The W ar of 1812 greatly exacerbated a nother of Philadelphia’s problem s:
an insatiable hunger for cheap energy.16 Like m ost urban and even m any rural
Americans, by the turn of the nineteenth century Philadelphians cast fa r and
wide for power sources. The Delaware and the Schuylkill rivers both seem ed too
broad and too powerful to be dammed, so the City of Philadelphia had evaded
the dearth of harnessable waterpower near the highly populated parts of town by
using coal- and charcoal-fired steam engines in the design for the Philadelphia
waterworks. It was an expensive example that som e industrial concerns,
especially ironworks, soon followed, but steam engines were still too costly or
impractical for other purposes. Furthermore, the cost of fuel for work, for
heating, and for cooking skyrocketed during the W a r of 1812. Philadelphians
had long supplemented their supply of firewood and charcoal that had been
floated down the Schuylkill or Delaware with bitum inous or “soft” coal shipped
from Britain and Virginia because its use as ballast kept it affordable. However,

15Charles G. Paleske, Observations on the Application for a Law to Incorporate “The Union Canal
Company" Respectfully Submitted to the Members of Both Houses of the Legislature of Pennsylvania
(Philadelphia: Duane, 1808), 7.
sFor a general discussion of America’s energy needs during this period, see David E. Nye, Consuming
Power: A Social History of American Enemies (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998); for Philadelphia’s
particular need for fuel in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, see H. Benjamin Powell,
Philadelphia's First Fuel Crisis: Jacob Cist and the Developing Market for Pennsylvania Anthracite
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978).
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with the British blockading the coast, coal from either the old country o r the Old
Dominion becam e unavailable. Although the cost of fuel dropped w hen the w ar
ended, the dem and fo r energy grew fa s te r than the population. As one city
resident observed, “the rapid disappearance o f wood from all the stream s
connected with Philadelphia” continued apace, resulting in ever-rising fuel
prices.17 Philadelphians continued to ca st about fo r new, cheaper form s of
physical power.
Philadelphians considered all o f these challenges during a period o f
increasing econom ic transformation, th e 1790s to the 1830s. Transportation
improvements on the local, regional, and sectional scale helped accelerate
growth. Changes within the region, m uch more than links with other dom estic
markets o r international trade, drove this grand econom ic expansion.18 W ith the
notable exception of the trade em bargo in 1807 and 1808, high profits from
shipping during the Napoleonic W ars and the subsequent British flooding of
American m arkets with a backlog of cheap finished goods forestalled large-scale
domestic investm ent in manufacturing and internal transportation. Nonetheless,
beginning in the 1810s, the economic landscape of Philadelphia and its
surrounding hinterlands— western and southern New Jersey, eastern
Pennsylvania, and m ost o f Delaware— began to change considerably. Towns
sprouted on the Schuylkill and the Lehigh Rivers when the mining o f anthracite
began in earnest. The use of the new coal laid the foundation for the
development of the United States’ prem ier center of heavy industry, the

17[SamueI Mifflin], Observations on the Importance of Improving the Navigation of the River Schuylkill, for
the Purpose of Connecting it with the Susquehanna, and Through that River Extending Our Communication
to the Genesee Lakes and the Ohio (Philadelphia?!. 1818), 3.
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manufacture o f high-pressure stationary steam engines, in the Philadelphia area
during the second quarter of the nineteenth century.19 C lose r to the city,
Manayunk and Spring G ardens became manufacturing centers whose
production rivaled their m ore fam ous cousins such as Lowell, Lynn, and
Paterson. M eanwhile, farm ers in the surrounding countryside began to
specialize in particular crops fo r sale to the growing population of the city,
deviating from th e ir past practices of sending surpluses o f general farm produce
to more local m arkets. Philadelphia slowly shifted from an em phasis on foreign
commerce to m anufacturing products that it could sell in exchange for its
hinterlands’ growing bounty, and so began to look as m uch inland as it had
toward the A tlantic in the previous century. Exploiting the increasing productivity
of the countryside looked like the way to prosperity in the early nineteenth
century, and Philadelphians desperately wanted their share of the loot.
This process o f regional integration was but one play in the larger theater
of what historians increasingly have identified as the central defining process of
the United States during this period, the market revolution. Both producers and
consumers began to concentrate more intensely upon products fo r sale in the
nearest m etropolis and to use the new income to buy even more factory-made
goods.20 Internal im provem ents were the way to prosperity by more tightly linking

18See Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development in the Philadelphia Region. 1810-1850 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1978).
19See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. “Anthracite Coal and the Beginnings of the Industrial Revolution in the United
States,” Business History Review46 (Summer, 1972), 141-181.
Z0Forthe most sophisticated quantitative analysis of intensified market behavior, see Winifred Barr
Rothenberg, From Market-Places to a Market Economy: The Transformation of Rural Massachusetts. 17501850 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Richard L. Brooke’s The Heart of the Commonwealth:
Society and Political Culture in Worcester County. Massachusetts. 1713-1861 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1989) provides a more qualitative assessment, and Christopher Clark’s The Roots of
Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts. 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), falls
somewhere in between. For historiographic treatments of the market revolution, see Michael Merrill,

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

35

hinterland and m etropolitan production. A group of farm ers in Bucks County, for
instance, were “fully convinced of their utillity by so greatly facillitating the
conveyance o f the produce o f their Farms to Market, and being desirous that a
participation of those Benefits, may be further extended.”21 Credit, too, helped to
bring producers and consum ers together. One set of petitioners pointed to “the
loaning of money upon reasonable terms... the object and operations of which
are calculated to advance the interests of agriculture, m anufactures, and the
mechanical arts to produce benefits to trade and industry in general."22 In a time
when the great optimism fo r general im provem ent was m atched only by the fear
of being left behind, Philadelphians nearly fell over themselves in their rush to
accept improvements on alm ost any term s.23
In addition to such a clim ate of change, the American Revolution signaled
a shift in the makeup of the Philadelphia m erchant community. M ost noticeably,
Quakers figured much less prom inently in Philadelphia’s political and mercantile
circles. Many Quaker m erchants, because of the sect’s pacifist tenets, had
either been Loyalists or at least fallen under suspicion of being so, leading to a
decline in their business opportunities and political influence. A fter the
Revolution, a new generation of merchants gained prominence, a cohort that did
not have the same pow er bases as the old. The imperial adm inistration and the

“Putting ‘Capitalism’ in Its Place: A Review of Recent Literature," William and Mary Quarterly 52 (April
1995), 315-326; Paul A. Gilje, “The Rise of Capitalism in the Early Republic." in Paul A. Gilje, ed.. Wages of
Independence: Capitalism in the Early American Republic (Madison: Madison House, 1997); and Sean
Wiientz, “Society, Politics, and the Market Revolution,” in Eric Foner, ed., The New American History.
Revised and Expanded Edition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 61-84.
■‘‘“Petition to Pennsylvania General Assembly, Read January 23, 1804, From Citizens in Bucks County,"
Folder January 23,1804, McAllister Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania
^Pennsylvania House of Representatives Bill Number 74, January 28,1808, Historical Records, Box 1,
1807-1820, Folder Farmers and Mechanics Bank, Accession 1658, Hagley Museum and Library.
23For a work that captures the optimism of the period, see Daniel Feller, The Jacksonian Promise:
America. 1815-1840 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
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proprietary Penns were gone, and many attachm ents to them were swept away.
Ironically, Philadelphia’s m erchant com m unity became even m ore closely
enmeshed with the British econom y and m erchant community during the 1780s
than it had been before the Revolution.24 During the war, a num ber of
disaffected and loyalist Philadelphia m erchants fled to Britain, w here they
continued their mercantile pursuits by conducting business with old associates
who remained. Quakers figured prom inently in this group.25 Many em igrated to
Britain because of their loyalist leanings or ties to the Penn fam ily— even long
after the Penns’ conversion to Anglicanism — while others left to avoid the
harassment that any pacifist group endures during conflicts in which allegiances
are open to question. Typical o f cohesive, commercially vigorous religious
minorities, Quakers kept especially close ties with their relatives and partners in
the New W orld while resettling in the Old 26 Uprooted merchants who had
started their careers in Philadelphia proved perhaps greater assets fo r the city’s
merchant community in Britain than they had been at home.
Just as some Am ericans initiated m ercantile operations in the Old W orld,
immigrants from Europe did so in Philadelphia. From 1774 to 1785, the num ber
of merchants operating out o f Philadelphia increased by 60%; m ost of the new
merchants hailed from Britain, Holland, and France 27 These men brought not
only capital but also connections to business associates all over the Atlantic
world, and they came not only to Philadelphia but also to all the m ajor American

24Thomas M Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants and Economic Development in
Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 245.
"Doerflinger, 222.
26Another group that did much the same in terms of cultivating trade and contacts among coreligionists was
the Huguenot community. See John Garretson Clark, La Rochelle and the Atlantic Economy During the
Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
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port cities.28 W hile native P hiladelphia merchants w ere well informed of
European cultural, political, and technological developm ents, the newcomers
brought first-hand insight and knowledge of the latest business practices and
opportunities.
Both Philadelphia and British merchant firm s also saw the end of
hostilities between the two nations as an opportunity to reopen old trading ties or
to create new ones. British m erchants sent sons, nephews, trusted clerks, or
ju n io r partners westward to drum up business in Am erican port cities. Alm ost
immediately after news of th e Peace of Paris reached Philadelphia, Robert
Morris wrote to S ir Francis Baring, head of a London m erchant house, to strike
up a trade relationship. Through Morris, prominent Philadelphia merchants
Thom as W illing and W illiam Bingham soon opened accounts with the House of
,
Baring.
In 1795, in order to w ork out a proposed M aine land deal with New
OQ

Y orker Henry Knox, Baring se n t Alexander, his second-oldest son, to help close
the deal and to establish clo se r relations with other Am erican clients. He
succeeded so well th a t he m arried one o f Bingham's daughters in 1798, and his
brother married another Bingham daughter in 1802.30 Morris, Willing, Bingham,
and the Barings were am ong the m ost aggressive and m ost successful
merchants in Philadelphia and London, respectively, bu t their connections
typified the reintegration and even intensification of Anglo-Am erican trade
connections after the Revolution.
27Doerflinger, 244.
For example, Alexander Brown, founder of the nineteenth-century Brown family transatlantic empire,
emigrated from Ireland to Baltimore in the 1790s. Edwin J. Perkins, Financing Anglo-American Trade: The
House of Brown. 1800-1880 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 19.
Ralph Hidy, The House of Baring in American Trade and Finance: English Merchant Bankers at Work.
1763-1861 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), 22.
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The strengthened business ties between merchant com m unities on
opposite sides of the north Atlantic m eant more than strengthened econom ic
ties; they fostered a greater exchange of information on all sorts of business
opportunities. Some of th a t inform ation traveled east, resulting in a flow of
European capital to invest in Am erican land speculation deals, governm ent
securities, and eventually bank shares. Both British and continental European
m erchant firms looked fo r Am erican partners to help purchase western lands, a
process facilitated by the willingness o f the national and state governm ents to
auction off large tracts in th e ir haste to pay off Revolutionary W a r debts. Foreign
investors also snapped up shares in the Bank of North Am erica and the Bank of
the United States im m ediately after their founding and bought state and federal
debt certificates. The United States provided opportunity and Europeans had
the money; Philadelphia m erchants connected the two by offering services and
inform ation.
Even more news and data regarding business flowed westward across the
Atlantic than eastward. Throughout the eighteenth century, Am ericans had been
kept abreast of business developm ents in Britain through a variety of channels.
Som e future merchants and planters had traveled to England as young men to
be educated; others m ade the trip to defend or further their business or political
careers by lobbying proprietors, Parliament, or the Board of Trade. W hile such
travel may have declined afte r the Revolution, the men who had made those
trips usually kept up their contacts with those they had met. M ost merchants,
especially those in the dry goods trade, corresponded with one or more trading

^Hidy, 29-30.
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houses in London, Bristol, or Liverpool on a regular basis. Thomas W illing, one
of the central figures in the founding o f the Bank of North Am erica and the Bank
of the United States, exemplified these connections: Pennsylvania-born, he was
educated at W atts Academ y and the Inner Temple during the 1740s and
engaged in the m ercantile business upon his return, often corresponding with
London merchants including his uncle, Thomas W illing.31 Philadelphia
merchants depended on these houses to supply goods fo r trade, for financial
services including credit and insurance, and to purchase special luxury items that
could not be obtained in America. They also relied upon British merchants’
assessments of political and econom ic developments that could affect trade.
Scholars have puzzled over the roots of the business corporation in the
United States and have come to a consensus that such enterprises did not play
an important role in G reat Britain.32 Legal historians have noted the paucity of
new common law addressing business corporations— as opposed to other
corporations such as municipalities and colleges— in eighteenth-century Britain.
They have argued that because the corporate form fo r business did not evolve in
a legal sense during that period, it was not widely used.33 Similarly, econom ic
and business historians, whose concerns with corporations has mostly been their
use in relation to the industrial revolution, have cited the dearth of British
manufacturing corporations in particular during the eighteenth century. Both

31Robert E. Wright, “Thomas Willing (1731-1832): Philadelphia Financier and Forgotten Family Founder,”
Pennsylvania History 63 (Autumn 1996), 527-531.
32 Oscar Handlin and Mary F. Handlin, in their seminal article “Origins of the American Business
Corporation" Journal of Economic History, 5 (May 1945), 1-23, downplayed any British precedents of
American business corporations, as did Pauline Maier in “The Revolutionary Origins of the American
Corporation,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., 50 (1993) 51-84.
33 See for example James W . Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the Law of the United
States. 1780-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1970), 3-6.
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legal and econom ic scholars have also stressed the low number of eighteenthcentury British business corporations compared to the proliferation of Am erican
business corporations. Hence, they argue as a corollary of these conclusions
th a t the British use o f corporations did not influence Am ericans in their em brace
o f corporate organizational structure.
However, a clo se r look a t the logic and evidence o f these arguments
reveals their shortcom ings. In sum, these assertions are based on negations,
th a t is, on w hat was not occurring in eighteenth-century Britain. W hile
Blackstone and others found little developm ent in the common law treatm ent o f
British business corporations, a lack o f drastic change does not necessarily
denote an absence of use or im portance. True, fe w British used the corporation
to administer m anufacturing businesses, but then very few early United States
corporations were m anufacturing concerns. Not until the 1810s and 1820s
w ould a group of Boston m erchants use the corporate form to organize their
highly capitalized textile mills, and such operations remained the exception
rather than the rule until m id-century at least. By 1800, Parliament had chartered
a t least 92 business corporations in banking, insurance, and inland navigation.34
In the United States, fourteen state legislatures had by then chartered 335
corporations.35 However, the vast majority of the latter were formed to build and
operate turnpike roads, an activity that was relatively uncommon in Britain. By
contrast, Parliam ent incorporated fa r more canal and river navigation com panies

34 This number is calculated by combining data compiled from Joseph Priestley, Historical Account of the
Navigable Rivers. Canals and Railways throughout Great Britain (London, 1831) and adding known banking
and insurance firms.
35 Joseph S. Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1917), 26.
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during the 1790s than did A m erican state legislatures.36 In th e eighteenth
century, the British used corporations fo r business purposes fa r more frequently
than previous American historians have acknowledged; furtherm ore, most of that
activity was concentrated in the sam e kinds of ventures— financial services and
transportation development— as m ost early American business corporations.
British and American businessm en sought corporate charters for the
sam e reasons. The m ost com m on business organizations a t the tim e were
m erchant partnerships. Partnerships had the advantage of being easily formed
and served well for businesses run on a limited scale and involving small
am ounts of capital. They also had severe limitations. They could only last as
long as the members agreed to stay together; once one died o r left, the whole
partnership had to be dissolved o r at least reorganized, assum ing the survivor
rem ained solvent. “A copartner in trade is frequently interested to a large
am ount in the duration of his associate’s life,” reminded a typical insurance
com pany pamphlet, “and we recollect one instance in which a m erchant had
30,000 dollars dependent upon the safe return of another from a distant
voyage.”37 Every m ember o f the partnership was personally fu lly liable for any
debts the partnership might incur, m eaning a potential loss o f property and
debtors’ prison for group failure. Partnerships, then, implied a great degree of
trust: commonplace was the ruination of merchants through th e bad luck or

36 Parliament chartered at least 55 internal navigation companies during the 1790s, compared with 15
chartered by American state legislatures during the same period. British statistics compiled from Priestley;
American statistics compiled from correspondence solicited by Albert Gallatin for his report on roads and
canals for the United States Senate, American State Papers. Vol 1.. Miscellaneous (Washington: Gales and
Seaton, 1834), 724-921.
37 “An Address from the President and Directors of the Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and
Granting Annuities, to the Inhabitants of the United States, upon the subject of the beneficial objects of that
institution." Typescript copy of original publication. Folder “History of the Pennsylvania Company for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

42

malfeasance o f erstwhile partners. Incorporation provided a way fo r a group of
people whose m embership changed constantly to own property and buildings,
and unlike partnerships, the corporation did not have to start over when old
members left o r new ones joined. Furthermore, corporations greatly limited
liability of their m em bers: if a canal com pany borrowed money to construct new
locks, for example, the members were only liable up to the value of their
investment. Because of these features, corporations could attract fa r more
capital than partnerships, and therefore could undertake large ventures beyond
the resources o f a fe w individuals. In America, where all but the largest fortunes
paled next to those of British grandees, the ability to pool capital made
corporations an especially useful form of business organization.
Philadelphians read and heard about a range of British corporate
business activities. Some Am ericans decried English manufactories and the
slums around them and remained suspicious of corporations such as the Bank of
England. Nevertheless, to the Philadelphia m erchant community m any British
business corporations seemed at least as well suited for the United States as for
Britain if not m ore so— perhaps the Bank of England most of all. Incorporated in
1694, the Bank of England provided credit services primarily to the Crown by
buying large blocks of government securities at comparatively low interest rates;
that is, lower than could be gotten from financial houses either at home or on the
Continent. Even more so than other large banking enterprises, it could only have
worked as a corporation because of the great am ount of capital necessary to
absorb the huge am ounts of m oney the Crown needed at its disposal. Having a

Insurance, 1895,“ Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities, Accession 1476,
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willing purchaser for seem ingly infinite sum s of public d ebt allowed the Crown
great flexibility in its spending. For th e ir part, stockholders could be assured o f
steady dividends as long as the go vernm ent kept on paying interest, a fairly sure
thing given that the governm ent w as sovereign and m any m em bers of
Parliament or their fam ilies would have a t least small holdings of stock in the
bank. Thus, people active in the go vernm ent had an interest in making sure that
the state paid its debts. The Bank o f England provided stability on several
levels: for governm ent budgeting espe cially in wartime, fo r a financial com m unity
wary o f high governm ent debt, fo r investors, and even fo r those concerned about
political disloyalty. W ith those sam e considerations in m ind fo r the United
States, many prom inent Philadelphia m erchants strongly supported the
incorporation of the B ank of North A m erica, the Bank of the United States, and
eventually a num ber o f state banks as w ell.
Philadelphia m erchants were also fam iliar with Scottish banking practices.
Praised by David Hume, John Law, and Adam Smith, the Scottish example was
powerful to Philadelphia merchants because the Scottish banks had been central
to Scotland’s rapid econom ic developm ent during the eighteenth century. For
much of that period, Scotland had faced some of the sam e problem s that United
States did after independence: a lack o f local currency, a negative balance of
trade, and inadequate credit facilities. T h e Bank of Scotland, chartered a year
after the Bank of England, perform ed th e same functions as its English
counterpart. Unlike th e Bank of England, however, the B ank o f Scotland was not
granted a monopoly, so other banks— th e Royal Bank of Scotland and the British

Hagley Museum and Library.
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Linen Com pany— also obtained banking privileges, assuring tha t diffe re n t groups
could have access to the benefits o f banking. The Bank of England only
operated out o f its central office in London, issuing notes of £10 o r m ore— a
denomination fa r too large for everyday transactions and only intended fo r the
use of governm ents and large com m ercial houses. By contrast, Scottish banks
opened branches and issued notes as low as shillings and pence, thereby
greatly supplem enting the general m oney supply.

38

The Scottish system , much

more stable th a n the colonial Am erican financial institutions, looked very
attractive to Philadelphia m erchants and served as prototypes for Pennsylvaniachartered banks. State banks, just like the Bank of North Am erica and the Bank
o f the United States, resulted m ore from the enlightened mimicry o f British
organizations than from American innovation.

39

The Scottish banking system proved especially attractive given the poor
currency m anagem ent record of colonial and state governments. M erchants
could conclude th a t land banks and fia t m oney had proven insufficient, but not
necessarily because the underlying prem ises were unsound. Those measures
had often been approved with the backing of the merchant com m unity in the
colonies that undertook them. M erchants could reasonably argue th a t these
measures w ere ultimately unsuccessful partly because of the refusal of imperial
officers to force British merchants to honor the notes, but mostly because of the
unreliability of colonial legislatures th a t lacked the political backbone to retire
notes on schedule and foreclose on debtors. If anything, the latter problem

^ S ee Richard Saville, Bank of Scotland: A History. 1695-1995 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1996), 1-278; and Charles W . Munn, The Scottish Provincial Banking Companies. 1747-1864 (Edinburgh:
John Donald Publishers, 1981).
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would become exacerbated after the Revolution.

In 1786 and 1787,

Revolutionary W a r veteran Daniel Shays and hundreds of other central
Massachusetts farm ers protested high taxes and the state enforcement o f debt
collection and land foreclosure. A fter Massachusetts merchants funded a
successful m ilitary expedition to restore order, the disgruntled farmers w ent to
the polls in great numbers, electing Thomas H ancock as governor with a
mandate to pass laws relieving the tax burden and protecting debtors.40
Although merchants, too, involved themselves in w ebs of debts and credits, as
overall creditors they could draw two conclusions from the incident. First, the
dearth of cash and credit could spark not only econom ic dislocation but also
social unrest, and second, state governments could not be trusted to keep
promises to creditors or to follow a consistent currency policy.

From any

merchant's point o f view, the Shays affair showed the dangers of the existing
currency system, or lack thereof. The danger in Pennsylvania could be
particularly acute because its constitution guaranteed universal suffrage,
meaning that Philadelphia merchants could not rely on the statehouse to enforce
unpopular m easures limiting m oney supply.
Consequently, the Scottish system of incorporated banks that allowed the
mercantile com m unity to control and regulate currency and credit constituted an
exemplary model fo r Philadelphia merchants. In scheduled meetings, Scottish
bank representatives gathered to exchange the notes they had issued and had
been brought to each other’s counters. By doing so on a regular basis, they
39Although the Bank of North America had a Pennsylvania charter, it clearly was originally intended as an
institution of national scope.
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collectively insured th a t each of their m em bers had the ability to meet its
obligations, and so acted as a clearing-house mechanism to ensure that banks
and the notes they issued remained on firm ground.41 In their efforts to keep
note issues at conservative levels, they also prevented general inflation, always
the bane of those w ho are net creditors. Furtherm ore, these meetings allowed
bank officials, rather than public authorities, to decide how much m oney would
be issued and when.
In name, in form , and in operation, Philadelphia-based banks closely
followed British precedent, beginning with rem arkable similarities in their
charters. In terms of corporate governance, British bank charters dictated th a t a
majority of electors was required to amend com pany by-laws, that the
companies’ governor, lieutenant governor, and directors were to be elected
annually during a specified one-month tim e-fram e, that the directors m ust be
English (or, in the case of Scotland banks, Scottish) subjects, and that a m ajority
of directors constituted a quorum for official business 42 The Bank of North
America and the Bank of Pennsylvania’s charters, too, stipulated that by-laws be
amended by a m ajority of electors, that the president and directors be elected
annually on a specific date, that directors be citizens of the United States— or in
the case of the Bank o f Pennsylvania, residents of the state— and that a m ajority

40For a variety of historical viewpoints on Daniel Shays and his eponymous "rebellion," see Robert Gross,
ed., In Debt to Shavs: The Bicentennial of an Agrarian Rebellion (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 1993).
41 Randall Kroszner, "Free Banking: The Scottish Experience as a Model for Emerging Economies,”
presented at World Bank Seminar Financial History: Lessons of the Past for Reformers of the Present, IQ14.
42 Joseph Hume Francis. History of the Bank of England (Chicago: Euclid Publishing Company, 1888),
58-63; William Robert Scott, The Constitution and Finance of English. Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock
Companies to 1720. Vol. Ill: Water Supply. Postal. Street-Lighting. Manufacturing. Banking. Finance and
Insurance Companies: Also Statements Relating to the Crown Rnances (New York: Peter Smith, 1951),
253-256.
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of directors were required fo r a quorum .43 They raised capital in sim ilar ways, as
well; both British and A m erican banks issued a limited um ber of shares, se t a
maximum for individuals’ initial investment, and collected th e ir capital through
subscription. They even operated under sim ilar limitations, including chartermandated capital ceilings, the condition th a t dividends were to be issued only out
of profits while preserving the paid-in capital, and prohibitions against engaging
in any other trade. A nd once Philadelphia was home to several banks, com pany
officers met to coordinate money policy in much the sam e w ay the Scottish
banks did.44 Philadelphia bankers clearly mimicked British bankers through their
adoption of such sim ilar m ethods and structures.
Philadelphians could also look eastward across the Atlantic and adm ire
British transportation im provem ents corporations, especially in the field o f
internal navigation. Betw een 1760 and 1790, Parliament had chartered 2 8 river
navigation and canal com panies. Although waterpower would provide m ost of
the energy for Am erica’s factories in the first half of the nineteenth century,
Britain had not been equally blessed with so many fast-flowing rivers.
Furthermore, by the early eighteenth century the British had depleted th e ir
countryside of sufficient firewood to m eet their domestic heating and industrial
demands. Accordingly, they relied upon a different source of fuel, bitum inous
coal. To transport the bulky and heavy stone across great distances, they began
building inland navigations from mining regions to the coast or to regional
population centers.

T h e construction of canals accelerated in the 1760s, as

m ore inland m anufacturing and m ercantile centers strove to be better connected

^ Charters. Laws, and By-l aws, of the Bank of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: Clark & Raser, 1830), 2-21.
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to what was quickly becom ing a national m arket. However, that gentle increase
did not com pare to the canal frenzy of the early 1790s. In 1793 and 1794, 32
inland navigation com panies secured charters from Parliament. Americans
watched the British canal boom with great interest, fo r such projects inspired
them to sim ilar actions in the United States.
W hat th e Philadelphians saw, read, and heard about in Britain were a
host of institutions and technologies that integrated a national economy w hile
providing fo r regional development. Furtherm ore, they had witnessed how
sponsoring th e British corporations that adm inistered banks and navigations
could be personally profitable. Not only had British agents promoted these
investments, but m any Am ericans also read the popular, London-based

Gentleman’s Magazine that displayed the prices of British corporate stocks.
Philadelphia m erchants could not afford to buy Caribbean sugar plantations or
British estates, and Am erican land speculation was a notoriously tricky
enterprise.

However, they could observe th a t over the long term banks and

sometimes internal navigation company stocks rose gradually and issued regular
dividends w ithout dem anding any input of tim e on the part of the majority of
investors.
The A m erican Revolution, the econom ic and political stability of the
Constitution, and eventually the economic recovery of the early 1790s provided
Philadelphia m erchants with the opportunity to develop the kinds of projects that
had been undertaken in Britain.

Pennsylvania chartered the Delaware and

Schuylkill Canal C om pany and the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Canal and

44 See Chapter Six for an analysis of the cooperation between Philadelphia banks.
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Navigation C om pany in late 1791, and the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal
Company petitioned the Maryland, Delaware, and Pennsylvania assemblies in
1792. America’s transportation needs were even m ore pressing than Britain’s;
hence the tim ing o f the first canal boom in the United States strongly suggests
that it was an extension o f the British craze. Am erican corporate founders took
their cues from Britain, whose successful transportation projects served as a
model for developing Am erica to emulate.
Municipal charters, although having the sam e roots in medieval law,
operated differently than business corporations in the eighteenth-century British
Atlantic world. Municipal charters granted privileges fa r beyond those of
business corporations: a monopoly over local civil authority as well as em inent
domain and right-of-way, two oft-confused but technically different legal
constructs. Em inent domain endows the right to seize property permanently—
with compensation— in order to use it for public purposes. For example, the
town corporation would pay a landowner a sum of money, either agreed upon or,
if necessary, a fair price determined by the courts, and come to possess the
property on which to build a courthouse. Although the owner had no right to
refuse, at least she or he would get paid for the loss. Right-of-way gives one
entity the right to travel or even build a passage through others’ property, but the
property stays in possession of the original owner. In this case, the town could
build a road right through a farm er's wheat field and not necessarily have to
compensate for the lost crop, although technically the farm er would still own the
land. Because of their duty to enforce the law and because of the necessity of
eminent domain and right-of-way in building and maintaining streets and
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m unicipal property, city officials considered a charter to be essential fo r
continued municipal developm ent.
W hile investing m erchants saw the practical benefits o f incorporation,
corporate charters were controversial precisely because o f the nature of their
British origins in terms of special privileges for elites. Am ericans hotly debated
w ho should administer and control these various chartered organizations. A
concern of many citizens was the potential fo r a few rich men to control private
corporations: in 1794, one group o f angry petitioners referred to the issuing of
charters as "the most dangerous policy in this infant republic, to com bine the
w ealthy in order to make them pow erful.1,45 To combat such powerful
com binations, the Pennsylvania legislature inserted charter provisions designed
to curtail the influence of large investors seeking to dominate corporations.
Som e charters contained clauses requiring stock offerings to be held in several
places at once, limiting the n u m be r of stocks any individual could purchase and
scaling down the number of votes of individual stockholders. Nonetheless, in
com pany after company, a sm all num ber of investors eventually owned enough
stock to gain control of the board o f managers. The body of stockholders in
other com panies deferred to th e Board’s wisdom, assuming th a t directors would
act in the stockholders’ best interest: the whole point of investm ent fo r a great
m any of the small contributors w as to have their money grow w ithout having to
w ork at it.46 The result was th a t the men who put themselves in a position to run
such corporations could control crucial technologies and great am ounts of capital

45 Petition, House File, 17th Session-1, 1793-94 Records of the General Assembly, Group 7, Pennsylvania
State Archives.
46See Chapter 4 for a discussion of investor motivation and behavior.
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fa r exceeding w h a t they could have am assed on their own or in sm all
partnerships. Despite the best efforts of careful legislators— and through the
willing acquiescence of the m ajority o f investors— few er and few er men
controlled individual corporations. Furthermore, som e men m anaged to get
them selves on the boards of several corporations, further concentrating
corporate power.
The ideological viewpoint o f observers had a great deal to do with the way
they regarded these projects. C haracterizations of corporations fell everywhere
along the spectrum from great prom oters of national wealth to unnatural
monopolies th a t were nearly governm ents unto themselves.

Both extrem es

reflected a republican ethos that predated the Revolution. W hile republicanism
had nearly as m any definitions as it did definers, m ost Americans in public life
agreed on its m ain tenets: that private property and checks on governm ent
form ed the basis for freedom, th a t private interest m ust never override the public
interest, and th a t the struggle against tyranny required constant vigilance. Still,
those basic ideas left a good deal o f room to negotiate, raising difficult questions
to be considered by politicians, editors, pamphleteers, and their audiences. How
broadly or evenly should property be distributed? W hich was more im portant,
broader access to economic opportunity or the unfettered ability to pursue large
concentrations o f wealth? To w hat extent should or do private and public
interest coincide? Boosters of banks, insurance companies, and canal
com panies answered these questions in ingenious ways. They argued that by
making credit m ore available, by decreasing Am erican dependence on foreign
insurance, and by promoting dom estic com merce, they would bring prosperity to
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m ore people.

In doing so, they allowed fo r more people to gain personal

econom ic dependence, thus strengthening the nation. Boosters asserted that
banks, insurance com panies, and internal improvement companies contributed
to the greater society by empowering individuals. Corporate boosters took the
next step to claim that th e ir interest coincided with the public interest, especially,
they pointed out, when th e state owned stock in these ventures.
Philadelphians debated the ideological implications as well as the physical
com ponents and the financial aspects of canals and banks, knowing that such
projects were som ehow fundam entally different from previous form s of business
practice. Many of their debates about these new ways of doing business
centered on corporate charters.47 The charter as a legal construct had
originated as a perpetual grant from the sovereign to a group of people,
extending them certain rights or privileges; examples included guilds,
universities, and city governm ents, and com m ercial entities such as the Virginia
Com pany. Soon, colonial governments them selves began granting charters to
cities o r counties and eventually churches and social organizations. After the
Revolution, canal, turnpike, bridge, insurance, and bank com panies sought
charters for many of the sam e reasons as towns and congregations in that, in
the words of one applicant, "capital, concert, and duration [were] all necessary."
T hat is, such a large-scale enterprise was a “concern in which many must be

47For insightful discussion of the role of and debates over corporations in Pennsylvania, see Louis Hartz,
Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania. 1776-1860 (Cambridge. 1948); Oscar and Mary
Flug Handlin considered the Massachusetts case in Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in
the American Economy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947). Among the more recent
considerations of the historiography regarding the relationship between corporations and the state in the
early republic are Harry N. Scheiber, “Government and the Economy: Studies of the ‘Commonwealth’ Policy
in Nineteenth-Century America.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 3 (summer 1972): 135-151 and William
G. Shade, “Louis Hartz and the Myth of Laissez Faire” Pennsylvania History 59 3 (July 1992): 256-273.
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united, which requires a capital tthat must be furnished by many hands, and a
concert which m ust endure fo r a considerable period.”48 Big projects potentially
requiring hundreds or even th o u s a n d s of participants were im practicable in a
partnership structure.
In addition to the ability to* provide a structure fo r many investors, the
corporate form offered the a ttra ctio n s of limited liability and som etim es even
special privileges o r m o no p olies. The limitation o f liability was nearly a sine qua

non for attracting investors: “the-y require an act o f Incorporation,” a group of
petitioners pointed out, “to p ro te c t them from fu rth e r liability; — w ith o u t the last,
numbers will not engage, — w ith o u t numbers, the necessary capital w ill not be
raised, — and w ithout large capitsal, no great undertaking can succeed.”49 Both
banks and insurance com panies; took risks— on loans or property, respectively—
larger in aggregate than m ost in dividuals either could o r would take. Indeed, that
was their purpose. W ithout limitaed liability, investors m ight as well have
continued with private lending a n d self-insurance, the latter often being a
euphemism fo r having no in su ra n ce at all. Public improvement com panies, too,
required limited liability: m any of them either borrowed o r entered into
construction contracts beyond thieir current m eans. Furthermore, corporations
remained liable fo r damages to p riv a te property incurred during construction. By
obtaining limited liability, the m e n whose fortunes heretofore had been at the
mercy of partners, creditors, andl the sea could enter into large ventures knowing
even the greatest failure would n o t ruin them. Corporate power, then, was much

^Remarks and Observations Showing the Justice and Policy of Incorporation “The Schuylkill Coal
Company." Respectfully Addressed to the Public, and Particularly to the Members of the Legislature
([Philadelphia], 1823), 6.
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less risky to personal and fam ily fortunes than the merchant activities upon which
patron-client pow er had been based.
Corporations offered more than sta bility of return: many com panies
sought a virtual m onopoly through the chartering process, thus offering security
from competition. Banks lobbied fo r guarantees that the state governm ent would
deposit funds in them o r th a t they w ould be the only chartered banks in a given
city.

Bridge com panies, fo r which profits were unlikely even w ithout

competition, often desired monopoly assurances that others would not be able to
run a ferry within a certain distance. R ive r navigation com panies tended to be
concerned about another monopoly, one th a t they were often reluctant to
m ention: the exclusive possession of w a te r in the river, that they could then
“rent” to mill owners fo r tidy sums. P ublic improvements also needed a right that
banks did not: the right o f em inent dom ain. Turnpikes, canals, and bridges all
w ent through land already under private ownership, and so could not exist
w ithout some w ay o f gaining access to private (and sometimes public) property.
Monopoly privileges, as contem poraries knew all too well, further insulated
corporate power in a w ay th at merchants, with their strenuously com petitive
environment, could w ell appreciate.
While the chartering o f municipalities, congregations, and charitable
organizations tended to go smoothly through even the m ost contentious of
legislatures, bills to incorporate banks, insurance companies, canals, and
turnpikes nearly always ignited lively and sometimes acrimonious debates.
Certainly the fa ct th a t the latter category o f charters involved potential profit for

49Petition to House, March 11,1825, House File, 49th Session-1, 1824-25, Folder 5, Pennsylvania General
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private citizens, whereas the fo rm e r did not, figured significantly in th e differing
levels of controversy. M any people perceived banks as mysterious
m oneymaking machines fo r th e ir owners, believing those profits w ere made from
the w ork of the commonfolk.
Private profit, though, clearly was not always the primary consideration for
charter opponents. Canal and turnpike com pany boosters usually found the
chartering process to be a political challenge, and although som e o f these
im provem ents turned out to be profitable, the large majority proved unable to
break even. Many investors, as well as the public at large, never expected some
projects to turn a profit, yet even the least promising ones, from an investm ent
standpoint, rarely went through the legislature without rancor. In this case,
corporations from which no one would profit found the chartering process
difficult. On the other hand, the later chartering of manufacturing companies,
which clearly would profit, rarely encountered the sort of heated opposition that
nearly all prospective banking and public im provem ent companies learned to
expect as a m atter of course. W hile the possibility of the state officially
sanctioning the ability of some citizens to make money from a publicly granted
privilege certainly played a role in these debates, clearly more was at stake.
For example, the supply of fresh w ater to Philadelphia involved
technological, financial, and adm inistrative issues with far-reaching
consequences for the city corporation. W ater supply lent itself to several
fundam entally different solutions, each of which could have various advantages
and disadvantages reflecting both physical and social parameters: feasibility,

Assembly, Records of General Assembly, Record Group 7, Pennsylvania State Archives.
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tim e o f construction, cost of construction, availability of skills and labor, reliability,
durability, expandability, maintenance costs, repair costs, and maximum
operating capacity. For example, the Philadelphia City Councils o f the late
1790s began to investigate ways to provide the city with adequate supplies of
fresh water. A t first, th e ir only option was a proposed canal; later, British-born
and -trained engineer B. Henry Latrobe suggested a steam-powered pumping
system. A canal m ight have greater w ater capacity, was a fairly proven
technology, but would require expensive repairs. Pumping systems could be
constructed more quickly, worked all year round, and could be more easily
expanded, but steam engines would incur high fuel costs and were unfam iliar in
the United States. The City Councils weighed the characteristics of both
systems before making their decision. Their choice of the waterworks and their
further development and extension of the system held both intended and
unintended consequences for the administration of the city and its suburbs. The
W atering Committee, a subcom m ittee of the city’s governing Select and
Common Councils, supervised the waterworks, and eventually became the most
powerful group in the city governm ent by controlling a large portion of the city’s
revenue and budget and by securing its own revenue stream s and tax collectors.
The regulations necessary for the maintenance, protection, and distribution of
water entailed inspectors to enforce them . Moreover, the city parlayed the
extension of the system to the suburbs into regulatory and financial leverage
over suburban governm ent. All of these developments com bined to one effect:
the consolidation of the city corporation’s power over its own citizens and its
suburbs.
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The new institutions and technologies provoked such intense controversy
because people recognized them to be central to the region’s economy and thus
to the relationships, politics, and power that its econom ic structure fostered.
Indeed, th e ir adoption signaled a profound reordering of power in the
Philadelphia region. So m any people clam ored fo r better transportation, more
access to credit, and a larger m oney supply because they saw such
developm ents not only as necessary for their econom ic success but also as
perhaps a fatal blow to the patron-client system th at Trenchard and Gordon
described and that so dom inated social, political, and econom ic relations in
eighteenth-century Am erica. Credit, transportation, and available currency each
gave m ore people the opportunity to participate m ore freely in a cash econom y
rather than the book-credit econom y under which they had been operating. They
saw the taking of these opportunities as their opening to the economic
independence that would free them from patrons. The two m ost influential
recent w orks on the political transform ation of the early republic, Gordon W o od ’s
Radicalism of the Am erican Revolution and Alan Taylor’s W illiam Cooper’s Town
both describe the decline o f deference between patrons and clients, each
attributing revolutionary, egalitarian ideology as the underlying cause.50 Certainly
the spread of nearly universal white male suffrage in concert with the use of the
secret ballot contributed as well. However, the political independence that W ood
and T a ylor described would n ot have been possible without the economic

^S e e Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1992) and
Alan Taylor, William Cooper's Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier of the Early American Republic
(New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
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independence that b a n k notes and river navigations offered: they were opposite
sides of the same coin.
Nonetheless, freedom from patrons did not com e w ithout a price. On the
one hand, internal im provem ents were necessary to spur econom ic
development. On the other, when a corporation was granted the right-of-way of
a river, had the privilege o f em inent domain around its banks, and owned the
rights to the river’s w ater, it essentially controlled the econom y along a twentymile wide swath on e ith e r side of the waterway and even to its tributaries. The
com pany decided w h a t tolls to charge, influencing the final price of every product
shipped on the river and affecting ju st about everyone in the region. Anyone
who owned property on the riverbank essentially did so at the pleasure of the
company, which had the legal authority to dam up the river and thus flood
adjoining lands if it deem ed closing the river necessary fo r the navigation. The
com pany also influenced the cost and degree of industrial developm ent by
setting terms for the purchase of the river’s waterpower and by deciding where
and how much w ater could be used. Naturally, any change in price or policy by a
canal company inevitably involved the interests of m any people, interests that
company officials w ere only too willing to exploit. Everyone understood the
potential conflicts involved, and that was why canal com panies became such
lightning rods of public controversy.
As controversial as inland navigation com panies could be, transportation
debates never reached the furor of those over financial institutions because of
the consensus that the men who ran financial institutions, too, wielded great
influence over the grow ing econom y. By deciding how much m oney to loan and
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when, bank managers determ ined the region’s money supply, with its attendant
effects upon inflation. Lending policy, of course, carried with it great power over
politics and economic development: if, as John Marshall so fam ously stated
about opponents to the Bank of the United States, “the power to tax involves the
pow er to destroy,” then the ability to make credit available only to political
friends, members of particular groups or certain kinds of businesses also
provided great opportunities fo r power. And through their selection of
investments, either in governm ent loans or corporate stock, both banks and
insurance companies had opportunities to decide the projects that would be
funded and those that would not. For organizations not run by the public at
large, these were considerable powers indeed.
In addition, corporate administration had social com ponents, parts o f its
design that explicitly or im plicitly reinforced the greater econom ic agenda of the
owners, designers, or both.51 In the early republic, politicians, editors, and
petitioners all expressed varying opinions on many facets of financial institutions.
‘T ho u g h some people represent the Bank [of North America] as injurious and
dangerous, while others consider it as salutary and beneficial, to the community,”
one pam phleteer pointed out, “all view it as an object of high importance;
deserving and demanding the public attention.”52 The face value of banknotes
becam e particularly controversial. Certainly many merchants had a point when

51For an historiographic view of the growing “externalist” school of the history of technology, that is, those
who consider technology socially constructed, as opposed to the “internalist” school, which is more
concerned with intrinsic changes in technologies, see John M. Staudenmaier, Technology’s Storytellers:
Reweavina the Human Fabric (Cambridge: The Society for the History of Technology and the MIT Press,
1985); also see Wiebe Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch, eds., The Social Construction of
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1987).
52James Wilson, Considerations on the Bank of North-America (Philadelphia: Hall and Sellers, 1785), 3.
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they contended th a t the issuance o f sm all-denom ination bills might lead to
increased speculation, thus triggering inflation th a t could hurt everyone in the
economy. But critics argued that, like beauty, th e value of inflation was in the
eye of the beholder: it helped debtors, who could pay their obligations with
dollars that were now easier to earn and worth less— or even worthless— and
thus hurt creditors. M oney supply was a two-edged sword. The trick was to
have enough to make liquidity possible so people could pay debts, but not so
much that dem and would decrease for their credit business or that inflation
would ensue. Furtherm ore, the issuance of bank bills was the method by which
the country’s m oney supply grew; those who only dealt in small denom inations
would thus be dealing with a m uch less elastic m oney supply than those with
greater access to large denom inations. In a confidential meeting in 1820,
officials from seven of the largest Philadelphia banks made an agreem ent not to
accept any notes lower than five dollars.53 In so doing, they instantly depreciated
the value of any lesser notes issued by the city's M echanics’ Bank, catering to a
broader clientele, and those issued by almost all the country banks. The larger
city banks essentially devalued all of the other banks' notes because, by not
accepting country banks' sm aller notes, they underm ined public confidence in
the country banks' practices. A bank’s use of sm all denominations made all its
issuances now seem that m uch less solid. The men on the boards o f the larger
Philadelphia banks could thus use their control over financial institutions to
solidify their influence over a crucial sector of the economy, the credit market,
both in the city and in the rest o f the state.
“ Historical Records, Box 1, 1807-1820. Folder: Farmers and Mechanics Bank 1820, Accession1658,
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Administration o f the new technologies also severely limited the traditional
role of patron as a rb ite r o f local disputes, instead substituting the authority o f the
state to be invoked a t the desire of corporate officials. Q uarrels between local
property holders, w h ile often going to court, had frequently been settled by
neighborhood patrons either unofficially or in their official capacity as justice of
the peace. Such a rbitration held obvious advantages fo r those lacking legal
expertise or wanting to avoid the fees and annoyance o f legal proceedings; it
also reified the patron’ s local authority. However, disputes that involved
corporations were se ttle d alm ost exclusively by courts. Corporate officers in
Philadelphia did not tru s t local patrons, who might have had the ir own axes to
grind against a canal o r navigation, and possibly had political motivations fo r
siding with a local a g a in s t a distant corporation. M oreover, because corporations
could afford expensive lawsuits and experienced lawyers, corporate officers had
additional motivation to go to court where they could put those advantages in
play. In some cases, co n tro l over a community resource m eant that a
corporation decided lo c a l disputes. In the spring of 1817, som e Philadelphia
residents petitioned to have a public hydrant at the northeast corner of Front
Street and Chestnut S tre e t removed; a counter petition from residents of the
“vicinity of Chestnut a n d Front St.” protested that “such removal would be
attended with serious Inconveniences... in as much as the Pump is the m ost
central, and useful in th e neighborhood.” They further argued that “we would not
wish to injure one of o u r neighbours by its continuance, and we presume it will

Hagley Museum and Library.
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not in the present instance.”54 In this instance, the city corporation’s Watering
Com mittee, rather than a prom inent neighborhood merchant, decided the
outcome. Another pillar o f patron-client power had fallen, to be replaced by a
much stronger and durable corporate one.
Besides having profound local effects, the new projects catered to many
people over a wide area. In the late 1820s, the Lehigh Coal and Navigation
Com pany lobbied fo r the right to build a navigation along the Delaware River
from where it met the Lehigh down to Philadelphia. The com pany’s Board of
M anagers did not exaggerate much when it pointed out to the Pennsylvania
legislators that its proposed “improvement of the Delaware must be a matter of
deep interest to nearly one half of the population of this state and of NewYork.”55 W hen the residents o f such a large area depended upon one canal or
river navigation to provide th e ir connection to the market, those who controlled
the project held substantial power over a great num ber o f residents. Canal
com pany boards of directors decided upon routes, regulated traffic volume, and
determ ined toll rates for different commodities, thereby shaping economic
developm ent in the entire region through which their navigations passed.
Banks also cast long shadows: their managers had to set policies
regarding the honoring and discounting of other banks’ notes. For example, a
Philadelphia bank might only pay eighty cents for every dollar of a note drawn
from a bank in western Pennsylvania, both because of the cost of travel to
redeem the note and because of the risk that the rural bank might not be fully

^ “Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company Board of Managers to Pennsylvania House of Representatives,
March 2 4,182 5,“ House File, 49th Session-1,1824-25, Pennsylvania Canal Folder, Records of the General
Assembly, Record Group 7, Pennsylvania State Archives.
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solvent. Thus, the large Philadelphia banks had great influence over rural b a n k s ,
and therefore, by proxy, over m any o f same issues as they did locally: m oney*
supply and lending policy. This practice of discounting the notes of the rural
banks also had a much more insidious effect: in essence the big city banks w rere
also setting up an exchange. Those holding a strong currency could buy gooKfs
in other areas at a low price, but their own goods becam e more expensive to
sell. Thus, cityfolk could buy country goods cheaply, but country people had
trouble affording goods m anufactured in or imported through Philadelphia.
Corporations and the services they provided helped a small group of
Philadelphians to extend econom ic and political influence well beyond the
possibilities of traditional patron-client relations.
That extension of power could only be possible through the am assing cof
large am ounts of capital and the ability to employ th a t m oney as corporate
insiders saw fit. Leaders of proposed projects needed to raise capital far
exceeding the capacity of partnerships to do so, and consequently found new*
ways to raise money from a w ider range of the population while still co n tro llin g
the use of the money. Corporate boosters found all sorts of methods to tap th ie
resources of private citizens, and the amount of m oney demanded up front
tended to be inversely proportional to the riskiness of the venture. Bank sharees
cost anywhere from $50 for the sm aller institutions to $400 for the Bank of Noorth
America. As safe investments, banks— and to a lesser extent insurance
com panies— attracted a great deal of investment from widows, from trusts fo r
orphans, and from charitable institutions, all of which were looking for ways to*

5Slbid.
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guarantee steady incom e in an uncertain economy. Because transportation
projects were much less likely to succeed, they usually issued subscriptions for
stock in which investors in itia lly paid five or ten dollars and assessed further
am ounts whenever co m pan y reserves got low. Canals solicited subscriptions
from anyone who owned land or who conducted business within about twenty
m iles of the proposed route. In all of these projects, investors created a
relationship with the men w h o ran the corporations in w hich the form er provided
capital in exchange fo r th e services of the latter. The m en on the boards thus
com m anded far larger sum s o f money than they could have raised by
them selves. They then proceeded to use that m oney in m any o f the same ways
that patrons had: loaning it to themselves, their friends, and political allies;
distributing jobs and construction contracts; and rallying the support of those who
depended upon these services.
The growing extension of corporate power into th e econom y matched the
concentration of corporate control in fewer hands, as m any men served on the
boards of several institutions across different technologies. John Bohlen sat on
the boards of the Union Insurance Company, the second B ank of the United
States, the Schuylkill N avigation Company, the Pennsylvania Company for
Insuring Lives and G ranting Annuities, the G erm antown Turnpike, and the Bank
of Philadelphia; his brother Bohl was a director of the D elaware Insurance
Com pany of Pennsylvania. Because they had m em bers in common, corporate
boards often worked to g e th e r to the companies’ m utual benefit. Boardmembers
also served in the city councils and the state and federal legislatures. By serving
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on multiple boards and by having associates and fam ily members on still more, a
coterie of insiders coordinated corporate growth.56
Corporations also used their technologies to protect and insulate their
corporate status. W h e th e r it was the city o f Philadelphia watching w ater use,
canal companies controlling traffic, or banks manipulating the m oney supply,
corporations increasingly used their position in the econom y to cajole the
legislature into providing them with special protections fa r beyond the wildest
dreams of individuals or partnerships. Their ability to do so signaled the
culmination of the genesis of corporate power.
In the early 1830s, Philadelphians certainly remained proud o f their city.
They noted that th e ir Fairmount W aterworks had becom e the w onder of
residents, visitors, and lithographers alike. They counted the tons o f coal and
grain coming down a network of canal and river navigations to th eir busy
wharves and they listed the banks, insurance companies, and their respective
capitals proudly in their newspapers and city directories. Already, new railroads
promised even greater efficiency and riches. Such projects and institutions
evidenced the city’s prosperity and the energy of its citizens and transform ed the
structure of the local and even the state economy. For better or worse, the men
who ran large corporations had found answers to the area’s needs and in return
exacted a price of profits and power. In constructing and adm inistering river
navigations, w ater distribution systems, a banking system, and insurance
operations, they replaced the old ways of building and keeping pow er with new,

55For analyses of consolidation of control of finances and manufacturing, respectively, in Boston, see
Naomi Lamoreaux, Insider Lending: Banks. Personal Connections, and Economic Development in
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more permanent, and more far-reaching m ethods of projecting pow er in the
economy and the polity. They had invented corporate power.

Industrial New England (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), and Robert Dalzell, Enterprising
Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made (New York: Norton, 1993).
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T he New Power of Nexus Technologies
The w ater taunted them. Living in the w estern parts of Philadelphia in the
late eighteenth century, one could always hear the Schuylkill River, rushing over
the Falls several m iles northwest of the city. T h e fresh, cool water flow ing by
Philadelphia seem ed heavenly compared to th e som etim es fetid and possibly
deadly well w ater city residents forced them selves to drink. The Falls also
constantly reminded Philadelphians of the existence o f a potential w aterw ay into
its hinterland and perhaps to the west, if only it could be navigated. In the first
decades of the nineteenth century, Philadelphians used various technologies to
conquer the Schuylkill in order to supply the city with w ater and to m ake a cheap,
fast form of transportation to the coal counties upstream . More significantly, the
use of these technologies changed the structure of public power in the city and
the region.
The m otivations behind Philadelphia’s desire fo r a water supply system
were for the m ost part practical, beginning with public health. Yellow fe ve r
attacked alm ost every Am erican city, some repeatedly: Baltimore in 1794, 1795,
and 1797; New York in 1795 and 1799; N orfolk in 1795 and 1797; Charleston in
1796 and 1799; Boston in 1796; New Haven in 1794; Providence in 1797.1
Philadelphia suffered fa r worse than any other. During the sum mer and early
autumn of 1793, yellow fever ravaged Philadelphia, claiming 4,000 lives. In 1797
yellow fever claim ed over 1,200 in the City of B rotherly Love; in 1798 3,500; in
1799 1,000. By all accounts, the poor suffered the most, but no part of society

1 Nelson Manfred Blake, W ater for the Cities: A History of the Urban W ater Supply Problem in the United
States (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1956), 6.
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remained unscathed: “ten of the doctors, ten of the m inisters, even more
lawyers, even m ore m erchants, these of the city's great” were listed in a best
selling necrology in 1793.2 As many as 23,000 people temporarily left the city
during the plague m onths in 1793, and 40,000 evacuated in 1798. In 1797 and
1798, a combination o f city officials and private citizens helped set up two huge
cam ps north and w est o f Philadelphia for the indigent who could not afford to flee
anywhere else.
These yellow fe v e r epidemics threatened Philadelphia’s future as a
political and com m ercial center during a period when its collective psyche w as
already reeling from its im pending loss of political em inence: both Pennsylvania
and the United States w ere in the process of relocating their seats of governm ent
away from the Q uaker City. Anyone with relatives outside the city or enough
m oney— including the Pennsylvania State Assem bly— fled the plague during the
summer, and the United States Congress moved tem porarily to Trenton.3 ‘T h e
opulence of our m etropolis,” bemoaned Pennsylvania governor Thomas Mifflin,
“sustained an incalculable loss, by the suspension o f its commerce and its arts;
the obstruction o f public business, and the derangem ent o f moneyed
institutions.” He fu rth e r warned that “the general prosperity of our state will be
immediately endangered” unless all could work “to avert, as fa r as human
agency can avail, the recurrence of so awful a visitation.”4 The governor's words

2J.H. Powell, Bring Out Your Dead: The Great Plague of Yellow Fever in Philadelphia in 1793 (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 281.
3George Edward Reed, ed. Papers of the Governors, vol. 4 of Pennsylvania Archives, no. 4 (Harrisburg:
State of Pennsylvania, 1900), 267.
4 Reed, Papers of the Governors. 406.
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reflected those of his constituents, who thought that “the reputation & salvation of
the City [was] at stake.”5
A fter so much tragedy, controversy remained over what would prevent
further “awful visitations”: no one knew the cause of yellow fever. Some blamed
the influx o f immigrants from the French W est Indies, where yellow fever and
slave revolts made refugees out of rich and poor alike. Two thousand Haitians
crowded into the poorer sections o f Philadelphia, a city of about 50,000 before
the plagues hit.6 Accordingly, Pennsylvania and Philadelphia both enacted law
after law to quarantine and eventually prevent immigration during plague years.7
But the plague continued. Others, including the fam ous Dr. Benjamin Rush,
blam ed organism s in the muggy Philadelphia air, creatures that he insisted for
years cam e from the foul-smelling garbage in the streets of the city.8 Just about
everyone agreed that the foul drinking water and filthy streets, whether or not the
cause o f the plague, exacerbated its effects. Fire com panies vainly tried their
best to clean the streets. In 1796, the city council set aside funds for five carts to
clean and w ater the streets; in 1798, the city ordered the gutters washed and the
streets wetted three times a w eek.9 But washing streets intermittently with dirty
water, Philadelphians discovered, did not make them clean.

5Thomas P. Cope, Philadelphia Merchant: The Dfarv of Thomas P. Cope. (South Bend: Gateway Editions,
1978), 31.
6 Powell, Bring Out Your Dead. 5.
7 Reed, Papers of the Governors. 264, 267, 384, 397, 407, 426.
8The Journals of Beniamin Henry Latrobe 1799-1820: From Philadelphia to New Orleans, vol. 3 of
Journals. Edward C. Carter II, ed., The Papers of Benjamin Henry Latrobe, no. 1(New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1980), 9.
9 Report of a Committee of the Select Committee of Philadelphia. Read November 10th. 1796 (Philadelphia:
Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1796), 8-9 and William Currie, Memoirs of the Yellow Fever. Which Prevailed in
Philadelphia, and Other Parts of the United States of America in 1798 (Philadelphia: John Bioren, 1798), 3.
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Although Philadelphia's encounters w ith yellow fever were more frequent
and severe than th o se o f other eighteenth-century Am erican cities, its w a te r
supply problems w ere typical. First, there w as barely enough w ater to go
around: citizens petitioned fo r about fifteen new public hand pumps and w ells a
year. Even so, the three hundred or so pum ps and w ells did not always m eet the
need, especially during the winter, and the quality o f the city’s w ater was uneven
a t best. Philadelphia had no sewer system, and so homeowners dug deep privy
holes under their houses. Many of these w ere dug so deep as to contam inate
the underground supply of water from which m any Philadelphians drew th e ir
w ells.10 A few of th e city’s wells were near cem eteries, and after rains th e water
had a ghastly ta ste .11 In October 1798, Philadelphia’s Board of M anagers of
Marine and City H ospitals suggested working the pum ps more often, in the hope
that the “extremely offensive and unw holesom e” w ater would be pum ped out by
clean water underneath.12 A newspaper reported that the pungent sm ell of
standing water assaulted the nose of anyone w ho dared travel in the city, and
even Governor M ifflin admitted that current w a te r sources were “fa r from
affording, either in quality or quantity, w hat health and cleanliness dem and.”13
W ith each new w ave of yellow fever, the dem and fo r w ater grew until “th e [city]
Councils were bored by petitions... & the m em bers were perpetually dinned with
the cry of ‘W ater, w ater; no matter as to expense, the citizens will support

10The Virginia Journals of Beniamin Henry Latrobe 1795-1798. vol. 2 of Journals. Edward C. Carter II, ed.,
The Papers of Benjamin Henry Latrobe, no. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) 379-380.
11 Kenneth Roberts and Anna M. Roberts, eds., Moreau de St. Mery's American Journey. 17931798(Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1947), 262-263.
12Currie, Memoirs of the Yellow Fever. 108.
13Blake, Water for the Cities. 8; Reed, Papers of the Governors. 412.
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you.’”14 Mifflin certainly did not hurt his popularity when he claim ed that the
single best w ay to prevent more epidem ics was the “introduction o f good and
wholesom e water.”15 Clean w ater seem ed the best way to douse the hellish fire
o f yellow fever.
O f course, yellow fever w as not the only fire that needed dousing in
eighteenth-century American cities, built largely of wood. A nother motivation for
a m ore reliable, frost-free w ater su p p ly was fire prevention. N early a quarter of
New York City's houses burned to the ground in 1776. Philadelphia, where
Franklin had founded the first fire com pany in the colonies, was equally sensitive
to fire ’s danger. In 1791, widespread reports o f arson prompted Philadelphia’s
city officials to post round-the-clock fire patrols and to offer a $1,000 reward for
the arrest of offenders.16 Four years later, the Pennsylvania G eneral Assembly
allowed Philadelphia to prohibit the construction of wooden buildings in the main
parts o f the city, legislation applauded by both insurance com panies and
stonem asons.17 Searching for a w ell with enough water to put out a blaze in
Philadelphia provided a constant challenge fo r local firefighting com panies.
Israel Israel, an innkeeper, stable-keeper and local politician, provided the
city's ruling Federalists with a third m otivation fo r solving the city's w ater woes. A
local Revolutionary hero, Israel had w orked selflessly for the city during the 1793
yellow fever plague, serving on the O rphan Committee and helping run the

14Cope, Philadelphia Merchant. 31.
15Reed, Papers of the Governors. 412.
16Thomas J. Scharf and Thompson Westcott, History of Philadelphia. 1609-1884 (Philadelphia, L. H.
Everts & Co., 1884), 1:467.
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impromptu Bush Hill hospital.18

He lost bids fo r a seat in the state legislature in

1793 and 1795, both tim es running on a solidly Anti-Federalist platform— causing
Richard Peters to w onder why so many were “not fond of stable men and stable
measures.”19 The third tim e appeared to be the charm for Israel when he finally
beat opponent Benjam in Morgan in a close election in August of 1797, but
Morgan cried foul. Israel had eked out an overall victory by garnering a huge
m ajority of the poor vote while the more prosperous (read: Federalist) voters had
fled the plague-ravaged city.20 After petitioning the General Assem bly on a
technicality, Morgan w on a run-off the following February. The Philadelphia
councils at the time w ere predominantly Federalist. Although no council
members made any public admissions to the effect, thoughts of yellow feverskewed voting dem ographics may have given them pressing political reasons to
do whatever possible to end Philadelphia’s blight.21
Prompted by the request of a growing num ber of petitioners, in 1798 the
City Councils formed a “Joint Committee on the Subject of Bringing W ater to the

^Gertrude MacKinney, ed., Executive Minutes of the Governors, vol. 2 of Pennsylvania Archives, no. 9
(Harrisburg: State of Pennsylvania, 1931), 967 and James Hosmer Penniman, Philadelphia in the Early
Eighteen Hundreds (Philadelphia: St. Stephen's Church, 1923), 35.
18Powell. Bring Out Your Dead. 164.
19Samuel Breck, "Witty Sayings of the late Richard Peters, District Judge of the United States for Eastern
Penna.Died in August 1828, aged 83.Collected, set down and arranged by Sami. Breck, who was his friend
and neighbour in Blockley township, Belmont District for Thirty Years," (mss.,), Breck Papers, Case 25,
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
20John K. Alexander, "Poverty, Fear, and Continuity: An Analysis of the Poor in Late Eighteenth-Century
Philadelphia," in The Peoples of Philadelphia: A History of Ethnic and Lower-Class Life. 1790 - 1940. ed.
Allen F. Davis and Mark H. Haller (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973), 23.Federalist candidates
and their followers tended to be much more wealthy than their opponents, and election turnout was
unusually low in the plague years of 1793 and 1797; see Table 5, “Distribution of Wealth by Party
Candidates, 1800” in Richard G. Miller, Philadelphia—The Federalist City: A Study of Urban Politics. 17891801 (Port Washington. NY: Kennikat Press, 1976),15, and Figure 3, “Voter Participation in Philadelphia;
Miller, Philadelphia—The Federalist City. 150.
21 For a full discussion of the connections between Philadelphia politics and the yellow fever epidemics,
see Martin S. Pemick, “Politics, Parties, and Pestilence: Epidemic Yellow Fever in Philadelphia and the
Rise of the First Party System,” WMQ 3d. Ser., 29 (October 1972), 559-586.
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City” to investigate various options fo r supplying Philadelphia with fresh water.
This Joint Com m ittee was organized strictly fo r the temporary purpose of
deciding w hat would be the best w ay to solve the w ater problem, and it explored
three possible methods: the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal, which was an
unfinished predecessor of the Schuylkill Navigation Company, and two plans for
steam -engine powered waterworks, one from local inventor Oliver Evans and the
other from British-trained architect and engineer Benjamin Henry Latrobe.
The Joint Committee settled on the last proposal, despite their wariness
over steam engines. In some ways, Latrobe’s was the most technically dubious
of the three plans; a canal booster derided it as “aerial castles."22 But after
months o f exasperating negotiations with the recalcitrant directors o f the
Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Com pany, com mittee opined that the poorly
managed canal com pany appeared to be more concerned with “the profits to be
m ade by supplying the city with w ater” than its obligations to the city, suspicions
reinforced by the company’s exorbitant demands 23 Moreover, the patrician
Com mittee members may have been som ewhat suspicious of Evans, a man
fiercely proud of his artisanal background. More likely, the largely Federalist city
councils had no desire to hand out plums in the form of large contracts to
Republican Evans. Latrobe, on the other hand, nearly seethed sophistication,

22 Address of the Committee of the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company, to the Committees of the
Senate and House of Representatives on the Memorial of Said Company (Philadelphia: John Ormrod,
1799).
23B. Henry Latrobe, Remarks on the Address of the Committee of the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal
Company to the Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives, as Far as It Notices the “View of
the Practicability and Means of Supplying the City of Philadelphia with Wholesome Water. Printed bv order
of the Committee of the Councils (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799),14.
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w as English— always a plus with Federalists— and had no political am bitions.24
Furthermore, three prom ises o f Latrobe’s design proved crucial to its adoption: a
pipe system which w ould distribute the w ater into m ore areas of the city,
discounted water piped directly into investors’ homes, and, perhaps m ost
importantly, the inclusion o f public hydrants, which m ade the water available fo r
free to the entire population.25 Lastly, in a city undergoing an image crisis,
Latrobe’s suggestion to sheath the upper engine in a graceful pumphouse, giving
it the appearance o f a tem ple of republican technology, provided an elegant
landm ark.26
The Joint C om m ittee’s selection of a double steam engine system fo r the
city’s water supply exem plified the myriad ways that politics and power shaped
technological choice in the early republic, especially fo r large-scale infrastructure
projects. Just as local governm ents would do throughout the antebellum period,
the Philadelphia C ouncils were initially willing to engage in som e type of
partnership with a chartered company, in this case the Delaware and Schuylkill

24David Freeman Hawke suggested that Evans was not patrician enough for the Watering Committee in
Nuts and Bolts of the Past: A History of American Technoloov 1776-1860 (New York: Harper & Row, 1988),
63-68; he also argued that Latrobe's pumphouse was crucial. While these may have been minor factors,
the Council members were more concerned with politics. Although Latrobe was well-connected among
Republicans—he had a letter of introduction from Thomas Jefferson— he also was friendly with prominent
Federalist Bushrod Washington, respected by Philadelphia Federalist Samuel Fox, and had no political
ambitions. Thus, the Federalist -dominated Council found Latrobe more politically palatable than staunch
Republican Evans, who ran for election to the Councils on several occasions. In 1802, when Evans gained
a seat on the city’s Common Council, he submitted a report arguing that much of the Latrobe system—
already constructed—was inefficient, especially the two-engine design; the report was narrowly rejected. In
1812, the city finally scrapped the two-engine power plant, replacing both with one high-pressure engine
built by none other than Oliver Evans.
25 Benjamin Henry Latrobe, View of the Practicability and Means of Supplying the City of Philadelphia with
Wholesome Water in a Letter to John Miller. Esquire from B. Henry Latrobe. Engineer. December 29. 1798
(Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799).
26Both the Centre Square waterworks and the Fairmount waterworks were excellent examples of the
technological sublime in American culture. See Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the
Pastoral Ideal in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967) and David E. Nye, American
Technological Sublime (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).
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Canal Company, to provide a public service.27 The city had an honored tradition
o f private entities serving the g reater good: a host o f fire com panies, the Library
Com pany, the Pennsylvania Hospital, and numerous mutual aid societies, to
nam e a few. But in negotiations between the canal com pany and city officials,
the com pany constantly overestim ated the strength of its bargaining position.
Perhaps in 1796, when it still had som e money and its leadership was still active,
the com pany might have been successful, but by 1798 its leadership had
unraveled. Robert Morris, the com pany's founder and president, had speculated
heavily in western lands; rather than seeing sturdy houses go up, he saw his
financial house of cards collapse. In March 1797, he was frantically trying to
unload a half million acres of land, and his form er political clout quickly
evaporated as news of his insolvency spread 28 Joseph Ball, a canal company
officer, had been a Philadelphia alderm an in the early 1790s, but no longer held
office; John Nicholson, form er Philadelphia council member and Pennsylvania
attorney general, had gone down with Morris. Delaware and Schuylkill Canal
Com pany board representatives m ade proposal after proposal, each more
unacceptable than the last: fo r the city to pay the $350,000 to take the entire
canal off their hands after years o f failure; for the city just to buy stock in the
enterprise and thus not have control over their own water; or for th e city to pay
$200,000 to take water from the canal and still pay for part of the canal’s

27The considerable scholarly work done on the nature of public-private cooperation on infrastructure will be
addressed in its particular relationships to finance, ideology, and corporations in their respective chapters.
28Morris tried to organize a holding company for all his lands, in the desperate hope that sales of shares
would provide enough money to keep him afloat; see Plan of Association of the Pennsylvania Property
Company. Established March 1797 (Philadelphia: R. Aitken, 1797).The plan was unsuccessful.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

76

maintenance.29 All this fo r a project that at its current rate of progress would
have city residents die o f old age if not yellow fe ve r before they would drink
Schuylkill water. A fte r a long series of fruitless negotiations, Latrobe emerged as
a deus exmachina to solve Philadelphia’s w ater problem, despite the am bitious
nature of his proposal.
Latrobe’s plan worked as follows. A sea wall reaching into the river
guided water into a sm all basin on the east side of the Schuylkill. By the bank, a
large steam engine— with a 40” cylinder, far larger than any yet made in Am erica,
and so powerful that the city leased its excess pow er to its builder— pumped
w ater through a 4 ’6” wide, 7’ high tunnel from below the river’s waterline to
Centre Square, so called because it was in the m iddle of Penn’s plan for the city,
although then still at the western outskirts of city settlement. There, a sm aller
engine— at 32” , still to be the third largest in the country— pumped the w ater from
the conduit to an above-ground reservoir, basically a short water tower.30 That
Latrobe would think of using steam engines was not surprising, given his
background. As a well-read engineer, he knew th at steam engines had first
been designed to pum p water out of mines, and his design showed striking
similarities to a waterw orks in Chelsea, not fa r from his boyhood London hom e.31
Once in the above-ground reservoir, the water flowed by gravity through wooden
mains down the m ajor streets, and residents got w ater from public hydrants or by

2 9Report to the Select and Common Councils on the Progress and State of the Water Works on the 24lh of
November. 1799. (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799).
30Carroll W. Pursell, Early Stationary Steam Engines in America: A Study in the Migration of Technology
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution, 1969), 32.
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building a connector a t th e ir own expense from the main to their property. The
m o st aesthetically attractive part of the plan was the pumphouse in Centre
Square, a beautiful, geom etrical structure: a box (containing the engine, fuel,
parts, and tools) fronted by G reek columns and topped by a dome (containing
th e upper reservoir). Sm oke from the engine’s fire escaped in a plume from the
top o f the dome. The plan impressed m any Philadelphians as a sophisticated
exam ple of the application of the latest technology to one of their direst needs.
Despite the pum phouse’s elegant shape, its contents proved unreliable.
Latrobe’s engines w ere inefficient, partly as a result of their design and partly
because of the inexperience of the builders. The W atering Committee replaced
th e lower engine in 1808, and in 1813 scrapped both engines for a single, highpressure one from O liver Evans situated farther north on the Schuylkill, in an
a re a soon to be renam ed Fairmount. That engine, too, was replaced in 1819.
T w o years later, the city threw a dam across the river at Fairmount, finally
harnessing the cheap pow er of the river. Above the dam, the city built the
gorgeous Fairm ount w ork; with gardens added in the 1830s, it became one o f
th e m ost celebrated and pictured spots in antebellum America.
The decision o f steam over a canal was motivated largely by non
technical considerations and held significant political consequences for
Philadelphia. It m eant that the water supply system would be run by the city.
T h e Joint Com m ittee becam e the Watering Com m ittee, a de facto perm anent
body. Alone am ong subcom m ittees of the City Councils, the Watering

Latrobe, Correspondence 1784-1804. 141-142.Also see Darwin Stapleton, “Benjamin Henry Latrobe and
the Transfer of Technology,” in Carroll Pursell, ed., Technology in America: A History of Individuals and
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Committee gained control over a separate budget, authority to e n te r into
contracts, and the ability to hire and fire its own em ployees. As city councilmen,
members o f the W atering Committee were elected officials; nonetheless, they
possessed fa r m ore influence and econom ic leverage than the entire city
governm ent had before the construction o f the first waterworks. In effect, the
W atering Com m ittee became a governm ent-within-a-governm ent, collecting its
own taxes in the fo rm o f water rents and making overtly political decisions about
city development as it decreed where new water m ains would go and when. It
issued its own printed annual reports and kept its own records separately from
the City Councils’. It owned land, paid its own bills, and ran a grow ing
bureaucracy, running up substantial debts in doing so. The W atering Committee
commanded a large part of Philadelphia’s budget, the surest sign of power in any
political entity.
Beyond the W atering Committee's new fiscal power, the construction of
Latrobe's pipe distribution system as opposed to the above-ground gutters
proposed by the canal com pany resulted in greater income, authority, and
responsibility for th e city government. The pipe system required hookups to use,
either private ferrules (pipes connecting mains to delivery system s) to houses
and businesses o r public hydrants. Therefore, any person o r neighborhood
wanting water could only obtain it through the W atering Com m ittee. W hen the
system became operational in 1801, the city passed an ordinance setting
residential water perm its at five dollars a year and charging “brewers, sugarrefiners, hatters, soap-boilers, inn-keepers, dyers, curriers, and others, who will

Ideas (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), 34-44.
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require the water for other purposes than the supply o f th e ir private-dwelling
houses” at rates proportional to the amount o f w ater to be consumed.32 A few
wealthy residents were so anxious to get Schuylkill w ater that they advanced the
city interest-free loans to have mains installed on th eir block.33 All sorts of
businesses signed up, including ones like distillers, whose work was water
intensive, and banks, w hose officers wanted the running w ater fo r prestige and
convenience. Some firm s paid as much as $80 fo r the privilege. The largest
customer, year after year, was the almshouse, fo r an outrageous $100, proving
that even charities had to pay their share. The W atering Com mittee could not
charge private fire com panies because they used the public hydrants; however,
as of 1812, private fire com panies had to apply to the W atering Committee for
permits to test or clean their engines and hoses. Three years later, the W atering
Com mittee gained control over the annual $2,000 disbursem ent to fire
com panies to help defray equipm ent costs.34 In 1822, the city passed an
ordinance giving the W atering Committee its own rent collectors, separate from
city tax collectors; thus, the W atering Committee now had alm ost total control
over its own cash flow.35

32City of Philadelphia, PA., “An Ordinance for Regulating the distribution of water in the City of
Philadelphia,” in John C. Lowber, comp. Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: to Which
are refixed, the Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the City
(Philadelphia: Moses Thomas, 1812), 178-179.
33Report of the Watering Committee to the Select and Common Councils. November 1. 1803 (Philadelphia:
William Duane, 1803), 20
34City of Philadelphia, PA., “A Further Supplement to ‘A Ordinance for regulating the Distribution of Water
in the City of Philadelphia,” Lowber, Ordinances. 229; City of Philadelphia, PA.,"An Ordinance granting aid
to the Fire Hose, Engine, and other Companies in the City,” Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of
Philadelphia: Passed Since the Eighteenth Day of June. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twelve
(Philadelphia: Philadelphia Councils, 1815), 9-10.
35 City of Philadelphia, PA., “An Ordinance for the Better Collection of W ater Rents,” Ordinances of the
Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia.Passed Since the Twenty-Seventh Day of December. One Thousand
Eight Hundred and Twentv-One (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1823), 227-231.
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Other more practical legislation included a series of m easures specifying
size and length of hookups, m aterials, and stopcocks, all of which had to be
installed according the W atering Com m ittee’s exacting standards. The city
councils enacted individual m easures to solve specific, practical problems. For
instance, an 1809 law specified th a t private hook-ups fo r city w ater include a
stopcock attached “at the distance of twelve inches from the gutter to prevent
accidents from the leakage o f said pipe.”36 The sum o f these laws, however,
amounted to more than their individual parts: they represented an
unprecedented degree of the city corporation’s adm inistrative control over its
residents. Anyone in Philadelphia wanting Schuylkill w a te r had to lobby the
W atering Com mittee to have a m ain put in, pay a W atering Com m ittee rent
collector, and hire a W atering-C om m ittee licensed plum ber to install a hook-up
according to W atering C om m ittee specifications. The W atering Committee
carefully parlayed its control o v e r w ater distribution into m any arenas of the city’s
operation.
Finally, through its handling o f the financing and ongoing costs of the
waterworks and its ability to aw ard construction contracts, the W atering
Committee became a powerful entity in financial m atters, in party politics, and in
city. Until the Fairmount w orks w ere converted to w aterpow er in 1821, the
system ’s steam engines devoured fuel twenty-four hours a day. Constructing
mains and connections required thousands of feet of wood, lead, and finally iron

36City of Philadelphia, PA., “An Ordinance for Further Regulating the Distribution of Schuylkill Water,
Collecting the Rents Thereof, and for other Purposes Therein Mentioned,” John C. Lowber, Ordinances of
the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: to Which Are refixed, the Original Charter, the Act of
Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the Citv (Philadelphia: Moses Thomas, 1812), 227.
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pipes, all of which needed m aintenance and replacements. Even the m ost
casual readers of Philadelphia new spapers could not have m issed the W atering
Com mittee advertisem ents calling fo r bids on thousands of fe e t o f lumber, on
bushels of coal, on carpentry work, on masonry work, and on tunneling work.
These were the routine expenditures, not including the enorm ous sum s spent on
initial construction. Alm ost all such costs were contracted out, giving the
W atering Committee trem endous potential for patronage contracts.
The am ount of m oney the W atering Committee had a t its disposal for
such contracts began high and grew astronomically. Latrobe’s original estimate
fo r his waterworks was $127,000 fo r construction, not including m aintenance.37
According to W atering C om m ittee calculations, the total cost as of O ctober 12,
1801 was $220,310.55; as of N ovem ber 1, 1803, $296,604.34; a year later,
$336,830.99; and five years after that, $482,212.5538. In any given year, from
the first acceptance of the Latrobe proposal in 1799 through 1825, the
construction, maintenance, and financing of Philadelphia’s w a te r supply system
commanded a huge portion of the city government’s energies and resources,
measured either in total dollars (see Figure 1) or as a percentage of city
expenditures (see Figure 2).39

37Latrobe, View of the Practicability.
38Report of the Committee for the Introduction of Wholesome Water into the Citv of Philadelphia
(Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1801); Report of the Watering Committee to the Select and Common
Councils. November 1. 1803 (Philadelphia: William Duane, 1803), 5: Report of the Watering Committee to
the Select and Common Councils. November 1. 1804 (Philadelphia: Robert Cochran, 1804), 13: Report of
the Watering Committee to the Select and Common Councils. November 2. 1809 (Philadelphia: Jane
Aitken, 1809), 15.
39Not including 1804, for which the surviving data are incomplete. I have included in water expenditures all
payments expressly dedicated to the waterworks as well as ancillary costs including paving over pipes,
construction of pipes, machinery for pipe boring, the purchase of land and water rights for Fairmount, debt
service on waterworks construction (as designated by the councils and as an estimated portion of overall
debt service). From this total, I have subtracted waterworks income deposited in the sinking fund including
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Figure 1
Philadelphia Expenditures, 1799-1825:
Total Annual Expenditures by Dollar Amount
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Figure 2
Philadelphia Expenditures, 1799-1825:
Waterworks as a Percentage of Total Expenditures
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both water rent and sale of old or excess materials. Not included are funds for pumps and wells not
connected to the central water supply system, interest on city loans because of cash-flow problems induced
by payments for the waterworks, or opportunity cost on waterworks investment. Thus, the water
expenditures as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 are, if anything, probably lower than the actual costs of the
waterworks bom by the Corporation of Philadelphia.
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O ver the entire period from 1800 to 1825, the waterw o rks soaked up nearly 47%
of total city expenditures; in every one of those years, tota l waterworks costs
exceeded outlays for any other city service or project, even more than fo r
fortifications during the W a r o f 1812. Only tw ice d u ring that period did the
waterworks cost less than 30% of the city’s dollars (1809 and 1811, at 27.4%
and 25.3%, respectively); in nine different years, the w aterw orks constituted over
half of all city spending, reaching over 60% at least fo u r tim es.40 By the 1820s,
the Fairmount waterworks supplied water reliably to Philadelphia and several of
its suburbs, and the W atering Committee decided h o w and where every penny
was spent. With its hands on hundreds of thousands o l municipal dollars in
building and maintenance of the nation's first grand m unicipal infrastructure

40An Ordinance for Raising Supplies, and Making Appropriations, for the Services and Exigencies of the
Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson,. Jr., 17991: Report of the Joint
Committee of the Select and Common Councils, on the Citv Debts and Expenditures, and the Citv Credits
and Resources (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1801; Report of the Joint Committee of the Select
and Common Councils, on the Citv Debts and Expenditures, and the Citv Credits and Resources
(Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 18021: Accounts of the Corporation, for the Year 1802 (Philadelphia:
Robert Cochran, 1803); Report of the Committee of Councils. Exhibiting a Correct Statement of the
Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year 1803 (Philadelphia: Wm. Duane, 1804);
Report of the Committee of Accounts, to the Select and Common Councils. February 8th. 1804
(Philadelphia: Robert Cochran, 1804); Accounts of the Corporation of th e Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year
1805 (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1806); Committee of Wavs and Means Report for Appropriations for 1806.
accompanied bv An Ordinance for Raising Supplies and Making Appropriations for the Services of the Citv.
for the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred and Six, and An Ordinance to Assess L ew and Collect a Tax on
Personal Estate (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1806); Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia,
for the Year 1806 (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1807); Committee of Wavs and Means Report for
Appropriations for 1807. accompanied bv An Ordinance for Raising Supplies and Making Appropriations for
the Services of the Citv. for the Year One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seven (Philadelphia: [Jane
Aitken?], 18061: Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. For the Year 1806 (Philadelphia:
Jane Aitken, 1807); Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year 1807 (Philadelphia:
Robert Cochran, 1808); Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year 1808
(Philadelphia: Robert Cochran, 1809); Accounts of the Corporation of th e Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year
1809 (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1810); Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia, for the Year
1810 (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1811); Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia for the Year
1811 (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1812); Report of the Committee of Accounts, with the Report of the
Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company on the Present State of the Bridge (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1813);
Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia for the Year 1812 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey,
1814) Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia from the twenty-third of December. 1816. to
the first of April. 1819 (Philadelphia: the Councils, 1819); Accounts of the- Corporation of the Citv of
Philadelphia from the first of April. 1819. to the first of April. 1823 (Philadelphia: the Councils, 1823);
Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: from April 1. 1823. to January 1.1828 (Philadelphia:
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project, the W atering Com m ittee had become the behem oth of Philadelphia
politics.
Just as control over the waterworks gave th e W atering Committee great
leverage over m unicipal affairs, control over transportation projects provided
great leverage over regional development issues.41 From the very beginning,
inland navigation schem es often resulted in intense political struggles.

The

design of a canal o r river navigation dictated w hat kinds of goods, how many,
and how fast those goods could travel, and what th e costs of construction would
be.

Trem endously expensive, they begged the question of who would bear the

cost o f construction, the controllers, the users— usually represented by
municipalities and state governments— or a com bination of both. Perhaps the
most pressing issue becam e that of control: who w ould run a given project once
com pleted and the extent to which owners could profit from it. And of all the
transportation im provem ents in the Philadelphia area, none had a greater im pact
upon the Philadelphia region in the 1810s and 1820s than that of the Schuylkill
Navigation as it m ade the Schuylkill River navigable fo r both upstream and
downstream traffic.
The Schuylkill Navigation Company initially was typical of early internal
improvements in th a t its first promoters generally did not expect stock dividends;
rather, they wanted transportation projects to provide synergies with other
investments, making their land speculations or com m ercial forays inland more

Philadelphia Councils, 1828); General Accounts, Corporation of Philadelphia, vols. 3-5, Philadelphia City
Archives.
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profitable.42 Proponents of internal im provem ents in the early republic usually
supported th e ir projects other rationales beyond the possibility of dividends,
touting national o r regional econom ic developm ent, defense preparedness, and
the further unification of the new nation in term s o f interregional trade,
com munication, and goodwill.43 They did so w ith good reason. Despite the
protestations o f pro-canal and pro-turnpike literature, up until the 1810s everyone
understood th a t such projects tended to lose m oney, and so did not provide
enticements o f direct profit.44 Hinterland trade and land speculation, though,
were both popular investments, and smart m oney knew that accessibility to the
market, that is, cheap transportation for the bulky produce of the backcountry,
could mean the difference between gain and loss. Accordingly, land speculators
and merchants in the hinterland trade carefully rationed money into ancillary
projects that would make their prim ary investm ents profitable: roads, turnpikes,
canals, and river improvements.45
Josiah W h ite ’s first attem pt to provide better water transportation
exemplified early internal im provem ent efforts. He entered the field not to profit
from the transportation itself but because the transportation could make his main
business more remunerative. W hite ran a wire-pulling plant on the east bank of

4 ^With the possible exception of one predecessor, Boston’s Long Wharf, no municipal project approached
the scale of the Philadelphia first waterworks for twenty years, about when the Fairmount works would
replace them as the standard-bearer for another two decades.
42See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of motives for investment in internal improvements.
43See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the ideology and rhetoric of internal improvement in the early
republic.
“^ T h e most successful of early canal projects in terms of physical utility was the Middlesex Canal, which
eventually paid some dividends but never recouped its investors’ capital. For a detailed investigation of the
trials and tribulations of that project, see Christopher Roberts, The Middlesex Canal. 1793-1860
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938).
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the Schuylkill, ju st north o f the city, on lands at the Falls o f the Schuylkill. The
W ar of 1812 proved to be a mixed blessing: suddenly there was great dem and
fo r his iron products, but British coal and Virginia coal becam e scarce, and
lumber costs skyrocketed.46 Like many others in the Philadelphia area, W hite
began looking fo r alternative sources of fuel.
The im m ediate solution to Philadelphia’s fuel crisis turned out to be the
end of the war.

N ot only did British coal become more available, but also a

flood of cheap British finished iron goods to Am erica sent the domestic American
iron industry into a tailspin. However, during the War, expectations were even
higher than profit m argins, and Philadelphia’s artisans cast about desperately for
a cheap source o f energy. The long-term solution to Philadelphia’s energy
shortage was a technological innovation typical for its com bination of conscious
intent and random luck, one that could “afford a supply o f fuel to the capital, not
only indispensibly required at this period of distressing want, occasioned by the
interdiction and destruction of the coasting trade, but commensurate with its
utmost demands fo r centuries to come.”47 The discovery of anthracite coal held
huge implications fo r Pennsylvania’s industrial future. W hite had heard of a kind
of “hard” or “stone” coal available from up the Schuylkill. He knew that Frederick
Graff, the superintendent of the waterworks, had tried to use it in 1808 to no

45And vice versa: land speculators often asked, before purchasing unsettled plots, whether “they lay near
the proposed route of the Canal or any turnpike Road of consequence?” March 4, 1826, Andrew Bayard,
Letterbook, personal business, 1806-1831, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
46Josiah White’s autobiography, Josiah White's History Given Bv Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and
Navigation Company, 1909) is interesting but episodic. For a lively account of White’s long career, see
Eleanor Morton [Elizabeth Gertrude Stem], Josiah White: Prince of Pioneers (New York: Stephen Daye
Press, 1946).
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avail; this W a te ring Committee failure remained on hum iliating public display, the
unburned rocks used to gravel paths around the central pumphouse. The
problem w as sim ple: no one could get the stuff to lig h t W hite bought some and
his workm en trie d and tried, one day finally slam m ing the door of the furnace
shut and knocking off for supper. W hen one cam e back, having forgotten his
coat, he found th e furnace red-hot and called back his coworkers. They
proceeded through four runs of iron before the furnace finally cooled. White
im m ediately realized that this different kind of coal, anthracite coal, could solve
P hiladelphia’s fu e l dilemma and quickly set out to find a way to transport large
quantities o f it to the city.
The slow adoption of anthracite coal as a viable fuel testifies to the
im portance of accum ulated knowledge in our understanding of technological
diffusion, that is, the rate at which the use of a given technology spreads.48 A
newer, “superior” technology— although that notion is problem atic— does not
im m ediately or com pletely supplant an older, perhaps less efficient one,
especially when th e new one requires different skills, equipment, or methods
than the old. Anthracite coal burned hotter and longer than the “soft” or
bitum inous coal Philadelphians shipped in from Britain and Virginia, important
qualities fo r anyone working with metal, and it burned with less residue. But
anthracite did n o t ignite easily; Frederick Graff, the superintendent of the
waterworks, had abandoned its use in 1806 because, when his workmen had

47Berks County petition to the Pennsylvania Legislature from 1814, as quoted in History of the Coal Lands.
and Other Real Estate. Owned bv the New-York and Schuylkill Coal Company (New York: Geo. F. Hopkins,
1826 ), 15 .
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shoveled some on th e fire, the anthracite sm othered it. Lighting anthracite, in
fact, turned out to be counterintuitive because the high temperature necessary to
ignite it required a m ethod fundam entally different than that currently used to
light other materials. Early nineteenth-century Am ericans set fire to wood,
charcoal, and “soft” coal by giving them as much air as possible. But anthracite
proved completely different; as one observer later explained, “the more they
scratched and poked a t it— an operation necessary with the bituminous coal—
the worse it was with the anthracite.”49 W hen workers at W hite’s shop slam m ed
shut the door of the furnace, they most likely did so in utter frustration, because
for them closing the d o o r meant putting out the fire. T he ir accidental discovery,
though, was not the firs t successful use o f anthracite in Philadelphia. In 1785,
the omnipresent Benjam in Franklin printed a pam phlet explaining how to burn
anthracite coal in his fam ous stove, and O liver Evans patented his own stove
specifically designed fo r burning anthracite thirteen years later.50 Charles Cist, a
Lehigh valley entrepreneur, had tried for years to sell anthracite in Philadelphia,
at one point helping to publish a pam phlet with endorsem ents from Evans,
W hite, and the now m ore knowledgeable G raff.51 But not until well after Josiah
W hite widely publicized “ his” discovery and large supplies began floating down
the Schuylkill and Lehigh navigations in the m id-1820s did the use of anthracite

4®See Joel Mokyr, “Technological Inertia in Economic History," Journal of Economic History 52 (June1992),
325-338 for an interpretation of the reluctance to adopt technological innovations.
49Charles V. Hagner, Earlv History of the Falls of Schuylkill. Manavunk. Schuylkill and Lehigh Navigation
Companies. Fairmount Waterworks. Etc. (Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen, and Haffelfinger, 1869),, 42.
50Oliver Evans to Charles Miner, as quoted in Charles Miner, ed., Lehigh Coal. Certificates from a Number
of Persons. Shewing the use and Value of the Lehigh Stone Coal, with Some Prefatory Remarks (WilkesBarre, PA: Charles Miner, 1815), 5.
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become widespread. T he W atering Committee had been willing to leap to a new
technology, steam engines, fo r labyrinthine political reasons, but most of
Philadelphia’s artisans and other residents were reluctant to use the new
technology of anthracite because of the more m undane m otivations of habit and
familiarity.
Josiah W hite not o n ly promoted the use of anthracite, but he also decided
to make it available to consum ers. Unfortunately, the lack of supply became
even more difficult to solve than the lack of dem and: the closest anthracite fields
lay up the Schuylkill, w hich was unnavigable upriver beyond Philadelphia. Here
again, politics determined the solution to a technological problem, in this case
the challenge of transporting anthracite coal to a m arket one hundred miles away
from where it was mined. W hite had trouble rounding up investors, and when he
finally did, they lobbied the Pennsylvania legislature to charter the Schuylkill
Navigation Company.

Its purpose was to render navigable the length of the

Schuylkill River that stretched from the coal fields in sparsely settled central
eastern Pennsylvania through Reading and on to Philadelphia before it flowed
lazily into the Delaware River. Three years and much wrangling later, White and
his backers finally got th e ir charter.52 Even then, the state stipulated that the
com pany spend an equal am ount of money and tim e com pleting the potentially
less profitable section above Reading. Once the charter was granted, financial

51 Miner, Lehigh Coal. For a detailed treatment of one entrepreneur’s early efforts to sell anthracite, see H.
Benjamin Powell, Philadelphia’s First Fuel Crisis: Jacob Cist and the Developing Market for Pennsylvania
Anthracite (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978).
52See Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion of the Schuylkill Navigation Company’s problems in
acquiring its charter.
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troubles and technical reverses convinced im patient investors to force W hite
from the Company, but w ork continued.
Schuylkill Navigation Company officials had to deal with a host of
obstacles. They built canals to bypass falls and rapids; they used hammers o r
gunpowder to elim inate im pediments such as rocks and tree-stumps; they used
dam s to alleviated shallows; and they used reinforced locks and especially
strong dams to negotiate spring freshets (what are now referred to as flash
floods). By the time it w as finished, the Schuylkill Navigation ran 108 miles, 62 o f
them by canals that skirted falls, rapids, and shallows, and the other 46 by
channels and pools in the river, all having towpaths. There were 120 locks and
lock-keeper's 65 houses. Com pany officials estim ated traveling speed along the
navigation to be four m iles per hour through the pools and channels and three
through the canals. W h ether those were downstream or upstream rates was
unclear, but, for the first tim e, barges filled with goods could travel the length of
the Schuylkill.53
Routing provides an example of how different groups shaped inland
navigation technologies, often in ways that hindered the project’s efficiency. The
response of the citizens o f Reading to the Schuylkill Navigation Company's
original routing plans was a typical case of politics overcom ing engineering.
Reading lay on the east side of the Schuylkill River a t one of its rapids. Because
the town’s economy was based upon its service as both a milling site and as an
entrepot for the surrounding countryside, Reading residents made sure that no

53January2,1826, Minute Books, October 1815-November26, 1849, Box1, MG-110, Schuylkill Navigation
Company, Pennsylvania State Archives.
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local transportation project bypassed th e ir town. In the 1820s, when the Union
Canal was to connect the Susquehanna R iver to the Schuylkill navigation,
com pany officials planned the route to e n te r the Schuylkill below Reading. They
did so as a m atter o f economy: it was a cheap solution that involved building a
dam and putting the canal over bedrock rath er than going through Reading. The
latter route necessitated an expensive a queduct and included a path over
limestone, which because of its porous quality form s an inferior bed fo r canals.
However, Reading residents complained th a t the new route would “avoid
Reading altogether and thereby deprive the citizens of any chance of navigation,
the river, or the canal,” which the feared “w ould be productive of the m ost fatal
consequences to th e ir town.”54 So som e prom inent Reading citizens form ed a
com mittee that prom ised to waive dam ages— one of the main reasons for
avoiding densely settled areas— and successfully negotiated with the Union
Canal Company, the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany, and the legislature fo r a
more advantageous route. The new arrangem ent took nearly four years to
settle, pushed back the completion of the Union Canal, and proved to be a “great
source of interruption and delay” fo r tffe Schuylkill navigation “caused by the
nature of the lim estone formation over w hich it pass[ed].”55 The citizens of
Reading influenced canal engineering through the use of lobbying and letterwriting; all the parties involved understood th a t well-to-do mill owners with
connections in the statehouse could be ju s t as daunting obstacles to canal

54Letter dated August 4, 1825, quoted January 25, 1828, V-1674, Minutes of Board of Managers of Union
Canal Company, 7/30/1827-12/31/1831, Reading Company, Accession 1520, Hagley Museum and Library.
55Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company, to the Stockholders.
January 3. 1831 (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Co., 1831), 13.
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construction as more physical barriers. Canal operators were especially
cognizant of the econom ic dimensions of the routes, and planned accordingly.
Maurice Wurts, president of the Delaware and Hudson Canal, recalled an
incident in which “the line [of the canal] was changed to the manifest injury of
public interest after the w ork was commenced, first to effect the purchase [of
property along the route], and again altered back to the original design, after the
object was accom plished.”56 Cost had everything to do with it, physical
engineering none.
The width of canal and river navigations became another engineering
issue influenced by social concerns. Unlike later standardization controversies
such as railroad gauge and electrical voltage, canals and river navigation
com panies never agreed upon regional or national specifications for depth and
width. For one, they lacked many of the features that engendered the
standardization of other technologies. Canals were not the dominant form of
transportation long enough to form governing bodies, their heyday lasting a mere
decade from the m id-1820s to the mid-1830s. They never form ed a national or
even a regional system; m ost inland navigations connected rivers to other lakes
or rivers which then led to large bodies of water rather than other canals, and so
no one perceived a need fo r uniformity. Secondly and m ore importantly, river
navigations and canals technologies were particularly sensitive to local
geography. True, Am erican canal engineers found ingenious solutions to a
variety of challenges, including long tunnels through mountains, aqueducts over

56Maurice Wurts Papers, Series 2, Undated, 1805-1822. Wurts Family Paper, Vanuxem Collection, Hagley
Museum and Library.
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valleys and rivers, special locks tha t regulated w a ter flow, steam-powered
engines to pump w ater uphill, and cem ent that could dry underwater. One
problem no engineer could solve was a lack o f water. A canal could only be as
wide and deep as the water supply warranted. However, the Union Canal
Com pany tried desperately to keep a route that clearly had serious water-supply
problems. They eventually fired engineer Laom m i Baldwin, even engaging in a
pam phlet w ar with their disgruntled ex-em ployee over the proper width o f the
canal. Both sides considered which kinds of cargoes they would encourage
coming down the navigation, the possible size o f boats that might use it, and the
costs associated with excavating canals of various widths and differently
designed cross-sections57 Neither, however, ever addressed the main problem
that underlay their differences: the Union Canal did not have an adequate water
supply to support a very wide waterway. In this controversy in which the physical
limitations of the technology should have been the main point of consideration,
concerns of cost and economic potential dom inated.
Once its routing decisions were made, the Schuylkill Navigation Company
acquired its first license to charge tolls before the spring season in 1819 and a
trickle of coal and other goods found its way down the river that spring and
sum m er.58 It was for the most part com pleted by 1825, the year the anthracite
coal m arket took off carrying the corporation’s fortunes with it. The com pany

57Letters on the Union Canal of Pennsylvania. First Published in the “Boston Daily Advertiser [Boston?,
1826].
58PhiIip Justice and Seth Craige to William Findlay, Governor of Pennsylvania, January 30, 1819,
Pennsylvania Department of State, Record Group 26, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Internal
Improvements File, Canal & Navigation Companies, Schuylkill Navigation Company No. 42, Folder 1,
Pennsylvania Sate Archives.
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to o k in $20,123.91 in tolls and in rents fo r com pany real estate during 1825,
a lm o st six times the previous year’s total. In 1829, the Schuylkill Navigation
C om pany declared its first dividend, paying $3.50 a share in profits. C om pany
s to ck reflected its newfound success; only a few years before, the com pany had
no t been able to sell any at the original price of $50 a share; now they fetched
around $75.59
The com pletion of the Schuylkill Navigation along with the Union Canal
th a t fed into it m arked the beginning of the econom ic explosion of the Schuylkill
R iver Valley.60 The navigation’s construction involved a huge infusion of m oney
into the region in the form of wages and the purchase of construction m aterials
such as lumber, stone, and lime as well as other supplies. Through 1826, the
Schuylkill Navigation C om pany had spent over $1.8 million on improving the
river.61 Real estate values rose, both because the com pany purchased parcels
fo r canals and tollhouses and because farm lands, mines, and mills along the
river became more profitable now that residents could transport their goods more
cheaply. By a stipulation in its charter, the com pany deposited its operating
funds at the Farm ers B ank of Reading, thereby increasing the area’s m oney
supply.62 Although the overseas demand for w heat dropped at the end of the

59Schuylkill Navigation Company, Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation
Company, to the Stockholders. January 4. 1830. (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Co., 1830), 6.
60See Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development in the Philadelphia Region. 1810-1850 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1978), 121-151.
61 According to official company reports, $1,858,985.42; Report of the President and Managers of the
Schuylkill Navigation Company, to the Stockholders. January 1. 1827 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1827),
9.
62Acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company (Philadelphia:
Joseph & William Kite, 1838), 3. The above were all typical benefits of canal and navigation construction;
see Harvey Segal, “Canals and Economic Development,” in Carter Goodrich, Canals and American
Economic Development (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 224.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95

W a r o f 1812, Schuylkill valley residents used the navigation to specialize in m ore
m arketable crops and to b etter exploit the m iles and miles o f coal beneath
them .63 They began sending not only huge quantities o f anthracite downstream
but also all sorts o f goods extracted from the ground. In 1827, for example,
31,630 tons of coal, 1472 tons of limestone, 526 tons of iron ore, 678 tons of
marble, and 6,078 tons o f building stone found the ir way down the Schuylkill,
accom panied by traditional agricultural products including 31,436 barrels of flour,
24,244 bushels of w heat, 12,951 bushels of corn, 1,643 bushels of rye, 6,151
bushels o f flaxseed, and am ple quantities of o th e r com m odities such as live
hogs, apples, eggs, soap, nuts, glue, whiskey, tallow, bark, and even rags.64
Such increased m arket participation made them better able to afford the
cornucopia of goods flow ing up the navigation. These included regular
household products such as china and cloth, delicacies such as fresh oysters,
and construction m aterials like limestone and plaster. If the Schuylkill navigation
allowed residents to w e t th e ir feet in the market, a good m any o f them dove in
head first.
Because econom ic development in the Schuylkill River Valley depended
upon the navigation, th e Schuylkill Navigation Com pany, in its ability to
determ ine toll rates fo r various commodities, m odulate the volum e of traffic,
change the route of the navigation, and m odify the width of the waterway held
huge influence over local economies along the 108 m iles of the improved river’s

63Lindstrom, 121-151.
^ R e p o rt of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company, to the Stockholders.
January 7. 1828 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1828), 9.
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banks.65 Just as the Watering Com mittee becam e a center of m unicipal power,
the Schuylkill Navigation Company becam e a center of regional power. W hat
common characteristics did their technologies hold that helped their
administrators grasp such power?
The centralizing phenomenon shared by waterworks and the navigation
resulted from th e effects of their serving as “nexus technologies.” The navigation
and waterworks each formed a nexus of constant interaction between controllers
and the custom ers who employed these technologies in countless ways.
Philadelphia residents used Fairmount w ater every day for a myriad of purposes:
to cook dinner, wash clothes, distill spirits, and fight fires. They also heated their
houses and fueled their furnaces with coal th a t had been shipped down the
navigation, and used the Schuylkill navigation to sell their finished goods in
upriver markets. In essence, the waterworks and the navigation produced
nothing tangible. Rather, they provided constant occasion for Philadelphia’s
residents to exchange opportunities in return fo r the tolls the navigation company
demanded or th e w ater rents and taxes that the Watering Committee levied.
The navigation and the waterworks, as nexus technologies, diffused
benefits to nearly everyone in the areas they affected. In other words, not only
could stockholders prosper, but also others could use the technologies for their
own ends. Furtherm ore, such benefits were continuous, as opposed to discrete:

65The Schuylkill Navigation Company, by its original charter, could charge up to 12.5c a ton below
Reading, and 8c a ton above; however, it could set its own toll any amount less than that, and could also
charge different rates for different commodities. In 1821, the Pennsylvania legislature amended the charter
so that the Schuylkili Navigation Company could charge whatever it wanted, as long as its annual dividends
did not exceed 25% . Given competition from the Lehigh Coal and Canal Company from 1828 on, the
Schuylkill Navigation Company's rates fell well below the legal maximum. Acts...Relatina to the Schuylkill
Navigation Company). 3, 24.
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people used them constantly, ra th e r than making a single purchase or
interaction. These tw o qualities, diffusion of reward and continuity of exchange,
m ade nexus technologies q ualitatively different than other technologies in terms
o f th e ir increasing centrality to th e growth of the m arket exchange econom y in
the early republic.66 The P hiladelphia region's econom y expanded intensively
and extensively, th a t is, in te rm s o f productivity and income a s well as the
increasing pervasiveness of m a rke t participation and behavior. The use of
infrastructure technologies a llo w e d people to enter the m arket m ore fully and to
becom e more productive once engaged in it.67 New m arket participants found
that nexus technologies soon b eca m e indispensable to their engagem ent with
the economy, and the people w h o controlled such technologies thus placed
themselves in positions of great leverage over the m arket activities of others.68
The waterw orks’ and c a n a ls ’ centrality in the m arket and diffusion of
reward distinguished these pro je cts from previous econom ic ventures in the

6 6For insightful discussions on the inherently political nature of technology, see Langdon Winner, The
Whale and the Reactor A Search for Limits in an Aae of High Technology (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1986), p. 19-58, and Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in
Political Thought (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979).
67For the classic account of the role of transportation in American economic expansion during this period,
see George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution. 1815-1860 (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe,
1951). Shaw’s Canals for a Nation provides a good overview of the effects of that particular technology;
Nathan Miller, in The Enterprise of a Free People: Aspects of Economic Development in New York State
During the Canal Period. 1792-1838 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), argued that the Canal Fund
was just as instrumental as the canal in N ew York’s development. Also see Carter Goodrich, ed., Canals
and American Economic Development (N ew York: Columbia University Press, 1961).
68Perhaps nexus technology in early nineteenth-century America most purely manifested itself in the form
of banks. Banks were essentially a technology for multiplying investors' money for use by the community;
banks, insurance companies, various financial instruments, investment strategies, and the like will be
addressed in the next chapter.
Furthermore, although this chapter addresses technologies in the context of a marketplace, distributed
benefits should not be confused with the purely economic terms “multiplier effects,” “social benefits,"
“indirect benefits,” or “externalities,” each o f which refer to a theoretically quantifiable return enjoyed by
those other than the investors. I am using distributed benefits to define the way nexus technologies, by
their strategic location at the center of social and economic activities, can be exploited by their controllers
(investors or administrators) and their users (who are usually not principally the controllers) in
fundamentally different ways, ways that have deep political and social implications not measured or
properly defined in economic theory.
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United States that could not diffuse benefits on the sam e scale. That is, only the
owners, planters, farmers, tradesm en, or merchants w ho owned a stake in such
projects profited from them . Various technological advances in agriculture and
manufacture tended to provide limited benefits. Agricultural advances, such as
the cotton gin or introduction o f new farm ing equipment, could increase
production either through reducing labor costs or increasing yields, respectively.
Yet, in either case, only the people who adopted such new machinery or
techniques made more m oney. The sam e holds true fo r industrial innovations:
fo r example, while the clattering o f the looms at Lowell barely drowned out the
clanking of coins in the Boston associates’ bank accounts, those who did not
invest in textile factories had little to show for Am erica’s newfound textilemanufacturing com petence.69 These technologies proved effective in producing
physical goods, but proved com paratively limited as fa r as providing returns of
profit and power.
Nexus technologies form ed a critical innovation in scale for the
accumulation of influence because of their potential to “lock in” customers whose
own activities would increase w ith the use of the technology. Economists Robin
Cowan and W. Brian Arthur have described the phenom enon of “technological
lock-in,” in which the adoption of a given technology becom es more and more
prevalent until that technology becom es dominant. Lock-in is particularly likely

69Some manufacturing technologies could be considered to have limited nexus technology qualities. A
good example for early nineteenth-century America was the adoption of Oliver Evans’s techniques for fully
mechanizing flourmills, which increased the mill owner’s profits while potentially lowering milling costs for
neighboring farmers. However, such interaction occurred only once a year— harvest time—and was fairly
localized in nature. Additionally, one of the central tenets of neoclassical economics is that the individual
pursuit of self-interest always contributes to economic growth and efficiency; however, neoclassical
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when, as in the case of nexus technologies, use o f the technology has increasing
returns and when high barriers exist for potential com petitors.70 Both of these
conditions held for waterworks and for internal navigations. W hereas profits, and
thus power, from other technologies grew only geom etrically, nexus technologies
had potential for exponential growth. Revenue from technologies such as the
cotton gin or mill im provem ents only grew in proportion to the am ount of labor
and either land or m achinery an owner could put into production; double the land
o r the spindles, double the profit, triple the land o r spindles, triple the profit. But
fo r nexus technologies, growth seemed unbounded. W hile the Philadelphia
waterworks required high initial investments, it had the potential to grow with the
city. Upon completion in 1802, it provided water to less than a quarter of
Philadelphia’s approximately 43,000 residents; by 1830, it provided all of the
w ater for Philadelphia’s population of 80,000, and perhaps half fo r the additional
87,000 in nearby suburbs, a total of approxim ately 123,000 people.71 Thus, the
W atering Committee had indirect influence over a huge num ber of people, all
through a technology that, by the late 1820s, had begun to pay back the city’s
huge investment. The Schuylkill Navigation, m eanwhile, was the lifeblood of
econom ies all along the river: Pottsville, Port Carbon, Schuylkill Haven,
Hamburg, Reading, Pottstown, Phoenixville, Norristown, Conshohocken,
Manayunk, and western Philadelphia. From a trickle in 1818, the goods going up

economics does not address the ways that different kinds of economic activity have different political and
social consequences, which is at the center of this argument.
70See W . Brian Arthur, “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical Events,”
The Economic Journal, 99 (Mar. 1989), 116-131 and Robin Cowan, “Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in
Technological Lock-In," Journal of Economic History 50 (Sep. 1990), 541-567.
71 Population statistics from drawn from Lindstrom, Economic Development. 25.
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and down the river turned into a flood in the late 1820s: tolls increased almost
every year well into the 1830s, reaching a high of $604,190 in 1837 (see Figure
3C).72 The navigation had a place in as many lives as did the waterworks, and
so the controllers of these two nexus technologies touched a great many people.
Nexus technologies also exhibited great potential for extending power
across vast distances. Patrons usually limited their pow er to certain
neighborhoods or groups in the case of a city, or a t m ost two or three adjoining
counties in the hinterland. For the Watering Com m ittee, influence reached
wherever they could install a w ater main, thus extending through all of
Philadelphia proper by the 1810s and into connecting suburbs in the 1820s.
Meanwhile, the Schuylkill Navigation Company’s Board of Managers made
decisions affecting perhaps m ost of the people living within twenty miles of their
navigation, an area of 2,000 square miles, for the Schuylkill was now their
connection to markets regional and beyond. No one depending upon other
technologies could hope to project influence on anything approaching that scale
in terms of physical space.
More subtly, but also more profoundly, controllers of nexus technologies
learned to exploit them to create a new kind of power. The em ploym ent of nexus
technologies created new dependencies among th e ir customers, ones that,
unlike patron-client power, did not depend upon face-to-face contact. As early as
1818, subscribers to the waterw orks included 3,296 dwellings and 194 other

72Because the Schuylkill Navigation Company lowered tolls several times in response to competition from
the Lehigh and elsewhere, the accounting of tolls under-represents Schuylkill Navigation Company traffic
growth in terms of both traffic and value of goods. Minute Books, Box 1, Oct. 15-Nov. 26, 1849, MG-100,
Schuylkill Navigation Company, Pennsylvania State Archives.
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customers such as soap boilers, distillers, paper factories, hatters, inns, stables,
and banks, to nam e a few; other Philadelphians got their water from ubiquitous
public hydrants.73 Meanwhile, local eco no m ies all along the Schuylkill grew
because of the availability of fast and inexpensive transportation up and down
the navigation. In each case, a trem endous num ber o f people depended upon
either the w aterw orks o r the canal fo r th e ir water, th e ir livelihood, or both. W hen
the waterworks did not work, neither could tanners o r brewers, much less those
w ho needed w ater to drink, cook, or clean. Therefore, prospective bondholders
were not the only boosters for the usually costly im provem ents in the
waterworks; the people whose businesses o r jobs depended on the water
form ed a powerful constituency in favo r o f such policies.
Controllers o f nexus technologies could dem onstrated their power in
either brash or subtle ways. Adm inistration o f the waterworks required the
enactment and enforcem ent of a series of m easures fo r “regulating the
distribution of Schuylkill water.”74 W a te r w as a public resource, so the W atering
Committee had to conserve and protect it, but their doing so held consequences
beyond mere reservoir levels. In 1801, the city councils passed one law
imposing fines ranging from $3 to $50 plus costs of repair and recovery fo r
intentionally breaking pipes or mains, and another law imposing a $1 fine plus
cost of recovery fo r “a wanton or willful w aste of... w ater.”75 Five years later, the

73Report of the Watering Committee to the Select and Common Councils. Read January 14. 1819
(Philadelphia: Philadelphia Councils, 1819).
74The first was in 1801, "An Ordinance for Regulating the Distribution of Water in the City of Philadelphia."
Lowber; it was supplemented again in 1801, in 1806, twice in 1809, in 1818, and in 1821.
75May 7, 1801, “An Ordinance for Regulating the Distribution of Water in the City of Philadelphia,” The
Ordinances of the Citv of Philadelphia to Which Are Prefixed, the Act of Incorporation and the Several
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city added $5 fines fo r “soaking, or rinsing... manufactured” goods such as hats,
dyes, and leather, opening hydrants unnecessarily, and a hefty $20 penalty for
illegally adding connections to a m ain and fo r augmenting one beyond the
contracted size.76 Eventually, Philadelphians could incur legal punishm ents for
not using strong enough stop-cocks, fo r not covering them properiy, for using
someone else’s water, fo r not using licensed plumbers, and fo r not having pipes
at the right depth am ong a host of o ther petty offenses. These measures were
necessary for the efficient operation o f the waterworks: im proper installations
made repair difficult and caused leaks that resulted in mud in the sum mer and
treacherous ice in the winter. Nonetheless, such ordinances did more than
merely ease m aintenance and save water: by criminalizing any “improper” water
use, the W atering Com m ittee could use the force of the state to establish and
defend the city corporation’s position as arbiter of water supply and distribution.
Meanwhile, boatmen, merchants, farmers, and operators depended upon
the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany fo r their economic wellbeing. Such people,
who usually owned no stock, would support company officials when they lobbied
fo r laws that would give them more leverage in eminent domain suits or that
would impose harsh penalties for those convicted of sabotage on canals.
Several clauses in the Schuylkill Navigation Company’s charter— a rather typical
early nineteenth century canal charter— addressed the im portant issue of

Supplements Thereto: Together with the Address of George Washington. Late President of the United
States, to His Fellow Citizens (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1798). May 22, 1801, “A supplement to
an Ordinance for Regulating the Distribution of water in the City of Philadelphia,” Lowber.
76 March 15,1806, “A supplement to the Ordinance for Regulating the Distribution of Water of the City of
Philadelphia,” Lowber.
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damages.77 “Damages” encom passed any cost to landow ners contiguous to the
waterway whose property had been injured by the com pany, including flooding
from the dammed river, crops tram pled by workmen, and construction detritus.
Pennsylvania granted the com pany the right to put its constructions anywhere
along the river, that is, on anyone’s property, and to pay the damage done,
taking into account not only th e cost of replacement bu t the also the advantage
the landowner received by being along the navigation— advantage being defined
as increased property value. This definition of advantage represented a hidden
subsidy to the navigation com pany: offsetting the legally retrievable cost of
damages with increased real estate market value m eant th a t company workmen
and officials could cause substantial harm to properties along the navigation
without having to pay for them .78 The navigation com pany had thus gained an
economic advantage over o th e r participants in the m arketplace.
The navigation com pany's leverage was not lim ited to its relationships with
neighboring property owners. W hen anyone, including boatmen, teamsters, or
local residents, in some w ay injured the navigation, he o r she had to pay twice
the damages, as well as the com pany’s cost in recovering them. Not only that,
but also the company decided upon the cost of dam ages against the navigation,
while a six-member, theoretically impartial panel decided upon damages to
landholders.

In 1821, the com pany managed to have the legislature amend its

77 Acts... Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company. 3.
78Legal scholar Morton Horwitz has argued that the changes in laws dealing with damages amounted to a
juridical redistribution of the wealth from poor property owners to corporations. He somewhat over
emphasized the upward redistribution of wealth in that the land bordering canals or rivers tended to be
valuable land or mill property, but was correct in the general principle. Morton J. Horwitz, The
Transformation of American Law. 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 67-70.
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charter so that the com pany could appeal a n y decision on damages to a panel
from any county in th e state; whom ever lo st the appeal would pay for all court
and travel costs— a risk that plaintiffs against the com pany could ill afford.79
Thus, in its confrontations, Schuylkill Navigation Com pany officials held all the
cards: lower settlem ents, the cost of “im provem ent” (whether or not landholders
wanted a navigation along their property), a lower burden of proof, double
damages, potentially friendly appeals panels, and the risk of high court costs.
The Schuylkill Navigation Company’s Board of Managers successfully used its
nexus leverage to press for laws allowing it to bully its less powerful neighbors.
River navigations and waterworks operated as nexus technologies
because of their p e culiar historical context. Early nineteenth-century
Philadelphia was engaged in a market exchange economy. Goods transported
along a canal brought profits, and the ability to transport goods cheaply in turn
gave motivation fo r others to enter the m arket or to increase current m arket
production. Nexus technologies did not create the market; rather, people used
them to extend the m arket. The Philadelphia region was undergoing spectacular
demographic and econom ic expansion. W ith ou t such growth, water rents and
canal tolls m ight have remained constant o r increased only in direct proportion to
extensions in either system , limiting the attraction fo r large investments and large
investors. In m any cases, profits never approached expectations for m any
infrastructure im provem ents. And despite th e potential for the consolidation of
power and authority, nexus technologies did not necessarily reach the extrem e

79Acts... Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company. 24.
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of “authoritarian technics,” to borrow Lewis M um ford’s phrase.80

T o be sure,

Joseph S. Lewis, as president o f the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany after 1825,
seemed to be the m ost pow erful person in Philadelphia. On the o th e r hand, the
W atering C om m ittee was com posed of elected representatives; on a t least one
occasion, incum bents lost reelection because o f cost overruns on the
waterworks. Indeed, M um ford noted that the pow er that large-scale
technological system s could con fe r was limited by the structure of the
organization that adm inistered them. For m any nineteenth-century projects that
lost money, such as the feeders to the Erie Canal, users fared better than
investors; the exchange of pow er had the potential to tip toward the users rather
than the controllers.
In the case of the waterworks, though, the leverage of nexus technology,
like the water, generally flow ed in one direction despite the benefits drawn by
users. For the W atering Com m ittee, the ability to em ploy the waterw orks to
extend its own pow er and the pow er of the city corporation even beyond its
borders became evident during the planning stages o f the expansion o f the
works at Fairm ount in the late 1810s. As fast as the city of Philadelphia proper
was growing, its suburbs gained population at an even higher rate. Like any
adolescent, one o f the Philadelphia’s growing pains involved learning how to
control and coordinate its extrem ities, in this case the residents and governments
of neighboring com m unities: the Northern Liberties, Spring Gardens, Southwark,
and Moyamensing, all o f which bordered the city but were separately

80Lewis Mumford, “Authoritarian and Democratic Technics." Technology and Culture 5. (Winter 1964), 1-8.
Mumford postulated that large technological systems were particularly vulnerable to centralized control and
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incorporated m unicipalities of Philadelphia County. In 1818 and 1819, the
W atering Committee began investigating ways to lower costs and make sure that
the water supply would keep pace with the population. They planned to replace
the old, steam-powered waterworks with a system whose energy came from a
dam thrown across th e Schuylkill. Considerations fo r the new system included
higher reliability, greater output, and the elimination of fuel costs, all important
practical goals fo r w ater supply systems.
The W atering Com m ittee also saw the proposal as a way to make money
fo r the city and extend its administrational influence over the suburbs through the
sale of surplus water. In 1819, a W atering Committee report pointed out that
“the adequacy of the supply of W ater to the City, and the ability it affords of
supplying the districts, and thereby adding materially to the income of the City,
will... justify the expenditure” on the new system.81 Thus, the city could
potentially reduce its own tax burden by charging the suburbs for water. The
suburbs would pay annual tribute to the city. The city soon built its fabulous
Fairmount waterworks with its surrounding parks and gardens, and the suburbs
provided much of its ongoing m aintenance costs. For the suburbs, paying
Philadelphia fo r w ater w as like paying rent as opposed to owning. Suburban
governments could avoid the large up-front costs of building their own systems.
They implicitly decided to pay a different price: rather than building equity in their
own independence, they became ever more dependent upon Philadelphia fo r

thus contributed to the consolidation of bureaucratic power.
81 “Report of the Watering Committee on the Subject of Obtaining Water Power from the River Schuylkill,"
February 5,1819, City Council 120.42, Committee on Water, Papers 1804-1854, Box A3118, Philadelphia
City Archives.
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their w ater needs. In political system s, the ab ility to command taxes is a nearly
direct m easure o f power, and th e W atering C om m ittee was now using the nexus
of the waterworks to rein in the city’s sm aller neighbors.
W hile control over w a te r pricing gave Philadelphia leverage over its
suburbs, the regulation of that w a te r proved to be an even more insidious fo rm of
conscious municipal m anipulation. Philadelphia’s 1827 contract with Spring
Garden, an agreem ent typical o f those betw een the suburbs and the city,
included m any seemingly m undane conditions: Spring Garden’s pipes and
ferrules had to be a certain size and its hydrants had to meet the sam e
specifications as those in Philadelphia. Such restrictions made extensions to the
system much less difficult to construct because mains and fittings could be
ordered in standardized sizes. O ther parts of th e contract displayed some
concern fo r overall water supply stability: S pring Garden could only wash its
streets during the same periods as the city, tim es generally chosen when th e
reservoir was full and demand low. Many clauses of the agreement more baldly
dem onstrated Spring Garden’s subordination. The suburb was only to receive
w ater if Philadelphia had enough fo r its own needs; Spring Garden was to
appoint a local water rent collector, but all books and assessments had to be
approved by Watering Com m ittee; Philadelphia charged Spring Garden
residents 50% more than its own residents fo r private water; Spring Garden was
required to enact all the sam e ordinances and regulations as Philadelphia had
relating to the distribution and w asting of w ater; and, most crucially, the W atering
Com m ittee could shut off the suburb’s w ater if Spring Garden did not pay rent or
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if its pipes were not properly m aintained.82 This final stipulation, giving
Philadelphia inspectors— W atering Committee em ployees— the authority to shut
o ff Spring G arden’s water, provided the Watering C om m ittee with the m ost
leverage: as anyone who is fam iliar with plumbing knows, if one wants to “fin d ” a
leak one need only look. Thus, Spring Garden was vulnerable to m unicipal
blackmail. Taken as a whole, such contracts provided the W atering Com m ittee
with more than control o ver Philadelphia suburbs’ water; the nexus technology of
w ater supply gave th e W atering Com mittee influence o ve r suburban
administration, ta x collection, and legislation. In driving such hard bargains, the
W atering Com m ittee definitely demonstrated the potentially centralizing effects
of nexus technology.83
For the Schuylkill Navigation Company, tension between founder W hite
and the company’s boardm em bers, who had been elected by big investors,
symbolized the distinction between interest in the w aterw ay fo r its physical utility
and interest in its potential fo r profits. While W hite cam e up with the idea of
making the Schuylkill navigable, he did not have the cash necessary to
implement it; a collection o f financial bigwigs not only helped push the charter
through the legislature but also becam e the com m issioners named in the charter
to be responsible fo r supervising the company’s 1815 general stock offering.
The stockholders soon elected a Board of Managers— the early nineteenth-

82 “Contract between Corporation of Philadelphia and Spring Garden, February 16,1827,” City Council
120.42, Committee on Water, Papers 1804-1854, BoxA3118, Philadelphia City Archives.
83For a brief discussion of suburban ambivalence to the Fairmount works, and the role of the waterworks in
Philadelphia’s eventual annexation of its suburbs, see Howard Gillette, Jr., “The Emergence of the Modem
Metropolis: Philadelphia in the Age of Its Consolidation,” in William W . Cutler, III and Howard Gillette, Jr.,
eds., The Divided Metropolis: Social and Spatial Dimensions of Philadelphia. 1800-1975 (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 1980), 5-6, 21.
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century equivalent of a board o f directors. The board included, am ong others,
such financial and political notables as com pany president Cadwalader Evans,
Jr., who together with his father, Cadwalader, Sr., oversaw one of the city’s
grandest m ercantile empires; treasurer C lem ent C. Biddle, of the banking
Biddles; merchants Manuel Eyre and C aspar W . Morris, and brewer Joseph
W atson, the latter three all once or future m em bers o f Philadelphia’s city
councils. W hite, despite his efforts and enthusiasm, did not have the political or
financial heft to gain election. Nonetheless, having put in a good part of his small
fortune, he worked nearly full-tim e on the navigation, and the com pany benefited
greatly from his energy and his experience in already having damm ed the lower
Schuylkill.
In the spring of 1817, W hite proposed constructing a tem porary channel
to allow transport along the lower Schuylkill, from below Reading to Fairmount,
just above Philadelphia.

He remained com mitted to getting anthracite to m arket

and to his factory and submitted a plan to the board that included charging the
nominal am ount of five cents a bushel. W hite reasoned that this small fee, being
a large discount from turnpike tolls, would encourage traffic and would keep
business on the Schuylkill rather than shunting it to the Lehigh River. However,
boardm embers pointed out that, by law, they could charge up to twelve dollars a
bushel, which was exactly what they intended to do; they were even willing to
wait another year or two for the perm anent navigation to be in place. W hite later
lamented that the Board “spurned my offer of 5 c a bushel & laughed at our
pretended Rivalship from the Lehigh, & thus ended our last intercourse with them
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on the subject o f using their navigation.”84 Clearly, the Board, representing large
investors, and W hite, representing those who would use the navigation, had
diverged: the controllers of the project saw the navigation in term s of long-term
profit rather than its im m ediate physical utility.
Seven years a fter the Board laughed White out of th e ir meeting, they sent
an even more unm istakable m essage that they knew how to manipulate the
navigation’s nexus characteristics to th e ir advantage. Because both the
navigation and the Fairm ount works required the Schuylkill’s waters for their
operations, the W atering Committee and the Schuylkill Navigation Company
clashed frequently over who owned the rights to the Schuylkill’s water, water
power, and banks. In 1824, as part o f a series of com plicated agreements
between the city and the company, the W atering Com m ittee was supervising the
construction of a dam and a canal, both o f which would be owned by the
company. The com pany and the W atering Committee bickered constantly over
the materials, design, route, and specifications; in short, ju s t about everything
they could find to disagree about.

The largest controversy concerned the

building of an expensive retaining wall, fo r which the city would foot the bill.
Com pany officials sent a letter to Joseph S. Lewis, erstwhile president of the
W atering Committee, that concluded by reminding him that if the dam and canal
were not well-made, “the Board of Managers do not think it necessary to add any
thing more to enduce the W atering Com m ittee whose constituents are so deeply

84Josiah White. Josiah White’s History Given bv Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation
Company, 1909), 18. White accepted the Board’s dare, going on to found the Lehigh Coal & Navigation
Company, whose business eventually eclipsed the Schuylkill Navigation Company's in nearly every
measure of corporate success, including revenues, profits, and longevity.
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interested in th e navigation o f the Schuylkill to o rde r the walls to be im m ediately
made.”85

In o th e r words, if the city corporation continued to drag its feet, the

com pany could would bring its case to the council members’ “deeply interested”
constituents— the Philadelphia voters— in the next election. The w all was soon
finished according to Schuylkill Navigation C om pany specifications. The Board
of Managers had used their nexus leverage well.
If, in both o f these cases, one can determ ine when a technology’s
controllers began to use it to extend their econom ic and political clout, how can
that knowledge suggest a general pattern fo r identifying the initiation o f political
exploitation o f nexus technologies? There are three conditions to be met. One
indication of the turning point is the m om ent of prospective profitability: in other
words, when investors who have enough leverage (administrative o r level of
ownership) to exert significant control over the project begin to see it as a way to
extract profits. From then on, they invest not fo r the project's physical utility, for
example, to supply fresh water or to lower transportation costs, but to make
money, regardless of what physical tasks the project performs. However,
profitability, or the probability of it, does not alone distinguish nexus technologies;
after all, one w ould invest in either a canal or a widget-making m achine given the
expectation o f good returns.
The second necessary condition fo r identifying the intentional
manipulation of nexus technology is a pattern of behavior on the pa rt of a
project’s controllers that suggests th e ir use of the project in such a w ay that

85Letter from Schuylkill Navigation Company to Joseph S. Lewis, June 6,1820. Letter Books, Box 1, June
5, 1816-November25, 1824. Manuscript Group 11, Schuylkill Navigation Company, Pennsylvania Sate
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acknowledges the technology's conferring of special leverage. Such behavior
can include subtle form s of blackm ail, such as threatened withdrawal of services
or raising of rates should opponents not give in to political demands— weapons
at the disposal of both the waterworks and canal com panies— or the enlistm ent
o f those dependent upon the nexus technology fo r political support of special
privileges, such as th e Schuylkill Navigation Com pany’s monopoly of Schuylkill
water. The latter gave the com pany all rights to w aterpow er generated along the
Schuylkill, rights th a t form erly had belonged to those w ho owned property along
the river. By m oving in when profits were likely and using the projects to pursue
privileges in politics o r the m arketplace, the men w ho controlled such projects as
the Philadelphia w aterw orks and the Schuylkill Navigation demonstrated quite
clearly their perception of the pow er they could grab through the use of
technology.
The final condition necessary for indicating exploitation of nexus
technology is the em ploym ent o f the state to enforce the social interests—
defined broadly— o f those who control the technology. Obvious cases include
laws to criminalize unauthorized use. For example, in M ay 1801 the W atering
Committee put a m easure through the City Councils im posing a one dollar fine
on “idle and disorderly persons... in practice of collecting about the hydrants...
and wasting water.”86 W hen the waterworks had first been approved, one
justification Latrobe offered fo r the works was to “cool the city” ; however, a bunch

Archives.
86The Ordinances of the City of Philadelphia to Which Are Prefixed, the Act of Incorporation and the
Several Supplements Thereto: Together with the Address of George Washington. Late President of the
United States, to His Fellow Citizens (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1798).
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of ne’er-do-wells hanging about open hydrants on summer nights, w hile not
wasting water from their own point of view, appeared a public nuisance to the
good and proper members o f the city council.87 Laws that allowed Schuylkill
Navigation Company officials to call local sheriffs to arrest those who interfered
with the navigation worked much the sam e way: in 1826, the Pennsylvania
legislature passed a law that imposed fines and even jail sentences fo r bringing
anim als not used fo r towing on com pany towpaths, for going too slow or too fast,
o r for blocking or damaging the navigation, among other petty offenses.88 That
m easure even gave the navigation com pany the authority to enforce speed limits
at its own discretion: boatmen could be fined $20 for going over four miles per
hour, but the company could give written or printed permission to exceed that
rate. The sort of protests that often had been tolerated almost as a m atter of
course in a patron-dominated society, a “clients will be clients” attitude of patron
forbearance, now could be quashed or at least more easily discouraged through
fines and arrests. Furthermore, the navigation company and W atering
Com m ittee had the advantage in legal disputes over damages, precedents that
all sorts of corporations would later use to entrench their power. The monopoly
over water rights, either in Philadelphia by the Watering Committee o r along the
Schuylkill by the navigation company, interposed the state between econom ic
actors, namely, the W atering Com mittee and the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany
on one side, their customers and other citizens on the other. In all o f these
examples, the ability of those who controlled nexus technologies to im pose their

87Benjamin Henry Latrobe, View of the Practicability.
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social and econom ic interests through the use o f the state against all comers—
patrons or clients— testified to the ways th at use o f such projects subtly changed
the construction o f pow er in early nineteenth-century America.
The phenom enon of nexus technology seem s to form a tantalizing
paradox, both fo r th e history o f technology and fo r the study of the early republic.
Those who have looked a t the developm ent o f large infrastructure projects from
the standpoint of technological determ inism either praised such advances as
heralding a new o rde r o f dem ocracy based on increased access to markets,
energy, information, or natural resources, o r castigated them ju st as strongly as
modes of increased authoritarianism .89 Sim ilarly, early republic historiography
has focused on the creation o f a market econom y— made possible by
transportation im provem ents— that both stim ulated greater mass participation in
politics and precipitated greater consolidation of political and econom ic power.90
W hile these two historiographic traditions show remarkable parallels in
addressing the concom itant diffusion and consolidation of power, the y often
interpret such developm ents as being contradictory. What the exam ination of

88Acts— Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company. 28.
89For a typical contemporary account lauding the democratic potential of infrastructure technologies, see
William J. Duane's Letters. Addressed to the People of Pennsylvania Respecting the Internal Improvement,
of the Commonwealth: Bv Means of Roads and Canals (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1811), or, for a
twentieth-century equivalent, David Lillienthal, T.V.A.: Democracy on the March (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1944). Daniel J. Boorstin, The Republic of Technology (New York: Harper and Rowe, 1978)
provides a more historical view. The seminal works warning against the centralizing effects of such
technologies are Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1934) and Jacques
Eliul, The Technological System. Joachim Neugroshel, trans. (New York: Continuum, 1980).
90For a nearly encyclopedic treatment of rising democracy and power during this period, see Charles
Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America. 1815-1846 (New York, Oxford University Press,
1991); Sellers sees the rise of the market as antithetical to broad-based democratic political participation
and power. Also see Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania. 1776-1860
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1948). For the role of transportation improvements, see George
Rogers Taylor’s classic The Transportation Revolution (White Plains: M.E. Sharpe, 1951), which is the most
forceful argument for transportation infrastructure growth as central to American economic and territorial
growth; for canals in particular see Goodrich, Canals and American Economic Development and Ronald E.
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nexus technologies reveals is that these apparent paradoxes are in fact the
complementary developm ents that such projects entailed. Nexus technologies
acted as media fo r a few to concentrate political and econom ic pow er in
exchange for the m any’s ability use them to pursue their own agenda. The more
central the nexus technology is to the economy, and the m ore benefits that are
distributed, the greater the extent of consolidation.
Economic exchanges, w hether by barter, cash, or credit, inherently
include an exchange o f power. It m ay be power over the actions of others, such
as wages or a bribe; it m ay be power in terms of social prestige, such as a title or
a fashionable piece of clothing; it may be power over one’s physical
environment, such as food or shelter. In barter transactions, both parties give
and receive a good o r service; thus their exchange is limited to them selves.91 In
transactions marked by currency, a party that receives cash o r credit now has
the ability to make transactions with other members of society.92 The facility of
exchange that cash and credit offer means more than greater efficiency.
Economic transactions also represent the trading of one kind of power for
another, and, with the spread of money and credit, how quickly that power can
be diffused or concentrated. Buying o r selling something fo r the prevailing
m arket price seem s a fair trade, but it can involve a greatly unbalanced
exchange of power. W ages fo r unskilled labor is a typical case: while the going

Shaw, Canals fora Nation: The Canal Era in the United States. 1790-1860 (Lexington: United Press of
Kentucky, 1990). For Philadelphia’s growth, see Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development.
91These transactions, too, have great propensity toward inequality; for example, slavery was essentially a
trade of labor and sexual submission for food and clothing. The balance of power depends upon who
defines the rate of exchange. In this case, of course, the slaveholders did.
92Chapter 4, on financial institutions, elaborates on the distinctions between cash and credit as they
become relevant to this discussion.
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rate of pay m ay be extrem ely low, the em ployer can exact great physical
sacrifice from w orkers. Economic transactions m ay not always be equal, and
they certainly are rarely what one m ight call fair, but the y are voluntary and
conscious.
From the turn o f the nineteenth century on, nexus technologies like canals
and w ater distribution systems constantly facilitated exchanges, turning the
balance toward th e ir controllers. Those dictating the term s of the transactions
controlled the balance o f power exchange in the econom y. For example, the
W atering C om m ittee acted as a filter between citizens, suburbs, and the city
government. B y deciding what m oney would be spent on the waterworks and
what individuals should pay for water, it entrenched itself in Philadelphia’s
political landscape. Likewise, those who can position themselves as a medium
of transactions gain power from all transactions. Because anyone wanting to
participate in the m arket between Philadelphia and the Schuylkill valley sections
of its hinterland needed to transport their goods down the navigation, the
Schuylkill Navigation Company’s Board of M anagers gained money and political
clout fo r every sale up or down the river. Previously, patrons had dictated those
exchanges fo r th e ir clients; now, municipal bodies o r private companies used
technologies such as the waterworks or canals to a ffe ct the terms of economic
interactions.
Those w ho controlled nexus technologies gained influence, but, as the
term exchange implies, the technologies’ users gained something as well. Just
as the waterw orks brought water to a central reservoir before pumping it to every
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corner of the city, nexus technology tended to centralize o n e kind of power while
diffusing another. For m any in the City of Brotherly Love, t i i e resources
expended on the waterworks seemed well spent, fo r the w a te rw o rk s were a great
source of municipal pride. Philadelphians boasted of th e ir waterworks, first the
pumphouse in Centre Square and eventually the fabulous F a irm o u n t Works.
Latrobe designed the first to be a temple of technology, its elegant classical lines
hiding the steam engine inside. Residents called the s tru c tu re the “pepperbox,”
because of its distinctive shape, a dome atop a box. They reveled when people
from the country visiting the big city “gaped with a s to n is h m e n t [at a hydrant], as
at the tenth w onder of the world.”93

If Philadelphia could ano longer be the

political or the financial capital, it could lead the nation in m a nu fa ctu rin g and
technology. W ithin a few years, exclaimed one city-dwellenr, “ Philadelphians
were more proud of the water works than of Independence Hall. They said one
might as well visit London without viewing W estm inster A b b e y as come to
Philadelphia and not see the water works.”94 Residents fa c e d the nineteenth
century with the waterworks as a sign that Philadelphia w o u ld continue its role as
one of the great cities of the America. The Centre Square sand especially the
Fairmount works and its surrounding gardens appeared in d o z e n s of engravings
and lithographs at home and abroad. The waterworks g a v e residents the

93“Poulson’s Daily Advertiser,” January 29, 1801, as quoted in Blake, W ater f o r the Cities, p. 18.
94James Hosmer Penniman, Philadelphia in the Early Eighteen Hundreds. (Philadelphia: St. Stephen’s
Church, 1923): 43.
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psychic benefits o f living in th e self-proclaimed "M etropolis o f America" in
exchange fo r the considerable resources spent on the w orks.95
More practically, those w ho could afford to receive the fresh, cool
Schuylkill w a te r pumped into th e ir homes gained convenience, prestige, and
privacy in exchange for their w a te r rent; those who could not now got their daily
w ater from public hydrants on nearly every block. By the late 1820s, suburbs
Spring Garden, the Northern Liberties, and Southwark bought their water from
the C orporation of the City, falling into the orbit of the city th a t would incorporate
them in 1854. Owners and w orkers at soap factories, breweries, stables, and
various other ventures used th e w ater for their work. The ability of certain
suburbs or people to get th e ir own w ater signaled their growing ability to distance
them selves from those below them , a critical juncture in form ing class identity in
nineteenth-century America. W hile the Watering Com m ittee centralized its
control of city finance and politics, nearly all of Philadelphia’s residents gained
som ething by the waterworks.
The Schuylkill Navigation also facilitated many levels o f exchange. The
waterway m ade the transport o f anthracite coal to m arket in large quantities from
the mines of northeastern Pennsylvania economically feasible. For
Philadelphians, the coal brought a better source of heat fo r metalworking, for
steam engines, and for heating homes. The flood of anthracite catalyzed
Philadelphia’s development into a national center for the m anufacture of steam

95This is roughly the same phenomena as the current trend of municipally funded stadia for professional
sports teams: residents have the pride of living in a city with a professional team that has national exposure,
in exchange for millions of tax dollars, essentially subsidizing the franchise, while at the same time
contributing to the concentration of capital in both the city and the team ownership.
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engines and heavy machinery.96 Just as important, transportation im provem ents
such as the Schuylkill Navigation significantly reduced the cost of intra-regional
transport, thus allowing the localized specialization th a t boosted efficiency and
provided an engine fo r the area’s econom ic expansion in the first half of the
nineteenth century.97
The Schuylkill Navigation brought ways to distribute a greater quantity of
goods into the hinterland, spurring com merce and m arket production all along
the Schuylkill. Here again, the com pany’s control o f the economy was
complemented by increased general prosperity. Tow ns such as Reading,
Schuylkill Haven, Mt. Carbon, and Pottsville experienced great growth. Such
gains could be wonderful, such as the jo y of eating fresh sea bass 100 miles
inland, “which had such an effect upon the visages of our mountaineers th a t it
would have been a fit subject for the pencil of a Hogarth to imitate,” or troubling,
as many people found the “progress” th a t came w ith the navigation am bivalent at
best. The work of Paul E. Johnson, M ary Ryan, and Carol Sheriff on the Erie
Canal and the people who lived by it during this period testify to the unsettling
nature of the em erging market.98 However, all of them demonstrated the
countless ways that area residents took advantage of the access to m arkets to

96Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., “Anthracite Coal and the Beginnings of the Industrial Revolution in the United
States,” Business History Review 46 (Summer 1972): 141-181.
97This is one of the central points of Lindstrom, Economic Development. For a summary of this argument,
see Diane Lindstrom, “American Economic Growth before 1840: New Evidence and New Directions,”
Journal of Economic History 39 (March 1979), 289-301.
98Pottsville Miner’s Journal. October 3,1829, as quoted in J. Bennett Nolan, The Schuylkill (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1951), 29. For the ambiguous meanings and social upheaval
associated with “progress,” see Paul E. Johnson, A Shopkeepers’ Millennium: Society and Revivals in
Rochester. New York. 1815-1837 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978); Mary P. Ryan, Cradle of the Middle
Class: The Family in Oneida County. New York. 1790-1865 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981);
Carol Sheriff, The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and the Paradox of Progress. 1817-1862 (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1996).
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carve their niche in society. As each of these authors in som e w ay showed, the
ability to participate successfully in the m arket gave many the opportunity to
distance themselves from other social groups. Economic historian Joel Mokyr
has argued that, while technology’s various uses have been the source of much
anguish and destruction, in total its use has resulted in a higher standard o f living
for almost everyone, a rising tide that has lifted all b o a ts ." In early nineteenthcentury America, use o f nexus technologies allowed workers in the market
economy to become less beholden politically to local patrons, by taking
advantage of the quick transportation along the river to turn th e ir own labor into a
marketable com modity. In exchange, the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany not
only collected tolls but also subtly exercised great influence over regional
development.
In short, a great num ber of people exploited the waterw orks and the canal
to establish a distance from workers, while both groups used such technologies
to help themselves break free of the political and social pow er of the rich local
merchants. The bonus fo r the proprietors o f such ventures, beyond their profits,
was the ability to engage those who made the exchange in a growing cycle of
even more subtle, and yet in other ways more profound, dependence. Owners
used nexus technologies to project power across space on a scale far greater
than their gentry predecessors. Some form s of power were diffused toward the
many, while others w ere concentrated by the few.

" S e e Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990).
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By the late 1820s, one would have great difficulties trying to hear the
Schuylkill in Philadelphia, even standing on its banks. If fo r som e reason the
busy wharves and warehouses built in conjunction with the grea t traffic up and
down the navigation w ere quiet and no children or grownups were playing or
shouting along th e park by the waterworks, one still could not listen to its roar:
the falls had been rendered forever silent. Beginning with Josiah W hite’s dam in
1811, and continuing with Schuylkill Navigation’s constant im provem ents and the
W atering C om m ittee’s Fairmount dam, the lower Schuylkill had been
transformed into a series of slow-moving pools, and the falls w ere no more. Only
a few rocks show ed above the water to m ark their dem ise. Philadelphians had
subdued the rage o f the river; now it only boiled when heated fo r tea by coal that
had been shipped down it. The men who had harnessed the river, however, had
used the technologies involved for less trivial m atters: to rem ake power in the
early republic. During the same period, other Philadelphians were using their
indirect dividends o f the waterworks and the Schuylkill navigation to distinguish
themselves from each other and to create lifestyles and rituals that projected
their own identities and interests.100 Nexus technologies acted as one of the
lenses of that transform ation, spreading power in one direction while focusing it
in the other. But fo r people to control technologies, they had to find ways to pay
fo r them. The use and role of money will be the subject of the next chapter.

100Perhaps it is no coincidence that two of the best studies of middle class formation during this period,
Paul E. Johnson’s A Shopkeeper's Millennium and Mary Ryan’s Cradle of the Middle Class both examine
communities along the greatest of nexus technologies, the Erie Canal.
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Consolidating Finance
In 1790, Philadelphia had inadequate transportation to its growing
hinterland, no centralized w ater supply system , and no institutional methods for
financing the necessary im provem ents. O ver the next four decades, the general
public paid little in cash up fro n t for expensive technologies that fostered
Philadelphia’s growth and reaped the rewards in terms of greater economic
opportunities, but later paid dearly in tolls and w ater rents and even more in
term s of lost control over som e of the m ost im portant institutions governing the
city’s economic future. Corporations at first struggled to make ends meet.
Am erica’s first m ajor turnpike corporation, the Philadelphia and Lancaster
Turnpike Company, begun in 1792, w ould have a mediocre financial record, but
one much better than the failed Delaware and Schuylkill Canal C om pany and
Schuylkill and Susquehanna Canal N avigation Company projects of the 1790s.
The city corporation struggled mightily to pay fo r its first waterworks at the turn of
the century, shouldering big debts in the process. But by the late 1820s, the
Fairm ount waterworks profitably supplied fresh water to both city and suburban
residents, while various artificial waterways— the Schuylkill navigation, the Lehigh
navigation, and the Union Canal— provided efficient transportation fo r coal,
produce, and m anufactured goods for the entire Philadelphia region, as well as
returns for their stockholders. Meanwhile, through the clever use of a sinking
fund, the City Councils found a way to elim inate risk for investors w hile insulating
council financial decisions from the political process. As vital as such
technologies were to Philadelphia residents, financial control over the institutions
that administered these technologies cam e to rest in a few hands, only nominally
122
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subject to the electorate in the case of the waterworks and not at all fo r inland
navigations
In the 1790s, th e first efforts at public improvements in the Philadelphia
region— turnpike, bridge, and canal com panies— raised money the same way as
their British predecessors had. A group of local prom inent men announced a
public meeting, often a t a tavern or county courthouse, to discuss a proposed
improvement. The attendees then nominated a com mittee to look into possible
routes and estimate general costs; expenses at this point usually were paid
through a small collection from meeting attendees, generally a few dollars each.
W hen the com mittee m ade its favorable report at a subsequent meeting,
attendees nominated a prospective board o f managers responsible for
petitioning the state legislature for incorporation and fo r administering the new
company. They also appointed commissioners responsible fo r canvassing the
area for investment subscriptions.1 Once the legislature passed the charter— a
fairly routine proposition for turnpikes and river navigations, but often a more
difficult one for canals because of haggling over routes— the board of managers
and the com m issioners set to work.
Subscription w as the most typical form of soliciting investment in the early
republic: individuals gave a low deposit— usually five or ten dollars— signed an
agreement with the com pany to pay additional installments. Some companies
set a particular schedule for subsequent payments, many called for payments
whenever the com pany needed additional funds, while still others practiced a

’This way of associating and raising funds was fairly typical in the Anglo-Atlantic world, being nearly
identical to British canal company organization methods as well as the methods of prominent American
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com bination o f th e two. Raising m oney through subscriptions proved popular
because it did not require investors to put up much m oney initially in projects that
were not likely to deliver a return in the near future (or, as was the norm with
internal im provem ents, ever); n o r did it require sending in a large sum at any one
time. Furtherm ore, despite a legal obligation to pay the com pany in full,
subscribers alw ays had the option o f not fulfilling their contract. Subscriptions
potentially appealed both to the m oney-saw y and to a broader swath of the
population.
U nfortunately for early canal companies, the subscription system often
failed to raise the requisite capital.

Investors let their subscriptions lapse for a

variety of reasons that could range from personal, fam ily, or business financial
straits to a growing, well-warranted lack of confidence in the com pletion of the
projects. C orporate charters did hold subscribers legally responsible for
subsequent calls fo r capital, b u t com pany officials eventually had trouble
collecting from even the most patient investors. Although com panies did have
the right to sue th e ir subscribers fo r nonpayment, the cost and trouble of doing
so did not ju stify the effort, and such action might alienate potential new
investors.2
The need fo r subscriptions and for lotteries— ye t another widespread and
typically unreliable method fo r raising canal and turnpike com pany funds—
manufacturing societies. See George Heberton Evans, Jr., British Corporation Finance. 1775-1850: A
Study of Preference Shares (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936), 13-14.
^Company officials repeatedly tried to coax lapsed investors to complete their subscriptions offering the
carrot of full shares rather than the stick of legal action; see for example Delaware and Schuylkill Navigation
broadside, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Internal Improvements File, Canal and Navigation Companies,
Delaware and Schuylkill Navigation, File 14, Record Group 26, Pennsylvania Department of State,
Pennsylvania State Archives. Also, while the company was owed tens of thousands of dollars collectively,
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persisted because even the most successful o f these initial ventures were p oor
direct investments.3 The m ost famous of the 1790s turnpikes, and the one that
set o ff a turnpike-building craze throughout the nation in its first decade of
operation, was the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike. With an initial cost of
$465,000 and with yearly maintenance and wages costing around $8,000, the
com pany issued annual dividends around 2% fo r its first three decades except
fo r the war years 1813-1815, when com pany dividends crept up to 4.5% .4 Given
th a t the contem porary standard for investm ent remained six percent throughout
the early republican period, returns that averaged a third of that widely accepted
figure did not provide the main impetus for the stam pede to build turnpike roads
th a t occurred in the years following the com pletion of the Philadelphia and
Lancaster Turnpike. Had investors bought federal treasury bonds during the
sam e period— considered a comparatively safe investm ent— they would have
brought home close to six percent in profits year after year. Because the
dividends on even the m ost traveled of turnpikes were so low, any turnpike
investment, considered purely on its own, was effectively a losing proposition.5

the court costs, lawyer’s fees, and general inconvenience of collecting money from any one investor did not
justify the effort to take all of them to court individually.
For example, the Middlesex Canal, the most famous and successful of the New England internal
navigation projects, was incorporated by Massachusetts in 1793. By 1819, each share had been assessed
for S740, and by the time it closed in 1853, only repaid a total of S559.50 including all dividends and
liquidation disbursements. ‘T h e canal company was a financial failure from the end of the first year of
business to the day, fifty years later, when the last boat traversed its nearly abandoned works.” Christopher
Roberts, The Middlesex Canal. 1793-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), 186.
“Donald C. Jackson, “Roads Most Traveled: Turnpikes in Southeastern Pennsylvania in the Early Republic,”
in Judith McGaw, ed., Early American Technology: Making and Doing Things from the Colonial Era to 1850
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 231. Jackson argues that these dividends
demonstrated the great profitability of the Lancaster turnpike; however, he does so in a vacuum, not
considering that the original stockholders did not receive their dividend for several years after their first
investment, and when they did, those dividends were well below the standard accepted contemporary
benchmark of six percent a year.
5ln 1825, one investor complained about the high costs of maintenance and calculated that since 1796, the
shares had yielded an annual return of 3.69% a share, hardly the best of investments. Anonymous to
Mathew Carey, March 25, 1825, Edward Carey Gardiner Papers, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous
Correspondence on Internal Improvement, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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However, the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike showed Am ericans that a
paved toll road could cover its costs on a regular basis while significantly
lowering the cost of overland transport, and th a t became enough to trigger a
nationwide turnpike m ania. Turnpike boosters rarely harbored sober, realistic
expectations to get rich from the roadway. Rather, they hoped that lower
transportation costs would result in better business opportunities and increased
property values in the com m unities through which the turnpike traveled.
Investment in turnpikes rem ained predom inantly local, because it only made
sense in conjunction with oth e r local investments.
W hether early canal boosters expected to make m oney on their favored
projects is hard to divine, b ut the financial struggles of the Delaware and
Schuylkill Canal Com pany and the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation
Com pany suggest that the few optimistic investors who m ight have hoped for
direct profits were quickly disillusioned. Chartered in early April, 1792, the
Delaware and Schuylkill C anal Com pany had sold its full allotm ent of 2,000
shares by the end of May, a sign that the project held great prom ise. The stocks
were widely distributed: 1,124 different individuals had bought in, none holding
more than three shares.6 First on the list were Robert Morris and John
Nicholson, each signing fo r only one share, hardly the sort o f com mitm ent the
two opportunistic financial operators and land speculators would have made had
they thought the project likely to provide am ple returns.7 Som e people doubtless

^/Villiam Smith to Governor, May 26, 1792, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Internal Improvements File,
Canal & Navigation Companies, Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation, No. 14, Pennsylvania
Department of State, Record Group 26, Pennsylvania State Archives.
7According to its charter, individuals were allowed to buy one share on the first day of the offering, another
two shares on the second day, up to three shares on the third day, and as many as available thereafter; “An
Act to Enable the Governor of the this Commonwealth to incorporate a Company, for opening a Canal and
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were overly optim istic about early projects: the Susquehanna and Schuylkill
company shares w ere so popular that the com pany was oversubscribed, and the
board had to assign shares by lottery. Susquehanna and Schuylkill shares were
widely distributed too, with the vast majority of investors holding only one or two
shares.8 Even if no one invested large sums, a t least the projects elicited
investor enthusiasm.
However, difficulties in retaining an engineer, choosing routes, buying out
or compensating property owners, and lining up contractors for construction
plagued both com panies. When the Due de la Rouchefoucauld-Liancourt
passed through Pennsylvania in April 1795 he counted only 50 men working on
the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal. Observing the canal's route through hard-tocut marble and porous sand, he saw “little chance of success.”9 Since the
Company's charter three years before, it had m anaged to cut only three miles
from the Norristown end and an equal distance from the southern term inus. At
the same time, a decreasing number of the subscribers were willing to pay the
installments on th e ir subscriptions. The com panies’ directors found themselves
caught in a vicious cycle: they had trouble covering construction costs because

Water Communication between the Rivers Delaware and Schuylkill, and for other purposes therein
mentioned,” April 10, 1792. Acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Relating to the Union Canal Company
of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: Lydia r. Bailey, 1825), 13. Even given the possibility that the project sold
out in two days—thus explaining the maximum holding of three shares—the reluctance of men such as
Morris and Nicholson to buy the maximum allowed suggests that they did not think that the project would be
profitable. Considering their experience with the founding of Bank of North America, shares of which
skyrocketed in price immediately after its initial stock sale, Morris and Nicholson most likely believed that
the canal would not be a financial success.
8Report of the Commissioners Appointed to receive subscriptions to the Capital Stock for opening a Canal
between the waters of the Quittapahila and Tulpehocken in the Counties of Berks and Dauphine, Secretary
of the Commonwealth, Internal Improvements File, Canal & Navigation Companies, Schuylkill &
Susquehanna Canal & Lock Navigation Company, No. 41, Folder Pennsylvania Department of State,
Record Group #26. Pennsylvania State Archives. The Quittaphila and Tulpehocken are tributaries of the
Susquehanna and Schuylkill, respectively.
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subscribers did not pay installm ents, and subscribers did not w ant to make
paym ents on projects that did not make adequate progress.10 The companies’
Boards o f Managers repeatedly warned that “suits will be com menced... [against]
every person in solvent circum stances... indebted to this Corporation,” but never
they m ade good on the threats w hen subscribers w ere concerned.11 By 1810,
over two thirds of the subscriptions of the Delaware and Schuylkill and the
S usquehanna and Schuylkill com panies had reverted back to the company
because of non-payment.12 Few investors were faithful or optim istic enough to
continue throwing away good m oney after bad.
Desperate to rescue th e ir failing projects and unable to procure money
from subscribers, the com panies turned to the Pennsylvania General Assembly
for help, asking the state governm ent for a privilege typically granted to cashstrapped organizations: the authorization to conduct lotteries.13 On May 14,
1795, the canal companies successfully lobbied the General Assem bly for a
lottery to raise $400,000. The legislature also granted them exclusive lottery

9Fran<pois Alexandre Frederic, Due de La Rouchefoucauld-Liancourt. Travels Through the United States of
North America. The Country of the Iroauois. and Upper Canada, in the Years 1795. 1796. and 1797: With
an Authentic Account of Lower Canada (London: R. Phillips, 1799).
luNew York State’s Western Inland Lock Company, a predecessor to the Erie Canal, suffered a similar fate
in its struggles with subscription default; see Nathan Miller, “Private Enterprise in Inland Navigation: The
Mohawk Route Prior to the Erie Canal,” New York History 31, 398-413
"December 12, 1798, Series II, Subseries 2, Delaware & Schuylkill Navigation Company, Board of
Managers Minutes, Reading Company Collection, Accession 1520, Hagley Museum and Library.
,2Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation, and Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation [ledgers for 1810],
Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Of the original 1,000 subscriptions to
the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Navigation Company, 867 had been forfeited; the Delaware and Schuylkill
Canal Navigation Company fared slightly better, with 464 out of the original 1,000 subscriptions totally paid
in.
13See Irma A. Watts, “Pennsylvania Lotteries of Other Days,” Pennsylvania History 2 (Winter 1935), 40-53.
The Massachusetts state legislature also authorized lotteries frequently; see Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug
Handlin, Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1947), 68-70. Maryland, too, authorized lotteries to aid internal improvements;
see William J. Duane, Letters, Addressed to the People of Pennsylvania Respecting the Internal
Improvement, of the Commonwealth: Bv Means of Roads and Canals (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1811),
110; as did New Jersey, see Harry B. W eiss and Grace M. Weiss, The Early Lotteries of New Jersey
(Trenton: Past Times Press, 1966).
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rights in Pennsylvania in the hopes that, w ithout com petition, the canal
com panies would be able to sell their tickets easily.14 The lottery offered
substantial prizes in cash and in com pany stock, with the grand prize valued at
$100,000.15 Unfortunately, the com panies’ efforts to raise money through statesponsored lotteries becam e as frustrating and as disappointing as their
subscription travails. Com peting with several out-of-state lotteries, the Com pany
had trouble finding ticket buyers. Also, despite initial promises from the General
Assem bly of an exclusive franchise, legislators could not resist the pleas of
countless other organizations such as bridge com panies, religious
congregations, and libraries to conduct their own lotteries. For legislators,
authorizing lotteries w as an easy political decision: they could show concern for
their constituents by pressing for lotteries to build schools, churches, and
hospitals while not having to raise taxes a dim e.16 Such legislative generosity
resulted in stiff local com petition for the legal gam bling dollar, especially for the
canal companies. T h e ir difficulties in selling tickets, however, did not exem pt
com panies from having to award the promised prizes. They got embroiled in
several lawsuits over disputed prize payments, proceedings that diverted the
com panies’ money and attention away from construction.17 Editor and
pamphleteer W illiam Duane later suggested that the companies netted only
$50,000 in their lotteries, although George Paleske, a booster and insider

14Gertrude MacKinney, ed. Executive Minutes of the Governors, vol. 4. Pennsylvania Chronicles, no. 9
(Harrisburg: State of Pennsylvania, 1931), 979-980.
“Plan for Lottery,” April 27, 1795, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Internal Improvements File, Canal &
Navigation Companies, Schuylkill & Susquehanna Canal & Lock Navigation Company, No. 41, Folder 2,
Department of State, Pennsylvania State Archives.
16“Memorial to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by the
President, Mannagers [sic] and Company of the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation,” Society
Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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perhaps more fam iliar with com pany finances, argued that “the lotteries
heretofore granted to the canal companies, have actually involved them in
debt.”18 Lotteries, then, did not provide a viable solution fo r the financial woes of
inland navigation com panies.
Canal company boardmembers may have m ade quiet inquiries to
potentially sympathetic legislators, but neither com pany effected a wholehearted
campaign to gain direct funding from the biggest potential source of funding, the
state of Pennsylvania. T h e y did, however, try to get the legislature to grant them
a percentage of the duties placed on certain auctions in Philadelphia. The
auctions in question were m ost likely the ones used to liquidate large lots of
manufactured goods im ported from Britain. In the decades following the
American Revolution, British manufacturers often flooded United States ports
with products for which they could not get a good price in Britain in an attem pt to
alleviate problems of overproduction and to secure the Am erican market. The
m ost active canal boosters chose to push duties on auctions as their source of
state-sponsored funding out of shrewd political calculation. Although state
revenues would be going to a project that prim arily benefited the Philadelphia
region, the tax would be levied only in Philadelphia. Philadelphia manufacturers
and tradesmen would not object to the tax because it would effectively raise the
final price to the consum er for their overseas com petitors’ goods, and local

17Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation, and Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation [ledgers for 1810],
Box 4-b (mss., 1810), Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
18William J. Duane, Letters. Addressed to the People of Pennsylvania Respecting the Internal
Improvement, of the Commonwealth; By Means of Roads and Canals (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1811), 69;
Charles G. Paleske, Observations on the Application fora Law to Incorporate ‘The Union Canal Company"
Respectfully Submitted to the Members of Both Houses of the Legislature of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia:
Duane, 1808), 6. Nonetheless, Paleske advocated a lottery for the Union Canal Company on the condition
that the state grant the company exclusive lottery rights.
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Philadelphia m e rch a n ts already grumbled th a t low auction prices allowed British
merchants to u n d e rse ll them. The duties w ould provide a steady annual income
th a t would not c o m e out of the General A ssem bly’s main budget and therefore
would not visibly th re a te n the pet projects o f o th e r regions and interests.19
Nonetheless, the legislature never did gran t the duty on auctions to the
canal companies. C entral and western representatives were reluctant to support
any initiative fo r e a ste rn and especially Philadelphian interests, as they showed
when they insisted upon moving the state capital from the Quaker C ity to
Lancaster and e v e n tu a lly to Harrisburg. T h ey m ay also have opposed the duty
as they did federal ta riffs on imported goods because of the consequent rise in
prices and the d a n g e r o f trade retaliation a ga inst American grain exports. The
General Assem bly rejected the com panies’ request fo r tax-supported funding,
and by 1796 w o rk o n both the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal and the
Susquehanna and Schuylkill Canal had com e to a halt. The com panies m ight
have been able to overcom e either their technical obstacles or their financial
difficulties, but th e tw o sets of problems com bined proved insuperable.
Furthermore, in ke e p in g with its policies regarding business corporations, the
state did not step in to rescue these struggling com panies.20 Not until a fter the
W a r of 1812 w ould a n internal navigation com pany successfully raise enough
m oney to com plete construction; meanwhile, the City Corporation of Philadelphia
had money p ro b le m s o f its own.

19The end result would still be that the state would take in less revenue; however, this way the canals’
money would not be subjected to the annual budgeting and appropriations process, a notoriously unreliable
source of funds in early republican Pennsylvania.
20 See Chapter 6 for an analysis of state-corporate relations.
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Despite overw helm ing public support fo r a better supply of fresh water,
the city government struggled mightily to finance the waterworks. Because of the
yellow fever epidem ics o f 1793, 1797, and 1798, the City Councils certainly had
a mandate to spend som e public m oney to im prove the city’s water supply;
indeed, one Joint C ouncil report argued th a t yellow fever “rendered a copious
supply of more w holesom e water, in the estim ation of many, indispensable to the
health and preservation o f the city.”21 However, even then, council m embers,
politicians that they were, wanted to avoid large tax-hikes. In 1799, the total city
budget amounted to $72,397.18, of which $56,000 was to come from tax
revenue and the rem ainder from fixed-incom e sources such as rental of
corporate properties, licensing fees, and fines.22 Meanwhile, each o f the
Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Com pany’s proposals would cost the city up to
several hundred thousand dollars.23 Even the Latrobe plan that the C ity Councils
finally selected carried an original estim ated price tag of $150,000, all hopefully
to be spent on construction in the space o f one year.24 To raise that sort of
m oney through local taxes would mean nearly quadrupling them, a politically
unfeasible solution.
From their initial negotiations with the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal
C om pany through th e ir construction of the works at Fairmount in 1819, the

21Report to the Select and Common Councils on the Progress and State of the Water Works on the 24th of
November. 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799).
^An Ordinance for Raising Supplies, and Making Appropriations, for the Services and Exigencies of the
City of Philadelphia, for the Year 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799).
2JThe City Corporation and the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company negotiated for much of 1798 and
1799, to no avail. The canal company offered, at various junctures, to sell the entire stock to the city at first
cost (meaning that the city would pay for the company’s mistakes) and for the city to pay annual rent or
make a one-time payment for the water at fairly exorbitant rates. See January 31, 1799, Series II, Subseries
2, Delaware & Schuylkill Navigation Company, Board of Managers Minutes, Accession 1520, Reading
Company Collection, Hagley Museum and Library.
24February 17,1799, Select Council Minutes, October 14, 1 7 96-April 14, 1799, Philadelphia City Archives.
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Councils attempted to raise m oney in oth e r ways besides taxing the electorate.
The timeless, universally preferred form o f budget m anagem ent is to find a way
to spend someone else’s m oney with no strings attached, and indeed, the
Philadelphia Corporation certainly tried its best to do so. W hile the boards of
business corporations worried constantly about the strings associated with state
aid, the city government could reasonably expect that financial help from the
statehouse wouid not come with conditions of unwonted state interference in city
affairs. W ith hope in their hearts, in 1797 the City Councils appealed to the
General Assembly fo r direct aid. Not surprisingly, no funds w ere forthcoming
from a legislature that had recently relocated Pennsylvania’s seat of government
aw ay from Philadelphia because o f sectional jealousy and general rural
uneasiness with the big city. The General Assembly also rejected the city
corporation’s pleas fo r another politically painless solution (from local politicians’
point of view, that is), the right to receive taxes on all auctions taking place in the
city, the revenue from which currently w ent into state coffers.25 Given the canal
com panies’ fiascoes, the City Councils could easily rule out the possibility of
state-sanctioned lotteries as an effective fund-raiser. The Corporation of
Philadelphia was forced to look fo r new m ethods to gather enough capital to
build its waterworks.
Just as business corporations too k their institutional structure and fund
raising schemes from British precedents, the Corporation of Philadelphia took
advantage of British experience with water-supply companies. London-born

25The legislature had just spumed a request from the City Corporation to grant auction duties to contribute
to the construction of a bridge across the Schuylkill, too. December 4,1797, Select Council Minutes,
October 14, 1796- April 14, 1799, Philadelphia City Archives.
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Benjamin Henry Latrobe’s plan to use steam engines to pump Schuylkill water to
the city came as a godsend to th e Philadelphia’s Councils for reasons beyond
the frustration with the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company. Use of the
canal for water supply would have entailed a system of open access: residents
would have gotten their w ater eith e r directly fro m the canal or from sm aller
branches that ran down gutters through stree ts in the various neighborhoods.
The water would have been there for the taking, free for every resident.
Because Latrobe’s design called fo r a closed system , the city could charge for
access to the water. Latrobe to o k his inspiration from London water-supply
companies, which had been constructed w ith th e intention both to supply water
and to provide return on investm ent.26 From a financial point of view, Latrobe’s
underground distribution system held a great advantage over the canal system
because the w ater would be distributed in p ip e s that had to be tapped by cityauthorized workmen for private connections to residences or businesses. The
city government could hope to gain substantial revenue by charging businesses
and residents fo r “w ater rent.” N o t only w ould such a system arguably be more
fair than the canal in that those w ho used the w ater would pay fo r it, but also the
city could charge extra to those businesses su ch as breweries, inns, tanneries,
and soapboilers th a t were particularly w ater-intensive. The British engineer
suggested the installation of public hydrants on the streets, offering the free
public access to “the poorer inhabitants” th a t w ould make the plan easier to sell

26See Benjamin Henry Latrobe, View of the Practicability and Means of Supplying the City of Philadelphia
with Wholesome Water in a Letter to John Miller. Esauire from B. Henry Latrobe. Engineer. December 29.
1798 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799); also see “Philadelphia Waterworks, Editorial Note” in
John C. Van Home and Lee W. Formwalt, ed. Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers of Beniamin
Henry Latrobe. vol. 1. 1784-1804 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 109-110.
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politically across class lines.27 He also optim istically pointed out that if the
ow ners o f two-thirds of the approxim ately 6,000 houses in the city paid $10 each
annually, the resulting $40,000 in revenue would pay the interest for a loan of up
to $666,666.66, far more than the projected bill fo r building the system. Such
grand revenues would be sufficient to cover interest on the initial construction
and an estimated annual $6,000 in costs fo r the steam engines.

28

Latrobe’s

proposal, then, carried the possibility of offsetting its considerable estimated
annual costs for fuel and labor by having its own revenue stream from private
dom estic users and intensive industrial customers w hile affording everyone
access to the public water.
Despite these rosy estimates for future solvency, the city corporation
could not collect water rents until it had built the waterworks, requiring a
considerable expenditure up front.

Not wanting to risk further epidemics, the city

councils decided to proceed alone rather than w ait fo r m oney from the
statehouse. Instead of raising taxes, the City C ouncils first resorted to the fund
raising method that had m et with such success for th e federal government: the
issuance of interest-bearing bonds. The Councils used Latrobe’s estimate of
$150,000 fo r the completion of the waterworks, proposing to sell up to 1,500
bonds, each for $100. They would be sold as subscriptions: the buyer was to
pay $10 at the time of subscription, and $30 in each o f three subsequent
paym ents scheduled over the subsequent six m onths. Once paid up,
subscribers received six percent annual interest in sem iannual payments, in
other words, two payments a year of three dollars each. In addition, the

27Latrobe, View of the Practicability.
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subscriber’s house would be hooked up to the city water fo r three years free of
the usual five-dollar annual charge, increasing the bond’s annual yield for the
first three years to a substantial eleven percent.29 That im pressive interest rate,
the council members hoped, would be more than enough to attract significant
investment.
They were wrong. The city’s unsuccessful attempts to fill all, o r even
most, of the 1,500 subscriptions dem onstrated the novelty and fragility of
com plex municipal finance in the early republic. The City C ouncils employed the
sam e m ethods as did the canal com panies: they appointed a group of respected
and responsible men to serve as com m issioners who would supervise the
subscription books and solicit investm ent among their neighbors and business
associates. These men were chosen because they were influential in the
m erchant community and fam iliar w ith— and trusted by— the people most likely to
have funds to invest.

However, they only managed to sell around $73,000 of

the $150,000 dollar issue.30 They partly blamed the weather: the weeks
following the passage of the ordinance had been cold and snowy, preventing the
com m issioners from making the rounds in their neighborhoods as thoroughly as
they had hoped. Still, between appeals to the financial com m unity— bankers and
insurance com pany insiders— and door-to-door canvasses, the city’s seemingly
attractive offer fell short. The city’s biggest obstacle was its inefficiency in tax
collection. Federal bonds sold well because investors had confidence in the

28Latrobe, View of the Practicability.
“29An Ordinance Providing for the Raising of a Sum of Money, on Loan, for Supplying the City of
Philadelphia with Wholesome Water,” February 7, 1799, An Ordinance for Raising Supplies, and Making
Appropriations, for the Services and Exigencies of the City of Philadelphia, for the Year 1799 (Philadelphia:
Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799), 3.
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national government’s ability to collect taxes and so fe lt assured that the
government would have the necessary cash flow to pay interest on the bonds.
However, the yellow fever epidem ics had coincided with local summertime tax
collection efforts, and the city corporation had encountered great difficulties
collecting its entire assessm ents during the 1790s.31 A fter 1805, with an
overhaul of the tax-collection system and an alleviation of the summertime
scourges, the city’s revenue becam e more solid, but in 1801 such prospects
provided no consolation.
For the city to sell these long-term bonds— the first issue actually had no
stated maturation date at all— the Councils had to com e up with a way of paying
down the debt or at least of paying the interest into the indefinite future. In 1807,
after struggling to fill out th e ir third bond issue, they turned to a financial device
that was first suggested nearly a decade before, had been all the rage in British
financial circles from the 1760s on, and became popular in the United States in
the 1790s: the sinking fund.32 The city corporation would contribute a given
am ount every year into an account set aside specifically to pay off the debt; this
sum would be an appropriation in the annual budget just like those fo r salaries,

30August 1, 1799, Common Council Minutes, vol. 2. February 18, 1799-January 13, 1803. (mss.),
Philadelphia City Archives.
31In the ordinance authorizing the bonds, the Councils admitted that “though there is reason to hope a
liberal aid will be granted by the legislature, towards enabling the city to complete this important work... the
speedy accomplishment thereof appears to require the immediate exertions and resources of the citizens of
Philadelphia." Clearly, given that they had unsuccessfully appealed for state money before with the
lobbying assistance of the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company, the chance that they would get any
money over the Company’s objections was slim indeed. However, the Councils hoped that invoking the
General Legislature would give potential investors confidence that the state might back the city’s ability to
make good on its loans. An Ordinance for Raising Supplies, and Making Appropriations, for the Services
and Exigencies of the City of Philadelphia, for the Year 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799),
3.
32The use of a “sinking fund” is now generally referred to as “funded debt.” The city had first considered
starting one to pay for shares in the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company in exchange for watering the
city; see Report of the Joint Committee of the Select and Common Councils, on the Subject of Bringing
Water to the City (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1798). Also see Donald F. Swanson and Andrew
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paving the streets, and fuel fo r public buildings. The m oney in the fund could
then be used in several non-exclusive ways, including paying off current interest,
gaining returns through investment in state o r federal bonds, or buying back city
bonds until the corporation owned them all, at which point the debt could be
retired.

33

The City C ouncils quickly found that the very existence of a sinking

fund gave potential bondholders much greater confidence in the corporation’s
ability to redeem bond issues. Prudent adm inistration of the sinking fund could
also give the city the financial security to attract investm ent in city bonds and to
pay off city debts.
The City Councils established the corporation’s sinking fund in 1807.
From then on, the corporation had little trouble selling the bonds, som etim es
even above par value in the early 1820s.34 Declaring their intent that “the
reduction and paym ent of the debt due from the city of Philadelphia should be
effected as speedily as circumstances will perm it,” the Councils passed an
ordinance allocating $5,000 a year from th e incom e of the corporate estates—
city-owned buildings, wharves, market-space, and real estate leased on an
annual basis— to be p u t in a ‘“sinking fund,’ to be applied to the purchase and
redemption of the several species of stock, constituting the funded debt of the
P. Trout, “Alexander Hamilton’s Hidden Sinking Fund,” William & Mary Quarterly 3d.Ser., 49 (Jan. 1992),
108-116 for the popularity in sinking funds in Britain and America.
“^An Ordinance for the Reduction and Payment of the Funded Debt of the City,” March 26, 1807, John C.
Lowber, ed., Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: to Which Are refixed, the Original
Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the City (Philadelphia: Moses
Thomas, 1812), 212-214.
^From 1821 to early 1822, demand for bonds was so high that the city even managed to refinance much of
its outstanding debt at 6% rather than 5%. See Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia.
Passed Since the Third Dav of August. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty (Philadelphia: City
Councils, 1822), 168-169: Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the
Twenty-Seventh Dav of December. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-One (Philadelphia: City
Councils, 1823), 209-210, 221.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

139

city.”35 A t first the m oney in the sinking fund could only be invested in federal
bonds, although the Councils later relaxed that requirem ent to allow the fund
m anagers to buy stock in local internal im provem ents, thereby investing in the
com m unity at the same tim e as paying down the debt. Councils increased the
annual appropriation from the corporate estates to the sinking fund to $7,000 in
1811 and then to $8,000 in 1816.36 Once the annual operations of the
waterworks exceeded routine costs, the Councils began to set $4,000 aside
every year from the water rents, increasing that am ount to $10,000 and
eventually to $14,000.37 From tim e to time the Councils added stock from
investments in local projects such as the Schuylkill Perm anent Bridge Com pany
and the Schuylkill Navigation Company as well as prem ium s (that is, any am ount
paid above par) on the sale o f bonds. W hen interest rates temporarily fell
slightly in the early 1820s, the city consolidated m uch of its debt by selling a total
o f $535,000 in bonds at five percent annual interest to pay off earlier debts

On other occasions, the city sold bonds above par and put the premiums into the sinking fund, for example
for the loans of 1819 and 1820. See Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia from the first of
April. 1819. to the first of April. 1823 (Philadelphia: the Councils, 1823).
John C. Lowber, Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: to Which Are refixed, the
Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the Citv (Philadelphia:
Moses Thomas, 1812), 212-214.
Hendrik Hartog, in Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the Citv of New York in American
Law. 1730-1870 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), argues that New York City was
typical of municipal corporations at the turn of the nineteenth century in its selling of corporation-owned
lands as a policy of keeping as much property as possible in private rather than public hands. However, he
also admits that the New York City Corporation had trouble collecting rent and could not be sure in its legal
authority from the state to collect taxes, either, and so the selling of property was a rational way for the city
to raise money. Because Philadelphia had the legal authority to collect taxes, and had no problem
collecting rents, it held on to and even enlarged its corporate property in this period, buying the old
statehouse (Independence Hall) and collecting rent on it.
36John C. Lowber, Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: to Which Are refixed, the
Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the Citv (Philadelphia:
Moses Thomas, 1812), 212-214, 239-240; Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia:
Passed Since the Fourteenth Dav of September. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifteen (Philadelphia:
City Councils, 1817),69-71.
37Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Sixteenth of July. One
Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventeen (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1819), 117-118, 126-128;
Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Third Dav of August. One
Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1822), 171-172.
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contracted at six percent.38 The fund grew accordingly from its modest
establishment in 1807 to one of the largest single pools of assets in the
Philadelphia area by the late 1820s, reaching a value of $383,266.88 by March
of 1830.39
The use of a sinking fund revealed two assum ptions on the part of the
men who ran Philadelphia’s City Councils. The first was that the Councils would
have the political discipline to make significant appropriations to the fund on a
regular basis while n o t raiding it for purposes other than debt reduction. This
assumption held true. From its inception in 1807 through 1830, every
disbursement made from the sinking fund went either to the purchase of financial
instruments fo r the purpose of income or towards the acquisition of city bonds to
retire the debt. The second assumption behind the sinking fund was that the
corporation’s revenue base would continue to increase at a rate that equaled or
exceeded the growth in the corporation’s routine costs. In other words, as long
as the city grew faster than the cost of governing it did, the Councils could afford
to pay off the interest on their loans without resorting to higher taxes with
potentially adverse econom ic (and electoral) effects. As early as 1807, a City
Council subcomm ittee argued against higher taxes, claim ing that the increased
tax burden resulting from the cost of the waterworks had been “very injurious by
lowering the value o f real estates, and discouraging improvements.” The
subcommittee believed that loans to be paid off by future revenue made more

^ Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Twenty-Second Dav of April.
One Thousand Eight Hundred and Nineteen (Philadelphia: Citv Councils. 1821), 158-159; Ordinances of
the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Third Dav of August. One Thousand Eight
Hundred and Twenty (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1822), 164-165; Accounts of the Corporation of the Citv
of Philadelphia from the first of April. 1819. to the first of April. 1823 (Philadelphia: the Councils, 1823).
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sense because “the benefits arising from the w ater works are of a perm anent
nature, and the income from th at source likely to increase.” The com m ittee
suggested that the m ost “expe die nt’ course w ould be “to raise by ta x no more
than the sum necessary fo r the usual expences o f the year, and th a t th e moneys
necessary to pay for...perm anent im provements, ought to be borrow ed.”40 Here,
too, the Councils proved prescient: Philadelphia’s economy and its w aterw orks
revenue expanded fast enough to accom m odate the cost of governm ent and
governm ent services w ithout necessitating significant tax hikes. For these
reasons, the sinking fund did become an efficie nt tool in the City C ouncils’
finances.
Despite their discipline in refraining from raiding the sinking fu n d directly
fo r routine costs, the City C ouncils did use the sinking fund and the city budget in
creative ways to lessen the immediate tax burden and to pay for potentially
controversial projects. Because the city now had a fund expressly dedicated to
eradicating debt, investors proved much m ore willing to buy city bonds: they
knew that their money w ould be on a safe footing and likely to be repaid. The
success o f the sinking fund device to liquidate debt and to assure potential bond
buyers of the security of th e ir investment offered unexpected flexibility to the
C ouncils in dealing with c o st overruns and o th e r costly contingencies. A fter the
sinking fu n d ’s establishm ent, the Councils routinely took out loans fo r capital
projects and for budgetary overruns on annual appropriations: between 1807 and

39March 1, 1830, Philadelphia City Councils, Committee on the Sinking Fund, Minutes 1824-1834, Series
120.32, Philadelphia City Archives.
40Committee of Wavs and Means Report for Appropriations for 1807. accompanied by An Ordinance for
Raising Supplies and Making Appropriations for the Services of the City, for the Year One Thousand Eight
Hundred and Seven (Philadelphia: [Jane Aitken?], 1806), 3.
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1811, the C ouncils authorized six loans for enlarging markets, improving streets,
and building sew ers and another three loans fo r m aking up budgetary
shortfalls.41 The pattern continued: $20,000 to prepare fo r the defense o f the
city in 1813, $25,000 to m ake up fo r shortfalls in 1813 and 1815, $70,000 in
1816 to buy the old statehouse (Independence Hall) from the Pennsylvania state
government, and $12,000 fo r the construction o f a culvert in 1817.42 The City
Councils also issued bonds to fund improvements to the waterworks. To expand
the pipe distribution system, the Councils authorized another $70,000 in bond
issues in 1818. T h e following year the city began its efforts to expand the
waterworks at Fairm ount, giving Josiah W hite and Joseph Gillingham $150,000
in city bonds in exchange fo r land and water rights at the Falls (in addition to
issuing bonds w orth the $200,000 earmarked fo r construction). W hite
interpreted the bonds-for-land swap to be politically possible specifically because
of the use of bonds rather than tax moneys: incum bents could point to their
acquisition of lands to expand the waterworks w hile holding down taxes.43

41“Supplement to the Ordinance Entitled ‘An Ordinance for the Reduction and Payment of the Funded Debt
of the City,’" February 28, 1811; John C. Lowber, Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia:
to Which Are refixed, the Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to
the City (Philadelphia: Moses Thomas, 1812), 239-240.
^ “Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor to Borrow Twenty Thousand Dollars, and to Loan the Same to the
United States, for the Erection of Forts and Batteries on the Island in the River Delaware, Commonly Called
the Pea Patch,” June 23, 1813; “An Ordinance Authorizing the Borrowing Ten Thousand Dollars, in
Anticipation of the Taxes of the Present Year," September 30, 1813; “An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor
to Borrow Money in Anticipation of the Taxes of the Present Year," June 15, 1815; Ordinances of the
Corporation of the City of Philadelphia: Passed Since the Eighteenth Day of June. One Thousand Eight
Hundred and Twelve (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Councils, 1815), 11,12-13, 54; “An Ordinance Providing
For the Purchase of the State House, and State House Square in the City of Philadelphia, and raising the
funds to make payment therefor,” April 11, 1816; “An ordinance providing for the construction of a culvert in
Tenth street and Spruce street," July 14, 1817, Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia:
Passed Since the Fourteenth Dav of September. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifteen (Philadelphia:
City Councils, 1817), 69-71.
^ ’’Ordinance empowering the Mayor of the City to raise Money to be applied to laying down Iron Pipes of
Conduit, from the W ater Works at Fair Mount,” December 17,1818; “An ordinance empowering the
Watering Committee to purchase from Josiah White and Joseph Gillingham their rights to the Water Power
of the river Schuylkill, and also to raise money on loan for the purpose of erecting a dam and other works at
or near Fair Mount,” April 8, 1819; Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia. Passed Since
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On at least one occasion, the Councils used the sinking fund to absorb
directly a budgetary overrun. In late 1824, the City Councils found that the
corporation needed approxim ately $26,000 to provide fo r unexpected costs in a
variety of categories and voted to authorize a bond issue fo r that amount.44 A
w eek later, the sinking fund com m ittee pointed out that the fund had $19,315.77
in cash on hand, and the committee could sell enough o f its federal bonds to
make up the difference to buy the entire issue, a proposal soon approved.45 In
this particular incident, the account fo r the ensuing year’s tax fund was charged,
meaning that the m oney would still have to be accounted fo r out of taxes
somehow. However, this case is only a particularly clear example of the general
purpose for which the Councils used the sinking fund: to put off indefinitely the
consequences of tough financial decisions. For the m embers of the Common
Council, who were up for reelection annually, postponing budgetary crises
essentially m eant avoiding them altogether because the sitting council would not
be blamed for problem s inherited from the previous session. The loss of a
council seat because of budget problem s was not an idle threat: in 1802,
Democrats swept th e incumbent Federalists out of the Councils largely by
blaming the officeholders for cost overruns on the waterworks and the taxes that
those extra expenditures necessitated. W ise use of the sinking fund gave the
City Councils the wherewithal to spend tomorrow’s money today rather than raise
taxes, relieving politicians on the Council of the politically heavy burdens of
the Sixteenth of July. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventeen (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1819);
Morton, Josiah White. 100.
^ “Ordinance to Provide for the extraordinary expenses incurred during the present year," November 5,
1824, Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Eighth Dav of January.
One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-Four (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1825), 275
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unpopular tax hikes or cuts in servicess. They could cut their revenue pie and eat
it too, as long as the city brought in ennough dough to bake a bigger one the
following year.
The ability to float bonds e ith e r fo r budget overruns or fo r potentially
unpopular projects in essence insulatied the City Councils from m aking
controversial decisions over b u d g e tin g because it allowed them to postpone
cutting services, raising taxes, or ansrwering to the electorate fo r particular
appropriations that might be o b je ctio n a b le . This is not to say that the City
Councils demonstrably misled the putblic about how much the corporation was
spending or on what projects. Furthesrmore, manipulation of the Sinking Fund
allowed the corporation a welcom e fle x ib ility to pay for unforeseen expenses and
fo r waterworks-related construction wvithout raising taxes significantly.
However, any time the Councils fe lt p re s s u re on the corporation’s bottom line,
they could sim ply issue bonds that inw estors willingly snapped up. T he cost
associated with the bonds would be tra n s fe rre d to the sinking fund and therefore
out of the year-to-year, potentially co n te n tio u s process of deciding upon
appropriations. The annual a p p ro p ria tio n to the sinking fund am ounted to a
discretionary fund for the Councils to build or to spend: the overruns and the
building projects they funded only a p p e a re d in the annual appropriations under
the rubric of the sinking fund. No o n e would be willing to oppose Council
incumbents on a political platform su g g e stin g that the corporation should not pay

45November 13,1824, Philadelphia City Councils,. Committee on the Sinking Fund, Minutes 1824-1834,
Series 120.32, Philadelphia City Archives.
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its bills— especially if he ever expected to get a loan from any Philadelphia-based
bank, several of w h ich held large blocks of city bonds.46
Through its flexibility and its potential fo r being manipulated, the sinking
fund increasingly fu lfille d a political role beyond th a t o f a convenient financial
device: its use allow ed the C ity Councils to make significant financial decisions
regarding the corporation in ways that limited public scrutiny of City Council
policy. N on-investing residents got something, too: the best citywide waterworks
in America and low taxes, at least as long as the city grew. Meanwhile, the
sinking fund provided investors with city bonds, an extrem ely safe vehicle for
capital appreciation.
Use of a sinking fund was only possible if private individuals w ere willing
to buy Philadelphia m unicipal bonds. The Corporation of Philadelphia and all
Philadelphia-area business corporations— internal im provem ent com panies,
banks, and insurance com panies— competed fo r investm ent dollars from
individuals and, occasionally, each other. The questions o f who invested in
these corporations and why are fundamentally d ifferent from those concerning
the motivations fo r founding o r controlling such institutions, although som etim es
the two overlapped. Insiders who invested in banks wished both to m ake money
from their stocks a n d to have access to capital for th e ir other business dealings.
Men who owned large parcels of land up the Schuylkill expected their property to
appreciate because o f the navigation and hoped the navigation com pany would
turn a profit. Som e Philadelphia residents wanted th e ir homes or businesses

46ln 1817, for example, the city owed the Bank of Pennsylvania $54,000 and the Philadelphia Bank
559,000; Statements Submitted to the Senate, from the Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, and Farmers’ and
Mechanics’ Banks ffHarrisburq?!. 1817).
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protected and counted on steady returns from their insurance com pany stock.
Nonetheless, many people invested in city bonds or company stocks did not do
so out of a com m itm ent to local developm ent o r a desire fo r control over
economic resources. The majority of investors bought com pany shares knowing
that they would never become com pany customers, and the purchase of city
bonds (after the initial discount on city w ater fo r the 1801 issue) had no direct
effect on services to individuals: for m ost people, there was no relation between
investment and services rendered.47 Although a few speculators m ay have
made a pretty penny from exploiting fluctuations in the value of bank notes,
government bonds, and corporate stock, the prospect of getting rich quickly
rarely formed the prim ary motive for investm ent in these firms, either.
Motivations for investm ent varied som ewhat by the kind of institution and the size
of investment. For som e institutions, the reasons for investment changed as the
fortunes of the com pany waxed or waned, but in nearly all cases, investors
emphasized long-term, stable returns and a desire for minimal involvem ent in
com pany affairs.48 Those passive investors allowed institutional officers great
leeway in their adm inistration of the organizations they financed.
City bonds and financial institution stock tended to appeal to sim ilar
investors. From the beginning, banks represented a stable investm ent that
promised and usually delivered high dividends year after year. Boosters and
bank opponents alike regarded such corporations as nearly mystical machines
for multiplying investors’ dollars. The basic principle by which they operated was

47See Robert E. Wright, “Bank Ownership and Lending Patterns in New York and Pennsylvania, 17811831,” Business History Review73 (Spring 1999), 40-60.
48Wright, 48.
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fairly simple: lending out a sum of money at six p e rce n t interest— the highest rate
allowed by law— could lead to profits of up to six percent a year, th e same as
United States bonds generally paid. However, the ability to lend th a t same
amount to three people at once could lead to much h ig tie r profits, up to eighteen
percent. Banks in the early republic were able to lend o u t the sam e am ount of
money several times over by being allowed to issue th e ir own currency with a
face value up to four o r five tim es the am ount of sp e c ie , that is, hard money, in
their vaults. In practice, banks yielded dividends considerably low er than
eighteen percent a year, more often paying out profits in the seven-to-eleven
percent range. A num ber of practical factors limited b a r k revenues to that level:
some customers did not pay back their loans, m any banks’ paid-in capital was
lower than their paper capital, the lending process was not com pletely efficient
(new loans were not necessarily issued the instant old loans were paid back),
and banks had ancillary costs including salary fo r em ployees, renting or owning a
place of business, and the printing of banknotes.49 S till, dollar fo r dollar, banks
represented the surest bet in early republic investm ents.
The composition o f investors and investm ent in early banks reflected the
notion that banks would yield consistent dividends w ithout much attention from
shareholders.50 In its initial stock offering in February, 1807, the Farm ers and

49ln the founding of many banks, inside investors were allowed to take loans from the bank to pay for their
stock shares, with the stock shares used as collateral. With no money changing hands, the insider would
own stock which would net a profit because dividends would be higher than the interest rate paid on the
stock. Furthermore, the insider could sell the stock; bank stock usually rose far higher than par fairly
quickly. Even though a bank may have sold ail its shares authorized by the charter, it did not necessarily
have all its capital paid in for a long while, and in the case of some banks, ever.
“ in terms of motivation for investment, Philadelphia-area banks and insurance companies mirrored other
early nineteenth-century American corporate ventures. Contrary to previous interpretations suggesting that
investment in Massachusetts textile corporations was triggered by lower s.hipping profits, Robert Dalzell
convincingly demonstrated that Boston merchants, still quite successful, invested to diversify their portfolio
and to provide more stable returns with greatly decreased direct involvement in management. Robert F.
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Mechanics Banks attracted investment ranging from the 113 buyers acquiring
three or fewer shares a t a par value of $50 to the 30 investors who p u t in over
$5,000 each, with a top initial holding o f $15,250.51 The median holding was 10
shares, or $500, a significant amount o f m oney, and far more than th e m edian in
potentially risky ventures such as internal improvements. The large num ber of
big investors suggests an impression am ong men of capital that the bank would
be a profitable venture w orthy of tying up large blocks of m oney fo r an extended
period of time. Especially telling, only fo u r o f the top 30 investors w ere on the
board, meaning th a t m any of those men m ay have invested w ithout th e purpose
or even expectation o f getting special treatm ent when applying for loans.52
W ithout the motive o f access to credit, these investors must have seen the bank
as a likely vehicle fo r incom e. Their lack o f participation in the board shows their
willingness to have others guard a significant portion of their wealth. These
investors had either m ade their fortune on their own or who had at least
stewarded family m oney wisely, and so had the ability to use it in th e ir own
businesses ventures had they so chosen.53 Men of capital, then, saw banks as a
safe and convenient investm ent vehicle.54

Dalzell, Jr., Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1987), 61-67.
These statistics and the ones that follow regarding the stockholders of the Farmers and Mechanics Bank
were compiled and calculated from Corporate Series, Vol. 8, Stock Ledger, Farmers and Mechanics
National Bank, Accession 1658 Hagley Museum and Library .
This analysis agrees exactly with that of Wright’s interpretation of the motivation for investment in middle
Atlantic state banks, as opposed to Lamoreaux’s interpretation of New England banks that loaned a much
higher percentage of their capital to insiders who invested because they wanted access to the banks’ credit.
According to James Willard Hurst, “the obverse of creating a firm, substantially autonomous center of
direction for corporate business was assurance to investors that they had a vehicle for limiting their
investments of time and energy as well as of money”; The Legitimacy of the Business Corporation in the
Law of the United States. 1780-1970 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1970), 26.
See Robert F. Dalzell, Jr., Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), for an account of how Boston-area merchants increasingly
invested in manufacturing and banking because of their relative safety compared to mercantile activities
rather than out of an expectation of higher returns.
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The number and size o f investments m ade by and fo r women, in trusts fo r
children, and by charitable and social organizations also indicated that many
people perceived shareholding in banks as being prudent but profitable.
Because minors and, to a varying degree, som e wom en were unable (or
unwilling) to run their own businesses, investm ent on their behalf was generally
intended to provide fo r a stable income over a long period without requiring
business expertise or investors’ time.55 Som e trustees were also stockholders
in their own right, while others only held stock fo r dependents. At least one trust,
consisting of 16 shares, w as the property of a local M ason’s Lodge. Out of the
shares listed as originally issued by the Farmers and Mechanics Bank, 1,837, o r
15.3% w ere held by wom en o r in trust fo r wom en o r m inors.56 The size of
holdings in trust nearly exactly mirrored those o f all investors: the median holding
was ten shares, or $500. W om en, however, tended to own half as many shares,
with a m edian holding of five, or $250. Perhaps this lower figure indicates that
som e independent wom en, though having on average lower assets than men,
invested fo r themselves, w hereas wealthy men se t up many of the trusts. The
Farmers and Mechanics B ank clearly had a reputation as a worry-free
investment.
The Farmers and M echanics Bank did not stand alone in this regard. In
1805, the Board of Directors of the Bank of Pennsylvania proudly claimed that
“the stock o f the Bank of Pennsylvania has long been considered as a most

55Possibly, some investors put shares in trust for their children or in the names of female relatives to protect
assets from creditors; however, because such practices would account for a small minority of these
investments and because many men likely bought shares in their own name intending to keep money safe
for their legal dependents, if anything the following analysis most likely undercounts the overall percentage
of stock bought for family purposes.
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secure and provident fund, fo r the investment of the monies of widows, orphans,
and benevolent associations, to whom the safety o f the ir capital, and the
punctual paym ent o f its product are all important.”57 W hile bank directors were
not above using hyperbole fo r political effect— references to helpless widows and
orphans are the second refuge of a scoundrel— the bank did include many
women and trusts am ong its stockholders. The num ber of shares held in trust
and by women strongly indicated a widespread perception that banks were a
safe haven for those depending upon stable long-term gains.58
That need fo r steady income over the long haul, in turn, influenced the
w ay directors ran the big Philadelphia banks.59 Cashiers, under the watchful
eyes of Boards of Directors, tended to value long-term safety in their loans over
the ability to stretch out available capital in an effort to maximize immediate
gains.60 As long as the bank could provide dividends in the seven-to-nine
percent range, bank officers eschewed lending out as much money as they
possibly could, preferring to keep reserves against runs so as to promote
confidence in the bank and to do their part to stabilize the money supply.
Besides, banks could and did use excess capital to buy federal and local bonds
that in effect yielded nearly as much as loans did anyway.61 A t the same time,

“ Of the original issue of 12,000 shares, 11,970 are accounted for in the list of original stockholders; the
1,837 are taken as a percentage of 11,970 in the text.
To the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Memorial of the
President and Directors of the Bank of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: 1805?), 2
““Ownership in stocks, bonds, and other financial instruments was spread well beyond the richest sectors of
society. See Winifred Rothenberg, “The Emergence of a Capital Market in Rural Massachusetts, 17301838 (Journal of Economic History, 45 (1984), 781-808.
S9This discussion does not hold for many of the Pennsylvania country banks, especially those established in
1814, that often worked on little paid-in capital, paid scandalously high dividends, suspended specie
payments at the drop of a hat, and folded at the slightest whiff of economic trouble.
See Perkins, American Public Finance. 266-281; J. Van Fenstermaker, The Development of American
Commercial Banking. 1782-1837 (Kent: Kent State University, 1965).
bl Eventually, the state legislature tried to curb bank investments as a percentage of overall capital in order
to increase the amount available for lending.
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the notorious policies of early republican banks to reserve much of th e ir loans for
m erchants in general and insiders in particular—those on the board, their
fam ilies, and business associates— certainly excluded many w ould-be bank
custom ers, but it also operated as a credit-checking device. By definition,
insiders w ere known quantities, people w ith whom the bankers had been fam iliar
fo r a long tim e and whose businesses and expertise had been well established.
T hey therefore appeared to be a safer b e t fo r loans than strangers w ho had
unfam iliar business credentials and who m ig ht not feel the sam e social pressure
from friends and relatives to be punctual a s fa r as paying the bank back.62 The
desires o f investors and the lending policies of banks dovetailed to produce
institutions with a long-term focu s that nonetheless could operate m ostly beyond
the supervision of the general population o f stockholders.
The investment priorities both of insurance companies and th e ir
shareholders tended to be even more conservative than those of banks. The
very reason fo r their founding w as to m itigate the financial risks of business, of
property ownership, and, eventually, of m ortality itself.

Philadelphia com panies

specialized in particular sectors o f the insurance business: the earliest insured
ships and cargoes; then cam e firm s that insured houses, warehouses, and their
contents against fire; and finally, in the 181 Os the first of life insurance

“ Philadelphia banks were also reluctant to lend to manufacturers rather than merchants, claiming that
merchants could pay back 30- and 60-day loans promptly while manufacturers needed long-term loans to
buy machines, build workspace, and acquire raw materials. However, that reasoning is questionable, given
that a great number of the short-term loans to merchants were continuously rolled over, essentially making
them long-term loans, and that, once manufacturers were established, they were better able to generate
continuous cash flow and therefore more likely to be able to pay back loans than were merchants.
Wright argued that bank officers were able to
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companies began writing policies.63 Regardless o f w hat line of business
insurance com panies were in, they all operated according to the same general
pattern. Com panies com peted heavily, advertising th e ir prem ium rates. They
were all offering the same service to the same pool o f potential customers and
tried to keep the cost of prem ium s close to their estim ated costs of business, tha t
is, the calculated chance of total losses as well as salaries and office rent.64
Because o f this stiff rate com petition and the inexactitudes o f contemporary
actuarial methods, insurance com panies struggled to m ake significant profits on
the differences between prem ium s and claims.
However, insurance com panies always kept a large pool of capital in
reserve: the original capital paid in by investors along with all the paid-in
premiums, from which the occasional claim was paid. T h e y made their oftensignificant earnings from investing their reserves in a variety of ways including
buying federal and Philadelphia city bonds, owning stock in other corporations,
and making com mercial loans and private mortgages. As Jacob Shoemaker, the
actuary for the Pennsylvania Com pany for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities,
reported to his Board, they w ere losing potential custom ers to the Union
Insurance C om pany of New-York, which was offering low er premium rates. He
suggested that the Pennsylvania Company “can safely reduce their terms to the
Scale acceptable by the NY Com pany," because “ hitherto w e have been able to

“ See Harold Edgar Gillingham, Marine Insurance in Philadelphia 1721-1850 (self-published, 1933); Mary
Ruwell, Eighteenth-Century Capitalism: The Transformation of American Marine Insurance Companies
(New York: Garland, 1993); and Vivian A. Rotman Zelizer, Morals and Markets: The Development of Life
Insurance in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).
°‘T h e Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities advertised its rates in
Philadelphia, New York, and Baltimore, and sometimes adjusted its rates in response to competition from
New York companies. July 1, 1815, Minutes, Board of Directors, Vol. 1, Pennsylvania Company for
Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, Accession #1476, Hagley Museum and Library.
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em ploy money to better advantage than 6 pC ent compound interest.”65
Insurance companies’ ability to invest their reserves provided the great majority
o f their profits. These investments had to be on the safe side to guard against a
rash of big claims, for example, when a hurricane sank several ships warranted
by marine insurance company, when a large conflagration burned several
buildings covered by the same fire insurance com pany, or when an epidem ic
took the lives of many life insurance policy holders. That way, one com pany told
prospective customers, they “should ever be im pressed with a firm conviction of
the solid foundation of the institution, and of its entire capacity to com ply with all
its engagements.”66 As part of their conservative investment strategy, insurance
companies included a clause in their articles o f association or in their charters
that forbade them “to buy or trade in any stock whatsoever, for the purpose of
making a profit by such buying and selling.”67 Doing so committed insurance
companies to make investments based on long-term stability from dividendbased revenue rather than short-term profitability from the fluctuation o f stock
values. Nonetheless, insurance company charters allowed them to invest in
stocks and bonds in any Pennsylvania corporation, and invest they did.68

65June 3, 1819, Minutes, Board of Directors, Vol. 1,163, Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and
Granting Annuities, Accession 1476, Hagley Museum and Library.
66Typescript copy of “An Address from the President and Directors of the Pennsylvania Company for
Insurances on lives and granting annuities, to the Inhabitants of the United States, upon the subject of the
beneficial objects of that institution. Philadelphia: J. Maxwell, 1814,” 47 in Pennsylvania Company for
Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, Accession #1476, Hagley Museum and Library.
s?The Charter and By-Laws of the Pennsylvania Comoanv for Insurance on Lives. Granting Annuities, and
Executing Trusts (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Brother, 1836), 8.
“ For example, the Insurance Company of North America, chartered on April 14,1794, was allowed to “be
vested in securities for or evidence of debts due by the United States, or in the stock of the Bank of
Pennsylvania, or of the Bank of the United States, or of the Bank of North-America, or of the Susquehanna
and Delaware Canal, or of the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Navigation Company, or of the Lancaster and
Philadelphia Turnpike Company” or any other company subsequently incorporated by Pennsylvania. An
Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Insurance Company of North-America (Philadelphia: William W.
Woodward, 1801), 4.
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Insurance companies were a fa irly safe haven fo r investors who wanted reliable
dividends over a long period.
W hile the motivation fo r putting money in insurance companies remained
constant, motivation fo r investm ent in Philadelphia city bonds shifted over the
course of the first two decades o f the nineteenth century. The people and
organizations buying bonds in the first issue of 1801 and 1802 invested either
out of civic duty o r because o f a potential increase in property values, much like
internal improvement investors. M ost bondholders purchased only one bond,
m any of them doubtless doing so because of the com bined inducement of
interest and the free water subscription fo r the first three years.69 Institutional
investors certainly hoped for gains, but they also bought bonds because the
successful completion and operation of the waterworks could contribute to their
respective missions. The Insurance Company of Pennsylvania bought 20 of the
$100 bonds and the Mutual Assurance Company bought 30. Each m ost likely
hoped that the waterworks would greatly enhance the city’s ability to fight fires.
The Pennsylvania Hospital purchased another ten, both because of the medical
consensus that fresh water would m ake the city’s residents healthier and more
resistant to yellow fever and because the hospital was extrem ely water
intensive.70 Although some investors bought multiple bonds, most seem ed to be
content with buying one to do th e ir part in keeping the city pleasant and livable.

69Statistics compiled from Loan Certificate Transfer Journal, City Treasurer, Feb. 1801-Aug. 1820,
Philadelphia City Archives.
70As of 1809, the Pennsylvania Hospital was the waterworks’ second largest consumer, behind the city alms
house. See Report of the Watering Committee to the Select and Common Councils. November 2. 1809
(Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1809), 16.
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Unfortunately fo r the city, though, a few institutional investors were not
enough to buy up the whole issue at first. In 1799 the federal governm ent had
ju s t issued bonds paying eight percent, and the Delaware and Schuylkill Cana!
Com pany had lobbied the General A ssem bly to declare the city’s use of
Schuylkill w ater a violation o f the canal com pany’s charter, both of which made
the city bonds seem less attractive because the city might not be able to collect
w ater rents.71 The city’s difficulty in collecting taxes in several of the previous
years because of the chaos of the nearly annual yellow-fever epidemics probably
also discouraged those looking fo r a safe place to put their money.
Eventually, the city’s prompt paym ent of interest on the first issue of city
bonds, the creation of the sinking fund, and the city’s more efficient tax collection
efforts com bined to establish confidence am ong investors in city bonds. From
1805 on, the City Councils borrowed m oney by issuing interest-bearing bonds
nearly every single year and som etim es several times in a ye a r for a variety of
purposes. They borrowed the most m oney fo r expenditures relating to the
waterworks and the w ater distribution system : $25,000 for pipes and repairs in
1805, $70,000 to replace wooden pipes with iron ones in 1818, $150,000 to buy
the land and w ater rights at Fairmount and an additional $200,000 for
construction in 1819, and another $75,000 fo r the extension o f the iron water
main system in 1822.72 They also to o k out loans to pay for o ther capital

71Report to the Select and Common Councils on the Progress and State of the W ater Works on the 24th of
November. 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799).
/2 John C. Lowber, Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia; to Which Are refixed, the
Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the City (Philadelphia:
Moses Thomas, 1812), 239-240: Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia. Passed Since
the Sixteenth of July. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Seventeen (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1819),
117-118, 126-128; Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Twentv-
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improvements to the city such as the construction of culverts and markets in
1808, 1809, 1810, 1817, 1821, and 1824.73 They issued bonds to pay for
emergencies, such as to build fortifications to defend the city in the W ar of 1812
o r to make up for budgetary shortfalls.74 They even sold bonds to buy the old
statehouse, soon to be called Liberty Hall, from the state of Pennsylvania for
$70,000 in 1817.75 The city’s ability to fund all these projects as well as
shortfalls in its more routine activities stemmed directly from the willingness of
investors to snap up the city’s bonds.
City Council m em bers probably thought of bondholders as the best kind of
partners in their building of Philadelphia: investors who footed the bill with no
questions asked. Although taxpayers were willing to pay for a budget that
included incrementally larger appropriations into a sinking fund—payment for
debts already contracted— they were loathe to approve big new expenditures or

Seventh Dav of December. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-One (Philadelphia: City Councils,
1823), 109-110.
73John C. Lowber, Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia: to Which Are refixed, the
Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other Acts of Assembly Relating to the City (Philadelphia:
Moses Thomas, 1812), 239-240: Ordinances of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia: Passed Since
the Fourteenth Dav of September. One Thousand Eioht Hundred and Fifteen (Philadelphia: City Councils,
1817), 87: Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Third Dav of August.
One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1822), 168-169; Ordinances of the
Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Fourth Dav of February. One Thousand Eight
Hundred and Twenty-Three (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1824), 253-254; Ordinances of the Corporation of
the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Eighth Dav of January. One Thousand Eight Hundred and
Twenty-Four (Philadelphia: Citv Councils. 1825), 280-282.
/4Committee of Wavs and Means Report for Appropriations for 1807. accompanied by An Ordinance for
Raising Supplies and Making Appropriations for the Services of the Citv. for the Year One Thousand Eight
Hundred and Seven (Philadelphia: [Jane Aitken?], 1806), 5; John C. Lowber, Ordinances of the Corporation
of the Citv of Philadelphia: to Which Are refixed, the Original Charter, the Act of Incorporation, and Other
Acts of Assembly Relating to the Citv (Philadelphia: Moses Thomas, 1812), 191, 239-240; Ordinances of
the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: Passed Since the Eighteenth Dav of June. One Thousand Eight
Hundred and Twelve (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Councils, 1815), 11,12-13, 54: Ordinances of the
Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Twenty-Second Dav of April. One Thousand Eight
Hundred and Nineteen (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1821), 158-159: Ordinances of the Corporation of the
Citv of Philadelphia. Passed Since the Twenty-Seventh Dav of December. One Thousand Eight Hundred
and Twenty-One (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1823), 182; Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of
Philadelphia. Passed Since the Fourth Dav of February. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-Three
(Philadelphia: City Councils, 1824), 248-250.
Ordinances of the Corporation of the Citv of Philadelphia: Passed Since the Fourteenth Dav of
September. One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifteen (Philadelphia: City Councils, 1817), 69-71.
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to support unexpected costs. Bondholders w ere much less fickle than taxpayers
as a source of im m ediate funding for large capital projects and for overruns and
annual expenditures. They did not expect efficiency, responsibility, or
competence, m erely th e ir interest paym ents twice yearly. They invested in city
bonds fo r the sam e reasons that they invested in banks or insurance com panies:
precisely because th e y did not want to spend the time and energy necessary fo r
other potentially profitable pursuits. That lack of energy suited the politicians on
the City Councils, especially the Common Council whose members w ho were up
for annual reelection: through the sinking fund and city bond issues, the
corporation shifted th e burden of financial scrutiny of its affairs from the
electorate to people w hose precondition fo r investm ent was the ability to ignore
the details o f the corporation’s finances altogether.
City bond values stayed fairly steady during the first decades o f the
nineteenth century, b u t because of the poor success rate o f internal
improvement com panies, canal stocks often fluctuated wildly. Investors were
much more likely to sell these corporate stocks merely to recoup som e o f their
losses than they w ere interest-bearing bonds. Conflict over rights of original
investors as opposed to subsequent owners w as typical of early republic debates
concerning the ow nership and exchange of financial instrum ents and com pany
stocks. The earliest battle between first and subsequent owners had raged m ost
fiercely in the 1780s and early 1790s as a result of the econom ic chaos during
and after the Revolution. To finance both th e prosecution of the R evolutionary
W ar and more pedestrian government activities when even routine tax collection
was difficult, both the Continental Congress and the states resorted to a variety
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o f tactics including printing paper money, selling interest-bearing certificates, and
issuing scrip that am ounted to nothing more than the governm ent’s IOU.
Because of the post-w ar econom ic slum p and the w idespread uncertainty over
the ability of the fledgling governm ents to make good on th e ir considerable
financial commitments, all o f these instruments depreciated greatly during the
1780s, leading m ost of th e farm ers and soldiers who held such paper to unload it
fo r w hat little they could g e t in return. Speculators and urban m erchants often
ended up with large am ounts of such paper. Then, in the late 1780s and early
1790s, the states, following the federal government’s lead, began to make good
on those debts either at par or at least well above th e ir low est m arket value. The
new owners now held pap er o f value, and many of the original owners felt as
though they had been swindled.
Protests against the Union Canal Company charter reprised the sam e
controversies along sim ilar term s. Once the Watering C om m ittee had rebuffed
the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Com pany’s overtures in 1799, both that
com pany and its sister, the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Navigation Company,
fell nearly dormant, victim to the entire litany of problems th a t beset early canals.
The routes had been poorly chosen, there was trouble finding com petent
engineers to stay on the job, contractors fleeced the com panies, land costs
skyrocketed because of speculation, and capital-raising efforts could not keep up
with the ballooning costs. A t one point, the workmen even go t involved in a
tavern brawl with locals in an affair so violent that the governor finally had to
mediate between com pany president Robert Morris and angered Myerstown
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residents.76 Although the Delaware and Schuylkill project was all but
abandoned, in 1807 a num ber of men still harbored the notion that connecting
the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Rivers was a goal worth pursuing. However,
the Susquehanna and Schuylkill Navigation Com pany’s finances were by that
point unsalvageable because of the large number of defaulted subscriptions, the
failure of the state-sponsored lotteries, and its com plicated relationship with the
Delaware and Schuylkill Canal. So, in 1807, som e of its investors decided to try
out another solution of British origin: a merger of the two com panies into the new
Union Canal Company, in the hopes that it could provide a better institutional
and financial footing for the project.77
To begin operations, the sponsors of the new com pany had to obtain a
charter and determine w hat stake the stockholders of the old companies would
have. The legislature did not pass a charter until 1811, fo u r years after the first
proposal. In the end, boosters successfully applied to the legislature under a
plan in which those who had paid their full subscriptions of Schuylkill and
Susquehanna Navigation Com pany stock would receive tw o shares of the new
company, and paid-up stockholders in the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal
Navigation Company would receive one share in the Union Canal Company for
each completed subscription.78 The application for and the granting of the
charter precipitated wrangling in the legislature and the newspapers between
rival factions of stockholders. Those who had paid up their full subscriptions—

76Secretary of the Commonwealth, Internal Improvements File, Canal & Navigation Companies, Schuylkill &
Susquehanna Canal & Lock Navigation Company, No. 41, Folder 2, Pennsylvania State Archives.
^The Birmingham Canal Navigation and the Birmingham and Fazeley Canal Navigation merged by act of
Parliament in 1794; Armand Budington DuBois, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act. 17201800 (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), 375.
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both original subscribers and speculators who had b o u g h t com pleted
subscriptions at bargain-basem ent prices— generally' favored the arrangement:
the possibility that their investm ent would retain s o m e of its value o r at least
result in a completed waterway had drastically incre ase d.79 Those subscribers
who had not paid in all their subscriptions co m plained loudly because only
com pleted subscriptions could be exchanged fo r sh a re s of the new company.
They lost w hatever money they had paid in. Others, who had sold their
com pleted subscriptions well below par in a d e spe ra te attem pt to salvage some
of their investment, also protested, arguing that they had put fa r m ore m oney into
the project than the speculators to whom they had s o ld their shares and who
would now get shares in the new company. Opponeints to the new charter also
pointed out that it limited ownership to American citiziens, shutting o ut foreign
stockholders in the original com panies.80 This last objection was m oot because
as of yet neither canal had attracted significant foreicgn investment. Still, it was a
point worthy of consideration because banks did hav*e large num bers of foreign
stockholders and company founders hoped that a successful navigation
com pany could, as well.
Arguments concerning stockholding in the chartering of the Union Canal
Com pany seemed like a recurrence of the debates in the 1780s and 1790s
concerning federal and state financial instruments: thiose who had sold out were

78Acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Relating to the Union Canal Company of Pennsylvania
(Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1828), 40.
See for example Charles G. Paleske, Observations on the Applicatio-n fora Law to Incorporate “The Union
Canal Company” Respectfully Submitted to the Members of Both Houses of the Legislature of Pennsylvania
(Philadelphia: Duane, 1808) and January 3, 1812, Aurora General Adwertiser.
Memorial to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of PA, in General Assembly
met, from Stockholders in the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation^ and the Delaware and Schuylkill
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accusing speculators of cashing in while the investors who had m ade a greater
initial sacrifice w ould be left with nothing. In this case, as in the previous debates
over the holding o f Continental Congress d e b t from the Revolution, those who
had the stock in th e ir possession last won the day. A fter this debate, the
Pennsylvania legislature did not revisit the subject, essentially settling the issue
with profound consequences for the finance o f large projects and institutions.
The assurance that all transactions w ere final and not subject to e x post

facto review by civil authority gave investors the security to invest in stocks and
bonds knowing th a t such instruments w ould keep their value independent of the
political climate. A t the same time, the refusal of the General Assem bly to
com pensate the original investors who had sold th eir shares in the defunct canal
com panies m ade th e investment world a m uch riskier place. Together with the
governm ent’s haphazard support of big projects such as the waterworks and
internal im provem ent companies, the decision of the legislature to leave stock
values to the m arketplace most likely discouraged those with little to spend from
investing in local projects because o f the risk involved. For the rich, such
investment rem ained possible because th e y had more opportunity to diversify
their portfolios and because they had greater access to credit and so could
w eather econom ic storm s while others w ould be forced to sell assets like stocks
and bonds. The continued insistence o f corporations and the legislature alike to
keep initial stock prices at $50, $100, or m ore furth er exacerbated the
investment gap betw een the rich and the m iddling and lower sorts. The
com bination o f all these factors ensured th a t investm ent and therefore control of
Canal Navigation Companies, Box4-B, Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of
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banks, insurance com panies, city bonds, and especially internal improvements
would stay in the hands o f a small sector of the population.
After the W a r of 1812, the consolidation of the control of internal
improvement projects in few er hands became increasingly pronounced,
especially in those th a t would become profitable through the anthracite trade.
The first major Philadelphia-area coal-related internal im provem ent, the
Schuylkill Navigation Company, started out in 1815 with a roster o f investors
closely resembling those of previous projects. The average investment in the
Schuylkill Navigation C om pany was just over $350, with a m aximum single
holding of $2,500.81 Subsequent efforts, though, especially to make the Lehigh
River navigable, involved few er investors pouring in larger sums.
Once ousted from the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany— after his
suggestion that they reduce tolls— company founder Josiah W hite remained
determined to bring coal cheaply to Philadelphia. He set his sights on the Lehigh
River, a fast-flowing and rocky waterway running from the coalfields to the
Delaware River som e sixty miles above Philadelphia. He decided that the
Lehigh could be m ade navigable, and hoped to do so on his own after his bitter
experience with the Schuylkill Navigation Company. W ithin two years, though,
W hite’s travails in his quest fo r funding for the Lehigh Navigation and Coal
Com pany demonstrated that Philadelphia’s capital form ation m arket retained
som e features of its old, clubby system of m erchant networks. At the same time,

Pennsylvania.
81Statistics compiled from C-Miscellaneous Records; Reel 3327; Stock subscription book, Schuylkill
Navigation Company, MG-110, Pennsylvania State Archives.
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that market was gaining the advantages and efficiencies related to the growth of
and access to large pools of capital from banks and insurance companies.
Knowing that no bank would be willing to loan hundreds of thousands of
dollars for years to a man with little collateral, W hite used the tried and true
method of capital form ation in the early republic: he w ent to moneyed friends and
acquaintances who had access to capital. He had m ade these rounds before,
first when trying to find backing fo r his nail mill in 1811 and again when he
started the Schuylkill Navigation Company. Because he came from a prominent
Q uaker family, and because of his experience with the Schuylkill Navigation and
as a local manufacturer, W hite was at least fam iliar with many of the men most
prominently involved in financial activities in Philadelphia. Armed with pamphlets
he had had printed trum peting the advantages of the Lehigh River and Lehigh
coal, he and his partner Erskine Hazard made a long series of fruitless calls;
reactions ranged from only passive encouragement to outright rudeness.
Joseph Buonaparte— the Em peror’s wayward brother w ho settled for a time in
Pennsylvania— demurred in a note; Samuel Archer “agreed to give us a hearing
on the subject for 5 minutes by the watch” before saying no; “Stephen Girard
said he formed no partnerships” ; Samuel Spackman was to call back in three
days, but never did; Benjamin Stille “was polite enough to allow of some general
Remarks, but said he was unable to appretiate them ” ; John Friese claimed "he
ha[d] no money at his com m and” ; Joshua Longstreth m ade appointment, “but he
was gone next door to a party to have some fun” ; Jacob Ridgway “treated the
project & ourselves with much Contempt” ; John Rogers “hoped we would do
well” ; John Stille “proceeded to Read his news paper, & alltho we bid him, good
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afternoon, he was so m utch engaged at Reading the chit chat, occurences of the
day, that he had no tim e to bid us good night.”82 A fte r so m any rebuffs, the
prospects for support seem ed slim.
Finally, W hite appealed to Jacob Shoem aker, a fellow Quaker.
Shoem aker had been a founding director o f both the Delaware Insurance
C om pany and the Bank o f Philadelphia before helping organize and becoming
the actuary of the Pennsylvania Company fo r Insuring Lives and Granting
Annuities in 1809. In the Pennsylvania Com pany office, Shoem aker revealed
“hav9 formerly an intention o f forming a Co. fo r a sim ilar purpose up the Lehigh,”
and told W hite that in exchange “for 20 shares of stock he agreed to give... his
w eight and influence to get [the] Stock subscribed.”83 Shoem aker quickly
delivered on his promise, enlisting company president Condy Raguet fo r $10,000
and com pany board m em ber James Spencer and speculator John Stoddart for
identical stakes. According to White, “the Balance of the stock was then fill’d in
about 24 hours.”84 On the one hand, raising m oney through business partners
and their associates reflected nearly tim eless practice. On the other hand, the
am ounts involved, the speed in which they were pledged, and the motivation for
their investment signaled a significant shift in transportation improvement
financing.
The sums that m ajor investors were willing to grant to the Lehigh
Navigation and Coal C om pany dwarfed the am ounts previous investors had put
into other public im provem ents. The average investm ent in the Schuylkill

^Josiah White’s History Given bv Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 1909), 2326.
^Josiah White’s History Given bv Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 1909), 27.
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Permanent Bridge in 1801 w as only $36 and the highest only $220 despite its
obvious potential fo r success. Perhaps the reason fo r this broad distribution of
shares was the initial sale price of only $10, allowing a greate r slice o f the
population the chance to invest in the city’s and the com pany’s futures.85 A
listing of stockholders in th e Delaware and Schuylkill C anal as of 1807— by which
tim e many of the sm aller shareholders had defaulted on th eir subscriptions—
revealed the average holding to be $325, with a m axim um single investment of
$2,200.86 These projects w ere typical of early im provem ents whose wide
distribution of small, local investors reflected an expectation that a lack of direct
profitability would be m ore than m ade up for by higher property values and
cheaper transportation to and from the metropolis.87 A s one Union Canal
Com pany booster pointed ou t in 1808, “people of m oderate fortunes can turn
their money to superior advantage in a shorter time, and with less supposed risk”
than in internal im provem ent ventures.

88

By the early 1820s, the possibility of huge profits from the transportation
of coal distinguished the Lehigh navigation and the Schuylkill Navigation from
previous efforts. Here, as in so many other facets of Am erican economic and
technological developm ent in the early nineteenth century, the British precedent
loomed large. English coal canals numbered among the m ost profitable
^Josiah White’s History Given bv Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 1909), 27.
^Statistics compiled from Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company, List of Subscribers (mss., 1801),
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
n6Statistics compiled from List of Subscribers, May 26, 1792, Secretary of the Commonwealth, Internal
Improvements File, Canal & Navigation Companies, Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation, No. 14,
Pennsylvania Department of State, Record Group #26, Pennsylvania State Archives
87See John Majewski, “Who Financed the Transportation Revolution? Regional Divergence and Internal
Improvements in Antebellum Pennsylvania and Virginia,” Journal of Economic History 56 (Dec, 1996),
763-788.
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corporate projects in the Atlantic world during the preceding few decades.89
Furthermore, not only would the Lehigh navigation be able to deliver much
needed coal to the metropolis, but also, unlike other improvement com panies,
the Lehigh Navigation and Coal Com pany held mineral-rich properties not far
from the river. The com pany could mine its own coal and bring it to m arket
considerably more cheaply than potential competitors. Some of the investors
thought that the navigation would be the main revenue-producing part o f the
operation, while others calculated that the coal lands would be more profitable.90
The two together, though, represented an investment more likely to thrive than
either would by itself.
The early Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company and the later Schuylkill
Navigation Company differed from their internal improvement predecessors in
their potential for profit; the investors in these two ventures also had easier
access to larger amounts of capital. The proliferation of banks and insurance
com panies in the Philadelphia area had given many more city residents the
ability to invest their own cash or to borrow m oney to invest in big, risky ventures.
In addition, the banks, insurance companies, and the city of Philadelphia had
reserves of money available for underwriting area projects. Furthermore, the
coal-region navigation com panies had few er barriers to large investors than did
banks and insurance com panies. The state legislature had always carefully
regulated the issuing of stock in banks— and to a lesser extent insurance

“ Charles G. Paleske, Observations on the Application fora Law to Incorporate “The Union Canal
Company” Respectfully Submitted to the Members of Both Houses of the Legislature of Pennsylvania
(Philadelphia: Duane, 1808), 4.
See J.R. Ward, The Finance of Canal Building in Eiahteenth-Centurv England (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1974).
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com panies— in the hope o f making the opportunity fo r profits widely available
and out o f the fear th a t a fe w individuals could e asily gain control of financial
institutions crucial to the w orkings of the econom y.91 M any internal im provem ent
com pany charters contained the same kinds o f provisions that banks and
insurance companies did regarding distribution of stockholding.92 However, the
great difficulties canal and turnpike companies faced in attracting subscribers
resulted in far more leniency than banks received in term s of limiting individual
shareholding: here, the sense of urgency fo r transportation improvements
trum ped anxieties about the undue influence of a fe w individuals in the
corporation. The onset o f construction on the Erie C anal served to deepen the
rush for internal im provem ents in Pennsylvania and to lead legislators to look the
other w ay when the Lehigh Coal and Navigation C om pan y and the Schuylkill
Navigation Company w e n t searching for large sum s o f m oney to finish their
projects.

QQ

The chronic shortage of cash on the part o f the internal navigation
com panies in the late 1810s and early 1820s gave potential large investors a
strong position in dictating term s to Boards of M anagers of struggling projects,
further concentrating control of those institutions in fe w e r hands. Those

^Josiah White, Josiah White's History Given by Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation
Company, 1909), 46.
91See Pauline Maier, “The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation,” William and Mary Quarterly
3d Ser., 50 (1993), 51 -84 for an analysis of this debate; see Chapter 4 for an analysis of the corporate
boosters’ responses.
^Pennsylvania corporate charters generally carried stipulations limiting individuals from acquiring large
blocks of stock at a company's founding. The most usual way of doing so was to limit buyers to the
purchase of one stock on the first day available, two stocks on the second day, and three on the third.
Should here by any stocks left after the first three days, they would be distributed in proportion to the size of
bids for those remaining. Some charters also limited the total number of stocks that any individual could
purchase in the initial issue.
See Chapter 4 for an analysis of the ways that Pennsylvania inland navigation companies exploited
concerns over competition from Baltimore and New York City.
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investors used their leverage to protect their money in a variety o f ways, each of
w hich placed their rights and privileges ahead of earlier stockholders and
lenders. In 1817, the Schuylkill Navigation Company board bent to the demands
o f large investors when not enough sm all ones cam e forw ard to buy up a stock
issue. “From the backwardness o f the people to com e forw ard and make further
additions," the board reported, "it appears not probable th a t m uch progress can
soon be made therein.” Board m em bers weighed the o ffer of “a num ber of
m onied men...to subscribe large am ounts on condition that such subscriptions
shall not be binding on them unless the full amount o f five thousand shares now
wanting shall be fully made up and subscribed.”94 In the end, the board voted to
accept the rich men’s offer, having no other alternatives to raise the needed
sum s.
In these sorts o f affairs, too, the companies and investors cooperated to
use financial devices already pioneered by British internal navigation companies.
For example, in 1821 the Lehigh C anal and Coal C om pany began using
preferred stock.95 The com pany had run out of cash, and the stockholders did
not w ant to throw even more into a project that as yet had produced no revenue.
T h e ir money had already been tied up in the concern fo r several years, and
potential returns still appeared to be a few years in com ing. The Board of
Managers solved the problem by dividing shares into two classes. Josiah White
and Erskine Hazard, who jo in tly held $150,000 in stock and by fa r the largest

94August22, 1817, Minutes, Board of Managers, Roll 1, Oct 7, 1815-January 5, 1846, MG-110, Schuylkill
Navigation Company, Pennsylvania State Archives.
95See George Heberton Evans, Jr., British Corporation Finance. 1775-1850: A Study of Preference Shares
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936) for an extended discussion of the use of various
kinds of preference shares in British canal finance. Pioneered in Britain, these methods of raising capital
were replicated nearly identically in America.
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stake in the com pany (over 30% of it), agreed to accept a lower priority on
dividends for th a t block of stock.96 In other words, should the company make a
profit, all the other stockholders— old and new— would get to share the dividends
first, and White and Hazard would only get a share of the profits once everyone
else had received a reasonable return. The practical effect of this arrangement
fo r prospective investors w as that the threshold fo r returns had become much
lower: the com pany only had to make $21,000 in total profits to yield new
investors a 6% return on investment, rather than the $30,000 previously
required.97 W hite and Hazard agreed to this deal because they knew that,
should the com pany be unable to attract more money, th e ir entire investment
would go down the drain. They also understood that the stock had not been
selling under the current arrangement. Hence, new investors could now take
advantage of the com pany’s straits to demand better term s.
Stephen Girard, no stranger to financial m achinations, found another way
to use investment at a critical tim e to gain a significant stake in a struggling
com pany. In 1823, the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany ran out of cash and
projected needing another several hundred thousand dollars to finish the
waterway. The Board of M anagers realized that it had already exhausted the
usual methods of raising funds: no more would be forthcom ing from the state,
the company had already spent all the money generated by the sale of stock
under its charter, and it despaired of selling yet more stock to an unenthusiastic
public. Accordingly, the com pany board turned to yet another method of raising

^M ay 25,1821, MG-311 Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company Records, Roll 1, Minutes of the Stockholders,
1821-1831, Pennsylvania State Archives.
97Calculated out of a total capitalization of $500,000.
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m oney pioneered by British internal im provem ent com panies, in this case the
M anchester New Ashton Canal in 1 7 9 7 and the Grand Junction Canal in 1798:
the loan convertible to stock.98 The B o a rd negotiated a series o f loans from the
ever-adroit Girard am ounting to a to ta l o f $230,850, an incredible sum fo r one
individual to be able to offer.99 The fin a l agreem ent was structured first as a
m ortgage on the entire navigation pa ying Girard six percent interest annually;
however, he reserved the option to c o n v e rt any value of the loan into com pany
stock at par value. By coming in at a particularly vulnerable juncture fo r the
com pany and by being able to co m m it a princely am ount o f m oney, Girard had
wrangled fabulous term s that nearly guaranteed him a profit a t the expense of
previous investors, regardless of the co m p a n y’s ultimate fate. Should the
Schuylkill Navigation Com pany go bankrupt, Girard would own all its land and its
w ater rights, whose value fa r exceeded the amount he had put in. Furthermore,
the whole navigation could probably b e finished with limited additional
investment, so he would get a corporation potentially worth a million dollars or
m ore a t a bargain price. Should the c o m p a n y be successful and start to issue
substantial dividends, he could co n ve rt his loan into stock at p ar— probably well
below the market price— and he could then either sell the stock at a handsome
profit or collect the dividends. S om ew here in the middle, th a t is, were the
navigation to be finished but be only m arginally profitable, G irard could sit back
and receive the interest due on the loan. Girard had found a w ay to ensure that
he would profit in any given scenario, w hile previous stockholders could be hurt
"Armand Budington DuBois, The English Business Company after the Bubble Act. 1720-1800 (New York:
Octagon Books, 1971), 372, 429.
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in several ways: loan paym ents or dividend paym ents to Girard would cut into
their dividend paym ents, and if the project failed Girard would be the beneficiary
of their total investm ent. The ability to lend a large sum at a particularly
vulnerable m om ent fo r the company gave Girard the chance to dictate favorable
terms and considerable say in company affairs because he also retained the
option of calling in his loan. Through his use of capital, one man owned the
Schuylkill River.
For the internal navigation companies in coal-producing regions and fo r
the corporation of Philadelphia, the late 1820s brou gh t spectacular increases in
business and profitability. In 1823, the com pletion o f the water-powered
waterworks at Fairm ount drastically reduced operating costs compared to the old
steam-powered system ju st as the city corporation com pleted a campaign to
double the extent of th e distribution system through the introduction of large iron
water mains. The expansion of system capacity and the elimination of fuel costs
finally put the annual waterw orks budget into the black fo r the first time. From
then on, the w aterw orks’ annual surplus contributed to the sinking fund rather
than the other way around. In the fall of 1824, Josiah W hite convinced the
Lehigh Coal and N avigation Company to bring m ore than two thousand tons to
market, several tim es the am ount sold there the previous year.100 The resulting
abundance of anthracite in the city led consumers to the conclusion that
Philadelphia’s supply w ould be reliable enough fo r them to install the proper
grates to burn stone coal in their furnaces rather than wood, charcoal, or

"Schuylkill Navigation Company Board of Managers to Stephen Girard, February 5,1823, Letter Books,
Box 1, June 5, 1816-Nov 25, 1824, MG-110, Schuylkill Navigation Company, Pennsylvania State Archives.
100Josiah White's History Given by Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 1909), 53.
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bituminous coal. City bonds had sold well for some time, and in the late 1820s
Schuylkill Navigation Com pany and Lehigh Coal and Navigation Com pany stock
prices came into demand too, beginning to sell above par. The hopes for
steady, long-term profits had been realized fo r both city investors and for
investors in the two coal navigations.
The move into the black allowed corporations such as banks, insurance
companies, the City of Philadelphia, and finally the inland navigation com panies
to act as a medium for an exchange o f financial power over the course of the
early decades of the nineteenth century. On the one hand, the investment
benefits of these corporations were distributed widely, at least among the
wealthiest quarter of the population. By the late 1820s, thousands of
Philadelphia residents owned stock in one or more companies, city bonds, o r
both. By buying these financial instrum ents, they were investing in their own
futures a well as in the future of the city. The average taxpayer, too, got
something: a better regional transportation network and city-wide fresh water
supply system with little cost in term s of increased state taxes. The state had
contributed little o f the funds for the construction of the coal canals and none of
the expenses for the waterworks: stock and bond investors had put in the lion’s
share of the principal. In terms of city taxes, as long as Philadelphia continued
to grow, the increased taxpayer base and those who used the new technologies
most intensively— either by transporting goods along the navigations o r by
getting water piped directly to their hom es or businesses— would pay off the
interest and eventually much of principal for building the waterworks and the
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internal navigations. Meanwhile, once the coal trade took off, tolls covered the
maintenance, upkeep, and interest on th e inland navigations.
Despite such benefits, the users, taxpayers, and sm aller investors did not
get something fo r nothing. Rather, the use o f private corporations and the
floating of public debt amounted to a shell gam e that merely hid the unpleasantly
high costs of infrastructure projects necessary to the economic and urban
development nearly unanimously desired in the early republic. The cost of
heating fuel decreased in Philadelphia in the late 1820s because o f the
availability of cheap anthracite coal that traveled down the Schuylkill and Lehigh
navigations at no cost to the taxpayer. So fa r so good. But those prices, low as
they were, still included large profits to investors in the companies administering
those navigations, especially the big investors who had gotten their shares on
such fabulous term s. The waterworks, too, provided the city a necessary service
for its continued success but disproportionately rewarded those who had the
wherewithal to buy municipal bonds. Meanwhile, everyone’s taxes paid for the
interest support and the maintenance of the sinking fund that paid off bondowners. The waterw orks not only redistributed water; they redistributed wealth
as well. The individuals in control of capital had devised institutions and
methods that guaranteed their ability to skim off the cream of economic
development.
The general public also ceded control o f these technologies and the
institutions that adm inistered them to a sm all group of men who would direct
much of Philadelphia’s economic growth. These men, on the City Councils o r on
the boards of various corporations year after year, determined the routes and
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capacities o f the navigations and the c ity water mains and w hat to charge
consum ers. They m ade decisions involving hundreds o f thousands of dollars—
huge sum s at the time— with little o r no input from the electorate or, in the case
of business corporations, any public authority. So fo r the public, the price of
cheap access to water, transportation, and credit was the loss of control over the
corporations responsible fo r those technologies and services. The following
chapter will examine how corporation insiders, especially those in internal
navigation companies, explained and justified the distribution of the benefits of
these technologies along with the concentrated control o f the institutions they
used to run them.
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T h e Evolution of Corporate Ideology
From the early 1790s until 1830, inland navigations boosters found myriad
term s to promote their projects to different groups in d iffere nt places. Their
argum ents partly reflected the ir own motives, but even m ore, a perceptive
estim ation of the desires o f potential investors and various groups in the
com m unities through w hich proposed projects might run. Throughout the period,
they pushed canals and river navigations as wonderful vehicles o f economic
growth, but as the econom y o f the Delaware valley expanded and changed, so
did the economic vision offered by promoters, from one prim arily of land
speculation and developm ent to one in which m anufacturing and mineral
extraction played a significant, even leading, role. Once growth intensified,
com pany directors shifted th e ir rhetoric to stockholders from an appeal to
com m unity interest to one o f direct profit. Inland navigation boosters composed
their appeals to match the rhythm of the changing econom y, and learned to alter
their ideological tune as th e Revolutionary generation’s fears for the success of
the republican experim ent becam e overwhelmed by th eir children’s enthusiasm
fo r getting ahead and staying there. Thus, Philadelphia-area promotional
literature before the turn o f the nineteenth century em phasized the ways that
canals and river navigations could help keep the union together, but later
appeals increasingly highlighted the potential economic benefits to particular
com m unities and groups. By the late 1820s, inland navigation proponents
touted the beginnings o f industrialization, the prospect of profitable investment,
and the pursuit of ever m ore narrowly defined interests to create a new ideology
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that both invoked a need fo r their projects and provided a credo fo r the most
aggressive actors in the Philadelphia region’s growing economy.
Only a few years a fter the Grand Procession celebrated the birth of the
federal union in Philadelphia, a group of prom inent Philadelphians embarked on
a trio of related projects intended to help provide structure and direction to the
infant nation. They also hoped to make a good deal of money. Mainly
merchants, mainly wealthy, and mainly Federalists, they included among their
num ber Ebenezer Hazard, erstwhile postmaster o f the United States; John
Nicholson, future treasurer of the Commonwealth o f Pennsylvania; Robert
Morris, revolutionary financier; Samuel W etherill Sr., an oil and dye merchant;
David Rittenhouse, a scientist and instrument-maker; and W illiam Smith, the
president of the University of Pennsylvania. They also had something else in
common: they all owned great tracts of uninhabited real estate in central and
western Pennsylvania that they had acquired cheaply in the previous decade in
the expectation of great profits as settlers moved west. However, these
speculators quickly realized that no one would pay fo r land unless able to afford
to transport their produce to market. Land transportation remained too
expensive. So, these w ealthy Philadelphians set out to erect the transportation
infrastructure that would make their main investments profitable.
Many of these men had entered into various syndicates to buy large
parcels of land; they also associated in three organizations to bring those
properties into Philadelphia’s economic orbit. The first was the Society for
Improvement of Roads and Inland Navigation, founded in a meeting at
Carpenters Hall in 1791. The Society advocated state funding fo r the other two
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schem es, both established to accomplish m ore concrete tasks: the
Susquehanna and Schuylkill Canal C om pany and the Delaware and Schuylkill
C anal Company, both routed to connect the rivers after which they were named.
Com bined, the tw o canals would allow w ater transportation from the entire
Susquehanna valley in central and western Pennsylvania all the w ay to
Philadelphia’s w harves on the Delaware River.
The appeals o f the Society and the tw o canal companies em phasized one
g re a t goal: according to Robert Morris, “to com bine the interests of all the parts
of th e state, and to cem ent them in a perpetual commercial and political union,
by the im provem ent o f [Pennsylvania’s] natural advantages.”1 Apparently, the
Pennsylvania legislature agreed, for the pream ble to the charter granted the
Susquehanna and Schuylkill Canal Com pany asserted that “the opening o f a
com m unication by water... will greatly tend to strengthen the bands of union
between citizens inhabiting distant parts” of the state.2 The them e o f uniting
disparate econom ic and geographical interests was one inland navigation
boosters returned to constantly. In 1795, W illiam Smith optim istically predicted
th a t the two canals would bind Pennsylvania “together in one flourishing and
civilized whole, sensible of a common interest, and rejoicing in the com m on
prosperity.”3 Proponents recycled this argum ent whenever they applied fo r
charters, asked th e legislature for funding, solicited investment, or addressed

’William Smith, An Historical Account of the Rise. Progress and Present State of the Canal Navigation in
Pennsylvania. With an Appendix. Containing. Abstracts of the Acts of the Legislature Since the Year 1790.
and the grants of Money for Improving Roads and Navigable Waters throughout the State: to Which is
Annexed. “An Explanatory Map" (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1795), 3.
“An Act to enable the Governor of this commonwealth to incorporate a company, for opening a canal and
lock-navigation between the rivers Schuylkill and Susquehanna, by the waters of the Tulpehoccon,
Quittapahilla and Swatara, in the counties of Berks and Dauphin.” Smith, 23.
3Smith, iii.
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their stockholders. G overnor Simon Snydor claim ed in his annual address of
1811 that a state-funded canal system could “form an indissoluble bond of
union...forever banish the idea of a severation of th e States...create new and
strong ties and dependencies...and excite new sym pathies and affections among
the children of the sam e Am erican family.”4 The very next year, the Union Canal
Com pany’s petition fo r state aid reminded the legislature that “the strength of the
individual m em bers o f the union demands im periously a proportionally powerful
cem ent to bind them together.”5 Clearly, they hoped fo r the canal to serve as
that adhesive. As late as 1825, a subcommittee o f the Philadelphia city councils
endorsed a plan to cu t a canal across the city connecting the Schuylkill and
Delaware rivers by claim ing that it would “give a stim ulus and activity to those
parts now stationary— will make a unity of interest between the east and w est
[city wards]...and m ake the city united in all its great interests of trade and
commerce.”6 T h a t canal was never built, but the sentim ent that inland
navigations could unite disparate interests remained. Canal boosters suggested
that internal navigation had nearly magical, inherent qualities guaranteeing
prosperity and union, with the alternative being an undeveloped, fragm ented
econom y eventually leading to social and political chaos.
The purported ability of institutions or technologies to shape the polity and
the society form ed rather typical threads in the cloth o f political econom y in the

“Address of Governor Simon Snydor to the Legislature, December 5, 1811, in George Edward Reed, ed.
Pennsylvania Archives. Series IV, (Harrisburg: State of Pennsylvania, 1900), 752.
a Report and Memorial of the President and Managers, of the Union Canal Company, of PennsylvaniaMade and Presented to the Legislature of the State of Pennsylvania, at Their Session 1812-13
(Philadelphia: John Binns, 1812), 9.
Report of the Watering Committee, on the Disposal of the Surplus W ater Power of the River Schuylkill,
and the Construction of a Canal Between the Schuylkill and Delaware (Philadelphia: Councils of the
Corporation of Philadelphia, 1825), 12.
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early republic.7 W hether one had an optimistic view o f the abilities and merits of
the commonfolk or a darker opinion, nearly everybody believed that the creation
of a proper framework of laws and institutions could contribute greatly to the
survival of the new nation.8 For Republicans, confidence usually lay in strictures
limiting government, such as the federal Bill of Rights and state guarantees of
religious freedom. For Federalists, society’s salvation lay in strong political and
financial institutions that could in turn restrain social entropy. During the
Federalist era, the intensity of debate over the federal and state constitutions as
well as over policy showed th a t Am ericans of all political persuasions took
controversies over political and econom ic structure extrem ely seriously, both
because they understood th e ir actions to be perhaps irreversible precedents and
because they saw those issues as being inextricably connected to social
concerns such as economic opportunity.9 This intuition for the interconnection of
political, economic, and social problems— and the quest to solve those
problems— had evolved from the Enlightenment tradition of political economy, a
tradition permeating eighteenth-century American thought through sources as

7For a discussion of the relation between republican ideology and manufacturing technology, see John F.
Kasson, Civilizing the Machine: Technology and Republican Values in America. 1776-1900 (New York:
Grossman Publishers, 1976).
8For the intellectual background of the belief in the efficacy of political and legal structures to influence
social structure in the Constitutional period, see Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic.
1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969) and Forrest McDonald, Novus Ordo
Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1985). For an
analysis of the continuing confidence of the American people in such institutions in the following decades,
see Daniel Feller. The Jacksonian Promise: America. 1815-1840 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1995).
9For the best account of the ideological zeal of the 1790s and the political and personal bitterness that such
fervor engendered see Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
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diverse as Tom P a in e ’s Com mon Sense. Cato’s Letters, the Federalist Papers,
and countless n e w sp a p e r entries.10
Canals and river navigations offered a possible solution to one of the m ost
vexing philosophical and political problems facing the new nation. The
conundrum o f conflicting interests had played a central role in political econom y
fo r centuries; the notion that a republic could survive only through at least som e
modicum of public virtue and the occasional placing o f the common weal above
private interest fo rm e d a cornerstone of American political economy.11 In the
minds of many, th e divergence of American interests with Britain’s had
precipitated the A m erican Revolution. A num ber o f the men involved in the
Susquehanna and Schuylkill Canal and the D elaw are and Schuylkill Canal had
served in the C ontinental Congress or under W ashington in the Continental
Arm y and thus had first-hand knowledge of the num erous ways that sectional,
class, state, and occupational interests could th re ate n the young republic’s very
survival. In Federalist #10, James Madison assuaged som e anxieties over the
disparate interests o f a far-flung population by tu rn ing plurality into a virtue,
arguing that no sin g le interest would be able to dom inate the federal
government. N onetheless, the revolutionary generation, perhaps mindful of the
national governm ent’s dysfunction under the Articles of Confederation and the

10The literature concerning republican ideology is vast. The seminal works include Bernard Bailyn, The
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); J.G.A.
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Republican Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in
Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); and Gordon S. Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic. 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); for a
summary, see Robert E. Shalhope, “Republicanism and Early American Historiography,” William and Mary
Quarterly 3d Ser. 39 (April 1982), 334-356.
11For an extensive discussion of the origins of arguments relating to the role interest in eighteenth-century
political economy, see Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for
Capitalism before Its Triumph (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977); Cathy D. Matson and Peter S.
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raucous free-for-all th a t routinely characterized state legislatures, remained
apprehensive that if the population’s concerns diverged enough, the fractious
states and the federal union would be endangered.
Many Am ericans thus deem ed any projects that could join people from
different areas as especially felicitous to the republican experim ent. In Federalist
#11, Alexander Ham ilton lauded the merits of “a unity o f commercial, as well as
political, interests” that would result in “one great Am erican system.”12 Canals
and river navigations seem ed to fit the bill perfectly, even according to Madison:
in Federalist #14, he pointed out th at the fragility of the large republic would be
mitigated by “an interior navigation...throughout...the thirteen states. The
communication between the W estern and Atlantic districts, and between
different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy by those numerous
canals.”13 He pointed out that “intercourse throughout the Union... [would] be
facilitated by new im provem ents,” and help to keep Am ericans forever “knit
together as they are by so many cords of affection.”14 The man who had the
greatest single influence on the Constitution spoke for m any when he argued
that internal navigation would contribute greatly to the success of the federal
union.
Meanwhile, Philadelphians who put a high prem ium on social and
economic stability, including men such as Ebenezer Hazard, George Clymer,
and John Nicholson, had im m ediate proof that intra-state unity was as fragile as

Onuf provide a more specific analysis of American political economy in A Union of Interests: Political and
Economic Thought in Revolutionary America (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990).
Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist #11," in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers (New York: Penguin,
1961), 90-91.
13James Madison, “Federalist #14,” 102.
u Madison. Federalist Papers. 102-3.
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the national com pact. In the early 1790s w estern Pennsylvanians protested,
sometimes violently, the federal excise tax on whiskey, leading to the federal
march to put down th e “whiskey rebellion” in late 1794.15 At the same time,
settlers and two groups of speculators— one from Pennsylvania, the other
representing C onnecticut claimants to the sam e territory—continued wrangling
over disputed land titles in central and western Pennsylvania. Neither of these
types of extended conflict, moreover, was lim ited to the Keystone state. Maine
settlers and speculators would fight over land claim s fo r at least another
decade.16 The G reen Mountain Boys m anaged to carve themselves a new state
by exploiting the conflicts between New York and New Hampshire claimants,
perhaps flirting with joining Canada in the process.17 A group of Appalachian
settlers seceded from North Carolina in the late 1780s to found the short-lived
state of Franklin and m ade overtures to Spain before the area came under
federal control. These fears took years to dissipate; even Aaron Burr’s bizarre
1807 schemes— though completely unrealistic— were widely perceived to be
serious threats to federal cohesion. To m any Philadelphia Federalists, the
message must have been clear: that Pennsylvanians in the mountains and
beyond perceived th e ir interests as being at odds with those of east-coast
speculators and governm ents. Something was needed to establish the loyalty of

15Thomas Slaughter, in The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1987) argued that Western Pennsylvanians, at least partly because they sent their
goods west down the Ohio River to the Mississippi and on to New Orleans, had different economic interests
than did Philadelphians.
1BWhile Alan Taylor, in Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Main
Frontier. 1760-1820 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American
History and Culture, 1990) argued that settlers and speculators had differing views of the nature of
property—based on labor and law, respectively—at bottom, their conflict was over who owned particular
plots of land and often pitted local settlers again Boston-based speculators, and thus boiled down to a
direct conflict of interest.
17See Michael A. Bellesiles, Revolutionary Outlaws: Ethan Allen and the Struggle for Independence on the
Early American Frontier (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993).
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westerners, and the integration of western areas intto the economic fabric of th e
Atlantic ports seem ed to be the best solution. In th* eir desire to bring unity to
their state and to the union, Pennsylvanians did nott stand alone in their positive
view of the beneficial effects of canals.
Both in other states and at the national leveL, Americans of nearly all
political persuasions held lofty opinions of the potem tial influence o f internal
navigation upon the econom y and the polity. In ressponse to an 1807
congressional request for a comprehensive review • on internal navigation,
Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin, in his w elll-received and m uch-praised
report on roads and canals, predicted that better in la n d transportation “will
shorten distances, facilitate commercial and persom al intercourse, and unite by a
still more intimate com m unity of interests, the m ost remote quarters of the United
States.” 18 In G allatin’s opinion, “no other single o p e ra tio n ... can more effectually
tend to strengthen and perpetuate that union, w h ic h secures external
independence, dom estic peace, and internal liberty'.”19 An open letter from
Robert Fulton, added as an appendix to Gallatin’s n'eport, put the Cabinet
member’s sentiments in more practical terms: “w ha -t stronger bonds of union can
be invented,” the steam -boat entrepreneur rh e to rica lly asked, “than those which
enable each individual to transport the produce of hnis industry [1,200] miles fo r
60 cents the hundred weight?” He answered that “ffiere then is a certain m ethod
of securing the union of the states, and of re n d e rin g it as lasting as the continent

18[Albert Gallatin], Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, on the Smbiect of Public Roads and Canals;
Made in Pursuance of a Resolution of Senate, of March 2. 1807. Apnril 12. 1808 (Washington: R.C.
Weightman, 1808), 8.
19Gallatin, 8.
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w e inhabit.”20 H e n ry Clay’s American System , too, and the passage of the
Bonus Bill in 1817 demonstrated national su pp ort for projects that could integrate
the interests o f w e s t and east. Madison vetoed the measure not out of
disapproval fo r su ch projects— indeed, he had written and spoken in favor of
better transportation as a national cem ent fo r three decades— but because of
scruples over th e constitutionality of federal funding fo r them. Philadelphia area
canal boosters d id not exaggerate much w hen lauding “the wish at this tim e so
universally expressed, in favour of internal im provem ent.”21
While ea rly Pennsylvania project boosters were most likely sincere in their
desire to keep th e union together, they had another, far more im m ediate reason
fo r using com m unitarian arguments: an appeal based upon individual interest
had little potential fo r success. The com panies sim ply could not raise enough
m oney from private investors to com plete th e ir canals. Both the Delaware and
Schuylkill canal a n d the Susquehanna and Schuylkill canal did enjoy an initial
flurry of subscriptions, but they had trouble collecting further installm ents, a
problem exacerbated by construction costs fa r exceeding original estim ates.
Because th e y could not raise enough m oney from individuals, officials of
the two com panies constantly lobbied the state government for funds, or at least
fo r better circum scribed exclusive lottery rights in the state. However, the areas
through which th e canals were routed were still sparsely populated, and as yet
the western part o f the state was not developed to the point that transportation
from one end of th e state to the other form ed a top priority for western residents.
Z0Robert Fulton to Albert Gallatin, December 8, 1807, as quoted in Gallatin, 123.
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Furthermore, a potential rise in taxes of any kind continued to be an especially
touchy subject in the very districts that might profit m ost in the long run from the
canals: those that had experienced unrest during the 1780s and 1790s, including
the W hiskey Rebellion Fries Rebellion.22 Com pany boosters shrewdly
calculated that few er citizens would benefit from the canals than were not
com pletely opposed to any use of state tax money; tha t minority would not net
them enough political leverage fo r the necessary legislative majority. They had
to find some wider, more com pelling reason fo r legislators and their constituents
to vote for state funding. Therein lay the practical reasons fo r using the potential
union of the state as th e ir rhetorical paradigm: com pany backers then could
portray the canals as projects that would benefit everyone in the state by
strengthening the body politic. Throughout the period, inland navigation boosters
knew that neither party would oppose projects for ideological reasons; public
improvements did not becom e a partisan issue in Pennsylvania because
everyone supported the idea of better transportation, at least in the abstract.23 If
com pany officials could convince a majority of legislators that the canal would
help all districts, rather than a privileged few, then crucial state aid would come
their way.

21Report of the President and Managers of the Union Canal Company of Pennsylvania: to the Stockholders.
Made in Compliance with the Provisions Contained in Their Act of Incorporation (Philadelphia: John Bioren,
1818), 3.
^ S e e Terry Bouton, “A Road Closed: Rural Insurgency in Post-Independence Pennsylvania," Journal of
American History Dec 2000 <http://www.historycooperative.Org/joumals/jah/87.3/bouton.html> (2 Mar.
2001 ).
23Although partisan bickering in the Pennsylvania legislature was highly contentious at times, internal
transportation—like defense or education in later times—was a principle general enough for all to claim
support it without necessarily actually funding it. See Douglas E. Bowers, “From Logrolling to Corruption:
The Development of Lobbying in Pennsylvania, 1815-1861,” Journal of the Early Republic, 3 (Winter, 1983),
439-474; Philip Shriver Klein, Pennsylvania Politics 1817-1823: A Game Without Rules (Philadelphia: The
Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1940), 357; and Sanford W. Higginbotham, The Keystone in the
Democratic Arch: Pennsylvania Politics 1800-1816 (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum
Commission, 1952), 304.
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Before the 1820s, few contradicted the claim s that inland navigations
brought people of disparate interests together. Ju st about every community, in
fact, did want a canal o r river navigation running through its backyards because
the alternative, poor transportation, hurt a locality in a variety of ways. Most
obviously, it meant being shut out o f economic development. Pamphlet after
pamphlet touting the benefits of inland navigation projects compared the costs of
water transport to overland transport, a difference that could affect a farm er’s
bottom line significantly. That in turn influenced property values, sending land
prices in canal-fed areas skyward and depressing those in land-locked localities.
Compounding matters, som e of the taxes local residents paid to the state m ight
go to projects that helped other areas connect to Philadelphia. No locality
wanted its state tax dollars to pay for farmers living in some other area to be able
to undercut their ability to sell their produce profitably. Consequently, the
Pennsylvania legislature tended to distribute m oney to very small projects fairly
equally across the state, but was often stingy with m ajor projects that would only
benefit one portion of the state.24 Even the argum ents against many projects
reinforced the rhetoric o f unifying effects: the projects most likely to be defeated
were those that tunneled Pennsylvania goods to seaports in other states.
The theory that canal and river navigations united interests had special
resonance because, as both contemporaries and historians have noted, there
was much truth to the general assertion that good canals made good neighbors.
Inland navigation com panies detailed the goods th a t traveled up and down their

24That is, until the Pennsylvania Canal, a public project so huge that it promised something to nearly every
county, and eventually almost bankrupted the state in the process. See Robert McCulloch, The
Pennsylvania Main Line Canal (York, PA: American Canal and Transportation Center, 1976).
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projects. In 1829, fo r exam ple, the Schuylkill Navigation Company bragged that
21,329 tons of goods had been shipped upstream in the previous year, including
all sorts of m anufactured item s under the rubric o f “m erchandise"; building
m aterials such as plaster, marble, and cement; and a new delicacy fo r people
living inland, fresh saltw ater fish, the appearance of which “had such an effect
upon the visages of [inland residents] that it would have been a fit subject for the
pencil of a Hogarth to im itate."25 Philadelphians not only sold finished goods
upstream, but also bought tons of commodities from the hinterland com ing down
the navigation: in the sam e year, 84,133 tons had descended the river, more
than half of it anthracite, but also other extracted products such as iron, lead,
and lime; m anufactured item s including flour, hats, and whiskey; and agricultural
products like grain, hogs, and butter.26 A contem porary pamphlet corroborated
the Schuylkill Navigation C om pany’s boasts, with m erchant after m erchant
testifying to the thousands of barrels of goods the y had shipped up and down the
riv e r27 Like other cities in the sam e period, Philadelphia’s economy expanded
both figuratively and literally as an ever-greater physical area became more
closely integrated into the city’s economic fabric.28 The hinterland benefited at
least as much or possibly m ore than the city; despite the greater bulk of
25 Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to the Stockholders. January
5. 1829 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1829), 10. Pottsville Miner’s Journal, October 31, 1829 as quoted in
J. Bennett Nolan, The Schu''lkill (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1951), 29.
26 Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to the Stockholders. January
5 .1 8 2 9 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1829), 11. My understanding of flour as a manufactured good
comes from Brooke Hunter, “America’s First Industry: Flour Manufacturing in the Lower Delaware River
Valley, 1750-1800,” presented at the McNeil Center for Early American Studies, November 3, 1999; cited by
permission of author.
7Naviaat?on and Advantages of the River Schuylkill for Foreign Trade. Established bv Affidavits
([Philadelphia], 1829).
See Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development in the Philadelphia Region. 1810-1850 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1978), 111-112. Lindstrom’s central argument is that improvements in
transportation led intraregional specialization, which in turn fueled the economic expansion of the North in
the first half of the nineteenth century. Francis X. Blouin, Jr., identified the same phenomena farther
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downstream traffic, upstream traffic was actually higher in term s of dollar value.29
Both Philadelphians and th e people living in its growing econom ic orbit could see
the mutual benefits of inland navigation in their pantries and their account books.
By the 1820s the m ore pompous strains of “uniting the union” tended to
be relayed in a shorthand in which Philadelphia-area boosters needed only to
mention the connection betw een two specific geographic areas to imply the
commingling of interests th a t would occur should a given project be completed.
Popular familiarity with both the projects and the term s of the debate certainly
played a role. For thirty years, beginning with the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal
Company and the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Canal Com pany and continuing
with their successor the Union Canal Company, boosters had bombarded the
public and the legislature w ith pamphlets and petitions. The Schuylkill
Navigation Company, Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, the Delaware and
Hudson Canal Com pany, the Delaware and Raritan Canal Company, and a host
of others later took up the sam e refrain. As of 1822, Pennsylvania had chartered
eighteen canal com panies, som e of which had applied to the General Assembly
in more than one legislative session and nearly all of which were the subjects of
multiple acts of the legislature over several sessions.30 Perhaps equally
important, by the 1820s the men proposing, administering, and legislating such
ventures thought Pennsylvania’s polity to be far less fragile than had their fathers
in the 1790s. They felt less self-conscious about appealing to the interests of
different groups and regions, knowing that their audiences did not fear for the

northward in The Boston Region. 1810-1850: A Study of Urbanization (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press,
1980).
29Lindstrom, 102-105.
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state’s fragility.31 Nonetheless, the repetition of their message and its
undertones left no doubt that the great majority of Pennsylvanians considered
inland navigation projects to be a uniting influence.
In his study o f Virginia and central Pennsylvania internal improvements,
economic historian John Majewski suggested that early corporate transportation
project boosters engaged in two levels of discourse. Privately, corporate insiders
professed their motivations to be those of communitarian values: that is, that
they engaged in such activities out of strong patriotism and selfless concern for
the community’s overall econom ic wellbeing. Meanwhile, their public
pronouncements— petitions and annual reports— also emphasized potential
profits, often in the very sam e documents that actually revealed staggering
budget shortfalls, discouraging engineering setbacks, and ponderously slow
rates of construction progress. As Majewski pointed out, the internal
improvement com panies’ difficulties in raising funds testified to the fact that few
investors took these rosy predictions seriously; Philadelphia-area turnpike and
inland navigation com panies experienced the same fund-raising travails.

32

Most

people who bought stock did so in expectation of the appreciation of real estate
values or to get goods to m arket more cheaply. Perhaps Majewski drew too fine
a line between the public and private discourse in that com panies’ public
literature also often testified to how internal improvements could “go far towards

30Report on Roads. Bridges and Canals. Read in the Senate. March 23. 1822 (Harrisburg: C. Mowry, 1822),

18.
31Many Americans remained concerned about the strength of the union, as Henry Clay demonstrated with
the popularity of his ideas concerning the “American System.” However, Pennsylvania was far more stable
in the 1820s than in the early 1790s, not long after the Pennamite-Yankee conflicts and during the Whiskey
Rebellion.
32John D. Majewski, A House Dividing: Economic Development in Pennsylvania and Virginia Before the
Civil War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 54-55.
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realising the enlightened views of the patriotick statesm an,” as an 1812 petition
in favor of granting a charter to the Schuylkill Navigation C om pany stated.33 Still,
he rightly argued th a t the constant claims of profitability were attem pts to
legitimate private and governm ental investment in these projects.34
Boosters fu rth e r argued that, even should they not m ake m oney directly
from their investm ent in inland navigations, they would still recoup their outlays.
An anonymous January 1812 letter to a popular Philadelphia new spaper offered
exactly the sam e reasoning to answer his own question, “W ho, then, will invest
his money in this stock, when not half the income can be derived from it which he
can acquire in any o th e r way?” Touting “the im mense im portance of public
improvements,” a w rite r identifying him self only as “PENN” urged greater public
and private funding o f turnpike and navigation com panies as the solution to the
m oney problems o f inland navigation projects. He considered the answer to his
rhetorical question “obvious” : that “years must elapse before an adequate rise in
the value of the lands will take place, yet... the im provem ents will at last so
enhance the value o f the lands as to yield more than the requisite sum to secure
the holders of stock against loss.” He added another reason th a t Majewski did
not identify. For an individual or the state to invest in a project that admitted
financial futility was difficult; if the companies at least gave lip service to
dividends, investors would be assured that their dollars would be handled wisely
once in the com panies’ coffers. Perhaps taking their cue from Adam Smith,
petitioners to the state governm ent already com plained about the inefficiency of

^Josiah White, petition to legislature, December 5, 1812, Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of
Pennsylvania.
^Majewski, 56.
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publicly supervised projects, specifically pointing out that they spent taxpayers’
dollars foolishly. As “ PENN” wrote, “the public n e ve r has been...so capable of
having work well and expeditiously done as com panies of individuals, deeply
interested in the issue, and devoting every requisite personal attention.”35
Navigation com pany pamphlets argued that because governments gave up on
any pretense to profit they might spend taxpayers’ m oney wastefully, but a
corporation that at least retained the goal o f going into the black reassured
potential stockholders that their money would be used constructively.
Boosters w orked and reworked the argum ent that the private interest of
investors and com pany officers would ensure th a t boards of managers built
quickly and efficiently.

In a deft flip, com pany prom oters also reversed the logic.

If the profit motive inherent in incorporated com panies legitimized those
corporations, then any profits turned by internal im provem ent companies, too,
were proper gains as long as the pursuit of them did not conflict with the public
interest. Petitioners to the Pennsylvania legislature “[did] not hesitate to avow...
that views of individual profit had a share in the m otives of inducement” to found
and invest in internal im provem ent com panies. Nonetheless, they only gained
“individual profit connected with public advantage, — the pursuit of a lawful, a
necessary, and a laudable end, by fair, lawful, and honourable means—
persuaded...that th e ir efforts were in accordance with the views of the
Pennsylvania legislature."

36

According to internal improvement com pany

investors, the possibility of profits made internal navigation companies good, and
35Poulson’s American Daily Advertiser, January 24, 1812.
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the lofty goals of internal im provem ent com panies made profits good— too bad,
they privately lamented, th a t the companies rarely made good profits.
Using the corporate profit motive to prom ote internal im provem ent
corporations met with m ixed success, but appeals to individual profit proved
better at catching public attention. The changing appeals of the Union Canal
C om pany to potential investors— including individuals, town governments, and
the state legislature— before the W ar of 1812 showed a subtle shift from playing
on anxieties over the republic’s fragility to extolling the virtues of econom ic
development through the collected strivings of individuals. That change partly
reflected changing econom ic factors. The Susquehanna and Schuylkill and the
Delaware and Schuylkill Canal companies floundered for over a decade because
of financial and technical setbacks despite an initial flurry of activity in the early
1790s. In 1807, with Je fferso n’s Embargo looming, Philadelphia merchants
began to look more carefully fo r domestic outlets fo r investment and
development. A syndicate comprised of som e of the original investors as well as
speculators new to the projects decided that the inland navigation idea still held
merit. This group sought to combine the two companies and their assets under
a new charter from the state legislature, naming the amalgamation the “ Union
Canal Company.” The com pany’s public petition for a charter parroted the old
lines that “the facility o f transportation by w ater not only encourages agriculture,
manufactures, and com m erce, but greatly tends to strengthen the bands of union
between citizens inhabiting different parts of a country,” a self-conscious

^Citizens of Philadelphia, Petition to Pennsylvania General Assembly, House File, 49th Session-1, 182425, Folder 5, Pennsylvania General Assembly, Records of General Assembly, Record Group 7,
Pennsylvania State Archives.
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paraphrase of the original charters.37 Furtherm ore, they blam ed the failure o f the
first two companies at least partly upon “th e baleful effects o f local interests.”38
These included the “short sighted individuals, and their neighbours, affected by
the sam e errors, [who] have concurred in exacting unreasonable prices fo r slips
of land, far exceeding the proportional value of the rem ainder of the farm .”39 A
letter to the Philadelphia Aurora exhibited th e same logic, tracing canal troubles
in general to “various efforts of speculation and the influence of private over
public interests... and the infidelity and artifices of persons w ho sacrificed every
principle of public duty to an unjustifiable selfishness.”40 The canal com pany and
its friends suggested that by asking exorb itan t amounts for real estate through
which the canal would travel, the property owners put their own interests ahead
of the greater good— represented by the ca na l’s potential to bring better
transportation and higher overall real estate prices fo r everyone. Union Canal
Com pany backers claimed to represent th e public against the unseemly pursuit
of individual interest.
Those same men were not above m anipulating that line of reasoning in
creative ways. The Union Canal C om p any’s 1811 petitions to the legislature for
state aid hinted at the justification of private interest while using the old fam iliar
terms. W hen “the powerful motive o f individual interest is com bined and united
with the more exalted sentim ent which Patriotism and Public Spirit inspire to
hasten its completion,” com pany officials argued, their canal would provide great

37Charles G. Paleske, Observations on the Application for a Law to Incorporate “The Union Canal
Company" Respectfully Submitted to the Members of Both Houses of the Legislature of Pennsylvania
(Philadelphia: Duane, 1808), 2.
Paleske, 3.
39Paleske, 3.
40January 15, 1812, Philadelphia Aurora General Advertiser.
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service to the com m onwealth.41 In other words, canal backers were once again
asking for state investment to supplem ent funds raised through the sale of stock
to individuals in the building o f the canal. The harnessing of “the powerful motive
o f individual interest’ to prom ote the general good did n ot represent a new idea,
a t least to anyone who had read David Hume, Adam Sm ith, or the many
newspaper editors and politicians influenced by their ideas. Also, the Union
Canal Company officers still characterized “ Patriotism and Public S p irit’ as being
a “more exalted sentim ent’ than the desire for private gain. However, unlike in
previous lobbying efforts, this tim e boosters were not w arning of the divisive
dangers of interest and the subsequent need to unite potentially disruptive
private ends. Instead, they portrayed individual econom ic efforts as potentially
valuable when properly directed. Naturally, they considered their own project a
proper direction. Private interest, these petitioners im plied, was not an inherently
disjunctive force, separating individuals from society so a s to pull it apart; rather
it represented a neutral im pulse, one that could be either positive or negative
depending upon how it was channeled. The authors o f th e Union Canal
Com pany petition argued that internal improvement w ould point private interest
in a constructive direction. However, before the project gained momentum, the
W a r of 1812 pushed discussions of private interest and o f big construction
projects to the bottom of the political agenda.
W ars always disrupt econom ies, and the United S tates’ second struggle
against the British proved no exception. Especially because Philadelphians put

41Report and Memorial of the President and Managers, of the Union Canal Company, of Pennsylvania.
Made and Presented to the Legislature of the State of Pennsylvania, at Their Session 1812-13
(Philadelphia: John Binns, 1812), 8.
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much money and energy into building defenses for the city, the W ar of 1812
interrupted significant canal activity w hile at the same tim e indirectly providing
the impetus for increased developm ent along different econom ic and ideological
tracks. The steep wartim e rise in fuel prices prompted city residents to search
fo r alternate sources of energy, a quest that would eventually result in the push
to find ways to use anthracite and to bring it to market. Ideologically, the
ultim ately successful prosecution o f the war— or at least, the United States’
ability to survive the British onslaught until peace cam e in Europe— helped put to
rest many Americans’ fears about the ability of the Union to stay together in
tim es of crisis.42 Com bined with the Louisiana Purchase, the W ar of 1812 gave
Am ericans the confidence that their country would not be torn apart either
through British conquest from the north and east or through French or Spanish
seduction from the south and west.

Furthermore, by the tim e the war was over,

a younger generation began to drive national politics. Men such as Henry Clay,
John Calhoun, Daniel W ebster, John Quincy Adams, and Andrew Jackson held
widely differing views about the governm ent’s role in the economy, but they all
appeared to take fo r granted the prim acy of economic developm ent in civic
policy.43 DeWitt Clinton certainly had practical com merce as much on his mind
as political philosophy in his nearly evangelical fervor for New York State’s Great
W estern, or Erie, Canal.44 The issue of finding institutions or technologies to

42See Steven Watts, The Republic Reborn: W ar and the Making of Liberal America. 1790-1820 (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
43The literature on these men and on the role of development in national politics is vast. For a summary,
see Daniel Feller. The Jacksonian Promise: America. 1815-1840 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1995), 53-75. The best one-volume work on national politics in this era is Harry L. Watson, Liberty
and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York: Hill & Wang, 1990), which places differing
concepts of economic development and growth as the central political debate of the time.
^S ee Ronald Shaw, Erie Water West: A History of the Erie Canal 1792-1854 (Lexington: University of
Kentucky Press, 1966).
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bind the nation together suddenly seemed m uch less pressing— indeed, nearly
superfluous— com pared to the desire for m ore goods, better markets, and the
institutions and technologies that could m ake them more easily and m ore widely
available.
In and around Philadelphia, too, a younger generation of men becam e
the most energetic actors in local affairs, less anxious about the fate o f the
republic but with an even keener interest in encouraging Philadelphia’s growth
than their predecessors.

They were men like Samuel W etherill Jr., the son o f a

prom inent local paint and dye manufacturer, who pioneered the m anufacture of
white lead and mined m uch o f his ore in the Schuylkill Valley; Josiah W hite,
whose experience ow ning a wire-pulling m anufactory led him to experim ent with
anthracite; Joshua Gilpin, a Delaware paper mill owner; and M athew Carey, the
political economist w ho built the United nation’s first printing and publishing
empire. Their interests often contradicted those of their merchant predecessors
(and, for that matter, contem porary merchants, too), in a number of issues
ranging from tariffs to credit accessibility. These men wasted little tim e worrying
about the fragility of the nation but gave much thought to Philadelphia’s
economic prospects and how to push the city in directions that would ensure
their own fortunes as well as their com m unity’s. They saw that Philadelphia’s
future lay in economic expansion inland rather than toward the Atlantic, and that
manufacturing would form a crucial com ponent of that growth. Furthermore, they
thought that the best w ay fo r Philadelphia to reach its potential was to unleash
the talents and drive of every citizen, and to do so required the ability of
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tradesmen and m anufacturers to pursue th e ir own interests, adding to the whole
city’s economy.
In addition, the boosters who launched internal im provem ent projects in
the late 1810s and the 1820s had much m ore particular goals than the Delaware
and Schuylkill and th e Susquehanna and Schuylkill partisans, and they
articulated those goals in fa r more specific term s.

While pam phlets and

petitions fo r the e a rlie r projects usually included long reveries on the intangible
benefits that internal navigation could bestow upon the society and the body
politic, later ones w ere more likely to be filled with concrete calculations
estimating savings on transportation costs fro m locations along the proposed
navigation to Philadelphia’s warehouses. T h is shift in emphasis reflected more
than a greater accum ulated mass of available econom ic inform ation. It also held
two profound im plications. First, econom ic grow th— in this case, through lowered
transportation costs— could now be advanced as a sufficient condition fo r
economic activity, regardless of any possible hypothetical bonus fo r the polity.
Second, while these pam phlets would often show savings to the whole
community in term s o f tim e and money fo r w a te r travel as opposed to overland
transport, they also pointed out the savings to individuals. Canal com panies in
effect made a subtle but personal sales pitch: support the canal, invest in it, get
your representatives to vote for its charter, and you will be rewarded in gold. The
men who wrote these com pany publications w ould use the same kinds of
arguments in fa vo r o f the adoption of anthracite coal, or in fact any of their
ventures. They w ere now making an appeal less directed to patriotism o r the
greater good and m ore focused on econom ic expansion and personal interest.
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The use of an argum ent placing the welfare o f the com m unity first held
serious drawbacks particularly fo r the Schuylkill and Lehigh navigations and the
Delaware and Hudson C anal. W hile each project had a metropolitan area as its
downstream terminus, they all started as near as possible to the coalfields of
eastern Pennsylvania. T h a t is to say, they began in regions that were sparsely
settled in the 1810s and ea rly 1820s, dotted with occasional villages and with
farm s that barely generated enough cash to pay taxes. Even in 1832, Josiah
W hite of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Com pany frankly admitted that “our
canal terminates in a com plete barren wilderness.”45 The area of Pennsylvania
bordered by New Jersey on the east, New York on the north, the Susquehanna
to the west, and Philadelphia to the south boasted only one town, Reading,
larger than 2,500 people. T h e coal-related projects could not connect the great
northwest to the eastern seaboard, the northern cities to the southern cities, or
even highly developed hinterland with the nearest city. A t least the Schuylkill
navigation would pass by Reading and eventually have the Union Canal as a
feeder. That was barely enough to convince the state legislature to purchase
$100,000 in Schuylkill Navigation Company stock after the Panic of 1819, a
m easure intended to create tem porary employment rather than a grand
com m itm ent to the project’s completion. W ith that exception, however, direct
state investment in Philadelphia-region canals ended. Inland navigation
com pany officials would have to find private sources of investment. The
Chesapeake and Delaware Company, in 1823, tried canvassing the various
wards of Philadelphia, inducing city residents to invest “fo r the purpose of

4SJosiah White, Circular (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 6.
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com pleting a work of g re a t national importance, w ithout regard to any pecuniary
advantage which might p o ssib ly accrue to the stockholders.”46 Such efforts
yielded little success, so c a n a l backers knew they would need some reason
more compelling than the g re a te r good to attract m oney from individuals.
Another issue, dam ages, directly belied the assertion that canals were
universal instruments of com m union and hastened Philadelphia-area residents
to consider that canal com panies represented one am ong many competing
interests. River navigations and sometimes canals required dams that could
flood surrounding fields e ith e r permanently or on a sem iannual basis. Com pany
officials found themselves continually dragged into county courts to settle claim s
for inundated property. T h e vicissitudes of owning land along the route proved to
be extremely annoying a n d contributed to the high costs of canal building.
Having extensive experience with English canals, Benjam in Henry Latrobe
related that the "p roprietor who sells land to a Canal Company, independently of
dissevering his property, exposes it to the depredations of boatmen, who a t a
distance from their homes,, are often in want of fru it and poultry, and fence-rails
for fireing." Consequently, “he therefore demands a price which will cover the
land lost, perhaps the destruction of his meadows, the inconvenience, and the
nuisance, and also an insurance from depredations.”47 The question of
damages pitted the interests of those who used a navigation, represented by the
com pany that owned and operated it, against the interests of the people who

46Charles Biddle to Mathew Carey, April 29, 1823, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous Correspondence
on Internal Improvement, Edward C ary Gardiner Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
47B. Henry Latrobe, Remarks on th e Address of the Committee of the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal
Company to the Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives, as Far as It Notices the “View of
the Practicability and Means of Supplying the City of Philadelphia with Wholesome Water. Printed by order
of the Committee of the Councils (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799), 6.
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lived directly along it; in 1822, S outhw ark residents petitioned against a canal
fro m the Delaware to the Schuylkill cutting through their neighborhood because it
w ould be “destructive to the best interests of your M emorialists.” Pointing out the
“inconvenience and destruction to public and private property, in making a Canal
through a thickly settled district,” they further wrote that they w ere “fearful [that]
any attem pt to recover dam ages by th e tedious and expensive process of law,
will not compensate the sufferers fo r the injuries they will thus sustain.”48
A lthough many people benefited from the extension of inland navigations, those
w h o lived along the routes testified th a t canals and river navigations were a
decidedly mixed blessing.49
Ignoring the com plaints of local property owners, canal com pany
supporters applied the ideology of com m unity interest to defend them selves
ag a in st local property owners in the co u rt of public opinion. T h ey em ployed a
ta c tic of which business leaders becam e especially fond: identifying the public
interest with their own. It was an easy leap for them to make. Having already
posited that economic growth inherently contributed to the greater good, they
argued that they, as the agents of th a t growth, therefore represented and indeed
even guarded the public interest. U nder this rhetorical twist, “dam ages...to be
assessed by men, either locally interested o r biased by other causes” could then
be denounced as the obstacles that greedy individuals put in the w ay of the
w h o le society’s goals. C om pany officials eventually used such language in

“^Petition to General Assembly, House File, 46th Session-1, 1821-22 (Canal and Navigation Companies,
Roads, Turnpikes), Pennsylvania General Assembly, Records of General Assembly, Record Group 7,
Pennsylvania State Archives.
49For an examination of the ambivalence toward internal improvements and the changes they brought, see
Carol Sheriff, The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and the Paradox of Progress. 1817-1862 (New York: Hill
and Wang, 1996).
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nearly any instance o f opposition to the w ishes o f internal improvement com pany
boards. George Paleske, one of the men behind the m erger that resulted in the
Union Canal Com pany, w ent so far as to argue that the state should exempt
canal companies from property taxes, “which would o f course oblige them to
raise the tolls, evidently to the disadvantage o f the public, for the benefit of
perhaps one county."50 Paleske’s bold suggestion— that county property taxes
enacted by publicly elected officials operated against public interest— never
made its way into any navigation company charters, because every locality
wanted to reserve the right to tax whomever it wanted. Besides, counties
clam oring for better transportation had no desire to alienate internal
im provem ent com panies and certainly would not raise local taxes simply to
gouge only one of its taxpayers. Still, Paleske’s attitude and rhetoric typified
much internal im provem ent company posturing.
The Schuylkill Navigation Company in particular did not hesitate to claim
that any threat to the com pany inherently jeopardized the public interest. In
March 1826, the Pennsylvania legislature passed an act with sixteen clauses
listing possible infractions against internal im provem ent companies along with
the legal remedies.51 F o r the most part, these m easures reflected practical
concerns; for example, th e prohibition against boatm en's use of iron-tipped poles
protected canal beds from repairs that could both be costly and potentially shut
down the waterway during the busy season. T he law also authorized internal
im provem ent com panies to build and m aintain towpaths. That July, Richard

^Paleske, 14.
51 Acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company (Philadelphia:
Josephy & William Kite, 1838), 28.
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Peters, Jr., the bridge-builder's son, wrote to the company protesting th e ir
construction a towpath on his property, and disputed the company's rights under
the law. Schuylkill Navigation C om pany president Joseph S. Lewis curtly replied
that the "provisions are such as are indispensable to the security of the works,
and to the public enjoym ent o f th e ir benefits." Lewis had inserted "public
enjoyment" for w hat clearly was the company's bottom line. He further asserted
that Peters had nothing to com plain about because “before the navigation was
made, the advantages you suppose to be lost... were enjoyed by the m ere
permission of the com m onwealth. If they exist at present, they have been
created by the Company."52 In other words, Peters once may have been able to
use the river because it was a public, but once the Schuylkill Navigation
Company began building, it could only be used through the company's good
graces. According to Lewis's reasoning, what belonged to the public belonged to
the company, and w hat belonged to the company also belonged to the company.
Internal improvement com pany boards did not hesitate to claim that their
interests ipso facto not only coincided with the public interest, but also actually
were the public interest.
Beginning in the 1820s, inland navigation boosters began to shift from the
rhetoric of projects’ potential uniting influence to appeals to more locally defined
interests. Yes, canals could still unite people, companies' pamphlets
acknowledged, but promoters began to argue that the issue at hand had become
exactly whose interests would be united. Although they had voiced such
concerns in the 1790s, by the third decade of the nineteenth century
52 Joseph S. Lewis to Richard Peters, Jr., July 29, 1826. Richard Peters Correspondence, 1821-1839,
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Philadelphia investors becam e increasingly adam ant that state-chartered
projects should unite pa rts of the state to each o ther rather than linking
Pennsylvania hinterlands to the markets in Baltim ore or New York. In doing so,
canal promoters recognized that groups in different regions o f Pennsylvania
would lobby for projects th a t would reflect local interests, rather than som e evermore-elusive general good.
Internal im provem ent boosters had learned th a t their unifying rhetoric was
a double-edged sword, and they found a way to use the second blade
constructively: they w a rn ed Pennsylvania investors and legislators that if canals
did not link Philadelphia w ith the rest of the state, aggressive Baltim ore and New
York City would eventually have more in com mon with rural Pennsylvania than
the state’s own m etropolis. The Susquehanna River flowed southeast from north
of Harrisburg to the top o f the Chesapeake; counting the river’s eastern and
western branches and m a jor tributaries such as the Juniata River, it was the
highway to the ocean fo r a broad swath of central Pennsylvania and even
western New York. T h a t highway's term inus was Baltim ore, and in the closing
years of the century, B altim ore’s foreign trade exceeded that o f Philadelphia’s.
Contemporaries attributed much of Baltim ore’s growth to its acting as an
entrepot for the increasingly profitable trade of the S usquehanna Valley.
Philadelphians thought th a t because Baltim ore’s Susquehanna traffic originated
in Pennsylvania, the p rofits rightly belonged to Philadelphia and therefore was

Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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gained at the Q uaker City’s expense.53 A fter the W ar o f 1812, Philadelphia
canal boosters becam e e ve r m ore shrill in their pronouncem ents “that the future
existence of Philadelphia, as a com m ercial town, depends upon her opening a
water-route to the Susquehanna.”54 One pamphleteer w arned that the city “will
cease to flourish; that she will deteriorate and fall to ruin” w ithout a path to the
Susquehanna: “w ithout that rem edy the trade of the in terior will flow into other
channels, and leave her in a few years neither produce fo r her exports, nor buyer
o f her imports.”55 In 1799, Philadelphians even m anaged to get a state m easure
passed prohibiting anyone from removing impediments to navigation along the
low er Susquehanna, and they continued to stymie any legislation on that fro n t for
decades.56 M eanwhile, w hat Baltim ore had by the grace o f nature, New Y ork
eventually gained through the vision and ambition of D eW itt Clinton: a waterw ay
flowing westward, the Erie Canal. Thus, Both Baltimore and New York
threatened to beat Philadelphia in the grand race to capture the future m arkets of
the G reat Lakes region, a com petition that many observers thought would end in
fabulous riches fo r the w inner and stagnation and decline fo r the loser.
That sense of com petition fo r the western trade a t first had little basis in
reality: the trade of the old northwest would not be profitable fo r decades, both
because of a sparse population and because of the technological and

“ See James Weston Livingood, The Philadelohia-Baltimore Trade Rivalry 1780-1860 (Harrisburg:
Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1947), and Hartz, 42-51; for Baltimore in particular, see
Gary Browne, Baltimore in the Nation. 1780-1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980).
“ Samuel Breck, Sketch of the Internal Improvements Already Made bv Pennsylvania: with Observations
Upon Her Physical and Fiscal Means for Their Extension: Particularly As They have Reference to the
Future Growth and Prosperity of Philadelphia. 2d edition (Philadelphia: M. Thomas, 1818), 43.
“ Breck, 43.
“ Livingood, 33.
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geographic lim its to canal building.57 Nonetheless, Philadelphians clamored for
waterways to th e west. ‘T h e spirit fo r Inland Navigation is so general throughout
our country,” a desperate petitioner pointed out, “th a t if advantage is not taken by
our own State o r its Citizens,” Philadelphia would “become in a greater or lesser
degree insulated o r locked up from a market by m ore enterprising neighbours.”58
According to one pamphleteer, “two thirds of the trade of the western [states]
m ust pass through the middle eastern states and it of course becom es an object
of the greatest interest on the part of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New-York, to
secure this valuable commerce to the ir respective capitals.”59 W hichever of the
three cities “w hich should by its improvements first fix the trade in its own
channel would naturally for a long tim e retain it, notwithstanding the exertions of
its neighbours to interfere with it.”60 The contest with Baltimore and New York
lent extreme urgency to debates about how Philadelphia should im prove itself
and its fortunes: th e question never became w hether to go ahead but in which
direction and how quickly. Merchants still dom inated Philadelphia, and their
experience with international trade had shown them that successful trade was
based upon building up personal relationships with merchants, agents, and
suppliers in other markets. They thought that if they did not m ake contacts with
western farm ers first, merchants in New York and Baltimore w ould gain and
forever keep th o se customers in their orbit. So they pressed fo r projects that

57See Diane Lindstrom, “American Economic Growth before 1840: New Evidence and New Directions”
Journal of Economic History 39 (March 1979), 289-301.
58Petition to Pennsylvania House of Representatives, March 24, 1825, House File, 49th Session-1, 182425, Pennsylvania Canal Folder, Pennsylvania State Archives.
59[Samuel Mifflin], Observations on the Importance of Imorovino the Navigation of the River Schuylkill, for
the Purpose of Connecting it with the Susquehanna, and Through that River Extending Our Communication
to the Genesee Lakes and the Ohio ([Philadelphia?], 1818), 13.
bUMifflin, 13.
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could facilitate th e ir efforts to entrench the hinterland trade fo r Philadelphia
before their rivals could, enabling their city to continue growing. The men who
proposed canal and river navigations were only too happy to oblige.
Not only did inland navigation promoters increasingly play on city
boosterism, but also they began to em phasize mining and new kinds o f industrial
production rather than simply farm ing, flour milling, and com m erce as keys to the
success of their projects and econom ic growth in the Philadelphia area. Leaders
o f earlier efforts, fo r example the Susquehanna and Schuylkill C anal Company,
had emphasized the usefulness o f their project for “a Com m ercial and
Agricultural people,” noting “the im m ense quantity of Produce raised from the
Farms bordering on the Susquehanna and the Schuylkill Rivers.”61 Not
surprisingly, the newer, explicitly coal-related projects— the Schuylkill and Lehigh
navigations and the Delaware and Hudson Canal— made the prom otion of
anthracite their top priority. First, of course, they had to promote the product:
Pennsylvania anthracite burned differently from “British” or “V irginia” coal— the
contemporary term s fo r the bitum inous coal shipped into Philadelphia— and so
required a consum er education cam paign. Time after time, com panies reprinted
pamphlets touting all the advantages of anthracite coal as opposed to
bituminous coal, charcoal, and w ood~in cost, in the amount of h ea t generated, in
the level of care required to tend fires, and in the quality and quantity of soot
created. These publications usually included testimonials from various users,
demonstrating “the importance and value of this Coal to the m anufacturer as well
as for domestic purposes.” The pam phlets also reprinted statem ents chosen
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from a range of tradesm en showing the black sto n e ’s versatility in the workplace
“fo r nailing, fo r the rolling and slitting of iron, m alting, distilling, evaporation of
salts, [and] fo r steam engines,” and included instructions fo r constructing grates
fo r household and trade use as well as fo r lighting and tending anthracite.62
Som etimes these publications suggested that o ne Pennsylvania region’s coal
possessed better qualities than others; Lehigh-area coal, fo r example,
purportedly made fo r "the most durable fire, creating an intense, but regular and
steady heat, w ithout disagreeable sm oke or unpleasant smell, and producing no
soot.”63 Canal investors promoted the use of anthracite coal with a nearly
evangelical fervor.
Furthermore, boosters connected the use of anthracite to Philadelphia’s
continued econom ic expansion, growth that depended upon manufacturing
growth; the black stone would be “the inexhaustible sources of its future
prosperity.”64 They stressed “the im portance o f opening a communication with
these mines, rendered the more necessary by th e rapid disappearance of wood
from all the stream s connected with Philadelphia.”65 The iron industry,
especially, would b enefit from the availability o f this new heat source that one
Union Canal C om pany pamphlet cheerfully prophesied “will render this state the
m ost productive in the Union.” The w riter furthe r predicted that the Philadelphia
region’s mineral bounty and hard w ork would propel the United States to

61Broadside of Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation ([Philadelphia, 1796]), Historical Society of
Pennsylvania.
^Charles Miner, ed. Lehigh Coal. Certificates from a Number of Persons. Shewing the use and Value of the
Lehigh Stone Coal, with Some Prefatory Remarks (Wilkes-Barre. PA: Charles Miner, 1815), 1.
0JFacts Illustrative of the Character of the Anthracite, or Lehigh Coal. Found in the Great Mines at Mauch
Chunk, in Possession of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, with Certificates from Various
Manufacturers, and Others. Proving its Decided Superiority over Every Other Kind of Fuel (Philadelphia: S.
W . Conrad, 1827), 3.
“ Breck, 17.
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“become one of the greatest iron countries on the globe.”66 Because they would
“decrease the expense o f fuel” and thereby “encourage all manufactories,”
canals to coal country could “increase our inland and foreign trade, restoring us
in all probability, to the rank which our capital and resources entitle us to hold.”67
W h a t would help the city grow would also redound to the benefit of investors, as
well; after all, “experience has shown that all canals, which supply large
communities with so essential an article as fuel, have invariably yielded large
profits to the stockholders.”68 Boosters were quick to make the connection
between the consumption o f coal, the success of their projects, and the city’s
continued economic developm ent.
At the same tim e that they promoted coal, inland navigation partisans also
offered another source of energy for manufacturing: water power. Among the
companies in the Philadelphia region, the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany had
the largest stake in the prom otion of water power both because of its proxim ity to
the city and because, of all the projects, in the Schuylkill River it had by far the
m ost reliable source of constant flow pressure.69 Even before the founding of
the company, mills dotted the river’s banks in such places as Norristown,
Reading, and Mill Creek, and the first petitioners fo r incorporation to improve the
65Mifflin, 17.
66
Annual Report of the President and Managers of the Union Canal Company of Pennsylvania, to the
Stockholders. November 15. 1825 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1825), 12.
°'Mifflin, 20-21.
“ Mifflin, 21.
69
One of the greatest technical problems facing canal-builders was ensuring an adequate flow and water
supply merely for navigation. That eliminated the possibility of selling waterpower for the Chesapeake and
Delaware Canal Company, the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company, and especially the Union Canal
Company; for the last, water supply proved continually acute, limiting the use and profitability of the Union.
The Lehigh River proved difficult to control because of the ferocity of its spring freshets, one of the reasons
that the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company had to adapt a special kind of lock, a “bear trap,” merely to
ensure the safety of the barges. By the mid 1830s, however, the company’s land development efforts
began to pay off, and it was selling waterpower to millers in the company-owned towns of South Easton,
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river for navigation asked for the right to rent or sell the river’s power, a right that
the General Assem bly granted to the Schuylkill Navigation C om pany in its
charter.70 The C ity o f Philadelphia soon became the com pany’s largest single
customer. In agreem ents signed from 1819 through 1824, the com pany leased
to the city corporation enough w ater to supply the city waterw orks along with the
power necessary to raise it to a reservoir in exchange for a paym ent of $26,000
and an arrangem ent by which the city would maintain the com pany’s installations
through city property.71 The city government, in turn, quickly se t out to sublet the
excess power from the river once the waterworks were properly supplied. The
Philadelphia C ouncils put “disposal o f water power for m anufactories” as a
primary reason fo r purchasing the waterpower, because of the “facilities thereby
afforded to a branch of industry deserving of encouragement, as a means of
employing a vast num ber of our people, and of increasing the w ealth” of
Philadelphia.72 The city government and the company had thus become
partners in their efforts to foster industrial growth.
Meanwhile, in August of 1816, company officials optim istically estimated
the waterpower above Manayunk— about seven miles north of the city, but still in
Philadelphia C ounty— sufficient to “turn day and night, about one hundred and

Mauch Chunk, White Haven, and Nesquihoning. See History of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company
(Philadelphia: William S. Young, 1840), 47.
°“Original Draft Bill for Improving the River Schuylkill Presented in 1812-1813 by Josiah White & others,”
Schuylkill Navigation Company Folder, Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of
Pennsylvania. Acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company
(Philadelphia: Josephy & William Kite, 1838), 3.
’See Agreements of June 3. 1819. July 20. 1820. and June 14. 1824. Between the Mayor. Aldermen &
Citizens of Philadelphia, and the Schuylkill Navigation Company. Relative to the W ater Power. &c- at
Fairmount (Philadelphia: F. C. Markley & Son, 1869).
'‘’Report of the Watering Committee, on the Disposal of the Surplus Water Power of the River Schuylkill.
and the Construction of a Canal Between the Schuylkill and Delaware (Philadelphia: Councils of the
Corporation of Philadelphia, 1825), 5.
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forty overshot mill wheels, grinding w heat.”73 Although tha t extravagant goal was
never quite realized, the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany did nurture the
development of Manayunk, to the point that, in 1827, one local characterized it
as “one of the greatest m anufacturing establishments in the vicinity of
Philadelphia.” Indeed, by the 1830s it had became one of th e nation’s foremost
textile manufacturing districts.74 C om pany boosters and investors could see that
such growth in the Philadelphia area provided revenue fo r th e canal in a variety
of ways: the renting of water power, the renting of property, the transportation of
goods to and from the factories, and the transport of goods to and from the
growing town surrounding the mills. The exploitation of w aterpow er, they
realized, would be good for the com pany and for the Philadelphia region, and
they continued to prom ote “Valuable W ater Powers, Mills, Furnace[s], Wood
Land &c. On and n ear the River Schuylkill” along the length o f the navigation.75
Reinforcing the rhetorical them es of uniting interests and industrial
development, Inland navigation com panies also generated a large portion of their
revenue from the transportation of both manufactured goods from Philadelphia
to the hinterland and of raw m aterials to the city. As “valuable as [the coal trade]
is, there is yet another source fo r the augmentation of the business,” the
Schuylkill Navigation Com pany’s Board of Managers told its stockholders.76
Although more coal traveled downstream than any other product— indeed, it

73Breck, 17.
74Democratic Press, September 24, 1827, as quoted in Cynthia J. Shelton, The Mills of Manayunk:
Industrialization and Social Conflict in the Philadelphia Region. 1787-1837 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1986), 88. Shelton puts the Manayunk district just below Lowell in terms of textile
manufacturing output during this period.
7SBroadside, Schuylkill Navigation Company, “Valuable Water Power, Mills, Furnace, Woodlands, &c.”
(Philadelphia: J.P. Justice, 1831).
Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to the Stockholders. January
7. 1828 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1828), 5
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remained the raison d’etre fo r several of the projects long after their initial
construction— a host of other com m odities floated down to Philadelphia fo r use
in the city’s w orkshops and building trades. Canal com panies boasted about

“iron, coal, lead, zinc, marble o f great beauty...many sorts o f lime stone including
th a t with which hydraulic o r Roman cem ent is made, soap stone, sand stone, for
ornamental buildings, granite fo r flag pavements and curb-stones.”77 Som e
annual reports to stockholders enumerated the com m odities transported by type
and by quantity, thus giving a m anifest of local production.

Coal, of course,

topped these lists, b u t lumber, stone, limestone, iron, iron blooms, iron ore, nails,
and sawed m arble also w ent down to Philadelphia in significant quantities.78 The
cheap availability o f these com m odities in large quantities contributed
significantly to the ability of Philadelphia craftsmen and manufacturers to step up
production, especially in the crucial iron-working trades that produced the tools
and engines necessary to so m any o f the city’s and region’s manufacturing
enterprises.

7Q

Just as boosters prom ised, the growing population of the city and the
region formed an ever-greater m arket for local tradesm en and manufacturers.
“The increase in the return [ascending] trade has exceeded that of the
descending navigation, and form s a source of revenue not much calculated upon
at an early stage o f o u r w ork,” the Schuylkill Canal C om pany board cheerfully

^Annual Report of the President and Managers of the Union Canal Company of Pennsylvania, to the
Stockholders. November 15. 1825 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1825), 5.
/dSee for example Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to the
Stockholders. January 7. 1828 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1828), 11. Lumber, wood to be used in crafts
and construction is listed here to distinguish it from cordwood, which was used as fuel.
79See Philip Scranton, Proprietary Capitalism: The Textile Manufacture at Philadelphia. 1800-1885 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1983) and Paul E. Paskoff, Industrial Evolution: Organization. Structure,
and Growth of the Pennsylvania Iron Industry. 1750-1860 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press,
1983).
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reported to stockholders in 1827. W hat was more, the navigation prom ised "to
be of great importance; for as the population of the country bordering on the
Navigation increases, their demand of supplies m ust also increase.”80 Though
downstream traffic on all the inland navigations in the Philadelphia region
exceeded upstream tra ffic by weight, the return traffic of finished goods was of
greater value.81 Tradesm en and manufacturers in Philadelphia gained at least
as much from the canals and rivers navigations as did the people who lived
along their banks.
Accordingly, inland navigation supporters increasingly espoused the
cause of industry, and vice versa. As early as 1812, Josiah W hite’s first
proposal to improve the Schuylkill River promised that the waterw ay would “be
m ade subservient to th e m ost valuable purposes of manufacture and inland
navigation.”82 Mathew Carey wrote and rewrote scores of pamphlets supporting
protective tariffs fo r native manufacturing; he also promoted the value of internal
navigation in creating a domestic market for the city's m anufactured goods and
the countryside’s agricultural output.83 Canal company pamphlets constantly
predicted that internal navigation would provide a great boon for Philadelphia
because, as a Delaware and Raritan Canal publication read, “from her will be
drawn the supplies fo r the western world, of merchandise and m anufactures,
which the capital of o u r citizens, and the skill and industry of our artists and

^Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to the Stockholders. January
1. 1827 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1827), 6.
Lindstrom, Economic Development. 106.
“ josiah White, petition, Decembers, 1812, Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of
Pennsylvania.
83See Kenneth Rowe, Mathew Carev: A Study in American Economic Development (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1933).
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mechanics, can alw ays furnish.”84 Inland navigation supporters argued that by
giving Philadelphia w orkshops the opportunity to fulfill the demand o f a growing
hinterland, canals w o u ld ensure the city's continued growth and wealth.
The em phasis on mining and m anufacturing proved to be ideologically
profound in that it im plied a different view both o f Am erican developm ent and of
the role of the individual within that growth.85 Early canal boosters had
form ulated their appeals in terms of Am erica’s past economic development.
They did not claim th a t their canals would change either the overall econom y or
the w ay that people behaved in it. Rather, they argued that inland navigations
would allow the republic to expand spatially w hile still remaining predom inantly
rural: an early D elaw are and Schuylkill Canal C om pany called internal
transportation “one o f the first objects to a C om m ercial and Agricultural
People.”86 The vision they offered was essentially conservative, one based upon
replicating prevailing rural community structures ever further west by allowing
new settlements to becom e economically viable by virtue of their ties to coastal
cities and thus to th e m arket at large through the availability of cheap
transportation. Those boosters held rather static assumptions about the city as
well: that it would continue to act merely as an entrepot for exporting hinterland

^Considerations on the Proposed Canal to Connect the Rivers Delaware and Raritan (Philadelphia: Joseph
R. A. Skerrett, 1825), 5.
85For a discussion of the ideology of manufacturing, see Larry Peskin, “To ‘Protect and Encourage’
American Manufactures: The Intellectual Origins of Industrialization, 1763-1830,” (Ph.D. diss., University of
Maryland, 1998).
86Broadside of Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation, 1796, Society miscellaneous Collection,
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
Drew McCoy, in The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1980), argued that Jeffersonian Republicans envisioned the republic expanding
through space but not time; in other words, that territorial growth would forestall industrial development.
However, in Liberty and Property: Political Economy and Policymaking in the New Nation. 1789-1812
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), John Nelson, Jr. more convincingly demonstrated
that Federalist merchants were as much or even more dedicated to traditional, agriculturally- and
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produce and importing finished goods. The biggest early canal boosters were
merchants, and they had m ade th e ir fortunes in exactly th a t sort o f city. For
them , an ever-expanding, prim arily agricultural republic was a m ost wonderful
fantasy: it meant more profitable land speculation, m ore grain and flou r to sell
overseas, and greater dem and fo r the products they shipped in from foreign
ports.
The second generation o f Philadelphia-area canal boosters, however,
dream ed different dream s fo r the future of America. Perhaps the different
outlook should have been expected: the previous generations had grown up as
subjects in the provincial outpost of a worldwide em pire, while those of the new
generation came of age as citizens under an Am erican flag. True, some of these
younger men, too, had first m ade th e ir money in m ercantile pursuits spanning
the Atlantic world. Most of them , however, had invested tim e and m oney in
various manufacturing ventures as well and many had done so exclusively.
W hile the younger men certainly supported better access to a w ider agricultural
hinterland, they also espoused production of Am erican m anufactured goods
rather than importation from Europe. Furthermore, because m anufacturers and
m ine owners had greater difficulty getting access to bank loans than did
merchants, they were much m ore likely to demand w ider access to credit and a
larger money supply than the olde r m en.87 Thus, the new generation of canal
prom oters imagined Philadelphia’s future quite differently than the men who had
founded the Delaware and Schuylkill and the Susquehanna and Schuylkill canal

commercially-driven economic growth while many urban Republicans actually supported a more diversified
economy with domestic manufacturing as a central component.
87See Chapter 4 for discussion of credit.
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companies. These younger men’s hopes for the city dovetailed perfectly with
C lay’s, Calhoun’s, W ebster’s, and John Quincy Adam s’s hopes for the nation in
the years after the W a r of 1812: a republic connected by a network of interior
waterways that fostered the creation of a self-sufficient national market fueled by
equal economic opportunity— read: access to credit— fo r all (white) men. Thus,
not only did they picture Philadelphia proper as a center for trade, but also they
began to see the greater Philadelphia region, including manufacturing districts
such as the Northern Liberties, Manayunk, and the Brandywine Valley, as part of
a varied, integrated econom ic m achine with a vital m anufacturing sector.
Agricultural land speculation in eastern Pennsylvania, with its agricultural
em phasis, had becom e passe: coal now fueled Philadelphia’s economic
engine.

QQ

The young entrepreneurs had a new blueprint fo r the city’s economic
growth, and they em phasized the importance of the profit motive in that process.
Coal, credit, and corporations form ed the cutting edge o f economic activity in
1820s Philadelphia. T h e men who engaged in these avenues of endeavor
placed themselves at the forefront of the creative destruction of old traditions
governing economic and legal relations in the marketplace.

89

Accordingly, they

espoused an idea that im plicitly supported more aggressive behavior in the
marketplace: that the pursuit of individual interest was a positive good unto itself,

88 This is not to say that all land speculation in the area was over: the possibility of big coal-mining profits
led to a frenzy of speculation in potential anthracite-bearing lands in the 1820s and 1830s.
89Joseph Schumpeter, the first economist to concentrate on the effects of entrepreneurship upon economic
growth, argued that new economic activities created paths of economic development while destroying older
economic structures. See Joseph Alois Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry
into Profits. Capital. Credit. Interest, and the Business Cycle. Revers Opie, trans. (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1934).
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leading not only to personal wealth but also to regional and national wealth, and
that public economic policy should reflect th e sum of individual interests.
While men such as Josiah W hite and Joseph S. Lewis introduced
significant econom ic innovations, th e ir unabashed espousal of individual interest
did not represent a sim ilar philosophical innovation; rather, it reflected the
maturation of an ideology that had its Am erican roots in the colonial era.90 Just
as some colonists had pointed to w hat th e y (accurately) perceived as the selfserving aspects of the British Navigation Acts, others had suggested that
enlightened self-interest formed the best argum ent fo r independence. Adam
Sm ith’s Wealth of Nations was first published in 1776, but it was a brilliant
summation of ideas th a t had already circulated widely, hinted at by both

philosophes and Scottish political econom ists whose w orks had made th e ir way
across the Atlantic. Because their livelihoods depended upon the overseas
markets, after the Revolution merchants and farmers alike took up the banner of
free trade to keep ta riff barriers low. But, whether or not its proponents were
willing to admit as much, cham pioning free trade im plicitly justified the
enlightened pursuit of self-interest: the doctrine of free trade was based upon the
assumption that the aggregate of all individuals, m aking their own decisions in
the marketplace, will create a strong national econom y more efficiently than any
appointed or eiected body. Ironically, from the late 1810s on, many of the sam e
men who campaigned fo r high protective tariffs for industry—the very negation of

^S ee Cathy Matson and Peter Onuf, A Union of Interests: Political and Economic Thought in Revolutionary
America (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1990), and Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social
Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York: New York University Press, 1984).
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laissez-faire—also used appeals to the genius of self-interest to sell an agenda of
internal improvement.
In atypical exam ple, Chesapeake and Delaware Canal C om pany
supporters shifted th e ir emphasis from one o f union and agriculture to one of
manufactures and interest by the 1820s. In the 1790s, or perhaps before, many
people in southern N ew Jersey, southeastern Pennsylvania, northern Delaware,
and northern M aryland had recognized the potential utility of a navigable
waterway connecting the Delaware River and Chesapeake Bay across a thin
isthm us between the tw o bodies of water. However, the project faced even more
obstacles than the Union Canal in that any route w ould have to travel through
Delaware and M aryland, an especially sensitive point in the latter state because
the proposed canal threatened to divert Susquehanna River tra ffic from
Baltim ore to Philadelphia. Nonetheless, particularly dogged lobbying in both
state legislatures resulted in a Maryland charter in 1799 and a Delaware charter
three years later. C om pany pamphlets and petitions extolled the sam e
advantages as did o th e r contemporary inland navigation efforts: th a t the canal
would form “the great link of an inland navigation o f six or seven hundred miles,
and thereby establish a perfect, safe, easy and rapid transportation...which
would ever tend to operate as a cement to the Union between the States.”91
T h e y also suggested th a t “the prosperity and the agricultural interest” of
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Delaware depended upon connecting the two

91“A Supplement to an Act to Incorporate a Company for the purpose of cutting and making a canal
between the river Delaware and the Chesapeake Bay,” March 25, 1813, Secretary of the Commonwealth,
Internal Improvements File, Canal & Navigation Companies, Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, No.
5, Pennsylvania Department of State, Record Group 26, Pennsylvania State Archives.
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major waterw ays.92 Such appeals pushed all the usual buttons: linking great
expanses o f territory, uniting the states, and promoting agricultural production.
Like o ther projects in the area, the Chesapeake and Delaware canal
remained only partially completed because o f both technological and financial
problems after its first few years.93 However, in the early 1820s a group of
Philadelphia and northern Delaware entrepreneurs revived the company. These
men typified th e shift in Philadelphia's econom ic leadership. In the first decade
of the nineteenth century, merchant princes such as Andrew Bayard, James C.
Fisher, Jam es Vanuxem , and Thomas W illing had been the com pany’s most
active stockholders. Former shot m anufacturer Paul Beck Jr., who helped found
the Franklin Institute, and Mathew Carey, the printer, pam phleteer, and patron
saint of Am erican manufacturers and internal improvement, led efforts to
resuscitate the com pany beginning in 1821. They allied them selves with Joshua
Gilpin, a northern Delaware paper miller whose father had been associated with
the project since its inception. This time, Chesapeake and Delaware Canal
promoters em phasized the importance o f manufacturing to the canal as well as
the centrality o f manufacturing to Philadelphia’s continued growth. As Gilpin
explained to B eck about choosing the best route for the canal, of primary
importance w as “the supply of the m anufacturing district of Christiana with raw
materials such as wheat, tobacco, cotton and above all coal, [which] offered a

92“A Supplement to an Act to Incorporate a Company for the purpose of cutting and making a canal
between the river Delaware and the Chesapeake Bay,” March 25, 1813, Secretary of the Commonwealth,
Internal Improvements File, Canal & Navigation Companies, Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company, No.
5. Pennsylvania Department of State, Record Group 26, Pennsylvania State Archives.
Progress on the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal as well as others in the Philadelphia region followed
closely the chronological pattern identified for canal investment by Harvey H. Segal in “Cycles of Canal
Construction,” in Carter Goodrich, ed., Canals and American Economic Development (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1961), 169-207.
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source of revenue to the canal more effective than any other.”94 Just as
importantly, Gilpin pointed out, “there is produced in [W ilm ington and] this district
annually in flour, paper, gunpowder, cotton and woollen articles, barley, iron, and
agricultural products, between one & two millions value, every particle of which
centers in Philadelphia.”95 Consequently, “if the city attends to the sources of its
own prosperity, there is no one which more demands its attention” than the
Christiana valley 96 Gilpin later emphasized that the relationship between
Philadelphia and the manufacturing districts was reciprocal. “ Except for the
manufacturing people & the mercantile men in this part of [Delaware], whose
interests centre in the city, there is a very little knowledge or attachment either to
the city or canal itself,” the paper miller explained.97 “Below Christiana they are
all farmers, every one of whom would make a noise about the canal to suit their
own interests, tho none of them would give it any aid.”98 Gilpin, Beck, and Carey
agreed that integrating industrial districts would be Philadelphia’s path for growth,
internal transportation was necessary for that consolidation, and interests— in
this case those of m anufacturers and merchants— were legitimate econom ic
pursuits.
The earliest efforts of the Lehigh Navigation and Coal Company (later to
become, confusingly enough, the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company) also
reflected the shift from an emphasis on union and agriculture to one of

^Joshua Gilpin to Paul Beck, September 10, 1821, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous Correspondence
on Internal Improvement, Edward Carey Gardiner Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
95Joshua Gilpin to Paul Beck, September 10,1821, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous Correspondence
on Internal Improvement, Edward Carey Gardiner Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
^Joshua Gilpin to Paul Beck, September 10, 1821, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous Correspondence
on Internal Improvement, Edward Carey Gardiner Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
97Joshua Gilpin to Mathew Carey, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous Correspondence on Internal
Improvement, Edward Carey Gardiner Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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manufactures, markets, and interests. T he charter, passed on March 20, 1818,
m oved straight to Section 1, giving Josiah W hite, George Hauto, and Erskine
Hazard permission to w ork on the river, foregoing any pream ble with flow ery
paeans to the inherent glories of internal n a vig a tio n ." Thus, even from th e start,
the mere improvement of the river allow ing coal and lum ber to travel down the
Lehigh clearly was justification enough fo r the legislature without the possibility of
the commingling o f interest. Apparently, in W hite’s words, the possibility o f “a
m ore active enterprise” proved sufficient.100 The company’s first pam phlet more
forcefully set forth the sam e change in agenda. After a brief review of the term s
o f the charter and its benefits for the com pany, the pamphlet listed “the
advantages to be derived from the navigation of the Lehigh, improved on this
plan.”101 First, the com pany promised th a t “Philadelphia can be supplied with
coal... 20 per cent, purer than any... w hich has come to this m arket from any
other source, and at a less price.”102 T h e com pany also predicted that “a m arket
will be opened for an im m ense body of tim b er on the Lehigh, which is now so
com pletely locked up as not to be considered worth stealing, owing to the
expense that would [currently] attend getting it to market.”103 Finally, the
com pany touted the Lehigh’s proximity to the Susquehanna; it claimed th a t the
navigation would benefit from traffic th a t w ould be diverted from New York’s

98Joshua Gilpin to Mathew Carey, Mathew Carey Section, Miscellaneous Correspondence on Internal
Improvement, Edward Carey Gardiner Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
" “An Act to Improve the Navigation of the River Lehigh,” March 20,1818, Acts of the General Assembly of
Pennsylvania Concerning the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company; Together with the Bve-Laws. Etc.
(Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. and Brother, 1837), 3.
"Eleanor Morton, Josiah White: Prince of Pioneers (New York: Stephen Daye Press, 1946), 133.
101Statement of the Lehigh Navigation and Coal Mine Company, with the Terms of Subscription for Stock
(Philadelphia: William Brown, 1818), 3.
" Statement of the Lehiah Navigation and Coal Mine Company, with the Terms of Subscription for Stock
(Philadelphia: William Brown, 1818), 6.
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Grand (Erie) Canal at its intersection with the Seneca, go down the
Susquehanna, and be carried ten miles overland to the Lehigh at Berwick— a
pipe dream, but then so were many other canal claim s. Tellingly, the only
mention of interest .was in conjunction with the quick dism issal of the charter’s
potentially m ost expensive stipulation, that the legislature could require the
company to make the river navigable upstream as well as downstream.
Because the construction of an upstream navigation would allow the com pany to
charge high tolls to recoup the cost of building the locks, “the interest of the
whole com m unity would be opposed to the change.”104 In other words, even
should members of the General Assembly decide that an upstream navigation
would be in the interest o f the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania—that is, the
public good— local interests would be able to stymie any such proposal. For
Lehigh Navigation and C oal Company boosters, coal, access to markets, and
pursuit of interest form ed a worthy trinity.
Justifying, encouraging, and indeed even celebrating the pursuit of
individual interest proved to be a necessary ideological ingredient to the success
of internal navigations in the Philadelphia area. M ost obviously, the need fo r the
Schuylkill Navigation Com pany, the Union Canal Com pany, the Lehigh Coal and
Navigation Company, and the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company to raise
money from individual investors rather than gain state funding clearly indicated
that the general public, a t least as constituted by the Pennsylvania General
Assembly, did not consider these projects to represent the greater good of the
103Statement of the Lehigh Navigation and Coal Mine Company, with the Terms of Subscription for Stock
(Philadelphia: William Brown, 1818), 6.
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commonwealth. Therefore, the potential fo r return on private investm ent in
internal navigations, finally a possibility with the new market fo r anthracite, could
now become the selling point fo r new sources of funding. Even more
significantly, these projects represented the means to create new directions of
com merce and manufacture, ones that bypassed and thus weakened the old
economic structure.
The examples of the careers of two sets of men closely associated with
efforts to improve inland navigation in the Philadelphia area— Richard Peters and
Robert Morris, and Josiah W hite and the W urts brothers— put th e transition from
m odest strivings to the unbridled pursuit o f self-interest in sharp relief.105 Morris
and Peters demonstrated the am bivalence of the Revolutionary generation.
Born in 1744, Richard Peters in his long career served as a m ilitary officer during
the American Revolution, as speaker o f the Pennsylvania Senate, as the federal
judge who presided over many of the W hiskey Rebellion trials, and as a
boardmember of various Philadelphia social, charitable, and civil organizations,
including his presidency of the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture.
W hen the Peters died in 1828 at the ripe age of 83, his friends remembered him
as a wise, patient man with a quick tongue and a sharp sense o f hum or.106 But
Philadelphia residents best recognized him as having nearly single-handedly
built the first durable bridge to span the Schuylkill River, thus better connecting

104Statement of the Lehigh Navigation and Coal Mine Company, with the Terms of Subscription for Stock
(Philadelphia: William Brown, 1818), 4.
05For an extended discussion of the ideological gap between those who came of age before the American
Revolution and those after, see Joyce Appleby, Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation of
Americans (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).
""Samuel Breck, Witty Savinas of the late Richard Peters. District Judge of the United States for Eastern
Penna. Died in August 1828. aged 83. Collected, set down and arranged by Sami. Breck. who was his
friend and neighbour in Blocklev township. Belmont District for Thirty Years, ms., Breck Papers, Case 25,
Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
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Philadelphia with its w estern hinterland and w ith Lancaster. They rem em bered
him because he helped to found the Schuylkill Perm anent Bridge Company,
becam e its first president, designed the bridge, and closely supervised its
construction. Peters’s financial involvement with the bridge company was lim ited
to $100, an investm ent th a t in no way justified the tim e and effort he spent on the
project.107 He did have land near the bridge th a t surely appreciated, and the
improved transportation across the river may have marginally raised the value of
other real estate investm ents farther afield, too. Nonetheless, he put into the
project a trem endous a m oun t of energy that certainly could have been sp en t in
fa r more remunerative w ays.
Peters’s interest in transportation rem ained strong after completion o f the
bridge in 1803. In 1825, he and the tireless M athew Carey founded the
Pennsylvania Society to Prom ote Internal Im provem ent in order to lobby fo r the
construction o f a canal o r railroad traversing the length of the state. He generally
did not promote internal im provem ents in conjunction with particular investments.
In fact, both the construction of the Schuylkill Navigation, in which he owned
stock, and the consequent flooding damaged som e o f Peters’s property. He had
considerable trouble collecting; the building o f the navigation had actually hurt
Peters’s property value m ore than helped it.108 However, the Schuylkill
navigation was part of th e project that he had started as a Revolutionary soldier
and continued as a federal judge, especially a fter his involvement putting down
the W hiskey Rebellion: th e making of the Am erican nation. Furthermore, the

107Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company, List of Subscribers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
108 John C. Lowber, Report of the Case of Alexander and Others Against the President. Managers and
Company of the Schuylkill Navigation Company. Instituted to Recover Damages for the Loss of the Bridge
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nation Peters envisioned was one in w hich men of proper standing— that is, men
like himself—would run legal, political, and econom ic affairs in the name of all
the people. For Peters, activities such as writing letters to the legislature in favor
of canals and bridges even fo r the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany, whom he
sued several times, represented the subordination of personal interest to the
service of the common good.
Richards’ contem porary R obert Morris held a more nuanced position on
the conflict between private and public service, or perhaps more accurately,
often saw the two as being m utually reinforcing. Born in England in 1734, Robert
Morris immigrated to Philadelphia with his tobacco-agent father in 1747. W hen
the elder Morris died three years later, young Robert was left with a considerable
sum. After an apprenticeship with prom inent Philadelphia m erchant Charles
W illing, he began a m erchant career th a t by outbreak of the Revolution would
make him perhaps the richest man in Am erica. As a Pennsylvania
representative in the Continental C ongress, superintendent of finance under the
Articles of Confederation, delegate to the Constitutional Convention, and senator
in the first Congress, Morris knew b e tte r than anyone the disarray o f the
Continental Congress and its finances during the Revolution and after. He
acutely understood the various ways th a t all sorts of interest— private, regional,
state, and class— could paralyze the new nation. Morris’s efforts during the
Revolution and after to save the nation’s finances can quite accurately be termed
heroic: in the late 1770s and early 1780s, the continental governm ent

at the Falls of the Schuylkill. Purina the Fresh of the 21st of February. 1822 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey,
1825),
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som etim es operated on his solid credit rather than its own shaky reputation.109
Nonetheless, he never hesitated to seize the main chance even when in the
service of the government, often even using his government-agent status to
secure juicy contracts and commissions, in the 1780s and early 1790s w hen he
helped found institutions such as the Bank of North America, the Susquehanna
and Schuylkill Navigation Com pany, and the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal
Company, he emphasized the ir role “to com bine the interests of all the parts of
the state, and to cem ent them in a perpetual commercial and political union.”110
At the same time, Morris was usually quick to defend his own enterprises:
describing his actions in 1785 when a group o f Philadelphia men lobbied to
incorporate a rival bank, Morris frankly admitted on the floor of the Pennsylvania
General Assembly that “if any set of men were to apply to the legislature fo r a
charter, which I thought injurious to my private interest, I should, if I had
argum ents o f sufficient w eight to offer against it, make an appeal to the
representative body.”111 Morris promoted canals both because they were good
fo r the nation and because they would increase the value of his lands. For
Morris, the pursuit of interest form ed a necessary and laudable human impulse;
the trick was to keep the great number of possibly competing or differing
interests in harmony.
Unlike Peters and Morris, the generation that grew up after the
Revolutionary W ar appeared to have few doubts about the strength of the

109See Clarence L. Ver Steeg, Robert Morris: Revolutionary Financier. With an Analysis of His Earlv Career
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1954).
Smith, 1.
111Matthew Carey, ed., Debates and Proceedings of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, on the
Memorials Praying a Repeal or Suspension of the Law Annulling the Charter of the Bank (Philadelphia:
Carev and Co.. 1786). 40.
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federal union, even fe w e r hesitations about making a b u ck when they could, but
m any new ideas about how th a t money could be made. Josiah W hite was born
of Quaker stock in M ount Laurel, New Jersey, in 1781. He worked hard, lived
frugally, tried to set a positive example, and always considered the public interest
as much as his own. A fte r an apprenticeship with a P hiladelphia ironmonger, he
w ent into the hardware business fo r himself and m anaged to beat by two years
his boyhood goal of co m forta b le retirement at age thirty. Soon bored, he
decided to get into the w irepulling business, buying land a t the Falls of the
Schuylkill. There, he b u ilt an ironworks, managed to dam the river—a feat which
m any had thought to be im possible— and even constructed a wire bridge across
the broad waterway, b u t had tro ub le making money. T he W a r o f 1812 proved to
be a mixed blessing: su d d e n ly there was great dom estic dem and for his iron
products, but British coal and V irginia coal became scarce and lumber costs
skyrocketed. Like m any oth ers in the Philadelphia area, W h ite began looking for
alternative sources of fuel. W h ite settled upon Philadelphia anthracite and
realized that the best w a y to g e t it to market would be to invest in a com pany to
render the Schuylkill R iver navigable. Such a venture w ould be both in the
common interest and his own; he reasoned that “while I w as carrying out so
much good for the public, I w ould not impair my Estate, o r tha t it would increase
as fast as if I done no business and allowed the interest to accum ulate.”112 Just
as with his earlier projects, he encountered opposition, o r a t least a lack of
support, among a great m any m en with more conservative ideas concerning the
direction of Philadelphia’s grow th. At the same time, he knew on what term s to
112Josiah White, Josiah White’s History Given by Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation
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sell the idea to the general public, painting in huge letters on the outside wall of
his w ire m anufactory on the Schuylkill the message that the navigation “means
Ten Dollars in the P ocket of Every Citizen o f Pennsylvania,” ostensibly w hat
each person would save as a result of ch e a p e r fuel and low er transportation
costs.113 W hite’s choice of words was significant; after all, he did not propose,
fo r example, that the navigation would bring people together o r enrich the
com monwealth at large. T ha t he chose to point out the potential benefits of the
project in terms of its ability to fatten each individual’s w allet dem onstrated
W h ite ’s understanding that the public w ould be swayed by appeals to personal
interest. White saw industry as Philadelphia’s future, and believed the best way
to build that future w ould be to encourage individual interest in the marketplace.
W hile Josiah W hite held an harm onious view of the union of public and
private interest, the W urts brothers never bothered to take the public good into
consideration in their projects. Maurice (1783-1854), W illiam (1788-1858), and
John (1792-1861) W u rts were born in Flanders, New Jersey. As a teenager,
M aurice apprenticed to a dry-goods m erchant in Philadelphia, and in 1810
W illiam came to the big city to join his o ld e r brother as a partner in their own dry
goods business; John arrived two years later to clerk in a law firm . During the
W a r of 1812, the W urtses realized that w hoever could bring an inexpensive,
local source of energy to the market would m ake a pretty penny indeed. In 1814,
W illiam found anthracite in the far northeastern corner of the state, near the
Lackawanna River in w hat would eventually become Carbondale, Pennsylvania.
A fter several false starts, in 1822 they began mining in earnest, extracting over a

Company, 1909), 13.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

228

ton of the black stones, which they sledded to the Lackawaxen R iver and then
rafted down the Lackawaxen and the Delaware to Philadelphia. Meanwhile, their
careers progressed in lock step: John g ot elected to the Pennsylvania General
Assem bly, Maurice moved to New York, where he made valuable contacts in the
financial community including banker Philip Hone, and W illiam ’s dry-goods
business flourished in Philadelphia.
Together, the W urts brothers m asterm inded the organization, chartering,
and financing of the Delaware and Hudson Canal, designed to bring coal from
the northern anthracite field to the Delaware River and from there downriver to
Philadelphia and by canal to the Hudson River and thence New Y o rk City. If the
public interest entered their minds during the chartering process in the
Pennsylvania legislature, they made no mention of it in their letters to each other
during the 1823 and 1824 legislative sessions. Because the Delaware and
Hudson Canal Company would own m ines in addition to the navigation, John
successfully campaigned in the legislature for a rate of toll that the brothers
calculated would be low enough to be acceptable to potential com petitors but
actually high enough for the C om pany to acquire a virtual lock on anthracite
shipped along its route to the lucrative New York City market. In addition, the
com pany’s charter, unlike otherwise sim ilar ones, would never have to be
renewed. “Tho’ apparently for 20 years,” John gloated in a letter to Maurice, “it is
in fact a perpetual grant, at such a rate o f toll as makes it a com plete
m onopoly.”114 The W urts brothers considered the legislature in particular and

113Morton, 96.
114John Wurts to Maurice Wurts, March 10, 1823. Vanuxem Collection, Series 2, Maurice Wurts Papers,
Hagley Museum and Library.
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the public in general as entities to be negotiated with at best and fooled if
necessary. They show ed no reluctance to use underhanded tactics on fellow
investors, either. If Richard Peters represented the vestiges of an eighteenthcentury sense o f noble service to the cause and the nation, then the Wurtses, in
their frank and ruthless pursuit of their own interests, best presaged the
nineteenth-century phenomenon of the robber baron.
In 1828, already near the end of canal construction era in the Philadelphia
region, the Schuylkill Navigation Company Board o f Managers happily reported a
surge in anthracite use, noting that “the great increase in the consum ption of this
valuable fuel is very im portant to the interest o f the company.”115 In doing so,
they had taken another step in their mission to control the direction of
Philadelphia’s developm ent: they asserted that, just like individuals, the company
had interests to be nurtured and defended. In the same period, the City Councils
began seeing areas in which the City Corporation’s interests needed to be
watched. In the w inter o f 1832, the City Councils and the Schuylkill Navigation
Company fought over rights to the river’s water: their interests, in this case, had
diverged. Chapter Six will investigate how the men who ran private corporations
established institutional independence from civil authorities and coordinated their
efforts across corporations to create a corporate sphere beyond the reach of the
state government, while Chapter Seven will show the result when the city’s
corporate interests and the navigation com pany’s interests clashed.

11sReport of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to the Stockholders.
January 7.1828 (Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1828), 4.
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T h e Philadelphia Associates
In the opening decades of the nineteenth century, th e particularly anti-tax,
anti-elite, and anti-Philadelphia bent of the Pennsylvania legislature rankled
w ealthy Philadelphians in th e ir efforts to pursue business goals and to guide
econom ic growth in the D elaw are and Schuylkill river valleys. Pennsylvania had
perhaps the most radical state constitution— even after its conservative
m akeover in 1790— ushering in universal white male suffrage and the
accom panying political th e a te r decades before Jacksonian politics demonstrated
such democratic fervor in th e rest of the nation."I Finding th e ir views, interests,
and personal political influence increasingly pushed aside from the rough and
tum ble of Pennsylvania politics, corporate officers and th e ir friends endeavored
to carve out an economic realm beyond the reach of grasping politicians and
hidden from the eyes of a suspicious electorate. To do that, they developed an
adm inistrative and legal fra m e w ork within which to control and to run their
various projects. In that vein, corporate leaders pursued tw o inter-related goals.
First, boardmembers and o th e r insiders worked to make corporations
independent from the Pennsylvania state government. S econd, corporate
boards created structures to adm inister their tasks within the corporation and to
coordinate policies between corporations. Their success in doing so allowed a
sm all corporate oligarchy o f several hundred men to have grea t influence over
econom ic development in th e Philadelphia area, to put them selves in position to
reap disproportionately the rewards of that growth, and to use their leverage to
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further their greater political-economic agenda. They carved out a separate,
corporate sphere o f activity.
Corporate boosters did not try to avoid the governm ent altogether: they
needed the legislature fo r authorization to build the ir internal improvements, for
limited liability, and fo r banking privileges, and they used their leverage in the
statehouse to pass laws that furthered or protected corporate activities.
Company officials did their best to manipulate the legislature to their own ends;
previously chartered banks often allied with anti-charter factions to forestall
competition and with internal improvement com panies looking for emergency
funds.

C om pany officials sent letters and lobbyists to the state capital to

negotiate term s, to make offers, and to cajole concessions from representatives
whose interests, by electoral necessity, differed radically from those of wealthy
Philadelphia com pany boosters. Elected officials did not necessarily or
categorically oppose such entreaties, but they had motives beyond the mere
encouragement o f enterprise when they discussed and voted upon legislation.
Accordingly, the men who ran big corporate businesses had an ambivalent
relationship with the Pennsylvania General Assem bly, one in which they
considered the legislature far from a pro-active o r even necessarily sympathetic
partner. Most o f the time, though, the men who ran corporations did their utmost
to keep civil authorities at arm ’s length w henever they could, preferring to deal
with the state as a separate entity rather than a controlling one.

^Although the Constitution of 1790 repealed the radical structure of the 1776 document, including the
latter’s single legislative house and impotent executive branch, voting rights for all free men who paid taxes
and were resident in the state for at least one year and their sons who were of age remained.
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Corporations soon grew deep roots in Pennsylvania, but the seeds had
come from Britain. In eighteenth-century Anglo-Am erican legal theory, the
corporation served to harness the energy and resources of private citizens for
the interests of the state.2 As its name suggests, a corporation was a body
politic. The members of the corporation, generally defined by shareholding,
composed their own by-laws and set up an adm inistration— usually a board of
directors or board of managers—whose decisions were to be legally binding
upon all the shareholders. A corporate charter represented the granting of a tiny
bit of sovereignty: a governm ent-within-a-governm ent endowed with certain
privileges usually reserved to the state, such as the exercise of em inent domain
or permission to print bank notes that passed fo r money.

In addition, a

corporate charter endowed the authority to act as a legal “person” because a
corporation could sue and be sued, could own and alienate property, and could
hire and fire employees and agents to carry o ut its mission. The state could then
receive the benefits of the corporation such as improved transportation or greater
availability of credit without having to spend public money on it. For their part,
the owners of the corporation secured the privilege to profit from this
arrangement as long as they kept to the bounds of the charter. Furthermore,
charters tended to have finite time limits, a fter which the sovereignty and
privileges they entailed would revert to the ultim ate sovereignty, the state.

2See Ronald E. Seavoy, The Origins of the American Business Corporation. 1784-1855: Broadening the
Concept of Public Service During Industrialization (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982). The Handlins
argued that “the corporation was conceived as an agency of government, endowed with public attributes,
exclusive privileges, and political power, and designed to serve a social function for the state. Turnpikes,
not trade, banks, not land speculation, were its province because the community, not the enterprising
capitalists, marked out its sphere of activity.” While they were right in the former assertion, the latter
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Rarely acknowledged a t the time, British influence pervaded
Pennsylvania’s corporate charter-writing in the early nineteenth century. One
reason fo r such broad and conspicuous transatlantic borrow ing on the part of
Philadelphians lay in the nature of all matters legal, especially in a system based
upon com m on law. Lawyers recognized that the safest w ay to write any legally
binding docum ent was to use tested formulae possessing the power of
precedent and successfully withstanding challenge. Furtherm ore, they had no
reason to invent new structures when established form s w ere serviceable.
Those form s had been used and elaborated substantially in eighteenth-century
Britain even after the South S ea bubble scandal in 1720, as British businessmen
established companies fo r exploiting new technologies fo r canals, navigations,
and waterw orks and new actuarial methods for insurance. Pennsylvania’s
corporations duplicated the structures established in Britain from the most basic
elem ents, such as having an elected board, annual stockholders’ meetings, and
the keeping o f records to the sm allest details, including provisions fo r dissenting
directors to avoid potential liability by noting in the m inutes their dissent from the
majority, elaborate plans fo r changing by-laws, and the posting of security bonds
by com pany e m p lo y e e s .3

The powers, limits, and m odes of Pennsylvania

corporate behavior echoed those of British corporations even down to the titles,
such as naming banks after geographic entities— Bank o f England, Bank of

statement is not borne out by the evidence of early republican Pennsylvania. Oscar Handlin and Mary F.
Handlin, “Origins of the American Business Corporation,” Journal of Economic History 5 (May 1945), 22.
3For surveys of British corporate forms in the late eighteenth century see George Heberton Evans, Jr.,
British Corporation Finance. 1775-1850: A Study of Preference Shares (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1936); Joseph Priestley, Historical Account of the Navigable Rivers. Canals and Railways
throughout Great Britain (London. 1831); Armand Budington DuBois. The English Business Company after
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North Am erica, Bank o f Pennsylvania— canals and navigations a fte r the
w aterw ays they connected o r improved— M ersey and Inwell Navigation, Delaware
and Schuylkill Canal Navigation— and som etim es more fanciful nam es for
insurance companies— the London-based Phoenix Fire Office and the
Philadelphia-based Phoenix Insurance C om pany. As long as Philadelphia
businessm en were going to adopt British technologies, strategies, and methods,
copying of British legal form s to adm inister such projects seem ed obvious.4
W hatever their theoretical justifications, British business corporations and
th e ir lawyers rarely addressed philosophical issues in the latter half of the
eighteenth century.6 From the very beginning, the men active in founding
Pennsylvania corporations also exhibited little concern with thoughts of service to
the state when forming associations for which they sought state charters.6
Rather, they wanted to avail them selves o f the services or investm ent
opportunities that internal improvements, banks, and insurance com panies could
provide. T heir motivations fo r seeking incorporation were so apparent as to
rarely require explanation: one could hardly acquire all the land necessary to
build a canal without em inent domain or expect a bank to succeed if its notes

the Bubble Act. 1720-1800 (New York: Octagon Books, 1971); and Bishop Carleton Hunt, The Development
of the Business Corporation in England. 1800-1867 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1969), 3-13.
4See Richard Nelson and Stephen Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Chanoe (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1982). As the most prominent s of evolutionary economics, they argue that
rather than efficiency-maximizing or inherently creative, businesses operate in learned, familiar routines
until failure or until market circumstances force experimentation and change.
5Dubois, 281-284.
6This argument is a consideration only of business-oriented corporations; that is, ones which potentially
could issue dividends. Other corporations, such as churches, schools, charitable organizations, and fire
companies were treated much differently under law after measures passed in the 1790s standardizing such
charters.
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were not legally binding upon the endorser.7 In addition, incorporation provided
the legal structure for the easy alienability of shares and limitations of liability that
joint-stock companies did not.8 Before the Revolution, Parliament jealously
reserved the right to grant corporate charters both at home and in the colonies,
but once peace returned incorporation became the preferred framework fo r
large-scale American projects that neither the states nor the federal government
would undertake and that required more capital than only a few people could
provide.
Would-be corporate boosters needed governm ental authorization to
proceed with their plans, but not to draw them up.

The chartering process

began with a group of private individuals gathering to create an association to
pursue a given goal, w hether it be bridging a river, building a turnpike, or running
a bank. Those men then petitioned the legislature in the form of a bill
enumerating the articles o f the potential charter. Although the legislators
negotiated with each o ther and with company backers over the language of
particular provisions, they dealt with a specific docum ent designed to be

7ln “The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation,” William & Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., 50 (1993)
51-84, Pauline Maier argues that the proliferation of corporate charters in the early republic was a
“mystery,” because British corporate law had experienced incidental change since the aftermath of the
South Sea Bubble in 1720 and the French revolution quickly did away with corporations because of their
association with privilege in that country. Contrary to Maier however, the corporation was the preferred
form of organization for banking (the Bank of England) and for internal improvements such as canals,
turnpikes, and waterworks in eighteenth-century Britain, had been used and modified extensively during
that period, and was the obvious business model for most Anglo-Americans who wanted to enter those
lines of business. They did not even consider the French business environment, which, because of its
tangle of corporations, entitlements, office-selling, mixed jurisdictions, and vestigial feudal privileges and
prohibitions bore very little resemblance to that of either Britain or the United States. See Ted W.
Margadant, Urban Rivalries in the French Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
8A!though the ability of a company to levy its shareholders beyond their original subscription remained
confused in English law throughout the eighteenth century, the issue of limited liability to company creditors
appears to have been well-established by the early eighteenth century.; DuBois, 94-98. In Pennsylvania
the same principal applied: although some internal improvement companies raised money from their
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accepted as com plete upon application. Thus, while the numbers and a few of
the words changed, the form of nearly e very article of the charters eventually
passed had been written into the bill by th e applicants, not inserted by
representatives. As in Britain, those articles also encompassed clauses
seemingly intended to be checks on corporate power and the influence of large
stockholders.0 Regardless o f the purpose o f the clauses, generally corporate
promoters authored them.
Once a charter bill w as written, P hiladelphia’s corporate boosters
attempted to secure its passage while preventing the incorporation of potential
competitors. T h e extent to which businesses sought to manipulate the
unpredictable Pennsylvania legislature w a s evident in the bitter opposition to
certain charters, including the anticharter m ovem ents that had business-backed
support in the assem bly.10 The Philadelphia Bank’s charter application
floundered in Lancaster, the erstwhile sta te capital, for two years partly because
of the general suspicion of banks and m oneyed institutions, but largely because
the Bank o f Pennsylvania lobbied strenuously against it, offering the state
$200,000 in cash not to charter another Philadelphia-based bank.1 1 The
Schuylkill Navigation Com pany, too, had problem s acquiring a charter because a

subscribers beyond the original subscription, there is no documented case of creditors attempting to lay
claim to the assets of company stockholders for a corporation’s debts.
9See for example J.R. Ward, The Finance of Canal Building in Eighteenth-Centurv England (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1974), and George Heberton Evans, Jr., British Corporation Finance. 1775-1850:
A Study of Preference Shares (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936), 13-14.
10For a survey of the rhetorical character of anticharterists, see Maier, 51-84.
11 Stephen N. Winslow, Biographies of Successful Philadelphia Merchants (Philadelphia: James K Simon,
1864), 167; according to one legislator in 1803, “the memorial from the Bank of Pennsylvania has had
considerable effect upon the members, and in my opinion will prevent a charter to the Bank of Philadelphia
[in this session].’’ Joseph Reed to Paul Beck, December 30, 1803, McAllister Collection, Historical Society
of Pennsylvania.
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boardmember of the Union Canal C om pany held a General Assem bly seat fo r
Philadelphia County. T he Union C anal Company, a successor to the assets of
several failed canal efforts, had gotten a charter in 1811 to build a canal
connecting the Susquehanna to the Schuylkill around Reading. Led by W illiam
Duane, the state representative from Philadelphia, Union C anal Company
investors considered the Schuylkill Navigation a potential com petitor, and
opposed W hite’s efforts to get a charter. Only in the next session, when
Schuylkill Navigation Com pany backer Cadwalader Evans, Jr. replaced Duane
did the charter pass.12 Although anti-charterists took to the opposition when
individual bank charters cam e before the General Assem bly, they frequently
supported omnibus bills funding internal improvement com panies, especially
ones that covered their districts. M uch anticharter posturing in the legislature
sought either to put a principled face on attempts to wring m ore cash out of
banks or to represent already-chartered corporations trying to forestall
competition.
The Farmers and Mechanics Bank’s struggle fo r its charter involved
exactly the sort of haggling that led corporate leaders to th in k of the chartering
process as a bothersom e legislative hurdle and the legislature as an erratic and
unreliable entity. Tow ard the end o f the 1807-1808 session signs increasingly
suggested that the bank’s friends w ould not be able to m uster a majority in favor
of incorporation. Fortunately fo r bank partisans, the state senate’s com m ittee on
banking had given the institution a good report. The bank’s man in Lancaster

^Edward s. Gibbons, “The Building of the Schuylkill Navigation System, 1815-1828.” Pennsylvania History
57 (January 1990), 17.
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that year, James Sharswood, wrote to Joseph Tagert, the bank’s president in
Philadelphia, to tell him th a t they would be better off delaying a move to bring the
charter to the floor for a vote until the following session. This way, The public
m ay be led to suppose that...the lateness of the session alone prevented [the
charter’s] adoption," while the positive committee report and the absence of a
measure preventing the bank from pursuing its operations would imply the
legislature’s approval. Between sessions, the bank would “be in full operation
and there cannot be a doubt but that the prudence of the Directors will conciliate
in the public mind, gain m any friends and convince even our opponents that we
may be safely trusted with the privileges we asked for.” However, should the
bank’s friends push fo r a charter and lose during the current session, “our
opponents may take the advantage of this defeat to urge a law im mediately to
prevent our progress”; at the very least, their re-application in the ensuing
session would be severely jeopardized. Sharswood warned direly that “the
victory to our opponents would be so far complete and it is but fair to presume
they would not stop untill they had accomplished our final ruin.” "13 Those
opponents included both anti-bank factions and the partisans of existing banks.
O ver the long term, the legislature had no categorical opposition to banking.
The politics surrounding the omnibus bank bill of 1814 demonstrated the
ways that various corporate interests intertwined with anti-bank sentiments. By
1812, Pennsylvania had chartered only four banks, all based in Philadelphia.
Partly influenced by the de-chartering of the first Bank of the United States, over

13James Sharswood to Joseph Tagert, March 13,1807, Historical Records, Box 1, 1807-1820, Accession
1658, Farmers and Mechanics National Bank Collection, Hagley Museum and Library.
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the following three sessions the partisans of various associations vwanting to
incorporate country banks swarmed the new state capital at Harrissburg,
importuning representatives to expand the banking privilege quantfitatively and
geographically. T he majority opposed these bills individually, citini g what many
argued would be the inevitably ruinous expansion of paper m o n e y ’ . That
majority, though, w as a shifting one: the friends of the banks a lr e a d y chartered
opposed the new banks as much out of fear of competition as feanr o f inflation,
and few representatives were willing to vote for a bank in s o m e o n e else’s district
without getting anything in return. Finally, in the 1814 session, thee various
applicants got together to put all their banks in one bill, one th a t p a s s e d by so
large a margin th a t it overrode the threat of a gubernatorial veto.
Representatives did not oppose banks in general, merely other m a n ’s banks.
A fter that act, the state legislature would not charter another b a n k for decades.
Certainly the Panic of 1819, which m any blamed upon banks, w a s ; one reason
for the end of bank proliferation, but just as important, virtually evesry legislative
district had a strong group with a vested interest in limiting b a n k in g to those
companies already chartered. W hile the public interest presum ablly formed part
of the equation, corporate interests represented the crucial v a ria b le .
The negotiation necessary to obtain charters amounted to sa tollbooth on
the turnpike of success for Pennsylvania corporations. Corporate leaders
considered the acquisition of a charter as one of the tasks re q u ire d fo r setting up
a capital-intensive business, just as the election of a board, the ra is in g of capital,
and the hiring of em ployees were all necessary to the successful aadministration
of their projects. T h e chartering process is most accurately descriHbed as one of
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authorization: perm ission from civil authorities fo r com pany officials to proceed
w ith the activities th e y had proposed, organized, and initiated.
Although as a result of the chartering process the state often held stock in
m any corporations, th a t practice did not indicate a willingness on the part of
corporate boards to include the governm ent as a meaningful partner.
Pennsylvania did ow n shares in many banks and internal im provem ent
com panies, but a clo se look at the timing and circum stances o f state acquisition
of corporate shares suggests that this action did not constitute a true
partnership. D epending upon the kind o f corporation, the legislature’s reasons
fo r owning com pany stock belied any deep sense of com mon mission between
corporate boosters and the state government.
Neither a boon fo r banks and their private investors no r a sign of
governm ent-business partnership, the state’s ownership of bank stock was
designed to tax b a n k profits. As a requirement o f the Bank o f Pennsylvania’s
firs t charter in 1793, the state government retained the option of investing up to
an impressive $1 m illion in bank stock. The legislature intended to use United
S tates bonds that th e state treasury had on hand to pay fo r a portion of the
stock. The deal allow ed the state to receive more than m arket value for its
bonds while paying only par—the original issuing price— for bank stock, which
w as far less than m a rke t value. Thus, the bank performed the valuable service
of taking on the s ta te ’s poorly performing assets and replacing them with an
investm ent that w as expected to pay better dividends and to appreciate quickly.
T he state’s im m ediate market-value gain in the transaction, $54,187, amounted
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to a one-time bonus from the bank in exchange fo r receiving the ch arte r.14
Meanwhile, the state bought the rest of its bank stock, $250,000 worth, through a
loan from the bank a t an annual rate of six percent. In what would becom e
standard practice fo r the purchase of bank stock, the stock itself would be the
collateral for the loan. Legislators held the expectation that the Bank of
Pennsylvania’s dividends would be sim ilar to those o f the previously chartered
Bank o f North Am erica: ranging from eight to tw elve percent a year. The
practical effect of the bonus and the stock purchase was that the state would
receive 15.7% of all th e bank’s dividends up to 6%, and a total of 25.7% o f all
dividends above 6 % .15

No cash had changed hands, but the state received

dividends on a large portion of the bank’s capital.
Other banks would face the sam e sort o f taxation. In legislative haggling
over the Farmers and Mechanics Bank charter in the 1808-1809 session, the
opponents of the bank clearly were the ones w ho wanted the state to have a
higher stake in the institution’s stock. At one point the bank’s lobbyist reported to
cashier Joseph Tagert that “an amendment passed the Committee which will
prevent our accepting a charter; this am endm ent is that the Bank shall allow the
legislature to subscribe on the part of the State $100,000 in the stock o f the bank
at par.” 16 In the end, the Farmers and M echanics Bank compromised, issuing

14To the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Memorial of the
President and Directors of the Bank of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia. 1805), 6.
15The state received 942 shares in exchange for its United States bonds and 625 shares through its loan
from the bank. Private subscriptions brought the total shares sold to 6,250, each worth $400.
16Joseph Clay to Joseph Tagert, February 17, 1809, Historical Records, Box 1,1807-1820, Accession
1658. Farmers and Mechanics National Bank Collection, Hagley Museum and Library.
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the state $75,000 in shares in exchange for incorporation.17 The
Commonwealth eventually owned stock in a num ber of banks, but from the
bankers’ point of view state shareholding represented a regrettable cost to be
paid for the opportunity to make handsome profits.
In 1814, the legislature began to forego stock purchases and instead
required new banks to pay the state a certain percentage of their dividends,
depending upon the individual charter. This change certainly did not help the
new banks. First, they were giving up a higher percentage of their dividends to
the state than previously chartered ones. Second, they no longer received
United States bonds that they could use to back th e ir note issues, and as a
result gross profits were lower.18 Thus, the legislature had streamlined the
chartering process— the stock “purchases” had becom e increasingly
convoluted— negotiating with new charter applicants an appropriate cash bonus
and demanding a certain percentage of the institution’s dividends for the coffers
in Harrisburg.

The state had not acquired bank sto ck out of a magnanimous

effort to help bankers and bank investors or because of any general desire to
promote commerce: it did so strictly as a form of revenue generation, that is, as
a way of taxing those institutions. By 1814 it had sim ply found an easier way to
do so.
A major ingredient in the passage of bank charters, then, was the
negotiation of the terms of taxation, an important m atter for the legislature

17An Act to Incorporate the Farmers and Mechanics Bank (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1809).
18The state generally took 8% of the dividends from the banks chartered in 1814. Thus, the percentage of
their dividends paid in taxes was lower than the Bank of Pennsylvania’s, but the total dividends were lower
in proportion to private investment because the banks received no United States bonds from the state, even
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considering that a large portion of the state’s revenue cam e from bank dividends.
From 1796 to 1825, banks provided the state o f Pennsylvania with at least 36%
and as much as 50% o f its annual incom e.19 From m any politicians’ point of
view, that income represented a com paratively painless opportunity to raise
revenue while holding dow n constituents’ property taxes. From the bankers’
point o f view, the state’s taxing of banks in exchange fo r incorporation amounted
to a profit-draining annoyance, and did no t endear the legislature to dividend
conscious boardm em bers. On the contrary: the bankers’ lesson from the
chartering experience w a s that though the legislature could be influenced on
occasion, the price w as steep, the bargaining treacherous, and the outcome
uncertain. Better to stay clear of the state legislature whenever possible rather
than open bank business to public debate and risk humiliating defeat besides.
Other kinds of corporations such as insurance com panies and coal mining
com panies generally did not face the sam e kind of legislative gauntlet, nor did
the General Assem bly e ve r invest in insurance or coal-mining com pany stock.
The question often w as one of profitability: if the applicant institution seemed
certain to make a profit, then the legislature tried to find a way to tax it; if not,
then the legislature did n o t bother. In between, firms involved in riskier activities
such as coal mining, m anufacturing, and insurance found themselves in a
nebulous area where th e y hoped to avoid taxation.
Insurance com panies in particular often walked a careful line, claim ing in
the statehouse that they would have difficulty eking out profits while courting

at below market value as had the Bank of Pennsylvania. From the new banks’ point of view, the change
was a wash at best.
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investors in Philadelphia by em phasizing the likelihood of steady returns.
Negotiations fo r incorporating the Phoenix Insurance Com pany in December
1803 pivoted on exactly this tension. Representative Joseph Reed wrote to Paul
Beck, Jr., a founding director o f the Phoenix Insurance Company, that “the
idea...of raising a revenue from the Insurance com panies is not altogether
abandoned, and in this point o f view the [com pany's] offer to lend money has
had, as I expected, an injurious e ffe ct’ on the com pany’s chances fo r
incorporation.2^ The com pany was arguing against the necessity of paying a
bonus, offering a loan to the state instead. Hostile legislators pointed out that
the ability to lend a large am ount of money dem onstrated that the com pany
could, in fact, yield handsom e returns: as Reed observed to Beck, “it will be
difficult to convince the M em bers that the business is not profitable when the
com pany can afford to lend $60,000."21 For their part, coal company promoters
cheerfully predicted that they would develop coal regions while lowering the price
o f fuel in more densely populated areas, but claim ed that the necessity o f limited
liability and access to large pools of investment required incorporation for them
to succeed in such beneficial endeavors.22 The state legislature did not tax
these kinds of com panies, partly because such institutions contributed to
19See Richard Sylla, John 8 . Legler, and John J. Wallis, “Banks and State Public Finance in the New
Republic: The United States, 1790-1860” Journal of Economic History 47 (June 1987), 401.
20Joseph Reed to Paul Beck, December 30,1803, McAllister Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
21 Joseph Reed to Paul Beck, December 30, 1803, McAllister Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
22The argument among business historians over the development of limited liability is considerably
overblown: from the beginning, investors assumed that stock ownership in a chartered corporation did limit
liability to level of subscription. Especially telling in this regard are the clauses in bank charters holding
directors directly financially responsible for a range of potentially risky practices, clearly suggesting that
stockholders would be in the clear should the bank fail. Furthermore, given the problems with debt
collection and bankruptcy law in the early republic, any attempt to collect debts from hundreds of investors
would prove insuperable, especially given the dilemma of who to charge when stocks changed hands. For
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economic growth but mainly because they performed poorly com pared to banks
as far as investor returns until at least the late 1820s.23
None of these corporations— banks, insurance com panies, o r coal mining
companies— ever asked the legislature to buy stock or requested loans from the
state. Company directors balked at yielding stock to the state because doing so
cut into their profits. Furthermore, they knew that state stockholding opened
corporate decision-making to the scrutiny of the legislature, especially if
lawmakers demanded the right to appoint some of the boardm em bers. Banks
and insurance com panies often found themselves oversubscribed rather than
lacking investor interest. From the point of view of many bankers and insurers,
government shareholding seemed akin to having an unwanted cousin not only
stay with the fam ily and eat its food, but also demand a say in w hat was served
for dinner.
For some corporations, though, the Pennsylvania governm ent appeared
more like an occasionally overbearing, but nonetheless rich, uncle. Turnpike,
canal, and river navigation companies, unlike banks and insurance companies,
often solicited state aid and investment and received it in the form of loans, stock
purchases, and direct grants. However, legislators never attem pted to carve a
pound of flesh from these fledgling companies, nor did project boosters try to
wheedle money from a freewheeling General Assembly when applying for
charters. Internal im provem ent com pany directors hesitated to include the state
as a stockholder fo r the sam e reasons that bank officials tried to avoid having

the best discussion of the topic, see “Appendix: Stockholders’ Liability” in Edwin J. Perkins, American Public
Finance and Financial Services. 1700-1815 (Columbus. OH, 1994), 373-376.
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the government as an investm ent partner: such relationships lowered potential
returns to investors w hile making the m anagem ent subject to the prying eyes,
open hands, and loud mouth of every Pennsylvania politician. Banks did their
best to minimize state investment; insurance, coal, and manufacturing
com panies avoided it at all costs; and internal im provem ent companies
considered it the option of last resort.
Still, the state had an abundance o f one crucial resource that inland
navigation com panies often lacked: money. A fte r the initial high hopes of quick
construction and grand profits were dashed, inland navigation com pany officials
often appealed to the legislature for money, in the words of one supplicant, “to
recover the affairs o f the Canal Companies from the disorder and
em barrassm ent into which they had fallen,” em phasizing how much these
enterprises could contribute to the common w eal.24 Taken individually, these
appeals rarely succeeded. Because internal im provem ents were inherently
local, even the m ost zealously enthusiastic of prom oters faced great difficulties
getting company subsidies past politicians who faced annual reelection in the
counties where taxpayers would pay the brunt o f such largesse, but not reap the
rewards. M eanwhile, legislators knew that internal improvement com panies
w ere risky enough. To require companies to give the state stock— as the
assembly did with banks— might discourage the fe w investors those ventures
could attract in the first place. Moreover, the intense negotiations over exact

23|_ouis Hartz. Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania. 1776-1860 (Cambridge. 1948),
90-92.
24“Memorial to Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, from the
President, Managers and Company, of the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation, and of the Delaware

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

247

term s would not have been worth the G eneral Assembly’s tim e. Given internal
im provem ent com panies’ m inuscule rate o f success, for the state legislature to
have devised tax schemes would have been pointless.
Supporters of internal im provem ent companies, however, had one
weapon that bank directors lacked, a nearly unanimous support fo r the general
principle behind their project, better transportation.25 Projects w hose legislative
sponsors m anaged to befriend representatives from different districts but with
sim ilar causes found the state legislature a good place to look fo r capital.26
State aid to internal improvement com panies was considerable and generally
cam e bundled in sprawling om nibus bills providing infusions of cash to projects
through alm ost every part of the state, som etim es every county.27 From 1791
through 1817, the state allocated over $2.4 million for loans and stock purchases
in various projects; by 1822, the state owned $2.4 million in internal improvement
com pany stock alone.28 In the aggregate, the Pennsylvania legislature
expended considerable financial support to internal improvement com panies.
The General Assem bly voted to aid navigation and turnpike corporations
for a variety of reasons, but the desire fo r these companies to m ake a profit, that
is, to encourage corporate enterprise, w as at the bottom of that list. W hile the

and Schuylkill Canal Navigation,” December 13,1810, Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society
of Pennsylvania.
25See Chapter 4 for ways that internal improvement boosters fostered that unanimity and put it to rhetorical
and political use.

26 Hartz, 44-45.
27For a comparison of Pennsylvania’s and Virginia’s spending on internal improvements, see John D.
Majewski, A House Dividing: Economic Development in Pennsylvania and Virginia Before the Civil War
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
28 Samuel Breck, Sketch of the Internal Improvements Already Made by Pennsylvania: with Observations
Upon Her Physical and Fiscal Means for Their Extension: Particularly As They have Reference to the
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legislature granted money to m any internal improvement corporations, it allowed
an even larger number of turnpike and navigation companies to fail because they
did not generate enough initial subscriptions fo r the charter to be patented by the
state.2 ^ More than anything else, the opportunity to provide fo r transportation to
market, thus contributing greatly to the overall economic developm ent of their
districts, remained the param ount objective fo r legislators in securing help for
struggling local projects. Bringing state funds back home did not hurt, either:
providing employment, especially during difficult economic times, gave
representatives another way to please their constituents. At the height of the
depression following the Panic of 1819, a com m ittee of the Pennsylvania Senate
proposed “liberal appropriations fo r internal improvements.” By doing so, the
com m ittee suggested, the state could “assist its citizens with the means of
em ploym ent at a period of difficulty,” all the better to do “when labor can be
com m anded at half its customary rate," and Pennsylvania could build roads
costing half w hat they did in other years. The committee declared that “this is
the m om ent then for extraordinary exertion," that could “carry relief to the doors
of thousands, and at the same tim e, increase the fixed wealth o f the state to a
greater extent than can ever again be done by the expenditure of a similar

Future Growth and Prosperity of Philadelphia. 2d edition (Philadelphia: M. Thomas, 1818), 5; Report on
Roads. Bridges and Canals. Read in the Senate. March 23. 1822 (Harrisburg: C. Mowry, 1822), 3, 5.
29As part of almost all charters, the state required that the company present a list of a minimum number of
subscribers and subscriptions for the governor to authorize the letters patent to put the charter in force. As
of 1822, of the 146 turnpike companies chartered by the state, 84 had acquired letters patent, 30 of 49
bridge companies had acquired them, and 9 of the 18 inland navigation companies had gotten theirs;
Report on Roads. Bridges and Canals. Read in the Senate. March 23. 1822 (Harrisburg: C. Mowry, 1822),
3, 5.
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sum .”33 As a consequence o f th e panic, the state accelerated its distribution of
large sums, especially to turnpikes, in the early 1820s, and finally in 1825 the
legislature approved the huge state-adm inistered and -financed Main Line
project. Any encouragem ent o f corporations in the funding o f canal and turnpike
com panies was incidental; rather, the state supported internal im provem ent
com panies to foster the success o f non-corporate enterprise, much of which
depended upon a better transportation network. Perhaps m ore to the point,
legislators supported internal im provem ents as the m ost effective and prominent
m ethod of bringing hom e state m oney to their respective districts, a motive with
th a t internal im provem ent co m pa ny supporters were quite willing to identify.
Furthermore, although cash-strapped internal im provem ent companies
showed a willingness to ask the legislature for money, the state usually provided
only a small fraction o f those ven tu res’ overall capital. Rather, it provided a
boost, a financial stopgap w hile com panies scrambled to attract more private
investment and to finish construction so that they could generate their own cash
flow from tolls. State investm ent in Pennsylvania paled next to private
investment in turnpikes, bridges, and internal navigations. Even when the
legislature granted com panies large sums, they were only a fraction of the total
cost of construction.31

A ccording to a Pennsylvania Senate report, as of 1822

the state had invested $1,861,542 in turnpike stock, com pared to $4,158,347 in
private investment; $382,000 in bridges, compared to $1,629,200 in private
30Report of the Senate. Appointed to Enquire Into the Extent and Causes of the Present General Distress
(Lancaster: Pennsylvania Senate, 1820), 15. William G. Shade declared Louis Hartz’s characterization of
much internal-improvement spending as pump-priming “anachronistic,” but one would be hard-pressed to
find any policy that embodies that principle more fully at any time before Maynard Keynes methodically
delineated it in the twentieth century. Shade, 259.
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investment; and $130,000 in internal navigation companies, compared to
$1,416,510 in private investment.22 Overall, then, the state provided 31% of
turnpike funding, 19% o f bridge funding, and a m ere 8% of internal navigation
funding.

The corporate figures for private investm ent may well have been

inflated: in som e cases, they may have represented reported subscriptions,
rather than m oney paid in. Nonetheless, the state w as not involved in every
corporate enterprise. It was only bailing ou t th e ones that had the political
wherewithal to cobble together an omnibus bill for public aid. Pennsylvania
generally did not p u t up the bulk of the m oney for internal improvements,
especially fo r those m ost likely to succeed. Private investors supplied all
$465,00 for the P hiladelphia and Lancaster Turnpike, all $285,000 for the
Germantown and Perkiom en Turnpike, all $300,000 fo r the Schuylkill Perm anent
Bridge, and all but $100,000 of the nearly $2,000,000 for the Schuylkill
Navigation C om pany, each among the period’s m ost expensive and the
Philadelphia area’s m ost used im provements.22 T h e larger the corporation, the
less it asked of the Pennsylvania legislature and the more fiercely it guarded its
financial independence from public authorities.
W hether or not th e y received money from the legislature, com panies
resisted the state’s attem pts to set conditions on board elections, chafing under
rules that limited boardm em ber tenure or dictated boardmember eligibility. For
example, the original charter of the Farmers and Mechanics Bank stipulated that

31Hartz, 84-85.
32Report on Roads. Bridges and Canals. Read in the Senate. March 23. 1822 (Harrisburg: C. Mowry,
1822), Tables 4, 5, and 6.
33lbid., Table 4, 5; Report of the President and Managers of the Schuylkill Navigation Company, to the
Stockholders. January 2. 1826.(Philadelphia: Lydia R. Bailey, 1826), 10.
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a m ajority of the boardm em bers had to be either farm ers o r mechanics, which,
given the fluid meaning o f “m echanic” in the early republic, was especially vague
and proved impossible to enforce.3^ in 1817, Joseph Tagert, lifelong m erchant
and longtime bank president, suddenly became a “farm er,” an occupation he
som ehow managed to fo llow despite his bank duties in Philadelphia. Tagert had
appealed to farm ers’ aspirations to get his charter through the legislature, and
now he played fast and loose with the very definition of the term . When the bank
received its new charter in 1824, part of the bargain included new clauses
stipulating that only three quarters of the incumbents could be reelected to the
board in any given year and that no boardmember except the president could
serve more than three years in any four-year period. Nonetheless, only in 1826
and 1827 did the stockholders replace the minimum fo u r incumbents required by
law. The board eventually sent a petition to protest these limits, weakly arguing
that they had “been productive of great inconvenience to the Bank and of no sort
of benefit.”35 Corporate officers knew the letter of the law, but found ways to
subvert it or to get it changed.
Banks in particular tried to minimize public influence in the boardroom. In
the first negotiations for chartering the Farmers and M echanics Bank during the
1808-1809 legislative session, its Philadelphia promoters explicitly instructed
their lobbyist in Lancaster to make sure that any clauses allowing the state to
appoint members to the board be stricken from the bill. In the end, their efforts

34See Larry Peskin, “To 'Encourage and Protect' American Manufactures: The Intellectual Origins of
Industrialization, 1763-1830," (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 1998).
35“Petition to Pennsylvania Legislature, “February 9,1827, Historical Records, Box 2, 1821-1863, Farmers
and Mechanics National Bank records, Accession 1658, Hagley Museum and Library.
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were

r e w a r d e d .3 6

The Bank o f Pennsylvania had not gotten off so easily,

ending up with a charter that allowed the state legislature to appoint six of the
twenty-five boardmembers, three by the Senate and three by the House of
Representatives. Nonetheless, the stockholders’ representatives held a clear
majority and excluded state appointees from m em bership on the all-important
discount committee, the body th a t evaluated loan applications. In 1829, the
legislature-appointed directors publicly disputed the shareholder-elected
m ajority’s contention that the bank could not lend more m oney to the state, to no
avail. In its rechartering the following session the bank managed to have the
num ber of seats reserved for the state reduced to four. Regardless of the
number, the state’s block of seats remained a distinct minority, and therefore
could not restrict the board or shape bank policy as long as the shareholderelected boardmembers kept th e ir ranks closed. In an 1829 incident revealing the
impotence of state directors, th e Bank of Pennsylvania’s shareholder-elected
boardmembers rejected a proposal to lend the state a significant am ount of
m oney over the loud and public protests of the publicly appointed directors.37
The public representatives w ere allowed into the boardroom, but only as
spectators.
Boardmembers and associated large stockholders did their best to limit
oversight from within as well as from outside the com pany. Despite their
apparent design to put large and small shareholders on an equal footing,

36February, 1809 (?), Historical Records, Box 1, 1807-1820, Farmers and Mechanics National Bank
records, Accession 1658, Hagley Museum and Library.
37For both sides of the tangled issue, see An Address to the Stockholders of the Bank of Pennsylvania.
December 22.1829 (Philadelphia: Clark & Raser, 1829) and Report of the Committee of State Directors, of
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corporate structures minimized the influence o f all but the m ost vocal
stockholders.

A lm o st every charter included a system of graduated stockholder

voting for both dire cto r elections and changes in company by-laws— that is, the
internal rules for th e com pany’s operations as written by the stockholders and
the board— a practice directly derived from British precedent. For exam ple, the
1804 Phoenix Insurance Company charter allowed one vote fo r every three
shares owned, w ith a maximum of 15 votes.33 The Lehigh Coal and Navigation
Com pany’s 1822 ch a rte r granted one vote fo r any number of shares owned up to
ten; another for each ten if holding between ten and 100 shares; one more vote
fo r each twenty shares up to 500; and three m ore votes for every 100 shares
above that.39 Banks tended to have the m ost circumscribed voting rules: the
1809 Farmers and Mechanics Bank charter allowed each stockholder one vote
for each of the first two shares owned, another vote for every p a ir of shares up to
ten owned, a vote fo r every four shares between ten and 30 owned, a vote for
every six shares betw een 30 and 60 owned, a vote for every eight shares up to
100 owned, and a vote for every ten shares owned over 100. No stockholder
was allowed to have m ore than thirty votes.49 Corporate rules also discouraged
or prohibited the use o f proxies and forbade shareholders from voting unless
they held their shares fo r at least three m onths.
The inclusion o f such clauses in m any com pany by-laws as well as
corporate charters suggests that they reflected the intentions of corporate

the Bank of Pennsylvania. Appointed November 14. 1829. Upon the Loans of 1828 and 1829 (Philadelphia,
1829).
38An Act to Incorporate the Phoenix Insurance Company of Philadelphia (fPhiladelphia?!. 1804), 13.
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founders and of the board of directors as m uch as those of cautious o r perhaps
hostile legislators. In addition to being welcom ed by legislators as apparent
attempts to lim it the influence of large capital, these measures had the collateral
effect of securing control of the corporation fo r the founding group. Small
shareholders rarely worried over who ran the com pany or how, desiring rather
w hat they had invested for: the building of the internal improvement or the
issuing of dividends.41 For their part, corporate boardmembers and their
associates cared greatly that their com mand of the company remain
unthreatened. Because stockholding in m ost corporations was broad, low
turnout at annual and even emergency stockholders’ meetings ensured that
boardmembers and their friends could m uster enough votes to quell any
potential investor rebellion.42 Thus, the rules against proxy voting and the
exchange of stock fo r voting purposes im m ediately before stockholder meetings
functioned to prevent outsiders buying stock in the shortterm or acquiring
proxies in order to change the company’s m anagem ent or direction. In short,
they kept the affairs of the com pany in the sam e hands that had first shaped it.
Some com pany boards even enacted rules that, whatever the ir design or
motivation, clearly limited the participation and influence of the body of
stockholders. In 1823, the Schuylkill Navigation Company amended its by-laws
to allow the board of directors to call a stockholders’ meeting at only five days’

39Act of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania Concerning the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company;
Together with the Bve-Laws. Etc. (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. and Brother, 1837), 25-26.
40An Act to Incorporate the Farmers and Mechanics Bank (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1809), 7.
41 Robert E. Wright, “Bank Ownership and Lending Patterns in New York and Pennsylvania, 1781-1831,"
Business History Review 73 (Spring 1999), 47-48.
42See Chapter 5 for discussion of investor motives.
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notice.43 The intent m ay have been to allow the bo a rd to consult with the
stockholders on a tim elier basis, rather than the thirty days previously required.
However, for an enterprise administering an unfinished internal improvement
project stretching through 108 miles of occasionally rugged country, five days
was not enough for people fa r up the river to receive notice, make arrangements,
and travel down river to Philadelphia. If travel were th a t easy, no navigation
would have been needed in the first place. Thus, the change essentially limited
stockholder participation in potentially important e m ergency meetings to
Philadelphia-area investors. Those Philadelphia stockholders would be more
likely to sympathize with the Philadelphia-dominated b o a rd in potentially
controversial votes over the allocation of resources to the upper or lower section
of the navigation. Through a seemingly innocuous by^-law change, the Schuylkill
Navigation Company board consolidated its control o v e r the company.
Establishing adm inistrative and financial independence from the state—
and, in some cases, from their own stockholders— w a s no easy task, but having
done so, corporate leaders also had to figure out h ow to run the organizations
and technologies they had brought into being. At first, corporate boards did their
best to administer their projects on their own, often depending upon one or a
small number of their m em bers to do most of work. Internal improvement
companies in particular usually relied upon their presidents to do much of the
necessary work to keep the business going through th e construction phase and
beyond. The Schuylkill Perm anent Bridge Com pany succeeded alm ost solely

430ctober 17, 1823, Schuylkill Navigation Company Minute Books, Oct. 5, 1815-Nov. 26, 1849, Box 1 ,
Pennsylvania State Archives.
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through the efforts o f Judge Richard Peters, who helped to organize the
com pany in 1798. He cam e up with the idea o f covering the bridge, thus greatly
increasing its building costs— totaling about $235,000— but also reducing future
repair expenses and contributing to the structure's longevity.44 Attracting capital
as well as acquiring plots o f land on either side of the river fo r the entrances and
tollbooths, Peters closely supervised the construction from the laying of the
cornerstone in O ctober 1800 through the bridge’s official opening on January 1,
1805.

Stretching across the wide river, the bridge was 552 fe e t long and 42 feet

wide, and became a source of civic pride and traveler com plim ents in addition to
steady toll revenue well into the 1830s.45 Although the com pany had a full
board of managers, adm inistration remained prim arily Peters’s responsibility until
his death in 1828. Eventually such concentration of tasks in one person became
the exception rather than th e rule. In the case of the Schuylkill Perm anent
Bridge Company, Peters had the political acumen, the financial connections, the
energy, the time, and the facility with mechanics and design to be able to hand
the varied tasks required. No other project would be so fortunate to have a
leader with such varied com petencies.
The deciding factor in who would hold ultim ate pow er ove r a given internal
improvement usually hinged upon that most basic of business principles: capital.
Erskine Hazard, the son of Schuylkill Permanent Bridge C om pany boardmember
Ebenezer Hazard, team ed with Josiah White to supervise the construction and

44John Melish, Travels in the United States of America, in the ears 1806 & 1807. and 1809. 1810. & 1811:
Including an Account of Passages Betwixt America and Britain, and Travels Through Various Parts of Great
Britain. Ireland, and Upper Canada (Philadelphia: Thomas & George Palmer, 1812), 165.
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m uch of the early adm inistration and financing of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation
Com pany. W hite had m echanical talent and drive in abundance and Hazard
great meticulousness, but neither had the political sensibilities o r financial touch
Richard Peters did. Com pounding their problems— or perhaps sym bolizing
them — neither W hite nor Hazard had been elected to the board o f the company
they had founded. Peters’s corporation, the Schuylkill Perm anent Bridge
Company, had attracted a large body of small investors who w anted as little
involvem ent as possible in the actual management of the project. W hite and
Hazard’s com pany started as a three man undertaking— the third, George Hauto,
w as a confidence m an who, upon being discovered, was subsequently bought
out by the other two. Eventually it attracted a large infusion of capital from big
investors. Having great sum s invested, these later entrants dem anded control
over the m anagem ent of their funds. They did not worry over precise technical
details: they could pay W hite and Hazard to oversee construction while keeping
the overall direction o f the com pany in their own hands.
Other com pany boards were more explicit about choosing men with
expertise in account books rather than engineering diagrams. T he Schuylkill
Navigation C om pany’s board of managers chose a new president in 1825, and
the explanation of th e ir decision process included an explicit adm ission that the
need to pursue class interest rather than guarantee technical com petence
inform ed their decision. W ith Cadwalader Evans, Jr.’s resignation from the
presidency, the com pany’ board of managers looked for a replacem ent. Evans

45For the years 1830-1835, the bridge averaged $20,832 in toll revenue. Calculated from data in Memorial
of Richard A. Gilpin. Relative to the Construction of a Tunnel Under the River Schuylkill: Presented to the
Select and Common Councils of the City of Philadelphia (rPhiladelphial. 1836), 3.
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had divided his time among m any pursuits and projects, but now that the project
was substantially operational the board wanted someone who would w ork full
tim e fo r the company. They first considered hiring an engineering expert, but
com petent engineers were in short supply, and furthermore the navigation’s
im pending completion som ewhat obviated their need for a full-time engineer.
They also thought about employing a superintendent for the works, and admitted
that “it is possible that such an officer may be found necessary, as well as
inferior superintendents, limited to portions of the line over which they should
m aintain a continual personal inspection." Their main concern, though, was not
with m inor technical matters or everyday operations. Rather, “the capital
invested is large, the navigation is of great and increasing im portance,” reasoned
the managers, “and the public have in various ways an interest in preserving its
activity and usefulness, which, no less than the interest of the Stockholders, calls
for continued & even increased watchfulness and care.” In other words, they
feared that improper m anagem ent of the navigation might give “occasion to great
public com plaint” with concom itant political consequences along with raising their
own ire. Besides the assumption that an engineer might not be politically adept,
the objection to hiring an engineer to run the com pany would be that “his
inferiority of station... would prevent him from having the needful freedom in
com m unicating with the Board, and from having the requisite weight and
authority in his intercourse with

o t h e r s . ”4 ^

Boardmembers wanted som eone

who could deal with public pressures, but even more, someone who would be

460ctober26, 1825 Minute Books, Oct. 5, 1815-Nov. 26, 1849, Box 1, Schuylkill Navigation Company
Papers, Pennsylvania State Archives.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

259

th e ir own equal, who would defend the boa rd’s interests as if they w ere his own.
So they picked one of their own, to the unanim ous affirmation of stockholders:
Joseph S. Lewis, who had helped negotiate th e company’s $230,000 loan from
Stephen G irard, served on the boards of va rio us insurance com panies, and had
been president o f Philadelphia’s W atering C om m ittee. The selection o f Lewis
signified th e board’s desire that the com pany put th eir economic and political
goals a h ead o f its desire to provide efficient transportation along the Schuylkill
River.
Banks and insurance companies, too, kept important leadership positions
in fam iliar a n d trusted hands. W hile internal im provem ent com panies often
required th e services of an engineer, financial corporations had th e ir own
technical specialists: for insurance com panies, an actuary, and fo r banks, a
cashier. T h e actuary consulted and constructed mortality statistics, lists of ship
casualties, reports of fires, property values, and any other relevant inform ation
needed to decide upon premiums for w ha tever kind of insurance his com pany
issued. T h e cashier oversaw account keeping— a major task for banks with
hundreds o f active customers— and the issuing of notes. Both supervised the
clerks, o th e r employees, and routine bookkeeping and were responsible fo r dayto-day m anagem ent decisions. A close circle o f men dominated these positions,
both by necessity and by board preference. Nobody in Philadelphia had run a
fell-fledged corporate bank or insurance co m pan y before, and the cities m ost
accom plished businessmen were the best a t keeping track of com plicated
projects. Jacob Shoemaker, related to city co un cil member Abraham
S hoem aker and prominent merchant Jam es Vanuxem , was a m erchant and a
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founding member of the Delaware Insurance C om pany of Pennsylvania in 1804.
In 1809, he became an original director o f the Pennsylvania C om pany fo r
Insuring Lives and G ranting Annuities, and upon its chartering in 1812 was
appointed its first actuary.47 Even those w ho worked their way up th e ranks did
so through fam ily and professional connections, joining the corporate oligarchy
as they climbed the corporate ladder. Quintin Cam pbell, a Scottish orphan who
immigrated to Am erica as a cabin boy, served as a clerk in for Levi Hollingsworth
and became a virtual m em ber o f the powerful Hollingsworth flou r m erchant clan.
His master got him a job as a clerk with the Bank of Pennsylvania, in 1804 he
becam e the first teller for the Philadelphia Bank, and, when cashier Joseph Todd
died, replaced him and kept the position well into the 1830s.4 8 Once ensconced
as cashier or actuary, men tended to stay fo r a long time, lending stability to the
institution while ensuring that the interests o f the board remained primary.
The composition of corporate boards also embodied stability, w ith most of
the incumbents getting returned to their seats year after year. From 1810
through 1830, the Pennsylvania Company fo r Insuring Lives and Granting
Annuities averaged an 85% retention rate fo r boardmembers, m eaning that in a
typical year only two of the fourteen incum bents did not return. The m ost that
ever left the board was six, in 1823, but of the fourteen directors from 1822 six
still sat on the board in 1824, ensuring continuity amid the com paratively high
turnover. Banks tended to be even more static. From the Farmers and

47“Petition from Delaware Insurance Company to Pennsylvania Legislature/ February 13, 1804, McAllister
Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Stock Subscription Book, 1809, Pennsylvania Company for
Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities, Accession 1476, Hagley Museum and Library.
48Winslow, 55.
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Mechanics Bank’s 1807 inception until 1830, its board had a annual 90%
retention rate, most often losing only one incumbent and never more than four of
the thirteen members from the previous year. Even this low rate of change
exaggerated turnover because som e boardmembers left only to return a year or
two later. Internal im provem ent com pany board turnover could be high in the
first few years of operation b ut generally settled into th e sam e pattern as did
financial corporations. Beginning in 1815, the Schuylkill Navigation Company
returned twelve or more of its fourteen boardmembers in every election but one
during its first fifteen years o f operation. The other year, 1817, nine o f the
fourteen incumbents retained th e ir seats, keeping a strong majority. W ith rare
exceptions, boardmembers held their seats until they retired from all business
pursuits or until they died.
Incumbent boardm em bers even outlasted the direst com pany crises and
general economic downturns. In 1815, the board of the Pennsylvania Company
fo r Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities lost five of its thirteen members.
However, several took up seats on other boards the sam e year, suggesting
voluntary departures rather than a purge of upper m anagem ent, especially given
that the company was on the verge of issuing its first dividends. Most telling, the
com pany never failed to reelect a majority of the sitting board, a clear indication
that the dominant group stayed firm ly in control of com pany policy and
administration. The Farmers and Mechanics Bank returned most of its directors
every year, despite the normal vicissitudes of banking and the upheavals of the
Panic of 1819. Notwithstanding chronic money problem s before the late 1820s,
the Schuylkill Navigation C om pany did the same. Regardless of com panies’
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fortunes on the unpredictable economic seas o f the early republic, they kept the
same hands at the tiller year-in and year-out.
Boards’ continuity of composition, com bined with the longevity of m any
seatholders, dem onstrated the degree to which a small group of men could
dominate Philadelphia-based corporations. To som e extent, board m em bership
was self-selected: the vast majority of stockholders invested in corporations
precisely to be able to reap steady profits while minimizing their own active
involvement in business affairs, and perhaps few were willing and able to spend
the time to sit on a com pany board.49 Even annual stockholders’ m eetings
generally did not attract a majority of the investors. W idespread stockholder
lethargy contributed to the ability of men with energy and connections to get on
the board, and once there, to stay in as long as they wanted. Stockholders threw
out few boardmembers, but a number of board m inute entries declared feelings
o f sympathy fo r the fam ilies of members who died in office. By then, of course,
even unrelated boardm em bers may have felt like fam ily to each other, having
gathered together so m any tim es over a period of years or even decades. And
like family, they were quick to defend their com m on interests and fight for
common goals.
If an individual corporation could be considered as a family, then they all
belonged to the same exclusive and cohesive Philadelphia clan. The
interlocking of corporate boards resulted in a sm all community of men
dominating Philadelphia-area companies. Although most banks had articles in
their charter that forbade the holding of seats on other bank boards, insurance
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and public im provem ent com pany charters had no such strictures prohibiting the
holding of seats on th e boards of potential com petitors, and none of the charters
addressed the question of holding seats on the boards of businesses th a t would
not compete directly with the company in question. As a result, the sam e men
got on the boards o f m ultiple corporations, allow ing inter-corporation
com m unication and cooperation.
The level o f coordination among the Philadelphia corporate business
associates resem bled that of previous elite com m ercial groups in other Atlantic
port cities. Through his analysis of a com m unity of eighteenth-century London
merchants, David H ancock demonstrated the e xtent to which those businessm en
held common views, followed a common econom ic program, and even entered
into many short- and long-term mercantile partnerships and joint ventures.50
Although they did not articulate it as such, these men conceived of their
commercial activities as leading to and aided by the integration of the British
Atlantic world; they pursued that goal together through both business and
political activities. T h e y were typical in this regard: other scholars have shown
th a t similar groups in other Atlantic cities, including Philadelphia and New York,
did much the sam e.51 Such informal organization and activity was not limited to
English speakers, as John Garretson Clark’s w ork on both New O rleans and La

49See Chapter 3 for an extended discussion of the motivations of investors.
^ D a v id Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the Integration of the British Atlantic
Community. 1735-1785 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
®1See Thomas M. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants and Economic Development in
Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986) and Cathv Matson.
Merchants & Empire: Trading in Colonial New York (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).
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Rochelle during the sam e period has demonstrated.52 In all of these cities,
among all of these com m unities, men pooled their energies and sometimes their
resources to pad th e ir own profits in conjunction with political and legal efforts to
further and guide econom ic growth.
The same would be true of the Quaker City corporate entrepreneurs.
Indeed, from the very beginning of Philadelphia corporations the men who sat on
the boards of the canal com panies were often bank or insurance boardmembers
as well. Robert Morris and his associates not only founded Pennsylvania’s first
bank, the Bank of North America, in 1781 but also its first internal improvement
companies, the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Navigation C om pany in 1791 and
the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Navigation Com pany in 1792. A t any given
tim e from 1800 to 1830, about a quarter of the men sitting on the boards of
Philadelphia-based corporations held seats for multiple

c o r p o r a t io n s .5 5

Some

5^John Garretson Clark, New Orleans. 1718-1812: An Economic History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1970), and La Rochelle and the Atlantic Economy During the Eighteenth Century
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).
53These and the ensuing statistics and analysis of board memberships derives from a database compiled
from the following directories: James Hardie, The Philadelphia Directory and Reoister...1793 (Philadelphia:
T. Dobson, 1793); Thomas Stephens, Stephens’s Philadelphia Directory, for 1796 (Philadelphia: Thomas
Stephens, 1796); Cornelius William Stafford, The Philadelphia Directory for 1797 (Philadelphia: William W.
Woodward, 1797); Cornelius William Stafford, Philadelphia Directory, for 1798 (Philadelphia, 1798);
Cornelius William Stafford, Philadelphia Directory, for 1799 (Philadelphia: William W . Woodward, 1799);
Cornelius William Stafford, Philadelphia Directory for 1801 (Philadelphia: William W . Woodward, 1801);
James Robinson, Philadelphia Directory. City and County Register, for 1803 (Philadelphia: William W.
Woodward, 1803); James Robinson, Philadelphia Directory for 1804 (Philadelphia: John H. Oswald, 1804);
James Robinson, The Philadelphia Directory for 1805 (Philadelphia: James Robinson, 1805); James
Robinson. The Philadelphia Directory for 1806 (Philadelphia: James Robinson, 1806); James Robinson,
The Philadelphia Directory, for 1807 (Philadelphia: T.S. Manning, 1807); James Robinson, The Philadelphia
Directory for 1808 (Philadelphia: W . Woodhouse, 1808); James Robinson, The Philadelphia Directory of
1809 (Philadelphia: James Robinson, 1809); James Robinson, The Philadelphia Directory of 1810
(Philadelphia: James Robinson, 18101: Census Directory for 1811. Containing the Names. Occupations. &
Residence of the Inhabitants of the City. Southwark & Northern Liberties (Philadelphia: Jane Aitken, 1811);
John A. Paxton, The Philadelphia Directory and Register, for 1813 (Philadelphia: B. & T. Kite, 18131: Kite's
Philadelphia Directory of 1814 (Philadelphia: B & T Kite, 1814); James Robinson, The Philadelphia
Directory for 1816 (Philadelphia: James Robinson, 1816); James Robinson, Robinson’s Original Annual
Directory for 1817 (Philadelphia: Whitehall, 1817); John Adems Paxton, The Philadelphia Directory and
Register for 1818 (Philadelphia: E. R. Parker, 1818); John Adems Paxton, The Philadelphia Directory and
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sat on many at once, m en such as Jacob Downing, who in 1814 sat on the
boards of the Bank o f North America, the Lancaster and Philadelphia Turnpike
Company, the Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Com pany, and the Pennsylvania
Contributionship for Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire.
In addition, a t least a sixth of the men had relatives sitting on boards of
other companies. John Nixon served as president of the Bank of North Am erica
from 1793 to 1808 and his son Henry served as a director from 1804 until the
1830s; the younger Nixon also sat on the Insurance Com pany of Pennsylvania’s
board from 1804 to a t least 1830, the Ridge Turnpike Com pany’s board in the
late 1810s and the Lancaster Schuylkill Bridge C om pany’s board in the early
1820s. Brothers R obert and Jesse Wain shared a m erchant

b u s in e s s .5 4

Jesse

held seats on the boards of the Insurance Com pany of Pennsylvania and the
Germantown and Perkiom en Turnpike, while Robert held seats at various times
on the boards of the Am erican Insurance Com pany, the Bank of North America,
and the Philadelphia Insurance Company. Their cousin Jacob, who eventually
took over the business, was also a boardm ember o f the American Insurance
Company, the Bank o f North America, and the Insurance Company of North
America. Relative W illiam W ain also helped to direct the Bank of North

Register for 1819 (Philadelphia: John Adems Paxton, 1819k The Philadelphia Directory and Register, for
1821 (Philadelphia: M’Carty & Davis, 1821); The Philadelphia Index, or Directory, for 1823 (Philadelphia:
Robert Desilver, 1823); Thomas Wilson, The Philadelphia Directory and Stranger’s Guide, for 1825
(Philadelphia: John Bioren, 1825); Robert Desilver. Desilver's Philadelphia Directory and Stranger's Guide,
for 1828 (Philadelphia: Robert Desilver, 1828); Robert Desilver, Desilver's Philadelphia Directory and
Stranger’s Guide. 1829 (Philadelphia: Robert Desilver, 1829); Robert Desilver, Desilver's Philadelphia
Directory and Stranger’s Guide. 1830 (Philadelphia: Robert Desilver, 1830). Other sources of data include
the Farmers and Mechanics Bank Collection, Hagley Museum and Library; Minute Books, Oct. 5, 1815-Nov.
26, 1849, Schuylkill Navigation Company, Pennsylvania State Archives; Minute Books, Pennsylvania
Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities, Hagley Museum and Library; and various newspapers.
54Winslow, 132.
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Am erican and the Philadelphia Insurance C om pany. W hether fo r inland
navigation com panies o r other corporations, blood w as thicker than water.
Many board m embers had close business associates as officers in
various corporations.55 Henry Drinker, the cashier of the Bank of North Am erica
from 1805 to 1821 and an early director of the Susquehanna and Schuylkill
Navigation C om pany speculated in lands together with Samuel W . Fisher, a
director of the G erm antown and Perkiomen Turnpike Com pany from 1805 to
1814 and the president of the Insurance C om pany o f North America until 1805,
w hen he became president o f the Philadelphia Insurance Company, an office he
held for over a decade.55 Both Manuel Eyre, longtim e director of the Delaware
Insurance C om pany of Pennsylvania, the Am erican Fire Insurance Com pany,
the Schuylkill Navigation Company, and second Bank of the United States, and
Abraham Kintzing, w ho at various times sat on the boards of the Pennsylvania
Insurance Com pany, the Schuylkill Perm anent Bridge Company, and the B ank of
North America through the 1810s, had apprenticed together for m erchant Henry
Pratt in the late 1790s.57 Pratt, who took Kintzing into his firm as a partner, later
sat on the boards o f both the first and second Banks o f the United States, the
Commercial Bank, the Insurance Com pany of Pennsylvania, the Insurance
C om pany of North Am erica, the Bustleton and Sm ithfield Road Com pany, and
the Philadelphia and Lancaster Turnpike Com pany.

Joseph Evans and John

55 These are relatives with the same last name, not counting those so common, such as Smith, that were
less likely to be related. This number is actually under-representative because of the great number of men
related by marriage, who thus had different last names but shared family interests.
56Henry Drinker to Samuel W . Fisher, June 8, 1814, Society Miscellaneous Collection, Historical Society of
Pennsylvania.
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W elsh not only sat together on the boards o f the Philadelphia Bank and the
Delaware Insurance Com pany of Pennsylvania: W elsh took Evans into his firm,
and Evans married W e lsh ’s wife’s younger sister.55 W hether through birth,
brides, or business, th e men on Philadelphia boards were bound together in
myriad ways.
This interconnection meant that more than a third of the seats of
Philadelphia corporations were held by men who individually or through fam iliar
o r business connections represented their concerns in multiple com panies. In
1821, fo r example, Schuylkill Navigation C om pany president Cadwalader Evans,
Jr. also sat on the board of the Bank of the United States; he was a form er
boardm ember of the Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company, his father still
held a seat on board o f the Pennsylvania C om pany fo r Insuring Lives and
Granting Annuities, and he had friendly dealings with Henry Drinker, the cashier
o f the Bank of North Am erica, and Joseph Ball, a form er president and current
director of the Union Insurance Company. Three other members of the
Schuylkill Navigation Com pany’s Board of M anagers also sat on the board of at
least one insurance com pany and a fourth had a brother on the boards of two
insurance com panies and the Bank of Pennsylvania.59 This core of men who
sat on several boards or who had families or associates on various boards
form ed the nucleus o f influence and opinion guiding Philadelphia’s growth.

57Abraham Ritter, Philadelphia and Her Merchants. As Constituted Fifty @ Seventy Years Ago. Illustrated
by Diagrams of the River Front, and Portraits of Some of its Prominent Occupants (Philadelphia: Abraham
Ritter, 1860), 57.
58Stephen N. Winslow, Biographies of Successful Philadelphia Merchants (Philadelphia: James K Simon,
1864), 107-110.
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That influence extended to the City Corporation of Philadelphia, as well,
and often concentrated in the Watering Com m ittee. For the city’s first bond
issue to raise funds for the waterworks, the C ity Councils named commissioners
to sell the instruments.60 Among the twelve-man list were eight men active in
business corporate circles, including notables Jacob Shoemaker, Edward
Tilghman, and John Inskeep. Many men alternated between sitting on the city
councils and sitting on corporate boards. Jam es Vanuxem, for example, who
served on the Watering Committee for several years of its first decade and as its
president in 1806, sat on the boards of the Union Insurance Company, the
Am erican Fire Insurance Company, the Germ antown Turnpike and the Delaware
and Schuylkill Canal Company. Some families had connections in both the city
councils and corporate boards: Jacob Shoem aker’s brother Abraham sat on the
city councils off and on from 1801 to the early 1820s. Samuel W etherill would
become head of the Watering Committee in 1824 once Joseph S. Lewis left that
position to assume the presidency of the Schuylkill Navigation Company. Others
extended their influence even further: Cadwalader Evans, alongside his tenure
as Schuylkill Navigation Company president, sat for several years in the
Pennsylvania legislature. Robert Wain, on the boards at various times of the
Bank of North America, the Philadelphia Insurance Company, the American
Insurance Company, and the Insurance C om pany of North America, not only
held a seat on Philadelphia’s Common Council in the early 1790s and Select

59Compiled from The Philadelphia Directory and Register, for 1821 (Philadelphia: M’Carty & Davis, 1821)
and Minutes, Board of Managers, Schuylkill Navigation Company, Roll 1, Oct 7 ,1 8 1 5 -January 5,1846,
Pennsylvania State Archives.
S^An Ordinance for Raising Supplies, and Making Appropriations, for the Services and Exigencies of the
City of Philadelphia, for the Year 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799), 3.
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Council in the e a rly 181 Os but also was elected to the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives fo r tw o term s in the 1790s and the United States House of
Representatives in 1798; John Sergeant, council fo r and boardm ember of the
Schuylkill N avigation Company, the Union Canal Company, the second Bank of
the United States, the Am erican Fire Insurance Company, and the Pennsylvania
Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities, gained a seat in the
Pennsylvania H ouse o f Representatives and sat on its Roads and Inland
Navigation C om m ittee fo r the 1807-1808 term before serving four consecutive
terms in the U nited States House of Representatives beginning in 1815 and
being Henry C lay’s running mate in the 1832 presidential election.61 The
Philadelphia corporate com m unity was both connected well and well connected.
The practice o f multiple seatholding by individuals and families created a
dense web of relationships among all Philadelphia corporations. The directors of
banks, insurance com panies, and internal im provem ent companies formed a
tight community in which the general project o f orderly regional economic growth
along controlled lines could be carefully coordinated. No corporations had direct
contacts with e ve ry o th e r company, but all had boardmembers or relatives of
boardmembers w h o held seats on the boards of other concerns and so could be
kept abreast of general trends and the policies of the others through only one or
two degrees of separation. Such interconnections were rampant and consistent
throughout the firs t three decades of the nineteenth century, and, if anything,
slightly increased o v e r the period (see Figures 3, 4, and 5). Although

William Meredith, Euloaium of the Character and Services of the Late John Sergeant (Philadelphia:
Crissy & Markley, 1858).
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corporations may have com peted fo r individual customers, boardmembers were
sure to keep informed on issues that affected them and w hen necessary to take
concerted action even w ithout form al institutional ties.
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Figure 3
Interconnection of Corporate Boards
1811
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One individual or familial connection
Multiple individual or familial connections

B&SR - Bustleton and Smithfield Road Company; BNA - Bank of North America; BPA - Bank
of Pennsylvania; BPHILLY - Philadelphia Bank; BUS - Bank of the United States; C&WT Cheltenham and Willow Grove Turnpike Company; D&S - Delaware and Schuylkill Canal
Navigation Company; DIP - Delaware Insurance Company of Pennsylvania; F&BT - Frankford
and Bristol Turnpike Company; FARMEC - Farmers and Mechanics Bank; GTP - Germantown
and Perkiomen Turnpike Company; ICNA - Insurance Company of North America; ICPA Insurance Company of Pennsylvania; L&P - Lancaster and Philadelphia Turnpike Company;
MAC - Mutual Assurance Company; MFC - Marine and Fire Insurance Company; PCILGAPennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities; PCON - Philadelphia
Contributionship for Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire; PHOENIX - Phoenix Insurance
Company; PIC - Philadelphia Insurance Company; S&LT - Susquehanna and Lehigh Turnpike
Company; S&S - Schuylkill and Susquehanna Canal Navigation Company; SPBCO - Schuylkill
Permanent Bridge Company; UIC - Union Insurance Company; USIC - United States Insurance
Company.
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Figure 4

Interconnection of Corporate Boards
1819
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AFIC - American Fire Insurance Company; B&SR - Bustleton and Smithfield Road Company; BNA Bank of North America; BNOLI -Bank of the Northern Liberties; BPA - Bank of Pennsylvania;
BPHILLY - Philadelphia Bank; BSCHUY - Schuylkill Bank; BUS - Bank of the United States;
C&WT -Cheltenham and Willow Grove Turnpike Company; CB - Commercial Bank; DIP Delaware Insurance Company of Pennsylvania; F&BT - Frankford and Bristol Turnpike
Company; FARMEC - Farmers and Mechanics Bank; GTP - Germantown and Perkiomen
Turnpike Company; ICNA - Insurance Company of North America; ICPA - Insurance
Company of Pennsylvania; L&P - Lancaster and Philadelphia Turnpike Company; MIC Marine Insurance Company; PCILGA- Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and
Granting Annuities; PCON - Philadelphia Contributionship for Insuring Houses from Loss
by Fire; PHOENIX - Phoenix Insurance Company; PIC - Philadelphia Insurance Company;
RIDGE - Ridge Turnpike Company; S&TR - Susquehanna and Tioga Turnpike Company; SNC Schulkill Navigation Company; SPBCO - Schuylkill Permanent Bridge Company; UIC - Union
Insurance Company; UNION - Union Canal Company; USIC - United States Insurance
Company.
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Figure 5
Interconnection of Corporate Boards
1830
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AFIC - American Fire Insurance Company; AIC - Atlantic Insurance Company; BNA - Bank
of North America; BNOLI -Bank of the Northern Liberties; BPA - Bank of Pennsylvania;
BPHILLY - Philadelphia Bank; BPT - Bank of Penn Township; BSCHUY - Schuylkill Bank;
BSOUTH - Southwark Bank; BUS - Bank of the United States; CAMDEN - Camden Bank;
CB - Commercial Bank; DIP - Delaware Insurance Company of Pennsylvania; FARMEC Farmers and Mechanics Bank; ICNA - Insurance Company of North America; ICPA - Insurance
Company of Pennsylvania; KBANK - Kensington Bank; L&P - Lancaster and Philadelphia
Turnpike Company; LC&N - Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company; MB - Mechanics Bank;
MIC - Marine Insurance Company; PAFIC - Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Company; PCILGAPennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities; PCON - Philadelphia
Contributionship for Insuring Houses from Loss by Fire; PHOENIX - Phoenix Insurance
Company; PIC - Philadelphia Insurance Company; RIDGE - Ridge Turnpike Company; SNC Schulkill Navigation Company; UIC - Union Insurance Company; UNION - Union Canal
Company; USIC - United States Insurance Company.
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The interconnection of boards allowed the corporate community to
allocate funds from money-rich companies to cash-poor projects. The Schuylkill
Navigation Com pany in particular benefited from such coordination. In August
1817, Pennsylvania Com pany for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities
boardmember Cadwalader Evans, Sr. convinced his colleagues to approve
purchasing thirty shares in the navigation com pany, notwithstanding that it was
far riskier than the usual insurance-company investm ent.62

Evans could at

least vouch for the quality of the navigation com pany’s management, because
his son and namesake was the president. In 1821, W illiam Boyd suggested that
the Pennsylvania Com pany fo r Insuring Lives and G ranting Annuities invest
$20,000 in the Union Canal Company, a m otion th a t the finance committee later
approved.62 It was no coincidence: Boyd w as on the boards of both companies.
Three years later, because the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany was still
desperate for cash despite having opened the waterw ay in July, the navigation’s
board of managers authorized a $180,000 loan negotiated from a group of
bankers, insurance com pany officers, and the organizations they represented.
The men who eventually took up subscriptions did so on the condition that they
would hold a mortgage (subject to the prior claim s o f Stephen Girard, to whom
the company already owed $230,000) and th a t they would only be obligated to
pay in if the entire subscription were filled. T he largest investors included the
American Marine Insurance Com pany subscribing fo r $5,000 and the Marine

62August 20, 1817, Minutes, Board of Directors, Vol. 1. Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and
Granting Annuities, Accession 1476, Hagley Museum and Library.
63 Minutes, Board of Directors, Vol. 1., 4/13/1821. Accession #1476, Pennsylvania Company for Insurance
on Lives and Granting Annuities, Hagley Museum and Library.
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Assurance Company subscribing for $10,000.64 As Josiah W hite recounted, a
circle of men associated with the Pennsylvania Com pany for Insuring Lives and
Granting Annuities w as responsible fo r the funding that got the Lehigh Coal and
Navigation Com pany o ff the ground: Joseph Shoem aker arranged fo r W hite to
m eet him and his partners “at the Life insurance Co. office on the subject, when
fo r 20 shares of stock he agreed to give us his weight and influence to get our
Stock subscribed.”65 In this way, the corporate com munity supported local
economic developm ent by funding internal im provem ent projects fo r which they
may not have expected any direct returns.
A confluence o f the interconnections of corporate boards and corporate
lobbying in the statehouse occurred in the 1823-1824 Pennsylvania legislative
session. Eager to renew their charter, Philadelphia Bank partisans considered
several offers to the legislature in exchange fo r re-incorporation. Eventually,
they negotiated with the legislature fo r the bank to make a one-time purchase of
Chesapeake and Delaware Canal C om pany stock amounting to $100,000 rather
than the bank giving its own stock or a cash bonus to the state.66 Legislators
could justify the deal by pointing out that the bank was paying for its new charter
by supporting an im portant internal im provem ent. Compared to earlier charters,
though, the legislature had come away with relatively little: rather than getting
either cash to relieve the immediate tax burden or bank shares to relieve the

64Subscription book for loans of 1823 and 1824, Schuylkill Navigation Company, Accession #1215, Hagley
Museum and Library
65Josiah White’s History Given by Himself (Philadelphia: Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, 1909), 27.
66The bank was to receive any canal company dividends for the following fifteen years, after which it was to
transfer the stocks to the state at no cost. The Philadelphia Bank: Containing the Articles of Association,
the Original Charter, and All the Acts of Assembly Extending and Relating to it. with the General Banking
Law of April 16. 1850 (Philadelphia: Wm. F. Murphy & Sons, 1859), 40.
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long-term tax burden, representatives m ysteriously settled for a transfer of
wealth from one corporation to another. The m en on the boards of the bank and
the canal com pany had used the chartering process to get something both
wanted: in the bank’s case, a low price fo r the charter, and in the canal com pany'
case, a useful infusion of cash. In essence, th e se m en saved the bank
$100,000 because th e y might have made the sa m e transaction anyway, even
had the state required a cash bonus fo r the bank charter. George Gillaspy, one
of the Philadelphia B ank’s founding members, s a t on the Chesapeake and
Delaware Canal C o m p an y’s Board of Managers and a t least three men currently
or formerly on the ba n k’s board were related to m en on the canal board. They
easily could have gotten the bank to buy the shares.67 The state’s endorsem ent
made the exchange easier, because now the ba nk’s board did not even have to
justify the its investm ent in the struggling canal com pany. By coordinating their
lobbying efforts, the tw o boards had paid less to th e state while transferring
funds from a com pany that easily attracted investm ent, the bank, to one that had
more trouble doing so.
Although no corporations were more continually desperate for cash than
internal im provem ent com panies in their construction phase, insurance
companies som etim es needed liquid capital to tid e them over until more
premiums came in. Here, too, on occasion the clo se relations between
corporate boards cam e in handy for businesses dow n on their luck. Beginning in
the spring of 1822, th e Pennsylvania Com pany fo r Insuring Lives and Granting

67The Philadelphia Bank: Containing the Articles of Association, the Original Charter, and All the Acts of
Assembly Extending and Relating to it. with the General Banking Law of April 16,1850 (Philadelphia: Wm.
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Annuities suddenly faltered: after having issued dividends of at least six percent
and as high as ten percent for the previous seven years, it failed to issue
dividends that July. By the fall the com pany was running dangerously short o f
operating capital. The board of directors turned to the Philadelphia Bank fo r a
short-term $2,000 loan that the bank quickly approved, merely confirming a
history of friendly relations between the two boards.®8 The insurance com pany’s
longtime actuary, Jacob Shoemaker, had been a director of the bank, and Jacob
Sperry and John Bohlen sat on the boards of both companies. Form er bank
directors John W elsh, Augustine Bousquet, and Lewis Carpentier had all been
active in the insurance company’s founding, and the Newbold family had at
various times had seats on both boards.69 Corporate boards willingly bailed out
the companies of th e ir associates.
Even banks, m ost of which had strictures in their charters forbidding their
directors from holding seats on other banks, m anaged to keep their lines of
communication with each other open. Occasionally they simply flouted their
charters. In 1818, Joseph Lisle sat on the boards of both the Bank of the United
States and the C om m ercial Bank, despite the letter’s prohibition against its
directors holding seats on the boards of other banks. Such blatant disregard fo r
the law was the exception rather than the rule because boards found other, legal
lines of communication. Many brothers, fathers and sons, and business

F. Murphy & Sons, 1859), 15; Thomas Wilson, The Philadelphia Directory and Stranger’s Guide, for 1825
(Philadelphia: John Bioren, 1825).
680ctober 3,1822, Minutes, Board of Directors, Vol. 1. Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and
Granting Annuities, Accession 1476, Hagley Museum and Library.
69Stock Subscription Book, 1809, Pennsylvania Company for Insuring Lives and Granting Annuities,
Accession 1476, Hagley Museum and Library; The Charter and Bv-Laws of the Pennsylvania Company for
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associates sat on different bank boards and so could discuss the policies o f their
respective institutions in an informal manner. Som e men hopped from board to
board. John Barclay, an early president of the B ank of Pennsylvania later served
the Bank of the Northern Liberties in the same capacity, and Joshua Lippincott
sat on the board of the Schuylkill Bank before joining the board of the second
Bank of the United States. Nonetheless, longevity with a single board remained
the norm. Several m en declined the opportunity to switch while still keeping
cordial relations with the directors of other banks. In 1829, Robert Patterson
confided to a friend that he had “been solicited by m y friends to go into [Bank of
North America].

I believe it would give great satisfaction to the Directors if I

were appointed, but I would not leave the Philadelphia Bank. I am at home there
- with uncontrolled influence.”70 The prohibition against sitting on more than one
bank board did little to stop banking associates from communicating when their
common interests w ere at stake.
In addition to aiding each other’s corporations, members of the
Philadelphia corporate business elite benefited personally from cross-corporate
lending arrangements. Corporations were not the only backers of the big 1824
Schuylkill Navigation Company loan; Joseph Norris, a Bank of Pennsylvania
director, subscribed fo r $15,000, Henry Nixon of the Bank of North Am erica
subscribed for $8,000, and Joseph S. Lewis of the Philadelphia Contributionship

Insurance on Lives. Granting Annuities, and Executing Trusts (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Brother,
1836), ,3 .
70Robert B. Patterson to General Barnard December 25,1829, Robert Patterson Folder, Historical Society
of Pennsylvania
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subscribed for $10,000.71 T h ese men could avail them selves of such a good
investm ent opportunity because o f th e ir insider status. Furtherm ore, they had
acce ss to large sums because th e y knew that through th e ir ties to financial
institutions, they could afford to tie up capital fo r long periods w ithout the fe a r of
insolvency: should one run sh o rt o f cash, he could always take out a loan from
th e com pany on whose board he served. They were also using their corporate
links to aid companies in w hich th ey owned stock privately o r stood to gain in
increased property values upon the completion of the various im provem ents.
T hus, through their ties to o the r financial institutions, an increasingly sm aller
grou p of men held an increasingly larger portion of corporate stock and debt and
th u s an even greater say in how corporations would be run.
Bank officials coordinated the ir activities and policies through methods
o th e r than interlocking their directories. Eventually, the largest Philadelphiabased chartered banks held jo in t meetings, usually sending their cashiers as
representatives. These men gathered at the behest o f any one of the ir num ber
in regard to particular issues th a t m ight require the cooperation of banks across
th e city. One such set of m eetings took place in 1814 a t the suggestion of Henry
D rinker, the Bank of North A m erica’s cashier, after the legislature chartered fortyo ne new banks. He wrote to th e boards of the city’s three other established
chartered banks, the Bank of Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia Bank, and the
Farm ers and Mechanics Bank, proposing that they adopt a joint policy on the
acceptance of these new banks’ notes. Eventually, the group decided to accept

71 Subscription book for loans of 1823 and 1824, Schuylkill Navigation Company, Accession #1215,
Schuylkill Navigation Company Records, Hagley Museum and Library.
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the notes only of those banks in Philadelphia city o r county and, fo r the satellite
branches of the Bank o f Pennsylvania and the P hiladelphia Bank, to accept only
notes from banks in the sam e location as the branch.72 On another occasion,
the same group agreed no t to issue or accept any note with a face value under
five dollars despite the sta te ’s vacillation over its restrictions on low-denomination
issues.73 The prohibition on interlocking directories did not inhibit the big
Philadelphia banks from acting in concert on issues that affected them
collectively.
The coordination o f bank policies showed the extent to which Philadelphia
corporate associates extra-legally controlled banking and m onetary policies for
the Philadelphia region and indeed for the entire state. T h eir decision to accept
only the notes of som e rather than all of the banks chartered in 1814 revealed
that bank directors held fa r m ore sway over m oney policy than did public
authorities. For better or worse, the banks whose notes the long-established
Philadelphia banks refused to honor had obtained charters every bit as legitimate
as the ones granted to th e big city institutions. The big-city bank directors were
doing their best to keep th e m oney supply at safe levels, thus limiting inflation
and the chance of a run— a point they would bring up during the Panic of 1819,
which many observers blam ed upon the excessive issues of the forty-one banks
chartered five years earlier. If the government would not o r could not rein in the
excessive printing of bank notes with its inherent dan ge r fo r the entire economy,

72June 17,1814, Excerpt of Minutes of Board of Directors, Historical Records, Box 1, 1807-1820, Farmers
and Mechanics Bank, Accession 1658, Hagley Museum and Library.
73The legislature forbade and then allowed the issuing of notes below 55 at least twice in between 1814
and 1820. An Act to Re-Charter Certain Banks. To Which Are Added the Several Acts of Assembly
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a t least Philadelphia banks tried their utmost to give Pennsylvania’s econom y a
solid foundation while providing capital fo r growth. The big city banks also had to
deal with the practical problem of redeeming the notes of non-Philadelphia
banks. Many of the new banks were quite remote, making redemption o f their
notes fo r specie and com m unication on a regular basis extremely challenging;
the communication lag time particularly exacerbated the big banks’ chronic
difficulties with counterfeiting, a widespread practice damaging banks and the
population at large. As for the issuing of notes below five dollars, Philadelphia
bankers provided the discipline that elected representatives and shady country
banks could not. The big banks were protecting themselves, their customers,
and the greater public by getting together and acting in concert on such issues.
Certainly, some kind o f financial regulation was necessary and the
legislature’s sporadic, occasionally strict, but invariably toothless measures
proved inadequate. However, no matter how much the banks’ collusion may
have been motivated by the desire to follow sound financial policy, it also
reflected the clout of the Philadelphia banking community and its ability and
willingness to use that power w ithout submission to public scrutiny and debate.
They did not hold open m eetings or publicize their decisions, nor did they petition
the legislature for more effective legal changes or governmental oversight
accom plishing the same ends. Rather, they held their own private meetings and
m ade their own decisions m ostly free of the input or influence of the citizenry or
its elected representatives, keeping their own counsel and running the state’s

Relative to Banks, and the By-Laws of the Farmers and Mechanics Bank (Philadelphia: R. Desilver, 1824),
36;
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econom ic policy from cozy bank offices in Philadelphia. Regardless o f the
wisdom or effectiveness o f th e ir efforts to m anage banking and the economy,
m anage it they did.
Furthermore, while none of them were as bold or as foolish to adm it as
much openly, Philadelphia ba nk officials had som e inkling o f the im plications of
their regulatory efforts fo r th e ir own political and economic power. By denying
country banks the ability to have their notes honored in Philadelphia, the big-city
bankers ensured that the m etropolis between the Schuylkill and the Delaware
would remain the financial capital of the state. They were also protecting their
own profits while threatening those of the country banks. C ountry bank notes,
because they were not accepted in Philadelphia, circulated at a heavy discount
beyond the vicinity of th e ir respective institutions, meaning that their bearers
could not get face value fo r the notes. Custom ers who were already paying the
legal rate of 6% interest on a country bank loan might receive only 75 cents or 80
cents on the dollar for the notes they tried to spend outside th e ir local area,
making their de facto interest rate approach 30%. Therefore, anyone in
Pennsylvania who had P hiladelphia connections would try to get loans with the
Philadelphia banks, w hose notes were accepted close to par value everywhere
in the state. City banks could thus be much more selective about their
customers, only accepting th e ones that seemed the least likely to default while
denying the riskier others, w h o would have to resort to the country banks. The
Philadelphia banks were created a vicious cycle in which the people who were
greater credit risks increasingly turned to country banks that would only be able
to attract less desirable custom ers and whose notes becam e increasingly
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suspect. In effect, the Philadelphia banks’ non-acceptance of country bank
notes because of lack o f faith in those institutions becam e a self-fulfilling
prophecy whereby the city banks profited at the expense of their country cousins.
W he th e r or not P hiladelphia bank directors expected such results, they certainly
did not hesitate to reap the rewards of their policy.
During this era, the number of corporations— and thus the num ber o f men
running them— increased only slightly while the population whose econom ic
activities those com panies influenced increased dram atically, thus ensuring
those few men proportionately ever-greater influence. In 1811, 292 men out of a
Philadelphia County population of over 110,000 held the 384 seats available on
the various boards of Philadelphia business corporations, so that one individual
held a seat for every 380 residents.74 Nearly tw enty years later, influence was
even more concentrated: in 1830, when the Philadelphia County population had
risen to 188,797, 336 m en held the 416 available seats, meaning that there were
now 561 residents fo r each boardmember. The consolidation of power becom es
even more stark w hen the greater geographic area o f im pact comes into
account: Philadelphians’ dominance of the boards o f the Lancaster and
Philadelphia Turnpike, the Union Canal Company, the Schuylkill Navigation
Company, and the Lehigh Coal and Navigation C om pany translated into great
econom ic influence n o t only in Philadelphia C ounty but also in Berks, Lancaster,
Chester, Montgomery, Northampton, Schuylkill, and Lehigh Counties. Counting
a population of 571,840 in those areas in 1830, the ratio o f outsiders to
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boardmembers reached 1,701 to one. Such ratios o f constituents to
representatives may have been lower than those of the state legislature, but with
one crucial difference: Pennsylvania voters elected their legislators, while
Philadelphia boardm embers appointed them selves through their capital and their
energy.
Just as the Philadelphia corporate com m unity was composed of self
selected men who coordinated economic growth following the practice of
m ercantile cooperation o f m en before them, they set exam ples for their cohorts
in other American com m unities. Historian Robert Dalzell, in his examination of
the “Boston Associates”— a term coined by scholars, not the men themselves—
examined the extent to w hich a group of merchants cooperated to foster and to
control the development o f Massachusetts textile m anufacturing from the 1810s
on.7® They borrowed som e of the technology from Britain and hired men to
design and build the rest, ju s t as Philadelphians did with canals and river
navigations. Their use of th e corporate structure suggests British or perhaps
even Philadelphia’s influence in legal and organizational matters, as did their
form ation of the Suffolk B ank to help finance th e ir efforts and to stabilize the
New England money supply.7 ® As other scholars have noted, the same
phenomenon occurred on a sm aller scale in such m anufacturing areas as the
textile districts of Rockdale and Manayunk and the paperm aking region of the

74The population statistics used are from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research,
Historical. Demographic. Economic, and Social Data: The United States. 1790-1970 [computer file] (Ann
Arbor: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research).
75 Robert Dalzell, Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987). Dalzell credited Vera Shlakman with first using the term "Boston
Associates” in The Economic History of a Factory Town: A Study of Chicopee. Massachusetts
(Northampton: Smith College Press, 1935).
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Berkshires, where capitalists cooperated to promote common econom ic
objectives.77 The Philadelphia associates placed themselves a t the forefront of
the form ation of a new corporate class in the industrial cities of Am erica.
A t the same time, Philadelphia’s corporate leaders were not running a
m alevolent oligarchy silently tram pling the rights and will o f the people, all fo r a
small thrill and an extra half-cent on the dollar. On the contrary: they fulfilled a
variety o f functions that state and local governm ents were either incapable or
unwilling to perform. Corporations provided a framework to m obilize credit for
econom ic development, raise funds fo r internal improvements, pursue rational
m oney-supply policies, and provide a safety net for struggling projects. In
husbanding Philadelphia’s economic expansion from the 1790s to 1830, the
city’s corporate business elite kept the city’s economic and population growth on
a pace only exceeded by New York and Baltim ore, both of which had already
been growing faster in the 1780s and had better harbors and easier geographical
access to their hinterlands. Still, the Philadelphia associates proceeded largely
on their own and preferably with as little public input and com m ent as possible,
and while the whole city grew com pany partners profited disproportionately from
econom ic expansion and integration. Boardmem bers did not duck the
responsibilities that came with their influence, but they minimized the burdens

76Dalzell, 94-95.
^ S e e Anthony F. C. Wallace, Rockdale: The Growth of an American Village in the Early Industrial
Revolution (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 73-123; Cynthia J. Shelton, The Mills of
Manavunk: Industrialization and Social Conflict in the Philadelphia Region. 1787-1837 (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); and Judith McGaw, Most Wonderful Machine: Mechanization and
Social Change in Berkshire Paper Making. 1801-1825 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 117157.
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when they could and w ere not reluctant to grab the rewards when opportunity
called.
Therein lay the ultim ate irony o f the Pennsylvania electorate’s
overwhelming aversion to centralized authority in general and the caricature of
money-grubbing speculators in particular.

The great concern with the issues of

the moment— keeping ta xe s low while providing transportation and credit as
quickly as possible— cam e at the expense of considering broader, more
sweeping policies such as the ultimate social effects of different kinds of
economic development. This myopia played right into the hands of corporate
boosters. The general opposition to public projects o r even to the oversight of
privately financed ones m ay have lowered the ta x burden, but it also resulted in
the state’s inability to generate consistent or m eaningful leadership in economic
policy.78 Philadelphia’s corporate leaders were only too willing to step into the
policy arena and once th e re to make it their own, planting their flag, expanding
their territory and vigilantly guarding their perim eter. Even if from the windows of
Philadelphia com pany offices, Pennsylvania politics had becom e alarmingly
chaotic, the men who ran Philadelphia-based corporations worked to order the
economy to their own liking. W hile pandering politicians and the tax-aversive
and anti-elitist voters over-ran the Keystone S ta te’s political landscape, the
Philadelphia associates rem oved economic policy from the political realm,
separating as best they could the economy from the political economy of early
republican Pennsylvania.
78lndeed, even the assertion that the state ultimately saved money by having private investors put up the
capital for banks and internal improvements calls for examination: given the profitability of well-run banks
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and the public costs of the failures of others, the state may have saved taxes in the long run by
administering its own banks and internal improvement projects.
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Diffusion, Consolidation, and the Corporate Sphere
Used separately, technology, finance, and ideology could be potent
weapons. W hen com pany officers m anaged to coordinate all three, they
exhibited the extent to which rich, well-run and well-connected corporations could
control local economies and local resources. Two generations of Philadelphia
associates spent the half-century after independence building their corporate
empires. Despite the growing strength o f Schuylkill Navigation Com pany and the
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, in the early 1830s both still faced
challenges to their future ability to grow and to profit. Two particular incidents in
which they successfully defended their interests demonstrated more than the
power of the individual companies. Those two affairs showed that the
Philadelphia associates, with their great sway over local and regional economies,
had established their domain over broad issues of resource allocation and
economic development. In so doing, they created a corporate sphere with
profound consequences for the Am erican polity and for the legacy of the
American Revolution.
The Schuylkill Navigation Com pany flaunted its dominance of local affairs
on February 4, 1833, when Philadelphia county constable William Simpson
evicted John Gotwalt and his family from the home they had lived in fo r eight
years. Through no fault of Gotwalt’s, the house he occupied lay at the epicenter
of a dispute between the City of Philadelphia and the Schuylkill Navigation
Company, two of Philadelphia’s corporate behemoths. Their argument
concerned the one resource that both corporations depended upon for the vast
majority of their operating revenue: the waters of the Schuylkill River. The nature
288
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o f the conflict and the w ay th a t the Schuylkill Navigation C om pany m oved to
further its interests im plied th a t its board considered the river, which was a
crucial regional econom ic resource, to be under the com pany’s domain.
The first official dealings between the com pany and the W atering
Com m ittee occurred largely because of the efforts of none other than Josiah
W hite. In 1810, he purchased a set of properties at the Falls o f the Schuylkill,
several miles above P hiladelphia.1 Along with land on both sides o f the river,
the purchase included an 1807 law from the Pennsylvania legislature authorizing
the ow ner to dam the river and to make a lock navigation around the dam — a
right that the Schuylkill Navigation Company’s 1815 charter did not supersede.
Although the Schuylkill originated in rugged country, closer to Philadelphia the
land was more flat, requiring a dam to raise the level of the w ater enough to
ensure enough pressure to turn water wheels. The river was com monly thought
to be undammable at the Falls because in the spring, with the first thaws, great
freshets o f water careened down the river, carrying with them huge sheets of
crushing ice. Either too brave or too foolish to be daunted by such barriers,
W hite bought the site and within two years managed to dam the river. He also
built a lock fo r navigation on the west side of the Schuylkill and a millrace to
power a nail and wire mill near the river’s eastern banks. W hite soon realized
that the cost of constructing his strong, heavy stone dam fa r exceeded the
returns from the lock and the mill. Finally, in 1819, he found an eager buyer fo r
the property and the w a te r rights: the W atering Com mittee. W anting to expand
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the reservoir capacity of the waterworks and unsatisfied with “the constant and
great expense attending Steam Engines, and the vexation occasioned by
repeated accidents,” the Watering Com mittee and especially waterw orks
superintendent Frederick Graff saw W hite’s improvements and the land attached
to them as a godsend.2 The new site gave the city corporation an opportunity to
secure a seem ingly limitless quantity of water and pay next to nothing in annual
energy costs.
Many early corporations chartered to adm inister inland navigations
encountered opposition, and used their power m ost openly, in conflicts
concerning w aterpow er and eminent domain. The W atering C om m ittee’s
purchase of W hite's property and the subsequent construction o f the Fairmount
waterworks and reservoir at the site required the cooperation o f the Schuylkill
Navigation C om pany. The city would be diverting large quantities of Schuylkill
R iver water both fo r the new reservoir and for the new works to pum p the water.
The navigation com pany, for its part, wanted to ensure that it would be able to
collect tolls and retain enough water for the locks to be operable. Accordingly,
the two corporations arranged a com plex contract in 1819 to govern their sharing
of the river and its banks. In 1820 and again in 1824, they clarified the first
agreement. By the term s of the final deal, the city built and m aintained a lock
navigation around the dam according to Schuylkill Navigation C om pany
specifications. T he navigation was on city property— that purchased from

1The Falls of the Schuylkill was several miles above the city limits then, but was incorporated into the city
along with its other Philadelphia County suburbs in 1854.
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W hite— and the city was to em ploy a toll-taker there. All tolls went to the
Schuylkill Navigation Company, as did a one-tim e payment of $26,000 that
helped the cash-strapped concern complete construction elsewhere. In return,
the city retained all the rights to the actual w ater of the Schuylkill not required for
the navigation, a big concern for the growing city. The solution gave each side
w hat it wanted: fo r the navigation company, cash and a proper facility at no cost,
and for the city, a guaranteed supply of fresh water.
The agreem ent turned out to be short-lived because the Schuylkill
Navigation Com pany’s spectacular success after 1825 had not been anticipated
in the company’s original plans. Schuylkill Navigation Company officials had
initially constructed locks 80 feet long and 17 feet wide, enough to fit four boats
at a time. The daily possible traffic of those locks, given the time to fill and
em pty the locks, w as about 95 boats a day, a m ore than reasonable capacity
given the expected volume of shipping, the cost of construction, and the
com pany’s resources. But by the early 1830s, traffic volume exceeded the
grandest expectations of the com pany’s Board o f Directors, reaching an amazing
327,921 tons in 1832 with no lim its in sight (See Figure 7 A).3 Accordingly, in
1832 the com pany began building a second set of locks at the navigation’s
busiest points along the lower part of the navigation, putting in eight new locks
alongside the original ones in order to double capacity. On October 2, 1832, the
company, citing “the very great increase of trade along the Schuylkill,” informed

2“Report of the Watering Committee on the subject of obtaining Water power from the River Schuylkill,
February 5,1819,” City Council 120.42 Committee on Water, Papers 1804-1854, Box A3118, Philadelphia
City Archives.
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the W atering C om m ittee that they intended to do the same at Fairmount, the
location of the city-built and owned locks. The new lock would be dug right a t the
location of the current lock-tender’s house— John G o tw a lf s home as perk o f his
em ploym ent with th e city.4 On Decem ber 8, 1832 Joseph S. Lewis, the
president of the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany, w rote to Gotwalt instructing the
city employee to vacate the prem ises so that th e navigation com pany could build
the new locks.5 The com pany wanted to be ready fo r even greater profits
beginning with the 1833 season.
That the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany cam e into conflict with City of
Philadelphia over the building of the new locks dem onstrated many of the ways
that the two corporations had grown in im portance to the city and, indeed, to the
region’s economy. T h e navigation com pany’s im portance to the regional
econom y was even greater than the huge increase in tonnage indicated. The
increase in availability of anthracite did more than benefit coal-mining areas: it
contributed directly to the establishm ent of Philadelphia as a capital of steam engine production in the 1820s and 1830s. Succeeding early steam pioneer
Oliver Evans, men like Matthias Baldwin and W illiam Norris, began making
steam engines for locomotives, establishing Philadelphia as perhaps the w orld’s
prem ier city for the m anufacture o f railroad engines. The building of those steam

^Schuylkill Navigation Company statistics compiled from Minute Books, Box 1, Oct. 5, 1815- Nov. 26,
1849, Schuylkill Navigation Company records, MG-110, Pennsylvania State Archives.
4John Gotwalt to Frederick Graff, November 2, 1825. Correspondence of the Watering Committee with the
Schuylkill Navigation Company, in Relation to the Fair Mount W ater Works: Together with the Reports of
the Watering Committee to Councils. Made Dec’r 11.1832. and Feb’v 11.1833 (Philadelphia: Lydia R.
Bailey, 1833), 4-5.
5Joseph S. Lewis to John Gotwalt, December 8,1832. Correspondence of the Watering Committee with
the Schuylkill Navigation Company, in Relation to the Fair Mount W aterworks: Together with the Reports
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engines required great quantities of steel, metal requiring such high heat to w ork
that anthracite became th e fuel of choice for steel mills. In 1830, the city
accounted for nearly a q u a rte r of the entire nation’s steel production. W hile the
availability of coal allow ed the production of heavy m achinery sent all over the
world, the value of products sent up the navigation actually exceeded the value
o f those coming downstream . From 1831 to 1835, about $4,000,000 worth of
goods made their w ay south and east along the Schuylkill toward Philadelphia,
but over $6,000,000 in value traveled north and w est into the hinterland, away
from the city.6 Given th a t Philadelphia County’s population in 1830 approached
200,000 people, the Schuylkill Navigation C om pany alone accounted for
approximately $50 per person in regional trade com ing to and from the
metropolis.7 The com pany’s board suggested th a t “the additional work at Fair
Mount has become so essential to the accom m odation of the increasing trade on
the river, that w ithout it th e navigation will be m uch impeded.”8 According to
their terms, the city’s com m erce could grow only if the navigation could be
expanded at high traffic points, especially at Fairm ount.
For its part, the W atering Committee had legitimate concerns that the
operation of a second s e t of locks at Fairmount m ight threaten the city’s flow o f
water, and for that m atter, w ater revenue. The city’s growth, the extension of the

of the Watering Committee to Councils. Made Dec'r 11.1832. and Feb’v 11.1833 (Philadelphia: Lydia R.
Bailey, 1833), 14.
®Diane Lindstrom, Economic Development in the Philadelphia Region. 1810-1850 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1978), 102.
7According to the 1810 United States census, the total population of Philadelphia County was 188,797.
8Joseph S. Lewis to John Sergeant, Horace Binney, and Charles Chauncey, December 17, 1832. Opinion
of Counsel, on the Right of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to Make Another Lock and Canal for the Use
of the Navigation at the Fair Mount Dam (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Co., 1833), 2.
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waterw orks into the suburbs, and greater per-capita w ater use had resulted in
the expansion of the waterworks and its administration. T he first plan for the
waterw orks had been based on an expected need of one m illion gallons a day, a
figure quickly increased by half during the construction of the engines; the
contract fo r the engines stipulated a total capacity of up to three million gallons
daily.0 By late 1811, the W atering Com m ittee decided to build two new
reservoirs, each with a one-m illion-gallon capacity.10 By 1817, peak needs
approached two million gallons daily, but the narrow wooden mains could only
handle half that. Complaints th a t sum m er led to the 1818 construction of wider
iron w ater mains capable of delivering five million gallons in a twenty-four hour
period.11 W ithin a year, the W atering Com mittee was already planning the
Fairm ount works with its projected ability to supply up to ten million gallons daily,
and by 1825 it was supplying fo u r million gallons on the hottest sum mer days.12
By the early 1830s, demand w as so high that during dry spells in the summer the
level o f the Schuylkill dropped fa r enough that the city could not draw water from
it w ithout violating its contract to ensure that the navigation had enough water to
operate, and the water used by an additional lock would cut into the volume

9March 2, 1799, Select Council Minutes, October 14,1796- April 14,1799. CNL15 (mss.), Philadelphia City
Archives; Report to the Select and Common Councils on the Progress and State of the Water Works on the
24th of November. 1799 (Philadelphia: Zachariah Poulson, Jr., 1799).
I ^Report of the Watering Committee Upon the Present State of the Works for Supplying the City with
Water, and the Several Other Plans. Proposed for That Purpose. May 5. 1812 (Philadelphia, 1812).
I I Report of the Watering Committee. Read in Select Council. November 12. 1818 (Philadelphia: William
Fry, 1818).
12 February 5,1819, City Council 120.42 Committee on Water, Papers 1804-1854, Box A3118, Philadelphia
City Archives; Bernhard, Duke of Saxe-Weimar Eisenach, Travels Through North America. During the
Years 1825 and 1826 (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea & Carey, 1828), 137.
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c o n s id e r a b ly . 1

3 That increasing supply of water flowed to all d istricts within the

city limits and to the neighboring suburbs of Spring G arden, the [Northern
Liberties, and Southwark. It also resulted in a great deal of m o n e y fo r the city
coffers. In 1826, for the first time, water rents exceeded direct o u tla ys spent
maintaining the waterworks, in 1827 the city gained a $4,800 su rp lu s, and
revenues had continued growing quickly14. Furthermore, The W a te rin g
Com mittee controlled w ater policy not only for the city, b u t also f o r the
metropolitan area, and its m em bers perceived the building of a n o th e r set o f locks
as a short-term threat to the performance of the waterw orks and a long-term
threat to the city’s public health and continued growth. A s John IP. Wetherill,
chairman of the W atering Com mittee, wrote to Joseph S. Lewis, “granting
facilities to the increasing coal trade” should be m atched with “corresponding
facilities... to meet the increasing demand for water p ow er a ris in g from the rapid
growth of the City and the neighbouring

d is tric ts .”1 5

T he navigation and the

waterworks truly were at the nexus of economic activity and urba_n development.
The way that the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany officials w e n t about
building the new locks dem onstrated the company’s use of its fin-ancial,
ideological, and technological leverage. After so many lean y e a rs during

13john p. Wetherill to Joseph S. Lewis, February 13 1832, Correspondence of the Watering Committee
with the Schuylkill Navigation Company, in Relation to the Fair Mount W ater Works: Together with the
Reports of the Watering Committee to Councils. Made Dec’r 11. 1832. and Feb'v 11. 1 8 3 3 (Philadelphia:
Lydia R. Bailey, 1833), 36-40.
14 Accounts of the Corporation of the City of Philadelphia: From April 1. 1823 to January 1. 1828
(Philadelphia: Philadelphia Councils, 1828).
1®John P. Wetherill to Joseph S. Lewis, November 15, 1832, Correspondence of the Watering Committee
with the Schuylkill Navigation Company, in Relation to the Fair Mount W aterw orks: Together with the
Reports of the Watering Committee to Councils. Made Dec’r 11.1832. and Feb'v 11. 11833 (Philadelphia:
Lydia R. Bailey, 1833), 10.
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construction, the com pany had become rich. Issuing its first dividends in 1829,
the com pany could afford to expand in 1832 because it was flush with cash.
Beyond having the m oney to build, they had the paid m anpower and the loyalty
th a t cam e with em ploym ent: when Simpson cam e to evict Gotwalt, the sheriff
w as accompanied by tw e nty Schuylkill Navigation C om pany employees. T he
com pany also had the legal authority to build more o r less whatever it wanted in
connection with the navigation of the river as well as to invoke the power of local
law enforcem ent against anyone who opposed them . Lewis wrote numerous
letters to Gotwalt, to w aterw orks superintendent Frederick Graff, and to the
W atering Committee. W h en those missives did not result in Gotwalt’s voluntary
removal from the toll-keeper’s house, Lewis called W illiam Simpson, a
Philadelphia County sheriff, to evict Gotwalt. In orde r to do so, Lewis invoked
the 1826 measure that various canal companies had helped push through the
state legislature including a clause that allowed canal com panies to call local
constables to remove “refractory” toll-keepers from com pany premises. The title
o f the law even reflected the ways that business corporations presented their
particular interests as those of the community: “An A ct to protect the public in the
full benefit and enjoym ent of the works constructed fo r the purposes of Inland
N avigation.” 16 They had been able to get that clause passed because it w as
only one in a list of infractions that could slow traffic along the navigation—
im pedim ents to the technology that the com pany had built. In financial term s, in
legal terms, and in technological terms, the Schuylkill Navigation Company held

16Acts of the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Relating to the Schuylkill Navigation Company (Philadelphia:
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a great many cards in its hand, even com pared to a city corporation governing
over eighty thousand people.
The arguments th a t Lewis and com pany lawyers put forth to defend their
action to construct another lock further showed their sense th a t the Schuylkill
Navigation Company controlled the river. Responding to a W atering Committee
offer to negotiate a solution acceptable to both parties, Lewis denied that “the
alterations in the use of [Schuylkill water] at Fair Mount, are such as makes it
proper for them to com m unicate those alterations to the City Councils for their
approbation.” Lewis flatly stated that the navigation com pany “Board do not
suppose that the right to use the w ater and water power of the river fo r the
purposes of navigation to the extent that they may deem necessary, is subject to
any question.” 17 Later, com pany lawyers would argue that even if the com pany
wanted to sell water rights to the city, the original charter did not authorize the
alienation of those rights if they would in any way impede the navigation of the
river as determined by the com pany— notwithstanding that the city’s purchase of
w ater rights beyond w hat the com pany used at the time was clearly the purpose
of the 1824 agreement costing the city $ 2 6 ,0 0 0 . 1 8 Before the incorporation of
the company, the Schuylkill River, like all waterways, was legally a public
highway. In late 1832 and early 1833, the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany
successfully asserted its ownership o f the river and its right to use it in perpetuity,

Josephy & William Kite, 1838), 28.
17Joseph S. Lewis to John P. Wetherill, November 27, 1832, Correspondence of the Watering Committee
with the Schuylkill Navigation Company, in Relation to the Fair Mount Water Works: Together with the
Reports of the Watering Committee to Councils. Made Dec'r 11. 1832. and Feb'v 11. 1833 (Philadelphia:
Lydia R. Bailey, 1833), 10.
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and could arrest anyone who interfered with th at right. The Schuylkill River had
once been a public highway; but by the 1830s it was wholly owned by the
Schuylkill Navigation Com pany.
The intimacy of the corporate com m unity also played a part in the
Schuylkill Navigation C om pany’s successful building o f its new locks at
Fairmount. When Lewis wrote to Watering Com m ittee chairman Wetherill it was
at first with a certain degree of familiarity despite the legalistic tone the letters
took after a few m onths’ exchange. The two men typified the degree of
interconnection between and among Philadelphia corporations.

Together they

had served on the board o f the Schuylkill and Susquehanna Canal Company
from 1807 to 1811. Separately, Wetherill had served on the boards of the
American Fire Insurance Company, the Bank of Pennsylvania, the Schuylkill
Bank, the second Bank o f the United States, the Germ antown Turnpike, and the
Union Insurance Com pany— and, in 1823, the Schuylkill Navigation Company.
Lewis had been even m ore active as a director o f the Bank of North America, the
Delaware and Schuylkill Canal Company, the Pennsylvania Insurance Company,
and as the sitting president of the Pennsylvania C om pany for Insuring Lives and
Granting Annuities. He, too, had not only served on the city councils, but also he
was chairman of the W atering Committee from the late 1810s well into the
1820s, and had negotiated the 1819 and 1824 agreem ents on behalf of the
W atering Committee. If any of the Philadelphia associates understood the
combined power of technology, finance, and ideology, it was Joseph S. Lewis.

®See Opinion of Counsel, on the Right of the Schuylkill Navigation Company to Make Another Lock and
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Through all the letter-writing, W etherill did not take the step of filing suit to halt
com pany construction. Despite his letters of protestation about the com pany’s
actions, Wetherill and the rest o f the W atering Com m ittee never actually did
anything that would stop the Schuylkill Navigation Com pany from com pleting its
expansion. Long a fte r the construction was over, the city corporation sent a
petition o f protest to the legislature in April— to o close to adjournm ent fo r
legislative action— and finally filed suit in June. The associates had decided that
continued economic growth was more im portant than, in one disgruntled
pam phleteer’s words, the city’s “most cherished improvement, its m ost im portant
security against pestilence, its only safeguard against conflagration, its best
source of revenue, [and] the object of its honest pride.” 19 The associates had
spoken.
In asserting th e ir control over their river, the Philadelphia associates had
shown that they were in charge of Philadelphia’s econom ic development, but
Josiah W hite’s defense o f the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company against
coal-m ining rivals and corroborating descriptions of com pany operations showed
how fa r the corporate sphere could be extended. A t the same time the Schuylkill
Navigation Board flexed its muscles in its dispute with the Philadelphia Councils,
W hite’s new com pany faced a challenge from potential competitors. O ther
internal improvement com panies were barred from entering into trade, but the
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company had the right to mine and ship coal as well

Canal for the Use of the Navigation at the Fair Mount Dam (Philadelphia: James Kay, Jun. & Co., 1833).
The W aterworks. The Misconduct of the Present Citv Councils in Relation to the Fair Mount W ater
Works. Illustrated and Proved from Official Documents (Philadelphia. 1833), 8.
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as to build and operate its waterway. In 1832, several groups of investors in
various coal-mining concerns claimed that th e y w ere “aggrieved by the
oppressive m onopoly o f the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Com pany.”20 These
would-be rivals argued th a t because the com pany did not charge itself tolls for
the anthracite it mined, its lower overall cost to m arket gave it an unfair
advantage. Some critics fu rth e r campaigned against corporations entering the
coal trade at all, noting “th a t companies have the power to glut and engross the
markets, to sell below cost, give long credits, and in a variety of ways encounter
sacrifices and losses th a t would be ruinous to individual dealers.”21 These
groups petitioned to the legislature to force the Lehigh Coal and Navigation
Com pany to lower its tolls beyond its current legal limits, to be on par with those
of either the Schuylkill Navigation Company o r the state-owned Delaware Branch
that ran parallel to the D elaw are River. They knew full well that doing so would
threaten the com pany’s a bility to turn profits. In short, they aimed to break the
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company.
They would not be successful, because W hite knew how to use the
leverage of the Lehigh C oal and Navigation C om pany to gather political support.
In 1824, he had lobbied th e state legislature fo r permission to run a steam boat
navigation along the Delaware. The completion o f such a plan would im prove
transportation along the Delaware from the end o f the Lehigh navigation to
Philadelphia’s wharves. In conjunction with a projected plan to connect the

^Circular, April 23, 1832, addendum to To the Committee on Corporations of the Senate Tin Answer to
Charges Against the Lehiah Coal and Navigation Company! (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 12.
21 Facts and Observations Relative to the Incorporation of Coal Companies (Philadelphia!. 1833), 1.
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Lehigh and the Susquehanna, the new navigation would offer those near the
upper Susquehanna the option o f sending their goods on a more direct route
than possible at the time. W hite printed up petitions and sent them to friends in
the region, asking them “to com plete them and send them on to Erskine Hazard
in Harrisburg or to your m embers as you think best.” He suggested pointing out
to potential signatories that “every settler on either of the branches of the
Susquehanna would have an interest in this improvement to the navigation.”22
Soon after, a number of petitions covered with signatures arrived in Harrisburg.
Because the proposed projects would have cut into their business, Union Canal
Com pany backers managed to quash that bill, but White would be better
prepared for his
Between

1 8 3 2

1 8 2 4

battle.
and

1 8 3 2 ,

the Lehigh Coal and Navigation C om pany had

becom e the most powerful entity in the Lehigh River valley. W hen challenged by
would-be competitors, W hite fought back in the papers and in the legislature by
testifying just how great an influence— in his mind, a positive influence— the
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Com pany had over the economy of Mauch Chunk,
its principal depot on the river, and the areas through which the navigation
flowed. He countered his opponents by claiming that when the com pany began
construction, the area was a “wilderness” with fewer than ten fam ilies living within
a dozen miles of the river

la n d in g .2 3

Now, though, “10,000 citizens are

22 Josiah White to George Hollenback, et. al., December 4, 1824. As quoted in Norris Hansell, Josiah
White. Quaker Entrepreneur (Easton, PA: Canal History and Technology Press, 1992), 69.
22[Josiah White], To the Committee on Corporations of the Senate Tin Answer to Charges Against the
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company! (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 6.
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interested materially” in the continued success o f the navigation.24 Having
access to great p ools o f Philadelphia capital, the com pany had expended close
to $2.2 million in th e area.2 ® Everyone in the region, W hite suggested, owed the
com pany a great d eal of thanks, and he was not shy in boasting about the
accomplishments o f th e corporation:

O ur C o m p any has supported a population in and near
M auch Chunk, for a num ber o f years, exceeding
1,500 souls. The regular hands exceed 500, whose
annual savings exceed $30,000 p e r year, which is put
out to interest, or invested in lands o r in trade... O ur
stock is fifty dollars per share, which is possessed by
a g rea t num ber of people; a considerable portion by
the w orking class— the widow and the orphan. Our
loans a re also diffused. I presum e 10,000 souls are
in this m om ent supported more or less by the outlays
of this concern, or injured by the long suspension of
dividends.2®

Even “pine forest o w n e rs,” according to W hite “should give us much
commendation... fo r raising and keeping up the value of the lumber” th a t before
the navigation’s construction was “not to be considered worth stealing, owing to
the expense that w o u ld attend getting it to m arket.”27 W hite concluded that “it is
this community that is threatened with injury and a large portion with ruin” by
those “who have not laid out in public work, during the course of their lives,

^[Josiah White], To the Committee on Corporations of the Senate fin Answer to Charges Against the
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company! (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 8.
25Extract Relative to the Importance of the Lehigh Navigation, to the Commonwealth, from the Report of
the Committee of the Senate of Pennsylvania, upon the Subject of the Coal Trade (Harrisburg: Hugh
Hamilton & Son, 1835), 5.
26Josiah White, Circular (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 1.
2^[Josiah White], To the Committee on Corporations of the Senate rin Answer to Charges Against the
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company] (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 5; Statement of the Lehigh
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perhaps, as much as this Com pany, which is threatened with ruin, regularly lays
o u t per month.”28 W hite’s argum ents w ere a paean to the com pany’s diffusion
o f econom ic benefits.
Those arguments also w orked very effectively to keep the legislature in
his corner but out of his hair. In 1835, W hite published extracts from an 1834
Pennsylvania Senate C om m ittee nom inally charged with looking into the
operation of coal industry.

The com m ittee had been formed at the behest of “a

convention of delegates, representing several of the northern counties interested
in the navigation of the Lehigh, asking an investigation of the grounds of
com plaint against the Lehigh coal and navigation com pany.”29 Despite its having
been called by the navigation com pany’s opponents, the com m ittee w ent fa r to
defend the company from its attackers, its final report reading like a draft of
com pany promotional literature. The report was so com plim entary to the
com pany that W hite eventually had som e of it printed in pam phlet form.
Declaring that the navigation w as “adm itted to be the best in the United States,”
the committee denied any wrongdoing on the part of the com pany, arguing that
“w hether they have adopted a w ise or erroneous policy, which, by grasping after
large tolls, may prevent them from receiving any, is a question between them

Navigation and Coal Mine Company, with the Terms of Subscription for Stock (Philadelphia: William Brown,
1818), 6.
28Josiah White, Circular (Harrisburg: Hamilton & Son, 1832), 1.
2 8Extract Relative to the Importance of the Lehiah Navigation, to the Commonwealth, from the Report of
the Committee of the Senate of Pennsylvania, upon the Subject of the Coal Trade (Harrisburg: Hugh
Hamilton & Son, 1835), 4.
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and the stockholders.”30 The com m ittee then proceeded to suggest th a t the
legislature take W hite up on his offer fo r the com pany to sell the navigation to
the state for its original construction costs plus interest.31 Doing so would have
provided an incredible boon for the company: its early years were plagued by
dissension between those wanting to keep the com pany as one entity and those
who wanted to split it in half because they saw only the coal operations as
having potential for profit. Even in the early 1830s, the company’s board knew
that dividends lay in the coalmines, not in the navigation. Although the full
legislature did not approve the state’s purchase of the navigation, that the
com m ittee so firmly backed the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company confirmed
the com pany’s political power.
Despite the impressive leverage the com pany could bring to bear in the
legislature, it was small com pared to the com pany’s power over the town of
Mauch Chunk, a com m unity built to become a corporate

fie fd o m .3 2

By

1 8 2 9 ,

the com pany had paid fo r a hotel, a mill, a pair o f iron furnaces, a store, a
wheelwright’s shop, and a school among the ove r 120 business and residential
buildings its workers had constructed. The town that W hite built was no less
“benevolent’ than those constructed at Lowell, Massachusetts in the same
period. In keeping with his Q uaker heritage, W hite abolished the sale of hard
liquor, kept a close eye on the one tavern— company-owned— and fired

^ Extract Relative to the Importance of the Lehigh Navigation, to the Commonwealth, from the
the Committee of the Senate of Pennsylvania, upon the Subject of the Coal Trade (Harrisburg:
Hamilton & Son, 1835), 5-6.
31 Extract Relative to the Importance of the Lehigh Navigation, to the Commonwealth, from the
the Committee of the Senate of Pennsylvania, upon the Subject of the Coal Trade (Harrisburg:
Hamilton & Son, 1835), 9-12.
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alcoholics and those accused o f abuse o r neglect either toward their families or
to animals. He even set up a medical service fo r em ployees at a low annual
pay-in cost, perhaps the first com pany-run health maintenance organization.
One sympathetic journalist observed that “stricter obligations are here prescribed
and observed than could be enforced by th e state.”33 Although local citizens did
send their duly elected representatives to H arrisburg and W ashington and they
were free to discuss economic, social, and political affairs at the local tavern, the
Lehigh Coal and Navigation Com pany was th e ir true ruler: the corporate sphere
dwarfed the public sphere in Mauch Chunk, Pennsylvania.

During the American Revolution, m any Philadelphians reveled in their
rebellion, happy to reject the rule of Britain in fa ct and in symbol. They had
witnessed the birth of a new republic on ne w principles, a conscious rejection of
corrupt Britain with its monarch and its dom ination by financial interests— at least
in the eyes of m any Americans.
Some Philadelphia merchants had been W higs, others disaffected, and a
few Tories during the Revolution, but once the conflict was settled they all
agreed not to throw away the infant national econom y with the old imperial
bathwater. Perhaps they still took the term “revolution” literally: that the defiance
of Britain was a struggle fo r a return to an earlier, mythical political age in which

3^Mauch Chunk was since renamed Jim Thorpe in the twentieth century.
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the Crown and P arliam ent did not trample the political and econom ic dreams of
loyal subjects. D espite its small population, its lack of natural resources
compared to France o r Spain, and loss of its continental colonies, Britain was still
the Atlantic world’s econom ic powerhouse, and continued to be well into the
nineteenth century. Philadelphia merchants could not help but look to Britain for
business examples.
British m odels proved especially attractive because they promised the
order that any elite group craves, especially during and afte r periods of great
upheaval. The P hiladelphia mercantile com m unity was no exception.
Philadelphia m erchants intuitively grasped that British-style corporations lent
constancy on a variety of levels, and proceeded to establish dozens of them
from the 1780s through the 1820s. Banks and insurance provided economic
stability, thereby allow ing individuals to alleviate cash-flow problem s and
reducing potential pop u la r unrest. Corporations yielded steady, long-term
dividends for the m erchants and their families. And British corporate financial
devices, including bonds, preferred shares, and sinking funds, allowed for the
mobilization of dom estic capital in the quickly developing nation.
Corporations w ere at the nexus of the phenomenon th a t historians of the
early republic have increasingly identified as the period’s central theme, the
market revolution.^4

For the general population, Philadelphia-area corporations

33james Pierce was writing for Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania, a periodical published by the brother of
White’s partner Erskine Hazard. As quoted in Norris Hanseli, Josiah White. Quaker Entrepreneur (Easton,
PA: Canal History and Technology Press, 1992), 72.
34 See Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America. 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991), for the first and most comprehensive synthesis; Sean Wilentz provides a good
overview and bibliography in “Society, Politics, and the Market Revolution, 1815-1848,” in Eric Foner, ed.,
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provided services and technologies without greatly increasing taxes. Tens of
thousands of people in Philadelphia and its growing econom ic hinterland took
advantage of the water, the cash, and the cheap, efficient transportation that
corporations and their access to capital made available. As more people
increasingly depended upon corporate-owned technologies to pursue their own
econom ic dreams, com pany associates learned how to manipulate that
dependence for their own business and political ends. By creating interlocking
directories, a small group of men were able to control the institutions that
dominated the Philadelphia-area economy.
The creation of th a t corporate dependence entailed two lasting ironies.
On one level, just as the Revolution had been a fight fo r national independence,
fo r many Americans it m eant a more personal struggle for individual
independence. In the Philadelphia area, many people established independence
from their form er clients, only to fall under the more enduring and more
encompassing sway of corporate boards. The everyday evidence of clientpatron relations had been replaced by the illusion of political and econom ic
independence. On another level, the political triumph of the com mon man at the
polls was coupled with the corporate dominance of a financial elite holding far
more influence over econom ic matters than the imaginary cabal of speculators
and stockjobbers whom the revolutionaries had accused of dominating
Parliament and the Crown. W hat had happened?

The New American History. Revised and Expanded Edition (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997),
61-84.
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Scholars writing on the early republic have been divided into two cam ps
regarding the spread of egalitarianism — that is, am ong white men— in the United
States from the 1770s to the 1830s, w hat one m ight call the long American
Revolution.36 Both sides agree that the old eighteenth-century patterns of
deference collapsed over that half-century, but they part in their assessm ent of
the results. Bearing the flag for one cam p is Gordon W ood, who, in his The
Radicalism of the Am erican Revolution, argued that the availability of cash and
the leveling implications of revolutionary rhetoric com bined to create a far less
patriarchal society, one in which no white man felt obligated to doff his cap to
another.36 Alan Taylor’s W illiam Cooper’s Town shows in a particular place
w hat W ood had dem onstrated more generally: in this case, a community in
upstate New York that underwent a transform ation in its social and political
leadership from “Fathers of the People” to “ Friends of the People.”37 These
scholars portrayed an Am erica in which every white man acts and feels the equal
o f any other. The standard for the other historiographic side, Charles Sellers’s
The Market Revolution, relates capitalists’ increased dominance over political,
economic, and social affairs during the thirty years following the W ar of 1812.36
From a similar vantage point, Alfred Young asserted in The Shoemaker and the
Te a Party that the Boston Tea Party only became a “fit” event for official public

33This controversy is limited to the relative positions of white males. None of these authors suggests in the
least that legal or social equality extended to other Americans, nor do I.
36Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1992).
37Alan Taylor, William Cooper's Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier of the Early American
Republic (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
33Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America. 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991).
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celebration in the 1830s, once elite city leaders could be sure that its radical
undertones would be safely m uted.39 This second group of historians pointed to
the consolidation of power in ever few er hands during the early republican
period. The two interpretations seem so fa r apart th a t one may wonder whether
these scholars were looking at the sam e place and time, or whether either
analysis is accurate.
Part of the disagreem ent involves a difference in the outlook— and
choice— of the authors’ particular subjects. Taylor’s W illiam Cooper bemoaned
his form er clients’ growing insolence and his son Jam es Fenimore Cooper
m ourned his family’s lost stature, while Young’s aging George Robert Twelves
Hughes reminisced about the exhilarating m om ents when an ordinary
shoem aker rubbed shoulders with elite m erchants as revolutionary equals. Even
Harry L. Watson, whose Liberty and Power is perhaps the best political history of
the period and som ewhat bridges the gap between these two positions,
nonetheless argued that the era’s political controversies precisely revolved
around the diffusion of political participation and centralization of economic
power.49 The two phenom ena appear to be paradoxical: equality was spreading
at the sam e time that power was becoming consolidated.
The growth of Philadelphia corporations suggests that the two m ajor
interpretations of the period are not contradictory, but complementary. True, in
the public sphere, in taverns, civic celebrations, political rallies, and religious

Alfred F. Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1999).
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revivals, by the 1830s common m en dem anded and received their due. T o be a
leader in the public sphere, one had to be a “friend of the people.” Common
men had won that respect by pressing fo r and taking advantage of the
opportunities afforded by the proliferation of cash and availability of goods that
corporations helped bring into being. In the public sphere, at least the
appearance of and appeal to egalitarianism was what gave Jacksonian Am erica
its boisterous, raucous political contests. That public-sphere egalitarianism was
only possible because of the widespread economic opportunities created through
the use of the new technologies and new financial methods that corporations
administered. At the sam e time, business corporate elites gained
disproportionately com pared to th e ir contemporaries on two fronts. Most
apparently, they made a great deal o f money, but more subtly, in dominating the
administration of the new financial and technological hubs, they controlled
powerful institutions— corporations— w ithout American precedent.
Historians have increasingly used Jurgen Habermas’s characterization of
the division of eighteenth-century and subsequent Western European and
American social activity into a public sphere and a private sphere.41 Scholars
investigating northern cities in the early republican period have particularly noted
the extent to which parades and o th e r popular events in the public sphere
expressed an increasingly strident popular will. But the level o f corporate
influence over new activities in nineteenth-century American society, be they

^ H a rry L Watson, Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York: Hill and Wang,

1990), 171.
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economic, social, or charitable, does not fit Jaberm as’s model. The
administration of corporations, essentially taking place behind closed doors,
grew in the interstices between the public and private spheres. True,
corporations printed pam phlets and lobbied legislatures, but most of their
deliberations took place neither in the open spaces of the public sphere nor in
the domestic setting of the private sphere.
Corporations form ed a third area, fitting neither Jaberm as’s public nor
private spheres. On the one hand, they were at least nominally subject to state
authority, and the Corporation of Philadelphia was an elected government. Most
of their proceedings were technically matters of public record, though corporate
officers tended to make little effort to publish internal proceedings unless
involved in political disputes in which they thought public opinion might be
important. On the other hand, corporations conducted their business in an
environment that the close circle of corporate officers and their friends attempted
to put beyond the realm of the public. Shareholders elected corporate
boardmembers in meetings limited to those owning stock, and even those
proceedings represented little more than an affirmation o f incumbent
boardmembers or their chosen successors. Once chosen, directors made
decisions regarding the region’s economic future behind closed doors. They
directed their many em ployees, from lawyers and lobbyists to lock-keepers and
laborers, to do their bidding. In addition, they had econom ic leverage over those
not in their employ and decided among themselves how to use that leverage. By

41 Habermas first set forth this model in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into
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th e second quarter o f the nineteenth century, corporate activities form ed a
sphere of social interaction unto themselves.
The acknowledgm ent of the creation of a third, corporate sphere in
Am erican society dissolves the apparent paradox of diffusion and consolidation.
In the public sphere, pow er was diffused. No longer could a few self-styled
grandees dominate local or even state politics, much less expect those of the
m iddling or lesser sorts to step out of the way when th e ir “betters” walked past.
If anything, Jacksonian politics demonstrated the great anti-elitist bent of
A m erican society, the carnival that so shocked and delighted foreigners like
A lexis de Tocqueville. As historians like David W aldstreicher, M atthew Crocker,
and Kimberly Smith have dem onstrated, the early republic public sphere
belonged to the m asses.42 The s a w ie s t of the econom ic elites sim ply created a
new sphere, one they could m ore easily control and one that would encompass
m any of the affairs dearest to the heart of the new com mercial and industrial
princes. The corporate sphere enveloped some of the m ost crucial issues of
econom ic policy, including m oney supply, credit, and regional development. In
M auch Chunk, because the town was small and the Lehigh Coal and Navigation
C om pany dominant, the corporation also determined social policy regarding
alcohol consumption and fam ily relations. Mauch C hunk was an extrem e
exam ple, but com pany social efforts there did not differ in their m otivation from

a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger, Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1989).
4 2 David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism 1776-1820
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and
Culture, 1997); Matthew H. Crocker, The Magic of the Manv: Josiah Quincy and the Rise of Mass Poiitics in
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the many charitable organizations in Philadelphia, New York, or Boston that
sought to lift the m asses out o f their moral m orass w hile at the sam e time
channeling their b e havior into modes less threatening to the emerging middleand upper-class corporate order. Historian R obert Dalzell has argued that the
sam e men who ran the com pany towns of Lowell and Waltham as paternalistic
enterprises pursued sim ila r goals through their philanthropy in Boston, often
using the same kind o f corporate organization— boards of directors, by-laws and
charters— that they did in their business pursuits.43 In Philadelphia as in
Boston, the corporate sphere grew to fit the associates’ economic and social
goals.
In the follow ing decades, Philadelphia’s corporate sphere continued to
grow. All of Philadelphia County was incorporated into the City Corporation of
Philadelphia in 1854, creating perhaps the largest single municipal district in the
country at that tim e and serving as a model fo r the incorporation of other large
cities including New Y ork’s later absorption of Brooklyn. In 1846, Thomas P.
Cope, who near the beginning of his long career had been on the city corporation
committee overseeing the construction of the city’s first waterworks, helped
establish the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. In 1857, the Pennsylvania
Railroad purchased the state of Pennsylvania’s bankrupt Main Line system fo r
the bargain price o f $10,000,000, a fraction of the cost. After the Civil War, the

Boston. 1800-1830 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999); Kimberly K. Smith, The Dominion
of Voice: Riot: Reason, and Romance in Antebellum Politics (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).
4^Robert F. Dalzell, Jr., Enterprising Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987), 113-164.
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Pennsylvania Railroad Company become the w orld’s largest business
corporation, a position it held for thirty years.
The leaders o f each kind of corporation, by their use of finance,
technology, and ideology, continued in their efforts to limit the level of public
scrutiny and input over corporate affairs. M unicipal officials at least remained
accountable to the electorate, but beginning in the 1850s business leaders
increasingly espoused economic liberalism as their mantra to be repeated
whenever public officials dared to question the motives or actions of business
corporations— notwithstanding the willingness fo r corporate officers and
investors to lobby fo r land grants, tax abatem ents, subsidies, legislative barriers
to potential com petition, and other governm ental favors. According to this
philosophy, not only was the government less capable of regulating the economy
than the “invisible hand” of the marketplace, but also it had no right to try. As the
evolution of corporations in Philadelphia indicates, economic liberalism was a
justification for structures already established by 1830. In the Revolutionary
period, no one questioned the primacy of civil authorities in political and
economic matters, because everyone understood the two to be inextricably
connected. W ith the ensuing establishment o f a corporate sphere, business
corporation boosters created the self-serving illusion that many fundamental
economic issues lay beyond the proper bailiwick of elected officials. A fter the
Civil War, corporate leaders would even m ake the case that the government
existed to serve them , convincing governors and presidents to do the
corporations’ bidding by using government troops in the corporations’ private
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battles. When co rporate leaders did so, they carefully avoided m aking reference
to the Spirit of ’76.
The mixed le g a cy o f Josiah W hite and Joseph S. Lewis still lives in the
United States, a so cie ty unparalleled in its capacity fo r economic and
technological d e velopm ent but often plagued by the public’s inability to brook the
pow er of corporations w hose only interest is the bottom line. It did not have to
be so. Nor does it now .
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